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@article{holman_stop_2018,  
  title = {Stop, {Collaborate}, and {Listen}: {Women}'s  
{Collaboration} in {US} {State} {Legislatures}},  
  volume = {43},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12199},  
  abstract = {Collaboration plays a key role in crafting good  
public policy. We use a novel data set of over 140,000 pieces of  
legislation considered in US state legislatures in 2015 to examine the  
factors associated with women's collaboration with each other. We  
articulate a theory that women's collaboration arises from opportunity  
structures, dictated by an interaction of individual and institutional  
characteristics. Examining the effect of a combination of  
characteristics, we find support for an interactive view of  
institutions, where women's caucuses accelerate collaboration in  
Democratic-controlled bodies and as the share of women increases.  
Collaboration between women also continues in the face of increased  
polarization in the presence of a caucus, but not absent one. Our  
findings speak to the long-term consequences of electing women to  
political office, the importance of institutions and organizations in  
shaping legislative behavior, and the institutionalization of gender  
in politics.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Holman, Mirya R. and Mahoney, Anna},  
  month = may,  
  year = {2018},  
  note = {WOS:000431504000001},  
  pages = {179--206}  
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@article{dynes_who_2018,  
  title = {Who {Benefits} from the {Party} {Organization}?  
{Evidence} from {Republican} {House} {Members}' {Attendance} at  
{Caucus} {Meetings}},  
  volume = {43},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12193},  
  abstract = {As the role of US congressional parties in the  
legislative process has increased, so has the importance of  
understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this  
article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican  
House leaders with their rank-and-file. We consider how members'  
characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the  
collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords.  
Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members'  
attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among  
other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have  
more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership  
positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so.
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Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party-building activity.},

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    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Dynes, Adam M. and Reeves, Andrew},
    month = may,
    year = {2018},
    note = {WOS:000431504000002},
    pages = {207--243}
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@article{aleman_disentangling_2018,
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    title = {Disentangling the {Role} of {Ideology} and
{Partisanship} in {Legislative} {Voting}: {Evidence} from
{Argentina}},
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    volume = {43},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12182},
    abstract = {We present a novel approach to disentangle the
effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll-
call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common
ideological space. Next, we use roll-call data to identify the
partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a
structural equation model to account for these separate effects on
legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of
Argentine legislators conducted in 2007-08. Our findings indicate that
partisanship is the most important determinant of legislative voting,
leaving little room for personal ideological position to affect
legislators' behavior.},
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    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Aleman, Eduardo and Micozzi, Juan Pablo and Pinto,
Pablo M. and Saiegh, Sebastian},
    month = may,
    year = {2018},
    note = {WOS:000431504000003},
    pages = {245--273}
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@article{peskowitz_selection_2018,
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    title = {Selection and {Incentives} in the {Electoral}
{Security}-{Constituency} {Communication} {Relationship}},
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    volume = {43},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12195},
    abstract = {The relative importance of selection and incentives
is essential for understanding how elections structure politicians'
behavior. I investigate the relative magnitudes of these two effects
in the context of US House members' constituency communication.
Consistent with previous research, I find that there is a negative
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cross-sectional relationship between electoral security and the intensity of constituency communication. The negative relationship holds in a panel-data setting where only within-legislator variation in electoral security is used to identify the effect of electoral security on legislator behavior. Due to the likely presence of myopic voters, the impact of electoral security increases as the election approaches. Point estimates suggest that the total effect is almost entirely driven by incentives, and I am able to reject the hypothesis that the incentive effect is zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.},

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    number = {2},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Peskovitz, Zachary},  
    month = may,  
    year = {2018},  
    note = {WOS:000431504000004},  
    pages = {275--304}  
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@article{heuwieser_submissive_2018,  
    title = {Submissive {Lobby} {Fodder} or {Assertive} {Political} {Actors}? {Party} {Loyalty} of {Career} {Politicians} in the {UK} {House} of {Commons}, 2005-15},  
    volume = {43},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12184},  
    abstract = {Are career politician members of parliament (MPs) more or less likely to vote against the party line than their peers? Despite growing interest in the behavior of career politicians across parliamentary systems, answers to this question are marked by considerable theoretical and empirical uncertainty. I derive the two most common (but opposing) behavioral predictions before testing them over all legislative votes of two UK House of Commons terms (2005-15) using multilevel modeling of new and disaggregated data on MPs' occupational backgrounds. The finding that career politicians are more likely to rebel challenges conventional wisdom and provides an important empirical foundation for the ongoing debate.},
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    number = {2},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Heuwieser, Raphael J.},  
    month = may,  
    year = {2018},  
    note = {WOS:000431504000005},  
    pages = {305--341}  
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@article{hassell_principled_2018,  
    title = {Principled {Moderation}: {Understanding} {Parties}' {Support} of {Moderate} {Candidates}},  
    volume = {43},  
    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12197},
    abstract = {Recent scholarship has argued that parties
strategically support more moderate, and thus more electable,
candidates. Using interviews with party elites and new data on the
party support and the ideology of primary candidates for the US
Senate, I show that parties do support moderate candidates. However,
using evidence from districts with different levels of competitiveness
and over time, I find that support of moderate candidates appears not
to be strategic. Rather, party support of moderate candidates appears
to be the result of the ideological preferences of party leadership
rather a strategic effort to win elections.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Hassell, Hans J. G.},
    month = may,
    year = {2018},
    note = {WOS:000431504000006},
    pages = {343--369}
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@article{warwick_time_2018,
    title = {Time to {Think} in {Other} {Terms}: {A} {Response} to
{Powell} and the {Median} {Mandate} {School}},
    volume = {43},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12172},
    abstract = {In response to my characterization of ideological
congruence as an illusion, Powell (this issue) demonstrates that
incongruence, while common, tends to be only moderate in most cases, a
conclusion with which I agree. Nevertheless, I argue that the concept
of ideological congruence is misleading when applied as Powell does,
and problematic, if not meaningless, when applied in the alternative
ways proposed by Best, Budge, and McDonald. For these reasons, the
term continues to obscure more than it reveals.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Warwick, Paul V.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2018},
    note = {WOS:000425469900001},
    pages = {3--10}
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@article{best_jettisoning_2018,
    title = {Jettisoning {Illusions} {About} the {Median} {Mandate}},
    volume = {43},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12175},
    abstract = {We endorse G. Bingham Powell's cautionary corrective
to challenge Paul Warwick's conclusions that the median mandate thesis
needs to be jettisoned because there is not a close match between
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median voter and government left-right positions. More to the point, however, we go beyond Powell's mild caution to challenge Warwick's rejection more assertively and thoroughly. We show his rejection mistakes responsiveness for congruence, misapprehends how and why the median mandate thesis distinguishes between those two concepts, and fails to take account of a measurement artifact associated with his survey data.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Best, Robin E. and Budge, Ian and McDonald, Michael D.},

month = feb,
year = {2018},
note = {WOS:000425469900002},
pages = {11--20}

}

@article{powell_ideological_2018,

title = {Ideological {Congruence}: {Illusion} or {Imperfection}?},

volume = {43},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.1111/lsq.12177},

abstract = {Paul Warwick () argues that much of the research on ideological congruence leaves the erroneous impression that a close match of median left-right voter opinions and government ideological positions usually emerges from elections. I propose further clarifications. I offer a natural metric based on the average distances from the median voter of the most distant and the closest parties competing in all these countries' elections. I suggest that by these standards average ideological congruence in the Western liberal democracies in the last 20 years has been fairly successful, but not as successful as it could be.},

number = {1},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Powell, G. Bingham},

month = feb,

year = {2018},

note = {WOS:000425469900003},

pages = {21--32}

}

@article{powell_comment_2018,

title = {Comment on {Symposium}: "{Ideological} {Congruence}: {Illusion} or {Imperfection}?"},

volume = {43},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.1111/lsq.12180},

number = {1},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Powell, G. Bingham},

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month = feb,  
year = {2018},  
note = {WOS:000425469900004},  
pages = {33--36}  
}
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@article{fahey_perks_2018,  
  title = {The {Perks} of {Being} a {Lawmaker}: {Returns} to  
{Office} as a {Legislative} {Goal}},  
  volume = {43},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12181},  
  abstract = {Extant literature demonstrates that holding public  
office is financially lucrative. Yet little is known about which  
sitting legislators profit from office. Relying on original data of  
members of the Florida legislature, I estimate predictors of income  
growth among sitting legislators. I find that legislators whose vote  
share increases by 10 percentage points between elections report  
income growth of nearly $20,000. This finding is robust to estimation  
technique and model specification, indicating that electoral safety is  
tied to income growth. Lawmakers appointed to legislative posts with  
agenda-setting power do not obtain additional income. These data  
demonstrate the market values of electorally dominant legislators.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Fahey, Kevin},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {2018},  
  note = {WOS:000425469900005},  
  pages = {37--68}  
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@article{bertelli_decentralizing_2018,  
  title = {Decentralizing {Pork}: {Congressional} {Roll}-{Call}  
{Voting}, {Decentralized} {Administration}, and {Distributive}  
{Politics}},  
  volume = {43},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12183},  
  abstract = {Congress packages pork-barrel spending in complicated  
proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize  
that roll-call voting on such bills depends on grant programs'  
administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home-  
state governors, and differences in geographic representation between  
chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within-  
legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to  
support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with  
presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such  
party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only  
governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support  
rises with decentralization.},
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number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Bertelli, Anthony M. and McCann, Pamela J. Clouser},
month = feb,
year = {2018},
note = {WOS:000425469900006},
pages = {69--100}
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@article{parameswaran_bargaining_2018,
  title = {Bargaining and {Bicameralism}},
  volume = {43},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12179},
  abstract = {In bicameral legislatures, the protection of small
states often motivates the malapportionment of the upper house. Using
a legislative bargaining model, I show that malapportionment may
produce the opposite effect. Under unicameralism, same-state
legislators are shown to not inherently be coordinated to cooperate,
diminishing the fear of a big-state conspiracy. By contrast, under
bicameralism, preference complementarities enable upper-house
legislators to effectively coordinate their state delegations, and
this skews the expected allocation in favor of big states. Hence,
unless bicameralism significantly increases their agenda power, small
states will fare even worse under bicameralism whenever they are
disadvantaged under unicameralism.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Parameswaran, Giri},
  month = feb,
  year = {2018},
  note = {WOS:000425469900007},
  pages = {101--139}
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@article{mark_restraining_2018,
  title = {Restraining the {Court}: {Assessing} {Accounts} of
{Congressional} {Attempts} to {Limit} {Supreme} {Court} {Authority}},
  volume = {43},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12187},
  abstract = {We propose a multilevel account of legislative Court
curbing in order to assess existing explanations as to why such
proposals come about. We argue that although Court curbing is commonly
seen as the result of institutional conflict between Congress and the
Supreme Court, it is best understood as a product of three
interrelated factors: the individual motivations on the part of
lawmakers, the partisan context in which they operate, and
institutional disagreements between Court and legislature. We find
evidence that micro-level factors offer an important insight into
Court curbing that institution-focused explanations alone cannot.},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Mark, Alyx and Zilis, Michael A.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2018},
    note = {WOS:000425469900008},
    pages = {141--169}
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@article{meserve_multiple_2017,
  title = {Multiple {Principals} and {Legislative} {Cohesion}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12165},
  abstract = {In many systems, legislators find themselves
accountable to multiple principals. This article seeks to further
answer how legislators decide between their principals and what
factors condition legislators to choose one over the other. We argue
that electoral uncertainty, operationalized as electoral volatility,
pushes legislators towards the principal that has the greatest
influence over their re-election. Using European Parliament electoral
results and roll-call data from the second to the sixth European
Parliaments (1984-2009), we show that increases in electoral
volatility decreased European group cohesion and pushed legislators to
side more with the positions of their national parties over their
European group when the two disagreed.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Meserve, Stephen and Robbins, Joseph and Thames,
Frank},
  month = nov,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000423272300001},
  pages = {515--548}
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@article{bendix_partisan_2017,
  title = {Partisan {Infighting} {Among} {House} {Republicans}:
{Leaders}, {Factions}, and {Networks} of {Interests}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12168},
  abstract = {Congressional parties are commonly viewed as unified
legislative teams, but recent intraparty battles have revealed serious
ideological divisions within the House Republican caucus. Using annual
ratings from nearly 300 interest groups, we estimate the ideological
locations of Republican legislators in order to map their party's
factional structure. Based on the distribution of interest-group
support from 2001 to 2012, we detect three Republican factions that we
characterize as worker oriented, pro-business, and ethno-radical. We
find that Republican leaders block bills by legislators in the worker

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and ethno-radical subgroups and that they advance bills by members in the corporate faction.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Bendix, William and MacKay, Jon},
    month = nov,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000423272300002},
    pages = {549--577}
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@article{wojcik_men_2017,
  title = {Men {Idle}, {Women} {Network}: {How} {Networks} {Help}
{Female} {Legislators} {Succeed}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12169},
  abstract = {Why do some lawmakers form denser professional
networks than others? We extend existing theories of gendered
networks, arguing that legislators use networking as a strategy to
compensate for a challenging institutional environment. Using original
data from Brazil, we provide survey-based evidence that female
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies engage in higher rates of
intragender networking and have more profuse and diverse legislative
networks than male deputies. We also provide suggestive evidence that
these profuse legislative relationships pay off for women in the form
of higher vote shares at election time.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wojcik, Stefan and Mullenax, Shawna},
  month = nov,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000423272300003},
  pages = {579--610}
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@article{mills_dont_2017,
  title = {Don't {Sweat} the {Details}! {Enhancing} {Congressional}
{Committee} {Expertise} {Through} the {Use} of {Detailees}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12171},
  abstract = {In contrast to the dramatic growth in the size and
influence of the executive branch over the past 40 years,
congressional committee staffing levels are at an all-time low. Faced
with growing demands to produce legislation and to conduct oversight
of executive branch policymaking, Congress can and does supplement its
existing staff by borrowing personnel, known as detailees, from
federal agencies. Using an original dataset of detailees from 1997 to
2015, we analyze the degree to which congressional committees rely on
detailees to increase legislative capacity. We find that committees in
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the House and Senate use detailees in different ways to further both legislative and oversight initiatives.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Mills, Russell W. and Selin, Jennifer L.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000423272300004},
    pages = {611--636}
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@article{aleman_party_2017,
  title = {Party {Strategies}, {Constituency} {Links}, and
{Legislative} {Speech}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12174},
  abstract = {This article examines how parties organize
legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions
affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal
vote-seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening
speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name
recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms
constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the
lawmaking debates. We argue that parties resolve this dilemma by
organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches and
lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators
are more likely to speak. We examine the case of Chile and test the
implications of our theory with data on congressional speeches.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Aleman, Eduardo and Ramirez, Margarita M. and Slapin,
Jonathan B.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000423272300005},
    pages = {637--659}
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@article{gelman_rewarding_2017,
  title = {Rewarding {Dysfunction}: {Interest} {Groups} and
{Intended} {Legislative} {Failure}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12173},
  abstract = {Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on
arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable
legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to
accrue political support from their allied interest groups who
reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that
receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as
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interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead-onarrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority-party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Gelman, Jeremy},
month = nov,
year = {2017},
note = {WOS:000423272300006},
pages = {661--692}

}

@article{rogowski_electoral_2017,

title = {Electoral {Institutions} and {Legislative} {Particularism}},

volume = {42},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.1111/lsq.12153},

abstract = {How do electoral institutions affect legislative behavior? Though a large body of theoretical scholarship posits a negative relationship between multimember districting and the provision of particularistic goods, empirical scholarship has found little evidence in support of this expectation. Using data on the provision of US post offices from 1876 to 1896, a period during which many states elected congressional representatives from at-large districts, and a differences-in-differences approach, I find that counties represented by at-large representatives received approximately 8% fewer post offices. The results have important implications for studying how electoral institutions affect incentives for legislative behavior.},

number = {3},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Rogowski, Jon C.},

month = aug,

year = {2017},

note = {WOS:000407194200001},

pages = {355--385}

}

@article{eslava_legislative_2017,

title = {Legislative {Fragmentation} and {Government} {Spending} in {Presidential} {Democracies}: {Bringing} {Ideological} {Polarization} into the {Picture}},

volume = {42},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.1111/lsq.12152},

abstract = {We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance

between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives as in presidential democracies. Using cross-country data over time, we test the empirical validity of our claim finding that, in presidential democracies, there is indeed a positive effect of fragmentation only when polarization is sufficiently high. The same is not true for parliamentary democracies.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Eslava, Marcela and Nupia, Oskar},
    month = aug,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000407194200002},
    pages = {387--420}
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@article{payson_when_2017,
  title = {When {Are} {Local} {Incumbents} {Held} {Accountable} for
{Government} {Performance}? {Evidence} from {US} {School}
{Districts}},
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    volume = {42},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12159},
    abstract = {Do voters hold local officials accountable for
government performance? Using over a decade of panel data on school
district elections and academic achievement in California, I causally
identify the effect of test score changes on school board incumbent
re-election rates and show that incumbents are more likely to win re-
election when test scores improve in their districts but only in
presidential election years. This effect disappears in midterm and
off-years, indicating that election timing might facilitate local
government accountability.},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Payson, Julia A.},
    month = aug,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000407194200003},
    pages = {421--448}
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@article{van_coppenolle_political_2017,
  title = {Political {Dynasties} in the {UK} {House} of {Commons}:
{The} {Null} {Effect} of {Narrow} {Electoral} {Selection}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12164},
  abstract = {Does power persist within families? This article
considers whether members of the UK House of Commons with longer
legislative careers after 1832 were more likely to establish a
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political dynasty. Tenure can create opportunities to promote relatives. A regression discontinuity design for re-election races helps to rule out the confounding influence of inheritable traits. There is no evidence for a causal effect of tenure length on establishing or continuing a dynasty. Established families may have constrained further dynasty development, explaining the null result of tenure.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {van Coppenolle, Brenda},
    month = aug,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000407194200004},
    pages = {449--475}
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@article{bernhard_clustering_2017,
  title = {A {Clustering} {Approach} to {Legislative} {Styles}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12162},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bernhard, William and Sewell, Daniel and Sulkin,
Tracy},
  month = aug,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000407194200005},
  pages = {477--506}
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@article{wolak_public_2017,
  title = {Public {Expectations} of {State} {Legislators}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12147},
  abstract = {When members of Congress neglect the needs of their
districts or vote contrary to the wishes of their constituents, their
public approval suffers. Does the same hold true for representatives
at the state level? Using experiments, I explore whether people dole
out similar rewards and penalties to state legislators and members of
Congress for their successes and shortfalls in representing
constituents. I find that a similar model of political accountability
travels from national politics to state politics. People value policy
representation, casework, and attention to the district as much from
state legislators as they do from members of Congress.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    note = {WOS:000400294800001},
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@article{beckmann_targeting_2017,
  title = {Targeting the {Treatment}: {The} {Strategy} behind
{Lyndon} {Johnson}'s {Lobbying}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12150},
  abstract = {Lyndon Johnson woke up studying whip counts, went to
bed reading the Congressional Record, and invested countless hours in
between translating that political intelligence into a lobbying
offensive. The result, famously christened The Johnson Treatment,
remains the archetype practitioners and political scientists cite when
appraising presidential leadership on Capitol Hill. Yet Beltway
folklore aside, we know little about how LBJ helped forge winning
legislative coalitions. Stepping back from the (countless) colorful
anecdotes, this study offers a new and systematic look at Lyndon
Johnson's lobbying. Specifically, after exploring theoretical models
of presidential coalition building, we then investigate their
operational tenets using original data on all President Johnson's
contacts, with each member of Congress, in both chambers, for every
day he was president.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Beckmann, Matthew N. and Chaturvedi, Neilan S. and
Garcia, Jennifer Rosa},
  month = may,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000400294800002},
  pages = {211--234}
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@article{hanretty_dyadic_2017,
  title = {Dyadic {Representation} in a {Westminster} {System}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12148},
  abstract = {Is policy representation in contemporary Westminster
systems solely a function of programmatic national parties, or does
the election of legislators via single-member districts result in MPs
whose policy positions are individually responsive to public opinion
in their constituencies? We generate new measures of constituency
opinion in Britain and show that, in three different policy domains
and controlling for MP party, the observed legislative behavior of MPs
is indeed responsive to constituency opinion. The level of
responsiveness is moderate, but our results do suggest a constituency-
MP policy bond that operates in addition to the well-known bond
between voters and parties.},
  number = {2},

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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Hanretty, Chris and Lauderdale, Benjamin E. and Vivyan,
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note = {WOS:000400294800003},
pages = {235--267}
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@article{christenson_all_2017,
title = {All the {President}'s {Senators}: {Presidential}
{Copartisans} and the {Allocation} of {Federal} {Grants}},
volume = {42},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12160},
abstract = {Previous scholarship argues that House members'
partisan relationship to the president is among the most important
determinants of the share of federal dollars they bring home to their
constituents. Do presidential politics also shape distributive
outcomes in the Senate? Analyzing the allocation of more than \$.5
trillion of federal grants across the states from 1984 to 2008, we
show that presidential copartisan senators are more successful than
opposition party members in securing federal dollars for their home
states. Moreover, presidents appear to target grants ex post to states
that gain presidential copartisans in recent elections.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Christenson, Dino P. and Kriner, Douglas L. and Reeves,
Andrew},
month = may,
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@article{chernykh_measuring_2017,
title = {Measuring {Legislative} {Power}: {An} {Expert}
{Reweighting} of the {Fish}-{Kroenig} {Parliamentary} {Powers}
{Index}},
volume = {42},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12154},
abstract = {The Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) developed by
Fish and Kroenig (2009) is the most important effort to date to
measure legislative power in cross-national perspective, but it has
been criticized on both theoretical and methodological grounds. We
build on the 32-item PPI to develop an alternative indicator of
legislative strength that is based on an expert survey of 296
political scientists in 2014. We reweight each of the powers by expert
opinion, creating a new Weighted Legislative Powers Score (WLPS) for
the 158 national legislatures in the Fish and Kroenig data set. In
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addition, the article reports the expert-assigned weight factors for the entire set of 32 powers contained in the original PPI, thus allowing researchers to innovate alternative, disaggregated indicators of legislative power.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Chernykh, Svitlana and Doyle, David and Power, Timothy J.},
month = may,
year = {2017},
note = {WOS:000400294800005},
pages = {295--320}
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@article{aldrich_party_2017,
title = {Party, {Policy}, and the {Ambition} to {Run} for {Higher} {Office}},
volume = {42},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12161},
abstract = {This article examines why some state legislators run for Congress and others do not. Our main argument is that there are differences in the expected value of a state legislative seat and the expected benefits of being a member of Congress. One key component of this value is how closely the candidate fits with her party. We find that the probability of seeking congressional office increases among state legislators who are distant from the state party and proximate to the congressional party and decreases among those who are distant from the congressional party and proximate to the state party.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Aldrich, John H. and Thomsen, Danielle M.},
month = may,
year = {2017},
note = {WOS:000400294800006},
pages = {321--343}
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@article{park_lab_2017,
title = {A {Lab} {Experiment} on {Committee} {Hearings}: {Preferences}, {Power}, and a {Quest} for {Information}},
volume = {42},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12139},
abstract = {In principle, committees hold hearings to gather and provide information to their principals, but some hearings are characterized as political showcases. This article investigates conditions that moderate committee members' incentives to hold an informative hearing by presenting a game-theoretic model and a lab experiment. Specifically, it studies when committees hold hearings and which types of hearing they hold by varying policy preferences of

committee members and the principal and political gains from posturing. Findings provide new insights to how preferences and power distribution affect individuals' incentives to be informed when they make decisions as members of a committee in many contexts.},

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@article{anzia_polarization_2017,  
  title = {Polarization and {Policy}: {The} {Politics} of {Public}-  
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  volume = {42},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12145},  
  abstract = {For decades, America's state and local governments have promised their workers increasingly generous pensions but failed to fully fund them, producing a fiscal problem of staggering proportions. In this article, we examine the politics of public pensions. While mainstream theoretical ideas in the American politics literature would suggest the pension issue should be polarized, with Democrats pushing for generous pensions over Republican resistance, we develop an argument-rooted in more traditional theoretical work by Schattschneider, Lowi, Wilson, and others-implying that both parties should be expected to support generous pensions during normal times and that only after the onset of the Great Recession, which expanded the scope of conflict, should the parties begin to diverge. Using a new data set of state legislators' votes on hundreds of pension bills passed between 1999 and 2011, we carry out an empirical analysis that supports these expectations.},
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    number = {1},  
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@article{shomer_conditional_2017,  
  title = {The {Conditional} {Effect} of {Electoral} {Systems} and  
{Intraparty} {Candidate} {Selection} {Processes} on {Parties}'  
{Behavior}},
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  volume = {42},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12141},  
  abstract = {How do electoral systems and intraparty candidate
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selection procedures affect party unity? In this article, I distinguish theoretically and empirically between electoral systems and candidate selections and argue that the influence of selection processes on parties' behavior is conditional on electoral system (and vice versa). Measuring parties' unity using Rice and weighted Rice scores, and applying hierarchical models to a new data set of 249 parties in 24 countries, I find support for the claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral systems that encourage personal vote-seeking incentives than under electoral systems that encourage party centeredness.},

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    number = {1},
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  title = {Presence, {Representation}, and {Impact}: {How}
{Minority} {MPs} {Affect} {Policy} {Outcomes}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12142},
  abstract = {Many ethnic minorities demand (adequate) descriptive
representation in parliament because they expect it to affect the
responsiveness of governments towards their demands. However, the
mechanism of how minority representatives affect policy outcomes
remains unclear. I argue that descriptive representation mainly has an
effect if representatives possess additional leverage to influence
policy outcomes. The argument is tested with hierarchical time-series
models from 88 minority groups in 47 countries multi-ethnic
democracies. The analysis shows that descriptive representatives are
most successful in influencing policy outcomes if they are included in
the government, the legislature is powerful, and a group is
comparatively large.},
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    number = {1},
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@article{smith_political_2017,
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{Ministers}},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12146},
    abstract = {We investigate whether politicians whose family
relatives previously served in parliament and cabinet enjoy a
competitive "legacy advantage" in progressing from the backbenches to
cabinet. This advantage may stem from two potential mechanisms: a
direct effect attributable to the informational advantages of legacies
or an indirect effect that operates through greater electoral
strength. We evaluate the relative contribution of each mechanism
using candidate-level data from Irish parliamentary elections and
cabinets from 1944 to 2016. Our results reveal that politicians with a
family history in cabinet do enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection,
and that this advantage cannot be attributed simply to greater
electoral popularity.(1)},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Smith, Daniel M. and Martin, Shane},
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@article{palanza_congressional_2017,
  title = {Congressional {Institutionalization}: {A} {Cross}-
{National} {Comparison} (vol 41, pg 7, 2016)},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12166},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Palanza, V. and Scartascini, C. and Tommasi, M.},
  month = feb,
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  note = {WOS:000397262600006},
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@article{lucardi_effect_2016,
  title = {The {Effect} of the {Electoral} {Calendar} on
{Politicians}' {Selection} into {Legislative} {Cohorts} and
{Legislative} {Behavior} in {Argentina}, 1983-2007},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12137},
  abstract = {How do electoral opportunities affect politicians'
career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to
the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in
a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered
electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have
dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm
elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive
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experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Lucardi, Adrian and Pablo Micozzi, Juan},
    month = nov,
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@article{park_partisanship_2016,
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  about {Majority} {Rule} and {Minority} {Rights} in {Congress}},
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  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12140},
  abstract = {The balance between majority rule and minority rights
  is a central issue in the design and operation of democratic
  institutions and remains a contested issue in debates of policy-making
  processes. Remarkably, public attitudes about this balance are not
  subjected to scholarly investigation. In this article, we report the
  findings of the first survey experiment in which the American public's
  attitudes about majority rule and minority rights in legislative
  bodies are explored. We find robust support for both majority rule and
  minority rights, discover that only a few Americans distinguish
  between the US House of Representatives and Senate in the application
  of these principles, and demonstrate that views of majority rule and
  minority rights can be moved once we introduce respondents to the
  partisan implications of procedural rules. Moreover, with conflicting
  theoretical expectations about the effect of political sophistication
  on attitudes about majority rule and minority rights, we find that
  higher levels of political sophistication are associated with stronger
  partisan effects on attitudes about the balance between majority rule
  and minority rights in Congress.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Park, Hong Min and Smith, Steven S.},
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@article{geys_limits_2016,
  title = {The {Limits} of {Electoral} {Control}: {Evidence} from
  {Last}-{Term} {Politicians}},
  volume = {41},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12136},
    abstract = {In modern democracies, politicians' accountability is
often linked to the disciplining mechanism of electoral control. For
politicians in their final term, this mechanism is impaired. Using a
novel data set covering 910 members of the UK House of Commons active
within the period 1997-2010, we investigate how reduced electoral
control affects last-term MPs' trade-off between work effort inside
parliament, leisure, and outside interests. Our main contributions lie
in providing the first explicit consideration of (1) MPs' final-term
intra-/extraparliamentary work balance and (2) MPs' reasons for
leaving parliament (i.e., retirement, career change, electoral
defeat). These extensions provide important fresh insights concerning
the boundaries of elections' disciplining power.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Geys, Benny and Mause, Karsten},
    month = nov,
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@article{macdonald_retrospective_2016,
    title = {Retrospective {Congressional} {Oversight} and the
{Dynamics} of {Legislative} {Influence} over the {Bureaucracy}},
    volume = {41},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12138},
    abstract = {Research stresses that congressional committees
increase their oversight of the bureaucracy during divided government.
We extend this research by developing an explanation, rooted in a more
dynamic view of policymaking, for why Congress would sometimes conduct
vigorous oversight under unified control as well. In short, committees
seem to engage in what we call retrospective oversight and take
advantage of newly friendly executive administration to refocus
existing policy made under a past opposition president. We assess our
perspective using two separate sources of data on oversight hearings
spanning more than 60 years and find support for our claims regarding
retrospective oversight.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {MacDonald, Jason A. and McGrath, Robert J.},
    month = nov,
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@article{egar_tarnishing_2016,
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{House} {Minority} {Party} and the {Construction} of the {Roll}-{Call}
{Record}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12135},
  abstract = {Existing research on congressional parties tends to
focus almost exclusively on the majority party. I argue that the
inattention to the House minority party hampers our understanding of
the construction of the roll-call record and, consequently, our
understanding of the sources of polarization in congressional voting.
Employing an original data set of House members' requests for recorded
votes between 1995 and 2010, I demonstrate that votes demanded by the
minority party are disproportionately divisive and partisan and make
Congress appear considerably more polarized based on commonly used
measures. Moreover, minority-requested votes make vulnerable members
of the majority appear more partisan and ideologically extreme.},
  number = {4},
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@article{clarke_informal_2016,
  title = {Informal {Consequences} of {Budget} {Institutions} in
the {US} {Congress}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12134},
  abstract = {Though considerable research focuses on formal
institutions in Congress, scholars have long acknowledged that much of
what guides legislative behavior is unwritten. To advance this area,
we leverage a tool that allows appropriators to redirect billions of
dollars from mandatory programs to discretionary projects. Changes in
mandatory program spending known as CHIMPs show that existing
institutions are often maintained by the strategic action of
legislators. In the case of CHIMPs, we find their use is largely a
response to formal constraints and that they are preserved through
avoidance of minimum reform coalitions. This highlights that the
legislative process and budgetary outcomes in particular cannot be
understood without attention to procedures which remain off the
books.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Clarke, Andrew J. and Lowande, Kenneth S.},
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@article{loidolt_parliamentary_2016,  
  title = {Parliamentary {Opposition} {Under} {Hybrid} {Regimes}:  
{Evidence} from {Egypt}},  
  volume = {41},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12144},  
  abstract = {Why do opposition political parties choose to run for  
parliament in semiauthoritarian systems? Existing literature  
emphasizes the benefits that these parties derive from campaigning and  
running for elections, while paying little attention to the politics  
that occurs within legislative institutions under these regimes.  
Supplementing election-centric theories, we argue that opposition  
actors in semiauthoritarian systems also benefit directly from serving  
in weak parliaments and that this helps explain their participation in  
biased elections. We demonstrate this by examining the Muslim  
Brotherhood's legislative performance in Mubarak's Egypt, highlighting  
the mechanisms through which it used its minority presence in  
parliament to its advantage.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Loidolt, Bryce and Mecham, Quinn},  
  month = nov,  
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@article{erikson_congressional_2016,  
  title = {Congressional {Elections} in {Presidential} {Years}:  
{Presidential} {Coattails} and {Strategic} {Voting}},  
  volume = {41},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12127},  
  abstract = {This article analyzes voting for Congress in  
presidential election years. The national Democratic vote for the  
House increases with the Democratic vote for president but decreases  
with the Democrats' perceived chances of winning the presidency  
(anticipatory balancing). The evidence for coattails and for balancing  
become visible only when statistically controlling for the other. The  
aggregate evidence for coattails and balancing in presidential years  
is reinforced by the analysis of National Election Studies (NES)  
survey respondents. That analysis shows that politically informed  
voters are more likely to vote for Congress against the party that  
they believe will win the presidency.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Erikson, Robert S.},  
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    note = {WOS:000380717000001},
    pages = {551--574}
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@article{cormack_extremity_2016,
  title = {Extremity in {Congress}: {Communications} versus
{Votes}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12126},
  abstract = {I propose a theory of legislator-to-constituent
communication that describes a relationship between the types of votes
a legislator reveals and the partisan composition of her constituency.
To test this theory, I use an original data set of 40,000 official
communications containing 30,000 vote revelations from the 111th
Congress. I find evidence substantiating this theory; the extent to
which a legislator endeavors to appear more ideologically extreme in
communications varies systematically with the relative amounts of
different types of voters in her district. This result is contrasted
with an analysis of voting extremism where I find that the ideological
preferences of donors better explain voting patterns.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Cormack, Lindsey},
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  note = {WOS:000380717000002},
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@article{anderson_legislative_2016,
  title = {Legislative {Institutions} as a {Source} of {Party}
{Leaders}' {Influence}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12124},
  abstract = {Legislators' actions are influenced by party,
constituency, and their own views, each weighted differently. Our
survey of state legislators finds that legislator's own views are the
strongest influence. We also find that institutions are an important
source of party leaders' influence. Legislators in states where
members rely more on party leaders states without term limits, with
less professional legislatures, and where the majority party controls
the agenda put more weight on leaders' preferences. Beyond direct party
influence, the views of party leaders are preemptively incorporated
into legislators' preferences when the rules of the legislature make
party leaders more powerful.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Anderson, Sarah E. and Butler, Daniel M. and Harbridge,
Laurel},

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    month = aug,
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@article{lynch_cost_2016,
  title = {The {Cost} of {Majority}-{Party} {Bias}: {Amending}
{Activity} under {Structured} {Rules}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12133},
  abstract = {All major legislation in the House necessitates a
special rule from the Rules Committee before it can be brought to the
chamber floor. These rules often strictly limit floor amendments to
bills considered by the House. Scholars of political parties have
argued that the House majority party can bias policy output away from
the floor median through its usage of restrictive rules. In this
article, we argue that in order to secure the passage of restrictive
rules, the majority often makes concessions to centrist legislators
through the amending process. We examine this theory using a newly
collected data set that includes all amendments considered by the
Rules Committee during the construction of structured rules in the
109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses (2005-2010). Our results are mixed,
but they do suggest that moderate members of the majority party often
receive concessions via amendments for their support of the majority
party's agenda-setting regime.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lynch, Michael S. and Madonna, Anthony J. and Roberts,
Jason M.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000380717000004},
  pages = {633--655}
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@article{kirkland_representation_2016,
  title = {Representation, {Competing} {Principals}, and {Waffling}
on {Bills} in {US} {Legislatures}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12132},
  abstract = {Legislators are often placed in the position of
representing the interests of their constituents against the
preferences of their own party leaders. We develop a theoretical
framework indicating that these cross-pressured legislators are more
likely to initially support legislation and subsequently change their
minds than are legislators whose constituents and leaders share
similar preferences. Moreover, we expect this pattern to be most
pronounced among members of majority parties than minority-party

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members. We test our expectations using data on bill cosponsorship and final passage votes from 46 lower state legislative chambers and the US House, finding considerable support for our theory.},

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    number = {3},
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    author = {Kirkland, Justin H. and Harden, Jeffrey J.},
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    pages = {657--686}
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    volume = {41},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12125},
    abstract = {Although scholars have examined committee rosters
extensively, no study has considered the relationship between the
ideological composition of panels and their participation in bill
drafting. I thus ask: Which committees are frequently excluded from
legislative deliberations? Does the composition of committees affect
the degree to which they contribute to bill development? Using DW-
NOMINATE data, I calculate ideological scores for congressional panels
between 1989 and 2010 to see whether certain committees are routinely
bypassed. I find that moderate panels, polarized panels, and panels
with moderate chairs are often excluded, while extreme committees in
the majority direction tend to retain bill-writing duties.},
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    number = {3},
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@article{klein_electoral_2016,
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    title = {Electoral {Rules} and {Party} {Switching}: {How}
{Legislators} {Prioritize} {Their} {Goals}},
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    volume = {41},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12128},
    abstract = {Stemming from ambition theory, a vast body of studies
has demonstrated how politicians' pursuits of different goals can
explain their behaviors. Among other goals, politicians strive for re-
election or to attain a better office. However, little is known about
the way politicians prioritize these goals. This article uses the
phenomenon of legislative party switching to address this void and
examines how hierarchy between goals determines legislator strategies.
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The study exploits the 2008 Romanian electoral reform, which rendered the electoral system more candidate centered. Drawing on data from more than 3,900 individual-level observations over the period from 1996 to 2012, this article shows how vote incentives alter the trade-offs between re-election and office motivations. The findings suggest that politicians will pursue office goals only if the goal of re-election is to be achieved.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{ringe_pinpointing_2016,
  title = {Pinpointing the {Powerful}: {Covoting} {Network}
{Centrality} as a {Measure} of {Political} {Influence}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12129},
  abstract = {This article introduces centrality in covoting
networks as a measure of influence. Based on a simple cueing dynamic,
it conceptualizes those lawmakers as most central and thus as having
the greatest signaling influence who impact the greatest number of
colleagues' voting decisions. A formal proof and an agent-based
simulation show that cue-providers are always more central than
followers; hence, we can use real-world voting data to identify the
most influential legislators. To confirm the measure's construct
validity, we predict covoting centrality in the European Parliament
and find those factors that are expected to impact legislators'
influence to predict their centrality.},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Ringe, Nils and Wilson, Steven L.},
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  title = {Rules and {Speeches}: {How} {Parliamentary} {Rules}
{Affect} {Legislators}' {Speech}-{Making} {Behavior}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12130},
  abstract = {By extending existing theories of legislative speech
making, this study explores the importance of parliamentary rules
governing floor debates for government and opposition parties. An
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original data set including speeches of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies between 2001 and 2006 is used to test two hypotheses under different institutional scenarios, that is, rules either restricting or granting open access to the floor. Parliamentary rules are found to affect allocation of speaking time within both governing and opposition parties. Governing parties' leaders exploit their agenda control to a higher degree when allocating speaking time. Under restrictive rules, government party leaders control their MPs by essentially limiting the number of speeches and allocating them to frontbenchers. Restrictive rules give opposition party leaders an important chance to select MPs who are closer to their own position.},

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    number = {3},
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    author = {Giannetti, Daniela and Pedrazzani, Andrea},
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  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12149},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Schibber, Constanza F.},
  month = aug,
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@article{crisp_introduction_2016,
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{ahler_open_2016,
  title = {Do {Open} {Primaries} {Improve} {Representation}? {An}}
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{Experimental} {Test} of {California}'s 2012 {Top}-{Two} {Primary}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12113},
  abstract = {To improve representation and alleviate polarization
among US lawmakers, many have promoted open primaries-allowing voters
to choose candidates from any party-but the evidence that this reform
works is mixed. To determine whether open primaries lead voters to
choose ideologically proximate candidates, we conducted a statewide
experiment just before California's 2012 primaries, the first
conducted under a new top-two format. We find that voters failed to
distinguish moderate and extreme candidates. As a consequence, voters
actually chose more ideologically distant candidates on the new
ballot, and the reform failed to improve the fortunes of moderate
congressional and state senate candidates.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Ahler, Douglas J. and Citrin, Jack and Lenz, Gabriel
S.},
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@article{beckmann_up_2016,
  title = {Up the {Hill} and {Across} the {Aisle}: {Discovering}
the {Path} to {Bipartisanship} in {Washington}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12114},
  abstract = {Appeals for bipartisan diplomacy pepper popular
commentary, often with wistful references to a bygone era where
leaders (like Lyndon Johnson and Everett Dirksen) set aside partisan
point scoring to serve the public interest. Here we reconsider the
elements driving bipartisan contact in Washington. Stepping back from
popular narratives, we situate the president-opposing leader
relationship within a more general class of institutional bargaining,
leading to the prediction that bipartisan negotiation emerges from a
particular combination of incentives and institutions-namely, when the
president is strong politically (rendering opposing leaders willing to
compromise) but opposing party leaders are strong institutionally
(rendering them crucial to passing the deal). Utilizing Presidential
Daily Diaries, hypotheses are tested against original data on
presidents' personal interactions with opposing Senate leaders across
40 years, 20 Congresses, and eight presidencies (1961-2000).},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Beckmann, Matthew N.},
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    note = {WOS:000374971200003},
    pages = {269--295}
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@article{kogan_when_2016,
  title = {When {Voters} {Pull} the {Trigger}: {Can} {Direct}
{Democracy} {Restrain} {Legislative} {Excesses}?},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12115},
  abstract = {Direct democracy is sometimes described as a "gun
behind the door," but how do legislators react when voters pull the
trigger? Leveraging the high-profile referendum defeat of a
controversial law passed by the Ohio legislature, I examine how
legislators respond to voter disaffection. Using interest groups to
"bridge" votes before and after the election, I show that the
measure's defeat induced moderation on the part of the Republican
legislative majority, while leaving the behavior of opposition
Democrats largely unchanged. The results suggest that direct democracy
has the potential to restrain legislative excesses and alleviate
polarization in state legislatures.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Kogan, Vladimir},
  month = may,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000374971200004},
  pages = {297--325}
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@article{miller_power_2016,
  title = {The {Power} of an {Hour}: {Effects} of {Candidate}
{Time} {Expenditure} in {State} {Legislative} {Elections}},
  volume = {41},
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  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12116},
  abstract = {Using survey data from more than 500 legislative
candidates in 17 states during the 2008 election, I examine whether
state house candidates who devote more time to their campaign win a
larger share of the major-party vote. Consistent with previous work
studying campaign spending in state legislative elections, I find a
positive and significant association between campaign time and vote
percentage for challengers-but not incumbents-in incumbent-contested
elections.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{atkinson_better_2016,  
  title = {Better {Politicians}: {If} {We} {Pay}, {Will} {They}  
{Come}?},  
  volume = {41},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12117},  
  abstract = {While each election provides the Canadian House of  
Commons with a fresh batch of politicians, no consideration has been  
given to the question of whether the quality of politicians is  
improving. Yet improving quality has been the focus of several  
commissions urging increases in MP compensation. This article  
addresses the competence and compensation questions by asking whether  
changes in levels of compensation might make a difference to the  
educational qualifications of political leaders. We assemble a unique  
dataset of 1,291 federal politicians elected to the Canadian House of  
Commons from 1993 to 2011 and show that prime ministers do have a  
preference for more highly educated MPs when filling ministerial and  
other executive positions. Our findings suggest that certain subgroups  
of MPs, particularly educated women, may be attracted by upward shifts  
in compensation. We discuss the reasons for these effects and the  
relative importance of compensation in career decisions.},  
  number = {2},  
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  author = {Atkinson, Michael M. and Rogers, Dustin and Olfert,  
Sara},  
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@article{kernecker_political_2016,  
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{Democracies}},  
  volume = {41},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12131},  
  abstract = {This article captures the nature of legislators'  
ambitions and explores to what extent their career paths within a  
context of party competition lead to progressive versus static  
ambition. The findings show that their previous career path and  
retrospective loyalty towards the party influences which offices they  
seek. Progressively ambitious legislators also seek offices in less  
competitive environments, but this finding holds for the regional  
executive branch or the presidency. An additional robust finding shows  
that ideologically conservative legislators tend to be statically  
ambitious. This is a first step towards mapping out ambitions in Latin  
America by drawing on cross-national data.},  
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{daeubler_is_2016,
    title = {Is {Personal} {Vote}-{Seeking} {Behavior} {Effective}?},
    volume = {41},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12119},
    abstract = {Does representatives' legislative activity have any effect on their electoral performance? A broad theoretical literature suggests so, but real-world evidence is scarce as empirically, personal and party votes are hard to separate. In this article, we examine whether bill initiation actually helps MPs to attract preference votes under flexible list electoral systems. In these systems, voters can accept the party-provided rank order or vote for specific candidates, which allows a clear distinction between personal and party votes. The empirical analysis uses data on bill initiation by Belgian MPs in the period 2003-2007 to explain their personal vote in the 2007 elections. We find that particularly single-authored proposals initiated shortly before the upcoming elections are associated with a larger personal vote.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Daeubler, Thomas and Braeuninger, Thomas and Brunner, Martin},
    month = may,
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    note = {WOS:000374971200008},
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@article{warwick_ideological_2016,
    title = {The {Ideological} {Congruence} {Illusion}: {The} {Impact} of {Valence}},
    volume = {41},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12120},
    abstract = {Considerable evidence has been generated to establish that ideological congruence, that is, a close matching of government policy positions with median left-right voter opinion, generally prevails in liberal democracies. Based on a cross-national analysis of election survey data, this article challenges that view and elaborates an alternative perspective. In this perspective, nonpolicy or valence considerations strongly influence vote choices and electoral outcomes in a directional sense-sometimes favoring the Left overall, sometimes the Right. Partly as a result, government positions typically deviate

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substantially from median opinion, forming a pattern that is clearly bilateralist or two-sided rather than center-concentrated.},

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    number = {2},
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@article{baum_constraining_2016,
  title = {Constraining a {Shadowy} {Future}: {Enacting} {APAs} in
{Parliamentary} {Systems}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12121},
  abstract = {Single-party parliamentary governments often have no
institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and
implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party
loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such
governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative
Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom.
Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, and Sweden have all done so in the past 30 years. We
argue that the possibility of losing power motivates parliamentary
governments, both single-party and coalition, to trade current policy
loss for future gain with APAs.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Baum, Jeeyang Rhee and Jensen, Christian B. and
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@article{metz_hierarchical_2016,
  title = {Hierarchical, {Decentralized}, or {Something} {Else}?
{Opposition} {Networks} in the {German} {Bundestag}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12122},
  abstract = {Members of the German parliament may force government
to publicly answer questions by issuing minor interpellations (kleine
Anfragen). We use 3,608 interpellations from the session 2009-13 that
have been signed by authoring and supporting members to construct the
social network of support relations among members within the three
opposition parties. We find that parties differ markedly in terms of
internal structure. While social democrats organize hierarchically,
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Greens cooperate horizontally. The network for socialist Linke in contrast shows signs of homophily and social segregation. Our approach yields a novel perspective on intraparty politics in parliamentary systems which are notoriously difficult to analyze.},

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    volume = {41},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12104},
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    abstract = {This article explains variations in levels of
institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes
institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from
beliefs and investments made by political actors. Drawing insights
from work on US congressional institutionalization and congressional
organization, and on comparative party system institutionalization, it
provides an index to measure congressional institutionalization. Using
this index, it explores the constitutional factors that affect levels
of congressional institutionalization. The empirical results raise a
warning with respect to building comparative implications from an
excessive focus on one particular case.},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12105},
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    abstract = {Critics of Ukraine's single-member district
majoritarian and mixed-member majoritarian electoral systems argue
that they undermined the efficiency of the Supreme Rada by permitting
nonpartisan single-member district deputies to enter the legislature
in large numbers. Such deputies changed parties and ignored party
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positions. This article argues that the effect of the differences in how legislators are elected is dependent upon whether legislators are partisans. The statistical analysis of party switching and party cohesion in the Rada from 1998 to 2002 shows that nonpartisan single-member district deputies were the most likely to switch parties and the least cohesive.},

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    number = {1},
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@article{sieberer_mapping_2016,
  title = {Mapping and {Explaining} {Parliamentary} {Rule}
{Changes} in {Europe}: {A} {Research} {Program}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12106},
  abstract = {We outline a comprehensive research program on
institutional reforms in European parliaments. Original data show that
parliamentary rules in Western European parliaments have been changed
frequently and massively during the period from 1945 to 2010
suggesting that actors use institutional reforms as a distinct
strategy to pursue their substantive goals. We discuss how
institutional instability affects existing theoretical and empirical
arguments about institutional effects. Furthermore, we present four
ideal-typical approaches to analyzing rule changes, present new
software tools for identifying and coding changes in large text
corpora, and demonstrate their usefulness for valid measurement of the
overall change between subsequent text versions.},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Meissner, Peter and Keh, Julia F.
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    pages = {61--88}
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@article{bonvecchi_legislative_2016,
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{Complexity}, and the {Approval} of {Law} {Initiatives}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12107},
  abstract = {In this article, we explore the role of legislative
knowledge networks (LKN) in the enactment of tax policy in Argentina.
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Findings show that legislative innovation follows a hierarchical (power law) structure with a few distinct issue areas dominated by key enacted bills. Taxation in Argentina is well described by three main issue areas: the VAT laws, the income tax, and the revenue-sharing legislation. We provide evidence that complexity in the status quo, as described by a larger number of important precedent laws, reduces the likelihood of final approval. Our research departs from existing models of delegation by considering complexity in the status quo rather than complexity in the proposal. We argue that more complex status quo should be accounted for when trying to assess whether legislators draft more or less detailed law initiatives.},

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    number = {1},
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    author = {Bonvecchi, Alejandro and Calvo, Ernesto and Stein,
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    pages = {89--117}
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@article{harden_campaign_2016,
  title = {Do {Campaign} {Donors} {Influence} {Polarization}?
{Evidence} from {Public} {Financing} in the {American} {States}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12108},
  abstract = {Does the source of campaign funds influence
legislative polarization? We develop competing theoretical
expectations regarding the effects of publicly financed elections on
legislative voting behavior. To test these expectations, we leverage a
natural experiment in the New Jersey Assembly in which public
financing was made available to a subset of members. We find that
public financing exerts substantively negligible effects on roll-call
voting. We then find a similar result in an examination of state
legislatures. We conclude that, counter to the logic of the US Supreme
Court, pundits, and reformers, the source of campaign funds exerts
minimal influence on polarization.},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Harden, Jeffrey J. and Kirkland, Justin H.},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12109},
    abstract = {Most estimates of the incumbency advantage and the
electoral benefits of previous officeholding experience do not account
for strategic entry by high-quality challengers. We address this issue
by using term limits as an instrument for challenger quality. Studying
US state legislatures, we find strong evidence of strategic behavior
by experienced challengers. However, we also find that such behavior
does not appear to significantly bias the estimated effect of
challenger experience or the estimated incumbency advantage. More
tentatively, using our estimates, we find that 30-40\% of the
incumbency advantage in state legislative races is the result of
scaring off experienced challengers.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Ban, Pamela and Llaudet, Elena and Snyder, James M.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2016},
    note = {WOS:000370329800007},
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@article{broockman_approaches_2016,
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    volume = {41},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12110},
    abstract = {Some studies of policy representation test hypotheses
about the relationship between citizens' views and elites' positions
on multiple issues by proceeding one issue at a time. Others summarize
citizens' and elites' preferences with ideology scores and test
hypotheses with these. I show that approach is flawed. It
misinterprets citizens' ideology scores as summaries of policy
preferences, but these scores actually measure ideological consistency
across areas: how often citizens' ideal policies are liberal or
conservative. Examples show how attending to this distinction
overturns conventional wisdom: legislators appear similarly moderate
as citizens, not more extreme; however, politically engaged citizens
appear especially moderate.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Broockman, David E.},
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@article{squire_introduction_2015,
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  volume = {40},
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  month = nov,
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@article{golden_incumbency_2015,
  title = {Incumbency {Effects} under {Proportional}
{Representation}: {Leaders} and {Backbenchers} in the {Postwar}
{Italian} {Chamber} of {Deputies}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12087},
  abstract = {We study incumbency effects for individual
legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the
Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives
over 10 legislatures (1948-92) elected using open-list proportional
representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the
average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party
successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents
advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret
reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a
political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party
loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Golden, Miriam A. and Picci, Lucio},
  month = nov,
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  note = {WOS:000363516800002},
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@article{rogers_strategic_2015,  
  title = {Strategic {Challenger} {Entry} in a {Federal} {System}:  
{The} {Role} of {Economic} and {Political} {Conditions} in {State}  
{Legislative} {Competition}},  
  volume = {40},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12088},  
  abstract = {Over a third of state legislators do not face  
challengers when seeking reelection. Existing analyses of state  
legislative contestation almost exclusively focus on the stable  
institutional features surrounding elections and ignore conditions  
that change between elections. I remedy this oversight by  
investigating how political contexts influence challenger entry. State  
legislators particularly members of the governor's party more often face  
opposition during weak state economies, but the president's  
copartisans are even more likely to receive a challenger when the  
president is unpopular. My findings suggest that both national- and  
state-level political conditions have an important impact on  
challengers' entry strategies.},  
  number = {4},  
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@article{mcgrath_gubernatorial_2015,  
  title = {Gubernatorial {Veto} {Powers} and the {Size} of  
{Legislative} {Coalitions}},  
  volume = {40},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12089},  
  abstract = {Few political institutions are as central to theories  
of lawmaking as the executive veto. Despite its importance,  
institutional continuity at the national level has precluded  
identification of empirical effects of the veto on legislative  
behavior. We address this limitation and present evidence from the  
states demonstrating how the veto affects the formation of legislative  
coalitions and, indirectly, executive influence over policymaking. We  
find consistent evidence that the presence and strength of  
gubernatorial veto powers affect the lawmaking behavior of state  
legislatures. Our analysis shows how institutional provisions  
condition executives' ability to affect policy outcomes in separation-  
of-powers systems.},  
  number = {4},  
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    year = {2015},
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@article{fukumoto_effects_2015,
  title = {The {Effects} of {Election} {Proximity} on
{Participatory} {Shirking}: {The} {Staggered}-{Term} {Chamber} as a
{Laboratory}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12090},
  abstract = {This study discusses a downside of electoral
pressure. As elections approach, legislators reduce their effort in
legislative activities, albeit while increasing their efficiency. To
show this, we propose a new, natural experimental design exploiting
staggered legislative election calendars to identify the effect of
approaching elections. Two-way natural blocking improves the balance
of pretreatments and an instrumental variable approach addresses
noncompliance by retirees. Our analysis of the Japanese House of
Councillors demonstrates that legislators up for election show up in
the chamber less often than those not facing election; however, when
they do show up and speak, they tend to speak longer.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fukumoto, Kentaro and Matsuo, Akitaka},
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  note = {WOS:000363516800005},
  pages = {599--625}
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@article{herrnson_impact_2015,
  title = {The {Impact} of {District} {Magnitude} on {Voter}
{Drop}-{Off} and {Roll}-{Off} in {American} {Elections}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12091},
  abstract = {This study demonstrates that multimember districts
(MMDs) complicate ballots, reduce voter information, and increase
incentives for strategic voting in ways that reduce voter
participation. Using data from three states that elect members of at
least one legislative chamber from both single-member districts (SMDs)
and MMDs, we test hypotheses about the impact on MMDs on ballot drop-
off (selecting fewer candidates for an office than permissible) and
roll-off (not voting in down-ballot races). We find support for both
sets of hypotheses, with the strongest results related to ballot drop-
off. The results have broad implications for voter participation,
representation, and election administration in the many states and
localities that use MMDs to elect public officials.},
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{pyeatt_party_2015,
title = {Party {Unity}, {Ideology}, and {Polarization} in
{Primary} {Elections} for the {House} of {Representatives}: 1956-
2012},
volume = {40},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12092},
abstract = {Increasing party polarization in Congress is a vexing
phenomenon for political scientists, as it offers a theoretical
conundrum. Members of Congress have become increasingly ideologically
divided by party in recent years, which seems counterintuitive as the
public electorally punishes representatives for excessive partisanship
and ideological behavior. One explanation for this result is that
members receive benefits for such behavior during primaries. This
article examines the effect of ideological and partisan behavior on
primary challenges and primary vote totals for incumbent House
members. The results show that incumbents receive benefits in the
primary from greater levels of partisanship but not greater levels of
ideological extremity. This finding is substantively important as it
provides further insight into the motivation of congressional
incumbents and offers a partial explanation for the rise in
congressional polarization.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Pyeatt, Nicholas},
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    pages = {327--330}
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@article{paxton_increasing_2015,
  title = {The {Increasing} {Effectiveness} of {National} {Gender}
{Quotas}, 1990-2010},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12079},
  abstract = {National gender quotas policies that require a certain
percentage of women candidates or legislators are becoming more
effective over time. Using data on 145 countries from 1990 to 2010, we
document this trend with latent growth-curve models. Part of the
explanation for increasing effectiveness is that countries have
ratcheted up targets for women's inclusion and that quotas are
increasingly written in ways that make them more effective at
achieving stated goals. Activists, political elites, and policy makers
have learned over time which quota policies are most effective,
resulting in quotas with provisions that more often lead to success.
But, changes in rules alone do not account for the increasing
effectiveness of quotas over time. It appears that changing norms
about women's incorporation in politics are also increasing quota
effectiveness regardless of policy design.},
  number = {3},
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  author = {Paxton, Pamela and Hughes, Melanie M.},
  month = aug,
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@article{gelman_opportunistic_2015,
  title = {The {Opportunistic} {President}: {How} {US} {Presidents}
{Determine} {Their} {Legislative} {Programs}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12080},
  abstract = {The president is the most influential policy actor in
US politics, and his legislative program greatly influences Congress's
agenda. Yet little research has focused on what factors affect the
president's choices when constructing his agenda. We develop a theory
that determines when a president will include an issue in his program.
We hypothesize that presidents structure their agendas around the
congressional calendar for consideration of expiring laws and salient
issues. Using data over 28 years and across 12 policy areas, we find
presidents build their programs around these policymaking
opportunities. We assert that presidential agendas are less driven by
individual priorities than previous accounts have concluded.},
  number = {3},
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    author = {Gelman, Jeremy and Wilkenfeld, Gilad and Adler, E.
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    volume = {40},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12081},
    abstract = {The information theory of legislative organization
suggests that legislative committees are designed to provide their
parent chamber with necessary information to legislate. Despite
empirical evidence for various aspects of the theory, we have limited
knowledge of committees' influence on legislative outputs. I argue
that informative committees are more than information providers, that
they also substantively impact legislative outcomes. With supportive
evidence from the US state legislatures, this article shows that the
presence of an informative committee system not only lowers the number
of bills introduced to the legislature but also enhances the chamber's
efficiency in transforming legislative proposals into laws.},
    number = {3},
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    author = {Lin, Nick C. N.},
    month = aug,
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@article{mctague_thou_2015,
    title = {Thou {Shalt} {Not} {Flip} {Flop}: {Senators}'
{Religious} {Affiliations} and {Issue} {Position} {Consistency}},
    volume = {40},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12082},
    abstract = {Is there a relationship between legislators'
religious affiliations and the consistency of their voting records?
Building on the theory of the personal roots of representation, we
argue that a legislator's likelihood of switching positions depends on
whether the issue is central to their personal values. We evaluate
this claim using a data set including senators' religious affiliations
and culture war votes from 1976 to 2004 and find that different
religious groups vary in their voting consistency on issues such as
abortion, public prayer, and gay and lesbian rights.},
    number = {3},
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    author = {McTague, John and Pearson-Merkowitz, Shanna},
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@article{martin_parties_2015,
    title = {Parties and {Electoral} {Performance} in the {Market}
for {Political} {Consultants}},
    volume = {40},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12083},
    abstract = {We investigate whether the hiring relationships of
candidates and political consulting firms better resembles the
predictions of the adversarial or allied models of consultant-party
interaction. We find that the highest-quality consultants are not
allocated to the most competitive races, consultant-candidate
relationships persist even as candidates' electoral prospects change,
and firms who work for challengers face a higher risk of market exit
than firms working for incumbents. The market focuses entirely on win-
loss records and ignores the information on consultant performance
available in candidates' vote shares. These findings depict a market
driven by individual candidate, rather than aggregate party, goals.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Martin, Gregory J. and Peskowitz, Zachary},
    month = aug,
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    note = {WOS:000358328900006},
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@article{wirlds_staggered_2015,
    title = {Staggered {Terms} for the {US} {Senate}: {Origins} and
{Irony}},
    volume = {40},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12084},
    abstract = {This article provides the first detailed study of the
origins of staggered Senate terms, which typically have been
interpreted as part of the framers' intent to create an insulated,
stable, and conservative Senate. I draw upon three sources of
evidencethe meaning and application of rotation in revolutionary
America, the deliberations and decisions at the Constitutional
Convention, and the arguments during Ratificationto show that the
origins of and intentions behind staggered terms offer little support
for the dominant interpretation. Instead, staggered terms, a mechanism
to promote rotation or turnover of membership, were added to the
Constitution as a compromise to offset, not augment, the Senate's
longer terms by exposing a legislative chamber with long individual

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tenure to more frequent electoral influence and change.},
  number = {3},
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@article{baumann_personal_2015,
  title = {Personal {Characteristics} of {MPs} and {Legislative}
{Behavior} in {Moral} {Policymaking}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12072},
  abstract = {Theoretical and empirical models of legislative
decision making in parliamentary democracies typically neglect the
policy preferences of individual MPs and instead focus on political
parties and possible institutional constraints. We argue that MPs
actually make judgments and decisions on the basis of their
preferences, which are shaped by their personal characteristics.
However, given the strength of parties in most parliamentary systems,
the impact of personal characteristics on legislative behavior is
rarely visible. Therefore, we examine a moral issue. Looking at
cosponsorship, parliamentary speeches, and votes in the German
Bundestag, we analyze the legislative procedure on the regulation of
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in Germany in 2011. We show
that the legislative behavior of MPs does not only reflect partisan
conflict but is also influenced by the preferences of the constituents
and MPs' own personal characteristics such as: religious denomination,
gender, and parental status.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Baumann, Markus and Debus, Marc and Mueller, Jochen},
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    note = {WOS:000354730100002},
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@article{butler_how_2015,
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{Goods} {Games}?},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12073},
  abstract = {We study how policymakers play public goods games,
and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by
conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American
state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods
games more cooperatively and more consistently than the
undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments
that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to
additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed
characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play
the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for
understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Butler, Daniel M. and Kousser, Thad},
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@article{doherty_how_2015,
  title = {How {Policy} and {Procedure} {Shape} {Citizens}'
{Evaluations} of {Senators}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12074},
  abstract = {I report findings from survey experiments that
improve our understanding of how people want individual Senators to
approach their role as representatives. The findings show that people
are committed to the idea that Senators should prioritize their
states' preferences over those of the national public. This preference
persists in situations where a Senator's advocacy for her state plays
a key role in defeating nationally supported legislation. This finding
contradicts popular claims that voters are hungry for Senators who
prioritize national preferences over those of their constituents. I
also find that people who support a piece of legislation but not those
who oppose it evaluate a Senator who helps to defeat the legislation by
filibustering substantially less favorably than one who accomplishes
the same ends through majoritarian means. This suggests that how
people respond to some procedural characteristics of politicians'
behavior depends on how they feel about the outcomes it yields.},

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@article{howard_politics_2015,
  title = {The {Politics} of {Obstruction}: {Republican} {Holds} in
the {US} {Senate}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12076},
  abstract = {A defining feature of the modern US Senate is
obstruction. Almost all pieces of legislation considered in the Senate
are affected either directly or indirectly by obstruction. Obstruction
takes many forms in the modern Senate, but one of the most prevalent,
yet least studied, is the hold. Using a newly created dataset on
Republican Senate holds, we cast light on this important practice. Our
results suggest that a variety of factors including timing, party
status, and a senator's voting record are related to both the
prevalence of holds and the success of legislation subject to holds in
the Senate.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Howard, Nicholas O. and Roberts, Jason M.},
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@article{thomsen_why_2015,
  title = {Why {So} {Few} ({Republican}) {Women}? {Explaining} the
{Partisan} {Imbalance} of {Women} in the {US} {Congress}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12075},
  abstract = {This article examines why the percentage of
Democratic women in Congress has increased dramatically since the
1980s while the percentage of Republican women has barely grown. The
central claim is that ideological conformity with the party influences
the decision to run for office, and I suggest that partisan
polarization has discouraged ideological moderates in the pipeline
from pursuing a congressional career. The findings have gendered
implications because, first, Republican women in the pipeline have
historically been to the left of their male counterparts, and second,
there is a dearth of conservative women in the pipeline.},
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@article{binder_challenges_2015,
  title = {Challenges {Ahead} for {Legislative} {Studies}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12063},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{box-steffensmeier_examining_2015,
  title = {Examining {Legislative} {Cue}-{Taking} in the {US}
{Senate}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12064},
  abstract = {We examine congressional cue-taking theory to
determine its extent, conditionality, and various forms in the US
Senate. Using a novel data-collection technique (timed C-SPAN
footage), we focus on temporal dynamics via event history analysis.
Examining the effects of senator characteristics across 16 votes from
the 108th Congress, we find that committee leadership and seniority
generally predict cue-giving, while other types of characteristics
predict cue-giving on certain types of votes. Our results underscore
the importance of considering the order and timing of voting when
studying congressional behavior.},
  number = {1},
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  author = {Box-Steffensmeier, Janet and Ryan, Josh M. and Sokhey,
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@article{birkhead_role_2015,
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{Elections}},

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    volume = {40},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12065},
    abstract = {In this article, I examine the effect of incumbent
ideology on elections in 45 state legislatures, showing that
ideological extremists are more likely to be opposed in the general
election than are moderates and that extremists tend to do worse in
challenged elections than moderates do. I also explore the intervening
role of legislative professionalism, finding that in the majority of
state legislatures moderation is rewarded, though in the most
professionalized legislatures, incumbents are actually rewarded for
extremism. These results show that despite the informational
disadvantage of the electorate, the ideology of state legislators is
an important factor in elections.},
    number = {1},
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@article{carson_electoral_2015,
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{Behavior}: {Adoption} of the {Secret} {Ballot} in {Congressional}
{Elections}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12066},
  abstract = {There is widespread agreement that the Australian
ballot fundamentally altered the American electoral system. One common
approach to test the effects of ballot reform is to examine
legislators elected under the party and secret ballot. An alternative
research design, which we adopt here, compares changes in the behavior
of legislators who were elected under both ballot types. We use this
approach to investigate whether ballot reform directly influenced
legislators' decisions to seek renomination and their behavior within
the institution. Our results raise a number of important implications
for understanding the effects of electoral reform on political
behavior.},
  number = {1},
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{Politics}},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12067},
    abstract = {Distributive politics plays an integral role in
theories of legislative politics because it represents a fundamental
aspect of legislators' electoral connection to constituents. We argue
that because distributive politics is at its core a constituency-
centered process, it is essential to take geography into account in
both substantive and statistical terms. Our analysis, which employs
Geographic Weighted Regression, reveals substantial spatial
heterogeneity in traditional models of pork-barreling. The results
challenge the implicit assumption that one size fits all when modeling
the behavior of members of Congress in the realm of distributive
politics.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Clemens, Austin C. and Crespin, Michael H. and
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@article{kerevel_pork-barreling_2015,
    title = {Pork-{Barreling} without {Reelection}? {Evidence} from
the {Mexican} {Congress}},
    volume = {40},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12068},
    abstract = {Previous research on term-limited legislators
suggests they have few incentives to engage in pork-barreling. Using
the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term-limited, I find
legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the
lack of a reelection incentive. I argue term-limited legislators are
progressively ambitious and use interventions into the budget process
to further their careers. I find legislators elected in single-member
districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through
proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to
pursue future office. I also find governors and gubernatorial
elections influence the submission of budget amendments, which is
related to gubernatorial influence over political careers.},
    number = {1},
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@article{spirling_british_2014,  
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  number = {4},  
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@article{bronner_property_2014,  
  title = {Property and {Power}: {MPs}' {Assets} and {Support} for  
{Democratization} in the 1867 {Reform} {Act}},  
  volume = {39},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12054},  
  abstract = {Influential theories of democratization emphasize  
elites' fear of the redistributive consequences of democratic reform  
as an important limit on democratization. They also argue that  
landowners are more likely than capital owners to fear redistribution,  
as their assets are less mobile and thus more vulnerable to  
expropriation. To test these claims on the micro level, this article  
uses the 1867 U.K. Reform Act, which doubled the enfranchised  
population to include much of the urban working class, as a case  
study. Using an original dataset on the members of the 1865-68 House  
of Commons, this article finds that in fact, the most substantively  
important variable for votes on democratization was partisanship,  
which has been neglected by the distributional conflict literature.  
Material interests, particularly landowning, do matter, but they are  
crucially mediated by strategic partisan electoral concerns.},  
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = nov,
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    pages = {439--466}
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@article{moser_taking_2014,
  title = {Taking the {Leap}: {Voting}, {Rhetoric}, and the
{Determinants} of {Electoral} {Reform}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12055},
  abstract = {The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of
democratic politics in the United Kingdom by expanding the voting
franchise and remedying legislative malapportionment. Analyzing
parliamentary debates and divisions, we investigate why reform
successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. We consider why
reform passed under a minority Conservative government yet failed
under a majority Liberal government despite no election or change in
membership. Though partisanship is most influential for parliamentary
voting, it is an incomplete explanation given the absence of modern
party institutions. Rather, we argue that the narrowed scope of debate
under the Conservatives was crucial in passing reform.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  note = {WOS:000344054100003},
  pages = {467--502}
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@article{kam_enfranchisement_2014,
  title = {Enfranchisement, {Malapportionment}, and {Institutional}
{Change} in {Great} {Britain}, 1832-1868},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12056},
  abstract = {This article examines why after 35 years of
repeatedly rejecting the secret ballot, the British House of Commons
enacted it with the Ballot Act of 1872. Drawing on roll-call votes, I
show that parliamentary opposition to the secret ballot was invariant
between 1832 and 1867. In 1867, however, the Second Reform Act
significantly extended the electoral franchise and substantially
redistributed parliamentary seats; the House elected immediately
following these changes to pass the Ballot Act of 1872. I show that a
key reason for the change in the House's attitude on the ballot was
that anti-ballot MPs whom the redistribution threatened to expose to

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electoral competition were disproportionately likely to retire prior to the 1868 election. These results imply that it was the anticompetitive effects inherent in the gross malapportionment of the older electoral system rather than the restricted nature of the franchise that insulated MPs from public pressure and kept parliamentary opinion on the secret ballot in stasis. This is a useful lesson because while almost all modern democracies operate on a universal adult suffrage, many continue to be marked by significant malapportionment.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  title = {Franchise {Extension} and the {British} {Aristocracy}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12057},
  abstract = {Using evidence from the Second Reform Act, introduced in the United Kingdom in 1867, we analyze the impact of extending the vote to the unskilled urban population on the composition of the Cabinet and the background characteristics of Members of Parliament. Exploiting the sharp change in the electorate caused by franchise extension, we separate the effect of reform from that of underlying constituency-level traits correlated with the voting population. Our results are broadly supportive of a claim first made by Laski (1928): there is no causal effect of the reform on the political role played by the British aristocracy.},
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    number = {4},
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@article{camp_catalyst_2014,
  title = {Catalyst or {Cause}? {Legislation} and the {Demise} of {Machine} {Politics} in {Britain} and the {United} {States}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12058},
  abstract = {In the nineteenth century, British and American parties competed by hiring electoral agents to bribe and treat voters.
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British parties abruptly abandoned this practice in the 1880s. The conventional explanation is that legislation put an end to agent-mediated distribution. But this explanation leaves many questions unanswered. Why did the parties use agents for decades, even though they imposed great expense on candidates and were viewed as untrustworthy? And why, after decades of half-hearted reforms, did the House of Commons pass effective antibribery reforms only in 1883? In our formal model, parties hire agents to solve information problems, but agent-mediated distribution can be collectively suboptimal. Legislation can serve as a credibility device for shifting to less costly strategies.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Camp, Edwin and Dixit, Avinash and Stokes, Susan},
    month = nov,
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@article{egggers_electoral_2014,
  title = {Electoral {Security} as a {Determinant} of {Legislator}
{Activity}, 1832-1918: {New} {Data} and {Methods} for {Analyzing}
{British} {Political} {Development}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12059},
  abstract = {We consider the relationship between a Member of
Parliament's electoral environment and his strategic choice of
legislative activities between the First and Fourth Reform Acts in
Britain. We argue that voters and party institutions put cross-cutting
pressures on members during this time, and that legislators calibrated
their behavior in accordance with the marginality of their seat. We
gather a massive new dataset documenting MPs' biographical
information, electoral records, roll calls, and speeches. The extent
of MPs' speech making and voting (our measures of legislative
activity) vary with electoral security in ways consistent with our
theoretical priors for Westminster systems.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Eggers, Andrew C. and Spirling, Arthur},
  month = nov,
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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12046},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Squire, Peverill},
    month = aug,
    year = {2014},
    note = {WOS:000340070200001},
    pages = {295--297}
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@article{burden_sore_2014,
    title = {Sore {Loser} {Laws} and {Congressional} {Polarization}},
    volume = {39},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12047},
    abstract = {To enhance explanations for party polarization in the
U. S. Congress, we focus on an unappreciated legal structure known as
the sore loser law. By restricting candidates who lose partisan
primaries from subsequently appearing on the general election ballot
as independents or as nominees of other parties, these laws give
greater control over ballot access to the party bases, thus producing
more extreme major party nominees. Using several different measures of
candidate and legislator ideology, we find that sore loser laws
account for as much as a tenth of the ideological divide between the
major parties.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Burden, Barry C. and Jones, Bradley M. and Kang,
Michael S.},
    month = aug,
    year = {2014},
    note = {WOS:000340070200002},
    pages = {299--325}
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@article{harbridge_public_2014,
    title = {Public {Preferences} for {Bipartisanship} in the
{Policymaking} {Process}},
    volume = {39},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12048},
    abstract = {At a time of a high level of polarization in
Congress, public opinion surveys routinely find that Americans want
politicians to compromise. When evaluating legislation, does the
preference for bipartisanship in the legislative process trump
partisan identities? We find that it does not. We conduct two
experiments in which we alter aspects of the political context to see
how people respond to parties (not) coming together to achieve broadly
popular public policy goals. Although citizens can recognize
bipartisan processes, preferences for bipartisan legislating do not
outweigh partisan desires in the evaluation of public policies.},

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    number = {3},
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@article{hiroi_dimensions_2014,
  title = {Dimensions of {Legislative} {Conflict}: {Coalitions},
{Obstructionism}, and {Lawmaking} in {Multiparty} {Presidential}
{Regimes}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12049},
  abstract = {This article addresses central issues in multiparty
presidential systems: the functioning of legislative coalitions and
the dynamics of legislative conflict. Since electoral competition has
elements of both positive-sum (increase in common support) and zero-
sum (exact division of the support) qualities, lawmaking in
coalitional systems presents unique challenges. Using legislative data
from Brazil, we examine how coalition management and unity affect
legislative delay and obstructionism. We find, among others, that: (1)
coalition management is pivotal for both faster legislative approval
and less obstructionism, but its effect depends on coalition size; and
(2) cohesive opposition impedes the legislative process.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hiroi, Taeko and Renno, Lucio},
  month = aug,
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  note = {WOS:000340070200004},
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@article{makse_majority_2014,
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{Jurisdictions} in {State} {Legislatures}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12050},
  abstract = {Committee jurisdictions are important in legislative
organization, but the reorganization of jurisdictions has received
scant attention, particularly in state legislatures, where the
fluidity of committee organization allows us to examine rationales for
change. In this article, I examine whether new majorities use
jurisdiction reorganization for agenda-control purposes. Examining 39
state legislatures between 2003 and 2012, I test whether committee
patterns are less stable in legislative sessions under new majorities
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and the extent to which reorganization reflects party priorities. I find that new majority parties eliminate committees that reflect the other party's policy priorities and create committees that reflect their priorities.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = aug,
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    pages = {387--405}
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@article{hall_partisan_2014,
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  volume = {39},
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  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12051},
  abstract = {Term limits remain a popular policy reform and have generated a great deal of scholarship as a result. Although many predicted that term limits would benefit the Republican party, the literature finds no marked partisan effects, possibly because termed-out legislators have largely been replaced by copartisans. This article demonstrates that term limits have indeed had partisan effects-just not on electoral outcomes. Term limits have caused a significant reallocation of institutional power from Democrats to Republicans (as measured by contributions from access-oriented interest groups), in large part because they have removed more senior Democrats than Republicans. The partisan effects of term limits therefore point to the institutional value of seniority.},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = aug,
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  volume = {39},
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  year = {2014},
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  pages = {143--145}
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@article{preece_how_2014,  
  title = {How the {Party} {Can} {Win} in {Personal} {Vote}  
{Systems}: {The} "{Selectoral} {Connection}" and {Legislative}  
{Voting} in {Lithuania}},  
  volume = {39},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12040},  
  abstract = {Electoral rules can motivate politicians to cultivate  
a "personal vote" through their legislative voting records. However, I  
argue that candidate-selection procedures have the ability to  
overpower these electoral incentives. This study-the first systematic  
study of how candidate selection and electoral rules interact-takes  
advantage of Lithuania's unique mixed electoral rules and fortuitous  
candidate-selection procedures. Regardless of electoral rules, MPs  
whose future careers depend on getting renominated by central party  
leaders vote against the party less than those whose careers do not.  
This evidence of a "selectoral connection" suggests candidate-  
selection procedures must be studied much more seriously.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Preece, Jessica Robinson},  
  month = may,  
  year = {2014},  
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@article{kirkland_chamber_2014,  
  title = {Chamber {Size} {Effects} on the {Collaborative}  
{Structure} of {Legislatures}},  
  volume = {39},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12041},  
  abstract = {The collective nature of legislating forces  
legislators to rely on one another for information and support. This  
collaborative activity requires a choice about partnerships in an  
environment of uncertainty. The basic size and organization of a  
legislature amplifies this uncertainty in relational choices. Analysis  
of collaborative patterns between all the U.S. state legislators in  
2007 corroborates this expectation, indicating that large legislatures  
have highly partisan collaborative networks with generally low  
density, while larger legislative committees mitigate these effects.  
Thus, even when the attributes of legislators do not change, the  
organizational size of the legislature can shape how those legislators  
interact.},  
  number = {2},  
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  author = {Kirkland, Justin H.},  
  month = may,
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    year = {2014},
    note = {WOS:000334123700003},
    pages = {169--198}
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@article{pedersen_lobbying_2014,
  title = {Lobbying {Across} {Arenas}: {Interest} {Group}
{Involvement} in the {Legislative} {Process} in {Denmark}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12042},
  abstract = {Interest groups may approach political decision
makers in two phases of the legislative process: the pre-
parliamentary, administrative phase, in which bills are prepared by
bureaucrats; and the parliamentary phase, in which bills are discussed
and possibly revised by parliamentary committees. The article
investigates the factors that lead groups to engage in these phases
based on group proceedings for 225 bills presented to the Danish
parliament in the 2009/2010 session. We conclude that resourceful
groups are clearly more active in both arenas, but the parliamentary
arena is also a venue for voicing discontent and defending gains
achieved in the administrative arena.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Pedersen, Helene Helboe and Binderkrantz, Anne
Skorkjaer and Christiansen, Peter Munk},
  month = may,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000334123700004},
  pages = {199--225}
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@article{west_veto_2014,
  title = {Veto {Players} {Revisited}: {Internal} and {External}
{Factors} {Influencing} {Policy} {Production}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12043},
  abstract = {Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions:
(1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual
actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic.
Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain
institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as
individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence
over legislation. Using data on labor-law production in Europe, we
find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party
cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto
players should be more sensitive to both internal and external
institutional configurations.},
  number = {2},
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    author = {West, Karleen Jones and Lee, Hoon},
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@article{jacobsmeier_racial_2014,
    title = {Racial {Stereotypes} and {Perceptions} of
{Representatives}' {Ideologies} in {U}.{S}. {House} {Elections}},
    volume = {39},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12044},
    abstract = {I examine the hypothesis that race affects citizens'
perceptions of candidates' ideologies. In the past, systematic tests
of this hypothesis have relied almost entirely on data drawn from
experiments. While experimental research designs have contributed much
to the analysis of political stereotypes and heuristics, the extent to
which experimental research on this hypothesis is externally valid is
open to question. Moreover, experimental approaches are not well-
suited to estimating the magnitude of the effects of stereotypes in
real-world situations, especially in the context of complex political
phenomena such as election campaigns. In this article, I develop a
statistical model of the effects of race on perceptions of candidates'
ideologies and estimate the model using data on incumbent candidates
from the American National Election Studies. The results suggest that,
ceteris paribus, white citizens will tend to perceive black candidates
to be more liberal than ideologically similar white candidates. In
contrast, the perceptions of black respondents are not affected by the
race of candidates, although black respondents' perceptions are more
strongly correlated with candidates' positions on issues of particular
interest to minorities than the perceptions of white respondents. I
discuss the implications of these findings with respect to descriptive
representation in the United States, the accountability of office
holders, and the study of voting behavior.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Jacobsmeier, Matthew L.},
    month = may,
    year = {2014},
    note = {WOS:000334123700006},
    pages = {261--291}
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@article{bonica_punctuated_2014,
    title = {The {Punctuated} {Origins} of {Senate} {Polarization}},
    volume = {39},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12031},
    abstract = {This article uses a new dynamic ideal-point
estimation method that incorporates smoothing techniques to construct

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a more detailed account of Senate polarization. The results reveal that the Senate polarized in two distinct phases. Member replacement accounts for nearly all of the increase from the early 1970s through the mid-1990s after which ideological adaptation emerges as the dominant force behind polarization. In addition, I find that a few brief periods of intensified partisanship account for most of the increase in polarization since the mid-1990s, suggesting that these episodes have had significant and lasting effects.},

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@article{stiglitz_appointment_2014,
  title = {Appointment {Politics} and the {Ideological}
{Composition} of the {Judiciary}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12032},
  abstract = {Scholars have advanced a wide range of theories
regarding the role of Senate confirmation in judicial appointments. In
this article, I directly test the predictions of these models using a
novel measure of the ideology of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
The main results indicate that the filibuster and majority party have
predominated in appointment politics. Prompted by recent events, I
also conduct a simulation-based exercise to examine the ideological
composition of the judiciary under a confirmation regime in which the
filibuster is not present. This exercise suggests that the Senate
filibuster induces moderation in judicial appointments; the
elimination of the filibuster is likely to result in a more
contentious, if less dilatory, confirmation process and a more
polarized judiciary.},
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    number = {1},
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{District} {Electoral} {Systems}},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12033},
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abstract = {In recent decades, the literature has coalesced around either symmetry or responsiveness as measures of partisan bias in single-member district systems. I argue neither accurately captures the traditional idea of an efficient gerrymander, where one party claims more seats without more votes. I suggest a better measure of efficiency and then use this new measure to reconsider a classic study of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the original study findings, I show that the effects of party control on bias are small and decay rapidly, suggesting that redistricting is at best a blunt tool for promoting partisan interests.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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month = feb,
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note = {WOS:000330862900004},
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@article{chasquetti_subnational_2014,
title = {The {Subnational} {Connection} in {Unitary} {Regimes}:
{Progressive} {Ambition} and {Legislative} {Behavior} in {Uruguay}},
volume = {39},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsg.12034},
abstract = {How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in Uruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Chasquetti, Daniel and Pablo Micozzi, Juan},
month = feb,
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note = {WOS:000330862900005},
pages = {87--112}
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@article{rich_party_2014,
title = {Party {Voting} {Cohesion} in {Mixed} {Member}
{Legislative} {Systems}: {Evidence} from {Korea} and {Taiwan}},
volume = {39},
issn = {0362-9805},

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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12035},
    abstract = {How do mixed-member legislative systems influence
legislator voting? While the literature remains inconclusive, this
article suggests party influence as an intervening variable. Through
an analysis of roll-call data from Taiwan and Korea, no deviation is
evident between district legislators and legislators elected by
proportional representation. Further disaggregation of what it means
to vote against one's party again finds little evidence of a tier
distinction, while party variables remain significant. The findings
are suggestive of a contamination effect between tiers, consistent
with the influence of parties.},
    number = {1},
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    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12037},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Squire, Peverill},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{lo_electoral_2013,
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    volume = {38},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12023},
    abstract = {Concerns about endogeneity often complicate attempts
to estimate a causal link between public opinion and the voting
records of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In this article,
I overcome this problem by exploiting a rare natural experimentthe
surprising and exogenous revelation of Irish public opinion that
resulted from Ireland's ratification of the Nice treaty. I find that
the Irish electorate's rejection of Nice caused Ireland's European
Parliament delegation to vote in a more conservative manner, while its
subsequent ratification caused a partial reversal of this shift. My
finding of an electoral connection on the Nice treaty casts doubt on
the claim that MEPs are largely unconstrained by voter preferences on
European issues, despite claims of a democratic deficit in European
institutions.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Lo, James},
    month = nov,
    year = {2013},
    note = {WOS:000325934200002},
    pages = {439--460}
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@article{bernhard_commitment_2013,
    title = {Commitment and {Consequences}: {Reneging} on
{Cosponsorship} {Pledges} in the {US} {House}},
    volume = {38},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12024},
    abstract = {We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress
represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to
commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters
legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to
support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do,
these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further,
legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face
punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support
for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices
to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a
cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st-108th
Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its
consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions
as a commitment mechanism.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Bernhard, William and Sulkin, Tracy},
    month = nov,
    year = {2013},
    note = {WOS:000325934200003},
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    pages = {461--487}
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  title = {The {Intersection} of {Gender} and {Minority} {Status}
in {National} {Legislatures}: {The} {Minority} {Women} {Legislative}
{Index}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12025},
  abstract = {To date, we are unaware to what extent gains in
women's legislative representation have reached minority women. To
facilitate cross-national research on minority women in politics, I
present and explore new cross-national data on the election of women
and men from 431 ethnic, racial, and religious groups to national
legislatures in 81 countries between 2005 and 2007. I create a new
measure scoring countries by minority women's representation relative
to their share of the populationthe Minority Women Legislative Index
(MWLI). Descriptive analyses show minority women to be substantially
underrepresented in national legislatures overall but their level of
exclusion varies geographically.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hughes, Melanie M.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000325934200004},
  pages = {489--516}
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@article{curry_impact_2013,
  title = {The {Impact} of {District} {Magnitude} on {Campaign}
{Fundraising}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12026},
  abstract = {The number of legislators elected in a single
district influences many aspects of state legislative elections.
However, there is a dearth of research on how district magnitude
influences campaign fundraising. We theorize that the greater
competition for funds in multimember districts results in candidates
raising less money and encourages them to be more entrepreneurial in
their fundraising efforts. Specifically, we expect multimember
district candidates to raise contributions from more diverse sets of
interests than candidates in single-member districts, raise more funds
out of state, and create more unique financial constituencies. Using
data on candidates for Maryland's House of Delegates in 2006 and 2010,
we find support for our hypotheses.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Curry, James M. and Herrnson, Paul S. and Taylor,

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Jeffrey A.},
  month = nov,
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  pages = {517--543}
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  title = {Electoral {Budget} {Cycles} in {Legislatures}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12027},
  abstract = {This article examines electoral cycles in legislative
budget decisions. Where local structures play an important role in
candidate selection and election, legislators' incentives to amend the
executive spending proposal can depend on the proximity of elections,
leading to more spendthrift behavior in the run-up to popular votes.
However, stringent budget institutions can counteract this tendency.
Using a unique dataset of executive spending proposals and approved
budgets in Sweden, I find strong empirical support for these
predictions. Future studies of electoral cycles should pay greater
attention to separating the contributions of the legislative and
executive stages of the budgetary process and the conditions that
foster electoral cyclicity in legislatures.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wehner, Joachim},
  month = nov,
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  note = {WOS:000325934200006},
  pages = {545--570}
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  title = {Uncertainty and {Roll}-{Call} {Voting} in {Lame}-{Duck}
{Sessions} of the {US} {House}, 1969-2010},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12028},
  abstract = {Lame-duck sessions of Congress have become
increasingly common of late. Such sessions are marked by higher levels
of ideological and participatory shirking among departing members,
creating a more uncertain legislative environment. I investigate the
consequences of such shirking on coalition formation and roll-call
behavior. I analyze House roll-call votes held in the 12 congresses
that convened lame-duck sessions from 1969 to 2010 (91st to 111th
Congresses) to assess how roll-call behavior changes across sessions.
I find subtle but statistically significant changes across sessions
consistent with claims regarding greater uncertainty in roll-call
voting in lame-duck sessions.},
  number = {4},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Nokken, Timothy P.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2013},
    note = {WOS:000325934200007},
    pages = {571--591}
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@article{squire_introduction_2013-1,
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    volume = {38},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12015},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Squire, Peverill},
    month = aug,
    year = {2013},
    note = {WOS:000321976200001},
    pages = {287--290}
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@article{keele_term_2013,
    title = {Do {Term} {Limits} {Restrain} {State} {Fiscal} {Policy}?
{Approaches} for {Causal} {Inference} in {Assessing} the {Effects} of
{Legislative} {Institutions}},
    volume = {38},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12016},
    abstract = {Scholars of state politics are often interested in
the causal effects of legislative institutions on policy outcomes. For
example, during the 1990s a number of states adopted term limits for
state legislators. Advocates of term limits argued that this
institutional reform would alter state policy in a number of ways,
including limiting state expenditures. We highlight a number of
research design issues that complicate attempts to estimate the effect
of institutions on state outcomes by addressing the question of term
limits and spending. In particular, we focus on (1) treatment effect
heterogeneity and (2) the suitability of nonterm-limit states as good
counterfactuals for term-limit states. We compare two different
identification strategies to deal with these issues: differences-in-
differences (DID) estimation and conditioning on prior outcomes with
an emphasis on synthetic case control. Using more rigorous methods of
causal inference, we find little evidence that term limits affect
state spending. Our analysis and results are informative for
researchers seeking to assess the causal effects of state-level
institutions.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Keele, Luke and Malhotra, Neil and McCubbins, Colin
H.},

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    month = aug,
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@article{sharman_limiting_2013,
  title = {Limiting {Party} {Representation}: {Evidence} from a
{Small} {Parliamentary} {Chamber}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12017},
  abstract = {Parties are seen as vital for the maintenance of
parliamentary government and as necessary intermediaries between
voters and legislators; an elected parliamentary chamber not
controlled by parties is highly anomalous. This study contrasts the
party-controlled Tasmanian lower house with its Independent-dominated
elected upper house and finds that the major source of constraints on
party representation is not a clientelistic style of politics but the
persistence of a distinctive institutional design and electoral rules
based on fixed terms and annual staggered elections. The consequences
of these rules are explored for their effects on voter choice and
legislative behaviour.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Sharman, Campbell},
  month = aug,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000321976200003},
  pages = {327--348}
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@article{mcgrath_congressional_2013,
  title = {Congressional {Oversight} {Hearings} and {Policy}
{Control}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsg.12018},
  abstract = {Oversight hearings should be an important
congressional tool for controlling recalcitrant agencies, but it is
not clear that this should always be equally true. The logic of
principal-agent models of legislative policy control implies that
oversight might sometimes, but not always, be superfluous to said
control. Here, I reintroduce oversight hearings to theories of policy
control and argue that congressional committees conduct oversight
hearings primarily as a response to the extent to which agencies have
different policy preferences from them and as a function of their
capacity to conduct hearings cheaply. I test these hypotheses using
committee hearings data (Policy Agendas Project) from both the U.S.
House of Representatives and the Senate from 1947 to 2006 and provide
support for theoretical arguments about the institutional nature of

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legislative policymaking strategies and ultimately help clarify the role of oversight in legislative-executive relations.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {McGrath, Robert J.},
month = aug,
year = {2013},
note = {WOS:000321976200004},
pages = {349--376}

}

@article{neiheisel_use_2013,

title = {The {Use} of {Party} {Brand} {Labels} in {Congressional} {Election} {Campaigns}},

volume = {38},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12019},

abstract = {In spite of the centrality of partisanship to many theories of lawmaking, and the important role that party cues play in shaping voters' evaluations of political candidates, remarkably little is known about the circumstances under which congressional candidates use partisan symbols on the campaign trail. Employing data on candidates' televised advertisements over six elections (1998-2008), the present study explores the supply side of partisan cues and finds that candidates are strategic about their use of party symbols. And while personal and district-level factors influence how candidates utilize partisan rhetoric, we show that the institutional context in which they campaign also matters.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Neiheisel, Jacob R. and Niebler, Sarah},
month = aug,
year = {2013},
note = {WOS:000321976200005},
pages = {377--403}

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@article{mctague_voting_2013,

title = {Voting from the {Pew}: {The} {Effect} of {Senators}' {Religious} {Identities} on {Partisan} {Polarization} in the {US} {Senate}},

volume = {38},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12020},

abstract = {Partisan polarization in the Senate is in part a product of the increased sorting of evangelical Christians into the Republican caucus. The relationship between senators' religious identities, party affiliation, and ideology has changed since the 1970s. Whereas congressional party caucuses in the past were more diverse in their religious composition, evangelical Christian senators have sorted themselves into the party that most closely resembles the

values of their religious identities, leading to greater overall polarization.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {McTague, John and Pearson-Merkowitz, Shanna},
month = aug,
year = {2013},
note = {WOS:000321976200006},
pages = {405--430}

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@article{sqire_legislative_2013,
title = {Legislative {Studies} {Quarterly} {Introduction}},
volume = {38},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12008},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Squire, Peverill},
month = may,
year = {2013},
note = {WOS:000318028200001},
pages = {151--153}

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@article{harden_multidimensional_2013,
title = {Multidimensional {Responsiveness}: {The} {Determinants} of {Legislators}' {Representational} {Priorities}},
volume = {38},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12009},
abstract = {American politics scholars typically conceptualize representation narrowly as mass-elite policy responsiveness, with many studies identifying factors that hinder that relationship. These findings contrast with the high reelection rates in American legislatures. I show that policy is only one of several dimensions through which legislators provide representation. I unify policy, service, allocation, and descriptive representation in a model of legislators' priorities and then test it with survey experiments administered to 1,175 state legislators. I posit that legislators systematically emphasize different dimensions to further the goal of reelection. Results show that legislative institutions, district demand, and individual traits structure legislators' strategic representational priorities.},

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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pages = {155--184}

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@article{jones_major_2013,  
  title = {Do {Major} {Policy} {Enactments} {Affect} {Public}  
{Evaluations} of {Congress}? {The} {Case} of {Health} {Care}  
{Reform}},  
  volume = {38},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12010},  
  abstract = {This study analyzes changes in individual evaluations  
of Congress immediately before and after enactment of national health  
care reform in 2010. It tests three alternative hypotheses: that  
enactment increased the likelihood of approval by demonstrating  
congressional competence; that it decreased the likelihood of approval  
by calling attention to partisan processes; or that it differentially  
affected citizens' evaluations depending on their individual policy  
preferences. The results show enactment polarized citizens'  
evaluations of Congress, with supporters of the bill increasing their  
approval of Congress and opponents decreasing. These findings  
represent the first concrete evidence that enactments can affect  
evaluations of Congress.},  
  number = {2},  
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  pages = {185--204}  
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@article{smith_majority_2013,  
  title = {Majority {Party} {Power} and {Procedural} {Motions} in  
the {US} {Senate}},  
  volume = {38},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12011},  
  abstract = {While the metaphor of House parties as cartels is  
widely accepted, its application to the Senate is difficult as the  
majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and  
pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the  
Senate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table  
to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive  
votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agenda control or  
special party influence? Using an analysis of individual Senators'  
behavior on thousands of votes and an assessment of interest group  
scores, we find that motions to table do not elicit higher party  
influence or provide much political cover. A desire to speed up the  
legislative process, rather than to insulate members from electoral  
scrutiny, seems to motivate the use of motions to table.},  
  number = {2},  
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    author = {Smith, Steven S. and Ostrander, Ian and Pope,
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@article{baker_term_2013,
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in the {American} {States}},
    volume = {38},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12012},
    abstract = {State governments have experienced considerable
institutional change in the last several decades. None appeared at
first glance to be as far-reaching as the legislative term limits that
were adopted by over 20 states in the 1990s. The evidence to date
suggests that term limits have indeed changed the character of many of
the states' legislatures, if not always as predicted by their
advocates. We report data on veto dynamics over the period 19892008 to
determine how term limits have impacted legislative-executive
relations. Our data both challenge and support what has become the
conventional wisdom, i.e., that term limits will weaken legislatures
relative to their governors. States with more stringent term limits
experienced fewer gubernatorial vetoes but proved more likely to
override those vetoes when they were issued. Taken together the
evidence suggests that the relationship between governors and
legislatures in the wake of term limits is more complex and variable
than scholars and others had previously thought.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Baker, Travis J. and Hedge, David M.},
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    note = {WOS:000318028200005},
    pages = {237--258}
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@article{jensen_parliamentary_2013,
    title = {Parliamentary {Questions}, {Oversight}, and {National}
{Opposition} {Status} inthe {European} {Parliament}},
    volume = {38},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12013},
    abstract = {This study examines when and why members of the
European Parliament (EP) use parliamentary questions as a form of fire
alarm oversight. We argue that the multilevel nature of the EU
political system allows members of the EP from national opposition
parties to use parliamentary questions to alert the European
Commission to governments' failures to implement EU policy.}
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Representation in the EP provides the only avenue for such oversight for national opposition parties. Using a new sample of EP parliamentary questions, we demonstrate that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to alert the Commission to violations of EU law in their own member states. These parliamentary questions may lead the Commission to take legal action against member-state governments.},

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Jensen, Christian B. and Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Slapin, Jonathan B.},
month = may,
year = {2013},
note = {WOS:000318028200006},
pages = {259--282}
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@article{drutman_inside_2013,

title = {The {Inside} {View}: {Using} the {Enron} {E}-mail {Archive} to {Understand} {Corporate} {Political} {Attention}},
volume = {38},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsg.12001},
abstract = {For decades, scholars have debated the role of corporations in American politics. To date, they have relied on either interviews or publicly disclosed spending and lobbying reports. This article presents new methods and data that enable us to consider the internal processes of corporate political attention instead. Aided by automated content analysis, this article uses more than 250,000 internal e-mails from Enron to observe its political attention between 1999 and 2002. These e-mails depict Enron's employees as focused on monitoring and formally participating in political processes, including bureaucratic processes. Only a small fraction of their political attention focused on elections.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Drutman, Lee and Hopkins, Daniel J.},
month = feb,
year = {2013},
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pages = {5--30}
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@article{lawrence_publication_2013,

title = {The {Publication} of {Precedents} and {Its} {Effect} on {Legislative} {Behavior}},
volume = {38},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsg.12002},
abstract = {What was the effect of the publication of the precedents in the House in the late nineteenth century? Empirical

analysis demonstrates a significant effect of the publication of the House precedents on the behavior of members' willingness to appeal decisions of the chair. Publication of the precedents reduced the frequency of appeals, a finding consistent with the qualitative arguments of past parliamentarians but never before demonstrated empirically. Further, parallel analysis of the Senate reveals that the publication effect found for the House is not an artifact of some secular trend in legislative behavior, doing so by showing that no similar pattern occurs in the Senate during the same period of time.},

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    number = {1},  
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@article{martin_citizen_2013,  
    title = {Citizen {Participation} and {Congressional}  
{Responsiveness}: {New} {Evidence} that {Participation} {Matters}},  
    volume = {38},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12003},  
    abstract = {This article examines the influence of citizen  
participation, specifically voter turnout, on congressional policy  
responsiveness. We argue that higher levels of citizen participation  
signal to representatives greater surveillance of their actions by  
their constituents and, thus, a higher probability of sanction.  
Representatives respond to these signals by deploying resources in  
ways that provide better intelligence of district needs and  
preferences. As a consequence, higher citizen participation is  
rewarded with enhanced policy responsiveness.},  
    number = {1},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Martin, Paul S. and Claibourn, Michele P.},  
    month = feb,  
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    title = {The {Role} of {Party}: {The} {Legislative}  
{Consequences} of {Partisan} {Electoral} {Competition}},  
    volume = {38},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.1111/lsg.12004},  
    abstract = {We examine the proposition that incentives for  
legislative organization can be explained by the nature of electoral  
competition. We argue that legislators in environments where parties
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are competitive for majority status are most likely to have delegated power to their leadership to constrain individualistic behavior within their party, which will in turn increase the spatial predictability of individual voting patterns. Using roll-call votes and district-level electoral data from the U.S. state legislatures, we show empirically that increased statewide interparty competition corresponds to more predictable voting behavior overall, while legislators from competitive districts and those in the minority party have less predictable behavior.},

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    number = {1},  
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@article{obrien_cross-national_2013,  
    title = {A {Cross}-{National} {Analysis} of {Party} {Switching}},  
    volume = {38},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12005},  
    abstract = {Though instances of party switching have been widely documented, there is little cross-national research on this phenomenon. The prevalence of switching is therefore unknown, and the factors influencing this behavior remain unclear. Using the most comprehensive dataset on party switching ever constructed, we illustrate both that interparty movement is more common than previously assumed and that there are substantial differences in its prevalence across parties. To explain this variation, we examine the relationship between legislators' motivations, institutional arrangements, and switching. We find that motivational explanations are correlated with interparty movement and that institutional arrangements exhibit only limited direct influence on switching.},
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@article{squire_introduction_2012,
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00055.x},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = nov,
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  note = {WOS:000310541200001},
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@article{woon_political_2012,
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{Congressional} {Appropriations}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00056.x},
  abstract = {Although Congress passes spending bills every year,
there is great variation in the amount of time it takes. Drawing from
rational models of bargaining, we identify factors that systematically
affect the duration of legislative bargaining in the appropriations
process. Analysis of spending bills for fiscal years 1977 to 2009
shows that delays are shorter when the ideological distance between
pairs of key players decreases and distributive content is higher, but
they are longer following an election. We find that congressional
parties matter but that intraparty conflict matters as well, which
suggests that Appropriations Committees retain significant autonomy in
Congress.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Woon, Jonathan and Anderson, Sarah},
  month = nov,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000310541200002},
  pages = {409--436}
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@article{wichowsky_district_2012,
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    doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00057.x},
    abstract = {Incumbents tend to win with higher margins in less
ideologically constrained districts. I argue that incumbents are
advantaged by this electoral landscape in part because they work
harder to cultivate a personal vote. Utilizing data on earmarks, I
find that despite winning with a larger margin of victory, these
incumbents act much like their colleagues who narrowly escaped
electoral defeat. By more accurately measuring perceptions of
electoral vulnerability, we also see stronger evidence linking
district marginality to distributive politics. Such incentives appear
to stem not from the risks of position taking, but from the weaker
party attachments among constituents.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Wichowsky, Amber},
    month = nov,
    year = {2012},
    note = {WOS:000310541200003},
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@article{branton_race_2012,
  title = {Race, {Ethnicity}, and {US} {House} {Incumbent}
{Evaluations}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00058.x},
  abstract = {This article considers evaluations of U.S. House
incumbents under conditions of racial/ethnic congruence and
incongruence. We consider whether different racial groups have ordered
preferences among nondescriptive alternatives. We pose two theoretical
models of descriptive representation and test them using pooled
National Election Study data. After controlling for the propensity to
recall the Member of Congress, we find the extent of favoritism
towards descriptive representatives varies across groups, as does the
preference ordering among representatives of different racial and
ethnic identification. No evidence of race-based judgment is uncovered
among African Americans, while Latinos and Whites demonstrate
preferences based on race and ethnicity.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Branton, Regina P. and Cassese, Erin C. and Jones,
Bradford S.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000310541200004},
  pages = {465--489}
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@article{clark_examining_2012,
  title = {Examining {Parties} as {Procedural} {Cartels}:
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{Evidence} from the {US} {States}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00059.x},
  abstract = {Procedural cartel theory states that the majority
party exerts influence over legislative outcomes through agenda
control. This research tests predictions from the party cartel theory
in five state legislatures. I assess party influence through
comparison of term-limited and nonterm-limited legislators. I argue
that term-limited legislators (who are not seeking elective office)
are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect
means to determine the existence of party influence. The results
demonstrate that party influence is present in these legislatures. I
find that party influence is magnified on the procedural, rather than
final-passage, voting record which is precisely where procedural
cartel theory predicts. I find lower levels of ideological consistency
and party discipline among members for whom the party leadership
offers the least those leaving elective office. These results provide
support for party cartel theory, demonstrating further evidence of how
parties matter in modern democracies.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Clark, Jennifer Hayes},
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  note = {WOS:000310541200005},
  pages = {491--507}
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@article{rogers_responsiveness_2012,
  title = {The {Responsiveness} of {Direct} and {Indirect}
{Elections}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00060.x},
  abstract = {Previous research argues the Seventeenth Amendment
made Senate elections more responsive. To make this claim, existing
work compares the vote-seat relationships of direct and indirect
elections before and after the Seventeenth Amendment. I argue this
approach is problematic because it does not account for regional
variation and compares elections from different time periods using
presidential instead of Senate vote. I overcome these problems by
simulating indirect elections using state legislatures partisan
compositions to evaluate the responsiveness of direct and indirect
elections after the Seventeenth Amendment. With this counterfactual
approach, my findings suggest direct elections are not necessary for
electoral responsiveness.},
  number = {4},
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    year = {2012},
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@article{cunow_reelection_2012,
  title = {Reelection and {Legislative} {Power}: {Surprising}
{Results} from {Brazil}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00061.x},
  abstract = {A diverse and growing literature ties legislative
professionalization and power to career paths. In particular, higher
rates of reelection and longer legislative careers should produce more
professional, competent, and high-quality legislatures. Legislators
have more incentives to strengthen their own institution when they
intend to remain there for a long career. Using data from the most
recent constitutional convention in Brazil, we show that legislators
with greater prospects for long careers were actually less likely to
support strengthening the legislative branch. We explain this as part
of a local equilibrium where career legislators short-term need for
pork trumped their long-term interest in a stronger institution.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Cunow, Saul and Ames, Barry and Desposato, Scott and
Renno, Lucio},
  month = nov,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000310541200007},
  pages = {533--558}
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@article{williams_institutional_2012,
  title = {Institutional {Change} and {Legislative} {Vote}
{Consensus} in {New} {Zealand}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00062.x},
  abstract = {In this research note, I discuss results from a
recent study assessing the impact that New Zealand's electoral and
legislative system reforms had on levels of vote consensus achieved in
the House of Representatives. Using a new legislative vote data set
spanning from 1987 to 2007, I find evidence that the institutional
changes fostered an increase in consensual legislative vote outcomes.
I also provide a brief theoretical explanation of the developments and
address a few issues concerning the measure of consensus used and the
interpretation of the data.},
  number = {4},
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    year = {2012},
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  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00047.x},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = aug,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000306735300001},
  pages = {273--275}
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@article{wilkins_electoral_2012,
  title = {Electoral {Security} of {Members} of the {U}.{S}.
{House}, 1900-2006},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00048.x},
  abstract = {Previous studies have documented that the increase in
the incumbency advantage in the 1960s did not decrease the probability
of defeat of incumbents in the U.S. House. I define a method for
establishing bounds on the probability of incumbent defeat and find
that it decreases significantly in the 1950s, before the rise of the
incumbency advantage. Incumbency advantage does not have a direct
relationship with incumbent defeat rates, raising questions about the
use of the incumbency advantage as a means for making inferences about
the electoral security of incumbents.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wilkins, Arjun S.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000306735300002},
  pages = {277--304}
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@article{lewis_legislative_2012,
  title = {Legislative {Term} {Limits} and {Fiscal} {Policy}
{Performance}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00049.x},
  abstract = {Do term limits impede the ability of legislators to
effectively set fiscal policy? To address this question, I examine

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state bond ratings from 1996 to 2009. Bond ratings serve as a valuable indicator of a state's fiscal performance, gauging the risk and uncertainty that investors face when buying these bonds. In addition, bond ratings are important policy ends in themselves. High bond ratings make it easier for states to borrow and raise revenue, while lowering interest rates. Results from analyses of Term-Limitedness and legislator experience suggest that term limits negatively impact a state's fiscal performance, leading to lower bond ratings.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{kirkland_multimember_2012,
  title = {Multimember {Districts}' {Effect} on {Collaboration}
between {U}. {S}. {State} {Legislators}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00050.x},
  abstract = {In this article, I demonstrate that multimember
districts form a basis for collaboration between two legislators. In
order to maximize the limited incumbency advantages they possess,
legislators from multimember districts form coalitions in an effort to
generate greater credit-claiming opportunities and policy benefits for
their district. In order to test this conception, I utilize a natural
experiment and an opportunity to observe institutional change in North
Carolina's elimination of multimember districts during the 20002002
redistricting cycle. Coupled with cross-sectional analysis of several
states that use both single-member and multimember districts,
empirical evidence strongly corroborates my conception of multimember
districts as a basis for collaboration between representatives.},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{pablo_couyoumdjian_cultivating_2012,
  title = {Cultivating {Votes} in {Rural} {Chile}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00051.x},
  abstract = {In Chile's two-member legislative districts we show
there are two groups of swing voters, one group for the first seat won
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by the governing coalition, another for the second. We build a model that allows us to identify the relative prevalence of these voters across communities. Using data on the allocation of discretionary agricultural loans, we find that communities with relatively many voters pivotal for the first seat receive more loans than they otherwise would have, but we find no systematic advantage for districts that are pivotal for the second seat.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Pablo Couyoumdjian, Juan and Londregan, John Benedict},
    month = aug,
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@article{desposato_handbook_2012,
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  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00052.x},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Desposato, Scott},
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  pages = {389--396}
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@article{fish_response_2012,
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00054.x},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fish, M. Steven and Kroenig, Matthew},
  month = aug,
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  number = {2},
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    author = {Squire, Peverill},
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    year = {2012},
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@article{pope_mapping_2012,
  title = {Mapping {Dimensions} of {Conflict} at the {Federal}
{Convention} of 1787},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00041.x},
  abstract = {Previous work on the Federal Convention of 1787
hypothesized multiple dimensions of conflict. We evaluate the
dimensionality of conflict using a new method for estimating state
delegation positions and proposals that incorporates the many divided
votes at the convention. The results suggest that three dimensions are
adequate for most analyses and the first dimensionproportional
representation in the legislaturethe most important. Finally, we
examine how the agenda unfolds by mapping changes to the status quo
throughout the convention. We conclude that, despite the lack of
parties, the nature of the conflict is quite organized with a low
number of dimensions.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Pope, Jeremy C. and Treier, Shawn},
  month = may,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000302550800002},
  pages = {145--174}
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@article{meinke_party_2012,
  title = {Party {Size} and {Constituency} {Representation}:
{Evidence} from the 19th-{Century} {U}.{S}. {House} of
{Representatives}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00042.x},
  abstract = {Research on congressional parties assumes, but has
not directly shown, that party size affects individual members'
calculations. Drawing on a key case from the nineteenth-century
Housethe secession-driven Republican hegemony of 1861this article
explores the hypothesis that party voting not only declines but also
becomes more strongly linked to constituency factors as relative party
size increases. The analysis reveals that the jump in party size
coincides with (1) a decrease in party voting among individual
continuing members, (2) a strengthening association between some
constituency factors and party voting, and (3) patterns of decline in
individual party voting that are explained in part by constituency

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measures.},
  number = {2},
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  pages = {175--197}
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@article{coman_legislative_2012,
  title = {Legislative {Behavior} in {Romania}: {The} {Effect} of
the 2008 {Romanian} {Electoral} {Reform}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00043.x},
  abstract = {This article analyzes the impact of electoral rules
on legislators rate of vote defection from their party position in
legislatures while accounting for how party-leadership strength
mediates this impact. To this end it looks at the effect of the 2008
Romanian electoral reform. The reform shifted the electoral system
from a closed-list proportional representation to one in which all
candidates run in single-member districts. The analysis finds that
because party leaders have maintained their leverage intact, the
impact of the reform was minimal, with legislators being more likely
to defect in less important votes only, in which party leaders allow
defection. Also, after the reform legislators are more likely to use
other means to impress their voters, such as legislative initiation
and cabinet questioning. These forms of behavior are more accepted by
party leaders.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Coman, Emanuel Emil},
  month = may,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000302550800004},
  pages = {199--224}
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@article{makse_strategic_2012,
  title = {Strategic {Constituency} {Manipulation} in {State}
{Legislative} {Redistricting}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00044.x},
  abstract = {Scholars often identify gerrymanders by examining
changes to districts' partisan composition. However, advantages can
also be gained by systematically varying the extent to which
incumbents' constituencies remain the same. In this article, I examine
the post-2000 redistricting in 22 state legislatures. I find that
parties, particularly in legislatures with low turnover levels, gain

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advantages from constituency manipulation, but that these advantages are counteracted by geographic redistricting regulations. Lastly, I find that ostensibly bipartisan outcomes nonetheless feature partisan constituency manipulation. These findings echo a growing literature that analyzes the geographic aspects of gerrymandering and highlight how turnover patterns motivate redistricting strategies.},

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    number = {2},
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@article{gilljam_representatives_2012,
  title = {Representatives' {Attitudes} {Toward} {Citizen}
{Protests} in {Sweden}: {The} {Impact} of {Ideology}, {Parliamentary}
{Position}, and {Experiences}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00045.x},
  abstract = {What affects political representatives' attitudes
toward citizen protests? We test the impact of political
representatives' left-right ideology, parliamentary position, and
earlier experience of citizen protests. Using data from a pioneering
survey covering all local political representatives in Sweden (n =
9,101, response rate 70\%), we examine attitudes toward controversial
noninstitutionalized forms of citizen protests. The results show that
representatives to the right show considerably lower protest
acceptance than those to the left. Representatives in office show
significantly lower levels of acceptance than those of the opposition.
Finally, the results show that representatives with more protest
experience show higher protest acceptance.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Gilljam, Mikael and Persson, Mikael and Karlsson,
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@article{carnes_does_2012,
  title = {Does the {Numerical} {Underrepresentation} of the
{Working} {Class} in {Congress} {Matter}?},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00033.x},
  abstract = {Working-class citizens have been numerically
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underrepresented in policymaking institutions throughout most of America's history. Little is known, however, about the political consequences of this enduring feature of our democratic system. This essay examines the relationship between legislators' class backgrounds and their votes on economic policy in the House of Representatives during the twentieth century. Like ordinary Americans, representatives from working-class occupations exhibit more liberal economic preferences than other legislators, especially those from profit-oriented professions. These findings provide the first evidence of a link between the descriptive and substantive representation of social classes in the United States.},

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    number = {1},
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@article{griffin_gender_2012,
  title = {A {Gender} {Gap} in {Policy} {Representation} in the
{US} {Congress}?},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00034.x},
  abstract = {In the first article to evaluate the equality of
dyadic policy representation experienced by women, we assess the
congruence between U.S. House members' roll-call votes and the policy
preferences of their female and male constituents. Employing two
measures of policy representation, we do not find a gender gap in
dyadic policy representation. However, we uncover a sizeable gender
gap favoring men in districts represented by Republicans, and a
similarly sizeable gap favoring women in districts represented by
Democrats. A Democratic majority further improves women's dyadic
representation relative to men, but having a female representative
(descriptive representation) does not.},
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    number = {1},
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  title = {The {Strategic} {Use} of {Legislative} {Voting}
{Procedures}},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00035.x},
    abstract = {Legislative votes can be taken by roll call noting the
position of each individual member or by some form of indication
(sitting or standing, shouting yea or nay, etc.) noting only an
aggregate outcome. Cameral rules define one method of voting as the
standard operating procedure and how to invoke any alternative voting
methods. We develop a series of hypotheses related to position taking
to explain why, when procedures would typically lead to a vote taken
by indication, legislators choose to vote by roll call a means that
makes it much easier for actors outside the chamber to observe the
positions taken by individual legislators and partisan blocs. With
data from Argentina and Mexico, we test these hypotheses regarding the
strategic choice of vote procedures and their relationship to observed
party unity.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Crisp, Brian F. and Driscoll, Amanda},
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@article{richardson_public_2012,
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    volume = {37},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00036.x},
    abstract = {The determinants of public approval for state
legislatures have not received much attention, but one important
finding is that more professionalized legislatures experience lower
levels of public support. We argue that this result is an artifact of
limited data and problematic model specifications. Analyzing a large
national survey sample, we demonstrate that the negative relationship
holds primarily for conservatives and to a lesser extent for moderates
but not liberals. Additionally, we find that legislative approval in
states with term limits and ballot initiatives is no different than in
states without these institutions.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Richardson, Lilliard E. and Konisky, David M. and
Milyo, Jeffrey},
    month = feb,
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{Gerrymandering}},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00037.x},
  abstract = {The census data used to redraw legislative districts
counts the country's nearly 2 million prisoners in the location of
their incarceration, rather than their previous place of residence. By
drawing these phantom populations into districts that lean heavily
toward the majority party, legislators can free up eligible voters
from those districts to be distributed among neighboring marginal
ones, thereby increasing that party's likelihood of winning additional
seats in the state legislature. An analysis of state senate district
finds that prison populations shift systematically from districts
controlled by one party to districts controlled by the other following
a switch in partisan control.},
  number = {1},
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  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00032.x},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = feb,
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  note = {WOS:000299375400001},
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  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00024.x},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = nov,
  year = {2011},
  note = {WOS:000296867500001},
  pages = {487--489}
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@article{malesky_single-party_2011,  
  title = {The {Single}-{Party} {Dictator}'s {Dilemma}:  
{Information} in {Elections} without {Opposition}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00025.x},  
  abstract = {The literature on authoritarian institutions points  
to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the  
preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however,  
authoritarians face a trade-off between gathering reliable information  
and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how  
single-party regimes manage this trade-off and the particular types of  
information available to them. Using candidate-level data from  
Vietnam, we demonstrate that single-party regimes, in particular,  
forsake information on overall regime support and strength of  
opposition in favor of information on the popularity of local notables  
and the compliance of local officials with central mandates. In  
addition, we show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex  
post fraud at achieving these goals.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Malesky, Edmund and Schuler, Paul},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2011},  
  note = {WOS:000296867500002},  
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@article{desposato_using_2011,  
  title = {Using {Cosponsorship} to {Estimate} {Ideal} {Points}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00026.x},  
  abstract = {Ideal point estimates based on roll-call vote results  
have provided leverage for a variety of theory testing efforts.  
Recently, scholars have suggested using cosponsorship data as a proxy  
for roll-call votes. Conceptually similar to roll-call votes,  
cosponsorship data are appealing for a variety of reasons. However,  
the data-generating process for cosponsorship is untheorized and  
little studied. We examine the properties of ideal point estimates  
from cosponsorship data. We find that the ability to estimate ideal  
points from cosponsorship data is contingent on the underlying data-  
generating process; reliance on such measures requires strong and  
often unrealistic assumptions.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Desposato, Scott W. and Kearney, Matthew C. and Crisp,  
Brian F.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2011},
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    note = {WOS:000296867500003},
    pages = {531--565}
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@article{grasse_influence_2011,
  title = {The {Influence} of {Lobbying} {Activity} in {State}
{Legislatures}: {Evidence} from {Wisconsin}},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00027.x},
  abstract = {This study attempts to assess the degree of influence
interest groups can exert on the state policy process, specifically
via their lobbying activities. The analysis uses data from the 2005-06
Wisconsin Legislative Session to assess the association between
lobbying activity and legislative outcomes in one state legislature.
The study finds a direct association between lobbying activities and
bill outcomes, while also exploring the potential influences of both
key political actors and public attention. Public attention is found
to reduce the effects of lobbying efforts, suggesting that lobbying is
most effective when focused on less salient issues.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Grasse, Nathan and Heidbreder, Brianne},
  month = nov,
  year = {2011},
  note = {WOS:000296867500004},
  pages = {567--589}
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@article{asmussen_female_2011,
  title = {Female and {Minority} {Judicial} {Nominees}:
{President}'s {Delight} and {Senators}' {Dismay}?},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00028.x},
  abstract = {Female and minority judicial nominations take longer
and are less likely to be confirmed, yet presidents eagerly seek such
nominations. I account for this puzzle by building a model in which
senators face costs for opposing female and minority nominees. I
predict that such nominations are more likely when the gridlock
interval is large. Using appellate nominations from 1977 to 2004, I
find that Republican presidents are more likely to pursue these
nominations during periods of high gridlock. Furthermore, accounting
for the gridlock interval erases the differences in confirmation
duration and success between female/minority nominees and white male
nominees.},
  number = {4},
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    note = {WOS:000296867500005},
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@article{kerby_its_2011,
  title = {It's {Not} {You}, {It}'s {Me}: {Determinants} of
{Voluntary} {Legislative} {Turnover} in {Canada}},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00029.x},
  abstract = {The Canadian federal parliament is unique among
Westminster parliamentary democracies due to the unusually high level
of voluntary and involuntary MP turnover that occurs at each general
election. This article builds on existing research to test the
hypothesis that the MP career duration is related to MPs' expectations
about parliamentary roles, insofar as voluntary turnover is concerned.
Data on MPs drawn from historical records collected by the Library of
Parliament and from surveys conducted in 1993 and 20011 are used to
develop an event history model which estimates the hazard of voluntary
career termination when different parliamentary roles are taken into
consideration. Findings suggest that a number of individual factors
play a role in voluntary turnover, most notably that MPs who enter
Parliament hoping to affect policy are the most likely to move on.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Kerby, Matthew and Blidook, Kelly},
  month = nov,
  year = {2011},
  note = {WOS:000296867500006},
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@article{squire_introduction_2011-1,
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00017.x},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
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  note = {WOS:000293848900001},
  pages = {335--337}
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@article{martin_electoral_2011,
  title = {Electoral {Institutions}, the {Personal} {Vote}, and
{Legislative} {Organization}},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},

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doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00018.x},
abstract = {What is the relationship between electoral
institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing
research on the U. S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives
shaped by the candidate-centered nature of congressional elections
explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature.
Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that
the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is
dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will
be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism
(pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering
extra-legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis,
combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic
legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to
cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Martin, Shane},
month = aug,
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@article{zucco_distinguishing_2011,
title = {Distinguishing {Between} {Influences} on {Brazilian}
{Legislative} {Behavior}},
volume = {36},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00019.x},
abstract = {Ideal point estimators hold the promise of
identifying multiple dimensions of political disagreement as they are
manifested in legislative voting. However, standard ideal point
estimates do not distinguish between ideological motivations and
voting inducements from parties, coalitions, or the executive. In this
article we describe a general approach for hierarchically identifying
an ideological dimension using an auxiliary source of data. In the
case we consider, we use an anonymous survey of Brazilian legislators
to identify party positions on a left-right ideology dimension. We
then use this data to distinguish ideological motivations from other
determinants of roll-call behavior for eight presidential-legislative
periods covering more than 20 years of Brazilian politics. We find
that there exists an important nonideological government-opposition
dimension, with the entrance and exit of political parties from the
governing coalition appearing as distinct shifts in ideal point on
this second dimension. We conjecture that the Brazilian president's
control over politically important resources is the source of this
dimension of conflict, which has recently become far more important in
explaining roll-call voting than the ideological dimension.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    author = {Zucco, Cesar and Lauderdale, Benjamin E.},
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@article{battista_party_2011,
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    volume = {36},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00020.x},
    abstract = {We extend Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart's (2001)
method of measuring party influence over roll-call voting to the
comparative state legislative context. Examining 27 state lower
chambers, we find that overall parties exert detectable influence on
44\% of all roll calls and 69\% of close votes, but that the incidence
of party influence varies strongly across chambers. Taking advantage
of the comparative leverage the state context brings, we find that
party influence responds significantly to measures of legislative
careerism and state socioeconomic diversity, with majority size
playing some role. The effect of preference polarization is
complicated and conditioned by challenges facing the legislature, and
we find results both challenging and conditionally supporting the
conditional party government account.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Battista, James Coleman and Richman, Jesse T.},
    month = aug,
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    note = {WOS:000293848900004},
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@article{bratton_networks_2011,
    title = {Networks in the {Legislative} {Arena}: {How} {Group}
{Dynamics} {Affect} {Cosponsorship}},
    volume = {36},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00021.x},
    abstract = {In this study, we explore the determinants of
cosponsorship activity within state legislatures. Utilizing a social
dynamic framework, we develop and test a model of the interplay of the
activities of sponsorship and cosponsorship that includes both
individual-level and social network characteristics as determinants of
agenda-setting behavior; the latter demonstrating how collaboration
and mutual interests shape the agenda-setting process. We find several
consistent factors that influence the frequency of cosponsorship
activity: (1) ideological distance, (2) proximity of legislators'
districts, (3) homophily (similar characteristics such as race,
gender, and ethnicity), and (4) transitivity (the idea that friends of

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my friends are also my friends).},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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in {US} {House} {Elections}},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00022.x},
  abstract = {Research on candidate competition has focused on how
much context matters in emergence decisions and election outcomes. If
a candidate has previously held elected office, one additional
consideration that may influence entry decisions is the relative
degree of overlap between the candidate's current constituency and the
"new" set of voters she is seeking to represent. Using GIS software,
we derive a measure of the challenger's personal vote by focusing on
constituency congruency between state legislative and congressional
districts. Results suggest state legislators are more likely to run
for a seat in the U. S. House if constituency congruency is relatively
high.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Carson, Jamie L. and Crespin, Michael H. and Eaves,
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  number = {2},
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{Policy} {Committee} {Hearings}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00010.x},  
  abstract = {The exchange of rationales among debate participants  
is necessary for legitimacy in a deliberative democracy. I show that  
witnesses in congressional committee hearings tend to use falsifiable  
rationales when they encounter moderate levels of disagreement and  
shift to nonfalsifiable rationales when they encounter extreme  
disagreement. I use data from a coding of hearings testimony on the  
Medicare program, held between 1990 and 2003, as well as from a survey  
of participating witnesses measuring their perceptions of disagreement  
at the hearing. The results identify conditions that enhance  
falsifiable discourse and help to establish the empirical grounding  
deliberative democratic theory.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Esterling, Kevin M.},  
  month = may,  
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@article{konisky_effects_2011,  
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{Legislator} {Performance}},  
  volume = {36},  
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00011.x},  
  abstract = {Political competition lies at the core of  
representative democracy. Yet, uncompetitive elections and uncontested  
races are widespread in the United States, particularly at the state  
level. In this article, we analyze the consequences of uncontested  
elections on lawmaking activity. Our primary hypothesis is that  
legislators who run unopposed are less active lawmakers than those who  
were selected through competitive elections. Studying roll-call vote  
participation and bill introduction and enactment for most of the U.S.  
states for 1999-2000, we find that state legislators elected in  
unopposed elections perform more poorly compared to their colleagues  
elected in competitive contests.},  
  number = {2},  
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  author = {Konisky, David M. and Ueda, Michiko},  
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@article{fisk_superfluous_2011,  
  title = {Superfluous or {Mischievous}: {Evaluating} the  
{Determinants} of {Government} {Defeats} in {Second} {Chambers}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00012.x},  
  abstract = {Governments often extol the policy refining functions  
of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems,  
governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their  
ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine  
government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a  
function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original  
dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for  
governments to act strategically to avoid defeats (even when facing a  
friendly chamber), while opposition majorities and a weaker ability to  
sanction members who deviate from their party's position increase the  
likelihood of defeat.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Fisk, David},  
  month = may,  
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@article{trounstine_evidence_2011,  
  title = {Evidence of a {Local} {Incumbency} {Advantage}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00013.x},  
  abstract = {Incumbents are highly likely to win reelection at all  
levels of government, but scholars continue to debate the extent to  
which serving in office has a causal effect on winning. For city  
council elections it is unclear whether or not we should predict a  
causal effect at all. City councilors may not regularly seek  
reelection, and any apparent advantage could be entirely attributable  
to preexisting qualities rather than incumbency. This article uses a  
regression discontinuity design to provide evidence that city council  
incumbents are more likely to run and win their next elections because  
they served a term in office.},  
  number = {2},  
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  author = {Trounstine, Jessica},  
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@article{herrnson_issue_2011,  
  title = {Issue {Voting} and {Partisan} {Defections} in  
{Congressional} {Elections}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00014.x},  
  abstract = {In every election cycle the fate of some candidates  
is determined by partisans who defect from their usual voting habits  
to cast a ballot for the candidate of the opposing party. Defections  
in congressional elections have been attributed to incumbency,  
presidential approval, partisan strength, and factors related to  
individual voters. Our systematic assessment of the impact of issues  
on voter defections shows that party-owned issues and performance  
issues associated favorably with one party affect the likelihood of  
partisan defections. The results suggest that congressional candidates  
can use issues to draw supporters away from the opposing party and to  
keep partisan voters loyal.},  
  number = {2},  
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@article{swearingen_is_2011,  
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{Maintenance} in the {U}. {S}. {House} of {Representatives}},  
  volume = {36},  
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00015.x},  
  abstract = {Literature on open-seat elections has focused on the  
individual attributes of a candidate and/or institutional  
arrangements. When a seat becomes an open contest could be a  
significant indicator as to how likely the incumbent party is able to  
maintain the seat. Examining data on open U.S. House seats from 1996  
to 2008, we use OLS regression and logistic regression analysis,  
finding that time is a significant predictor for incumbent party fund-  
raising and seat maintenance. We conclude that political parties have  
an interest in encouraging members of Congress to announce their  
retirement early in the election cycle.},  
  number = {2},  
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  author = {Swearingen, C. Douglas and Jatkowski, Walt},  
  month = may,  
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00002.x},  
  abstract = {Under what conditions, if any, does the mass  
electorate hold congressional members accountable for their records on  
specific issues? We examine this question on the issue of crime, for  
which salience has varied substantially and opinion has favored  
Republicans, and the environment, for which salience has not varied  
much and voters have favored Democrats. Because different parametric  
specifications produce divergent findings, we utilize matching  
analysis in addition to ordinary least squares. The tests suggest that  
issue accountability exists even controlling for a member's overall  
record. However, such accountability depends crucially on issue  
salience and a member's partisan affiliation.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Minozzi, William and Reveley,  
Jessica Bonney},  
  month = feb,  
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@article{miller_reexamining_2011,  
  title = {Reexamining the {Institutional} {Effects} of {Term}  
{Limits} in {US} {State} {Legislatures}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00004.x},  
  abstract = {Research on term limits suggests that they have  
substantial consequences for the power of legislatures vis-a-vis the  
executive and interest groups and for the relationship between leaders  
and rank-and-file members within a chamber. Existing work, however,  
has not accounted for the actual power of relevant state actors. We  
contribute to this research by examining the effect of term limits on  
the influence of institutional actors conditional on the existing  
political power structure in a state. The inclusion of controls for  
the direct and moderating effect of actual institutional power  
suggests some significant extensions of previous findings regarding  
the institutional effects of term limits.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Miller, Susan M. and Nicholson-Crotty, Jill and  
Nicholson-Crotty, Sean},  
  month = feb,  
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@article{herrnson_impact_2011,  
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{Congress} on {Presidential} {Support} in the {US} {House} of  
{Representatives}},  
  volume = {36},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00005.x},  
  abstract = {Presidential influence is partly a function of the  
partisan, economic, and international context within which the  
president governs. Presidents arc, however, more than bystanders  
relying on the political milieu for policy opportunities. Recent  
scholarship demonstrates that presidents consciously influence this  
milieu and build political capital by campaigning for congressional  
candidates. We contribute to this literature by assessing the effects  
of presidential campaigning on legislative support for two presidents  
who governed under extremely dissimilar circumstances: Bill Clinton in  
the 106th Congress and George W Bush in the 108th Congress. We find  
evidence of campaign effects on congressional policymaking during both  
administrations.},  
  number = {1},  
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  author = {Herrnson, Paul S. and Morris, Irwin L. and Mctague,  
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  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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@article{lindstaedt_balancing_2011,  
  title = {Balancing {Competing} {Demands}: {Position} {Taking} and  
{Election} {Proximity} in the {European} {Parliament}},  
  volume = {36},  
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  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00003.x},
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    abstract = {Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have
incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how
members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands
from national parties and European party groups. We examine
ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how
election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of
legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate,
national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus
weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item-response analysis
of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Lindstaedt, Rene and Slapin, Jonathan B. and Vander
Wielen, Ryan J.},
    month = feb,
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@article{lowe_scaling_2011,
    title = {Scaling {Policy} {Preferences} from {Coded} {Political}
{Texts}},
    volume = {36},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00006.x},
    abstract = {Scholars estimating policy positions from political
texts typically code words or sentences and then build left-right
policy scales based on the relative frequencies of text units coded
into different categories. Here we reexamine such scales and propose a
theoretically and linguistically superior alternative based on the
logarithm of odds-ratios. We contrast this scale with the current
approach of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), showing that our
proposed logit scale avoids widely acknowledged flaws in previous
approaches. We validate the new scale using independent expert
surveys. Using existing CMP data, we show how to estimate more
distinct policy dimensions, for more years, than has been possible
before, and make this dataset publicly available. Finally, we draw
some conclusions about the future design of coding schemes for
political texts.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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Laver, Michael},
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@article{loewenberg_malcolm_2010,
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    title = {{MALCOLM} {E}. {JEWELL}, 1928-2010 {In} {Memoriam}},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
    month = nov,
    year = {2010},
    note = {WOS:000284029700002},
    pages = {455--455}
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@article{vander_wielen_influence_2010,
    title = {The {Influence} of {Conference} {Committees} on {Policy}
{Outcomes}},
    volume = {35},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    abstract = {This article examines the effect that the spatial
location of conference committees relative to the parent bodies has on
congressional policy outcomes. The article presents a theoretical
model proposing that conferees choose policies that maximize their
policy utility subject to the constraint of gaining House and Senate
majorities on the conference report. I tested the model using
conferences on bills associated with votes that generated liberal-
conservative divisions. The results confirm that, under specified
conditions, conferees pull outcomes away from the parent bodies toward
conferee preferences.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Vander Wielen, Ryan J.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2010},
    note = {WOS:000284029700004},
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@article{sqwire_introduction_2010,
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    volume = {35},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298010793322393},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Squire, Peverill},
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@article{yoshinaka_appointment_2010,

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    title = {The {Appointment} of {Rapporteurs} in the {European}
{Parliament}},
    volume = {35},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298010793322384},
    abstract = {Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making
in many multiparty legislatures. It is not clear, however, whether
these rapporteurs are best characterized as partisan animals or
technical experts seeking consensus in nonmajoritarian institutions.
We addressed this question by examining which members of the European
Parliament become repeat rapporteurs. Using an original dataset
comprising all committee reports from the 4th and 5th European
Parliaments (1994-2004), we found that the report allocation process
provides a way to pursue partisan policy goals within a multiparty,
consensual institution that rewards both coalition building and
expertise.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Yoshinaka, Antoine and McElroy, Gail and Bowler,
Shaun},
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@article{aksoy_it_2010,
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and {Legislative} {Decision} {Making}},
    volume = {35},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298010793322375},
    abstract = {This article empirically illustrates the value of
coalition formation in legislative bargaining. I argue that
legislators' potential to form powerful coalitions, their coalition
potential, is essential to their ability to obtain preferred policy
outcomes. Using data on the European Union's legislative process, I
show that coalition potential significantly increases legislators'
success. Moreover, the value of coalition potential depends on the
voting rules used to pass legislation. For example, under the
unanimity voting rule, the importance of coalition potential is
insignificant because of the veto power held by each legislator.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{engstrom_impact_2010,  
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{Campaign} {Contributions}},  
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  doi = {10.3162/036298010793322348},  
  abstract = {This article examines the connection between unified  
party government and campaign contributions. Our central argument is  
that unified party government confers a substantial, but previously  
overlooked, fundraising advantage to intra-chamber majority parties.  
We examined data on corporate campaign contributions to U.S. House  
incumbents and state legislators in 17 different legislative chambers.  
We found a strong fundraising benefit accruing to intra-chamber  
majority status across all of these legislatures, but the benefit is  
heavily conditioned by the presence of unified or divided government.  
The results offer important implications for our understanding of the  
financial balance of power in American politics and for the vast  
scholarly literature on unified party government.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Engstrom, Erik J. and Ewell, William},  
  month = nov,  
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  note = {WOS:000284029700006},  
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@article{feinstein_dynasty_2010,  
  title = {The {Dynasty} {Advantage}: {Family} {Ties} in  
{Congressional} {Elections}},  
  volume = {35},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298010793322366},  
  abstract = {Political dynasties, families in which multiple  
members have held elected office, commonly feature in the U.S.  
Congress. I explored the electoral origins of this phenomenon and  
determined that members of political dynasties have a significant  
advantage over first-generation politicians in open-seat House  
elections. Using an original dataset containing candidate- and  
district-level covariates for all candidates in open-seat House  
contests between 1994 and 2006, I found that dynastic politicians  
enjoy "brand name advantages," giving them a significant edge over  
comparable nondynastic opponents. In contrast, hypotheses concerning  
potential advantages stemming from past political experience and  
fundraising ability yield null results.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Feinstein, Brian D.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2010},  
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    pages = {571--598}
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  issn = {0362-9805},
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  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = aug,
  year = {2010},
  note = {WOS:000281049500001},
  pages = {303--305}
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@article{roberts_development_2010,
  title = {The {Development} of {Special} {Orders} and {Special}
{Rules} in the {US} {House}, 1881-1937},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010792069161},
  abstract = {The modern Committee on Rules plays a critical role
in structuring the agenda of the U.S. House of Representatives. In
fact, resolutions from the Committee on Rules are the primary means
through which controversial legislation reaches the House floor. But
the Committee on Rules did not play a role in shaping the floor agenda
until the 1880s and, despite intense scrutiny of episodes such as the
institution of the Reed rules and the revolt against Speaker Cannon,
our understanding of the role of the Committee on Rules is limited and
skewed heavily toward the post World War II era. This limitation is
unfortunate, because special rules play a starring role in major
theories of legislative organization. In this article, I present
analysis of the usage and historical development of special rules in
the House, and I offer findings from my empirical analysis of the
determinants of rule choice from 1881 to 1937. A nuanced interrogation
of new data on special rules in this era reveals support for committee
specialization and conditional party government as motives for rule
choice in this era.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Roberts, Jason M.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2010},
  note = {WOS:000281049500002},
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@article{baekgaard_self-selection_2010,
  title = {Self-selection or {Socialization}? {A} {Dynamic}

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{Analysis} of {Committee} {Member} {Preferences}},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010792069189},
  abstract = {Theories on committee power assert that legislators
self-select to committees and therefore have preferences regarding the
policy issues under the committees' jurisdictions that differ from the
preferences of noncommittee members. I argue that preference outliers
may be shaped both by processes of self-selection and by endogenous
processes within committees. Contrary to previous examinations of
committee member preferences, the study utilizes a dynamic approach to
examine the development of preferences over time in order to separate
self-selection from endogenous processes. Analyzing the development in
the spending preferences of 859 Danish local politicians over three
different election periods, I find that politicians increasingly
prefer spending on their committees' jurisdictions over time, but
their preferences do not change to the same extent on policy issues
beyond their committees' jurisdictions. The findings point to the
importance of endogenous processes in committees. Hence, committees
may be outliers for very different reasons than those proposed by
mainstream theory.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Baekgaard, Martin},
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@article{jessie_are_2010,
  title = {Are {Congressional} {Leaders} {Middlepersons} or
{Extremists}? {Yes}.},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010792069170},
  abstract = {Influential theories of legislative organization
predict that congressional leaders will be selected from the center of
their parties. Yet previous research has generally rejected the
"middleperson hypothesis," finding leaders to be extremists. We
challenged these findings by testing more-appropriate null hypotheses
via Monte Carlo simulation. We found that congressional leaders (and
leadership candidates as a whole) tend to be closer to their party's
median than would occur by chance, but leaders also tend to be
selected from the left of the median for Democrats and to the right
for Republicans. Compared to the pool of announced candidates for
leadership positions, winners are not ideologically distinctive. This
result suggests that factors affecting the ideology of leaders tend to
operate more at the candidate emergence stage.},
  number = {3},
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    author = {Jessee, Stephen and Malhotra, Neil},
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@article{zigerell_senator_2010,
    title = {Senator {Opposition} to {Supreme} {Court} {Nominations}:
{Reference} {Dependence} on the {Departing} {Justice}},
    volume = {35},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298010792069152},
    abstract = {Research indicates that senators evaluate U.S.
Supreme Court nominations on two ideological dimensions: the distance
between themselves and the nominee, and the potential effect
confirmation would have on the Court median. My analysis of
nominations from 1968 to 2006 provides evidence that senators are also
influenced by the ideological contrast between the nominee and the
departing justice.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Zigerell, L. J.},
    month = aug,
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    note = {WOS:000281049500005},
    pages = {393--416}
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@article{shor_bridge_2010,
    title = {A {Bridge} to {Somewhere}: {Mapping} {State} and
{Congressional} {Ideology} on a {Cross}-institutional {Common}
{Space}},
    volume = {35},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298010792069198},
    abstract = {Researchers face two major problems when applying
ideal point estimation techniques to state legislatures. First,
longitudinal roll-call data are scarce. Second, even when such data
exist, scaling ideal points within a single state is an inadequate
approach. No comparisons can be made between these estimates and those
for other state legislatures or for Congress. Our project provides a
solution. We exploit a new comparative dataset of state legislative
roll calls to generate ideal points for legislators. Taking advantage
of the fact that state legislators sometimes go on to serve in
Congress, we create a common ideological scale. Using these bridge
actors, we estimate state legislative ideal points in congressional
common space for 11 states. We present our results and illustrate how
these scores can be used to address important topics in state and
legislative politics.},
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Squire, Peverill},
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@article{stiglitz_agenda_2010,
title = {Agenda {Control} in {Congress}: {Evidence} from
{Cutpoint} {Estimates} and {Ideal} {Point} {Uncertainty}},
volume = {35},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298010791170187},
abstract = {This article develops two new tests of partisan and
nonpartisan theories of lawmaking based on cutpoint estimates and
measures of uncertainty about ideal point estimates. Theories of
congressional organization make explicit predictions about the absence
of cutpoints in certain intervals of the policy space. We test these
theories with new cutpoint estimates and exploit the fact that the
ideal points of members located far from the density of cutpoints are
necessarily estimated with less precision. We validate our empirical
approach through simulations, and we test three models of
congressional organization using House roll call data from the 86th
through the 110th Congresses (1959-2008). We find strong evidence of
partisan agenda control. Our findings exhibit modest differences from
the results predicted by Cox and McCubbins's party cartel theory:
negative agenda control increases over time and is negatively
correlated with the size of the blackout region.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Stiglitz, Edward H. and Weingast, Barry R.},
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@article{miller_parties_2010,  
  title = {Parties, {Preferences}, and {Petitions}: {Discharge}  
{Behavior} in the {Modern} {House}},  
  volume = {35},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298010791170141},  
  abstract = {Although discharge petitions lie at the confluence of  
personal preferences, committee prerogatives, and party leadership in  
Congress, these procedures have received little scholarly scrutiny. We  
capitalize on the public nature of petition signatures since 1993 to  
examine the behavior of the most cross-pressured members in discharge  
battles: bill sponsors and cosponsors belonging to the majority party  
who personally prefer the bills they have sponsored but who face party  
pressure not to sign the petitions that threaten the leadership's  
control of the legislative agenda. After controlling for personal  
preferences, we find a statistically significant partisan effect in  
the U.S. House, which further illuminates the "Where's the party?"  
debate.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Miller, Susan M. and Overby, L. Marvin},  
  month = may,  
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@article{richman_logic_2010,  
  title = {The {Logic} of {Legislative} {Leadership}:  
{Preferences}, {Challenges}, and the {Speaker}'s {Powers}},  
  volume = {35},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298010791170169},  
  abstract = {Principal agent theory implies that legislators will  
delegate power to a leader only when they need the leader's help and  
the leader can be expected to provide satisfactory help if granted  
power. This study is the first to evaluate the implied interaction  
between legislators' need for help and the degree to which legislators  
and leaders have similar preferences. By analyzing the Speaker's  
powers in the U.S. states, I arrived at three key conclusions. First,  
institutional leadership power responds to the interaction between  
preference alignment and policymaking challenges. Traditionally  
expected effects only appear when both alignment and challenges are  
relatively high. Second, professionalization causes weaker leadership  
powers. Finally, electoral competition correlates with stronger  
appointment, committee, and resource powers, but weaker procedural  
powers.},  
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    month = may,
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@article{langston_governors_2010,
  title = {Governors and "{Their}" {Deputies}: {New} {Legislative}
{Principals} in {Mexico}},
  volume = {35},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298010791170132},
  abstract = {Many studies on legislatures around the world have
not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often
important political figures and can exert strong influence on state
politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine
that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians
need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use
their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, the caucus
leaders, into working for their states' interests on fiscally relevant
issues, especially the annual budget. On all other issues, the
governors delegate their deputies' votes to the party's legislative
leadership.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Langston, Joy},
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@article{lewendusky_measuring_2010,
  title = {Measuring {Aggregate}-{Level} {Ideological}
{Heterogeneity}},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010791170196},
  abstract = {Ideological heterogeneity is a key variable for the
study of legislative and electoral politics. Scholars have long
recognized that members with more ideologically heterogeneous
constituencies behave differently than members with more homogeneous
ones. Empirical tests of these theories, however, have typically been
stymied by a lack of appropriate measures. We corrected this
shortcoming by developing a measurement model for ideological
heterogeneity, and we used our method to generate estimates for the 50
U.S. states and 435 congressional districts. Beyond the specific
results presented here, a key contribution of our model is its
flexibility: our technique can be used to produce similar estimates in
a variety of contexts.},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{smith_special_2010,
    title = {Special {Elections} to the {US} {House} of
{Representatives}: {A} {General} {Election} {Barometer}?},
    volume = {35},
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    abstract = {Vacancies in the U.S. House of Representatives are
filled using special elections. These elections occur off the usual
American electoral cycle, and their results are routinely portrayed by
the American mass media as indications of what to expect in the next
general election. We examined the predictive power of special
elections results with respect to the general election outcomes for
the U.S. House of Representatives from 1900 to 2008. We found that
special elections that yield a change in partisan control do have
predictive power regarding general election results.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{squire_introduction_2010-3,
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@article{gaylord_delegation_2010,
    title = {Delegation and {Defensive} {Legislative} {Strategies} in
{Brazil}},
    volume = {35},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298010790821969},
    abstract = {In the course of the legislative process, legislators
choose how much policy discretion to delegate to the executive branch.
Uncertainty about policy outcomes and bureaucratic intentions weighs
heavily in such decisions. In Brazil, executive control over the
budget creates uncertainty about the availability of discretionary
spending, which results in comparatively high levels of delegation in
the legislature's direct-spending decisions. I demonstrate that
sidelining the legislature from the budget in order to insulate
government spending from political pressures diminishes the value of
legislative work in Brazil and reinforces historical patterns of
policymaking centered on the federal executive.},
    number = {1},
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@article{melo_delegation_2010,
    title = {Delegation {Dilemmas}: {Coalition} {Size}, {Electoral}
{Risk}, and {Regulatory} {Governance} in {New} {Democracies}},
    volume = {35},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298010790822003},
    abstract = {This article addresses the determinants of regulatory
agency design in multiparty-coalition governments. Previous research
has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context-specific
findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and
coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy
of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational
level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief executives enjoy
only acquires explanatory power when it is interacted with government
turnover. Because Brazilian governors have great ability to build
oversized majority coalitions, coalition strength influences the
governor's strategy when the governor faces credible threats from
rival elite groups.},
    number = {1},
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    author = {Melo, Marcus Andre and Pereira, Carlos and Werneck,
Heitor},
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@article{sarbaugh-thompson_legislators_2010,
    title = {Legislators and {Administrators}: {Complex}}
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{Relationships} {Complicated} by {Term} {Limits}},
  volume = {35},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298010790821978},
  abstract = {State legislators' relationships with administrators
have received scant attention in the literature despite the importance
of these relationships for delivery of public services. We explored
whether or not the legislator-administrator relationship in one
professional state legislature resembles Congress's oversight of
federal agencies. We also assessed whether or not term limits changed
this relationship. Our findings indicate that monitoring state
agencies was a low priority for this legislature, and it dropped even
lower after term limits were implemented. More specifically, we found
some institutional roles to be associated with legislators placing a
higher priority on monitoring, especially before term limits, whereas
some individual motives were associated with a lower priority,
especially after term limits. Legislators exhibited more confusion
about the process of monitoring after term limits.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Sarbaugh-Thompson, Marjorie and Strate, John and
LeRoux, Kelly and Elling, Richard C. and Thompson, Lyke and Elder,
Charles D.},
  month = feb,
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@article{hayes_redistricting_2010,
  title = {Redistricting, {Responsiveness}, and {Issue}
{Attention}},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010790821996},
  abstract = {We explored the extent to which legislators respond
to redistricting-induced demographic shifts in their constituencies.
Our analyses focused on the behavior of members of the House of
Representatives who served in the terms preceding and following the
redistricting that took place in the early 2000s (namely, the 107th
and 108th Congresses). We investigated how demographic shifts relate
to the content of legislators' subsequent agendas (the legislation
that members introduce and cosponsor) and the nature of members'
voting patterns (their interest group voting scores). Our results
indicate that responsiveness is widespread, but important variation
exists in the patterns for agenda activities and roll-call voting.},
  number = {1},
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  author = {Hayes, Matthew and Hibbing, Matthew V. and Sulkin,
Tracy},
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    year = {2010},
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@article{harward_calculus_2010,
  title = {The {Calculus} of {Cosponsorship} in the {US} {Senate}},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010790821950},
  abstract = {We investigated why a legislator would be willing to
vote "yea" on final passage of a bill but would choose not to
cosponsor that bill. We tested a series of hypotheses regarding the
cosponsorship decisions of individual senators, using a dataset that
includes every major initiative that was introduced and received a
floor vote in the Senate between 1975 and 2000. We found that senators
are more likely to cosponsor bills when their preferences diverge from
the Senate median but are closer to those of the bill's sponsor. Also,
senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when they sponsor a higher
number of bills overall, when they become more connected with
colleagues, and when their constituents increase demand for
legislation within particular policy areas. Senators are less likely
to cosponsor bills if they received a higher percentage of the general
election vote in their most recent election.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Harward, Brian M. and Moffett, Kenneth W.},
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@article{loewenberg_introduction_2009,
  title = {Introduction},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298009789869682},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = nov,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000272502100001},
  pages = {451--453}
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@article{schickler_agenda_2009,
  title = {Agenda {Control}, {Majority} {Party} {Power}, and the
{House} {Committee} on {Rules}, 1937-52},
  volume = {34},

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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    abstract = {The role of the U.S. House Rules Committee is
consequential for theories of congressional parties, yet its role
during the "conservative coalition" era is not well understood. We
systematically analyzed the politics surrounding all special rules
considered in Democratic Congresses from 1937 to 1952. We found that
Rules repeatedly used its agenda power to push to the floor
conservative initiatives that were opposed by the Democratic
administration, the Rules Committee chair, and most northern
Democrats, especially in Congresses that followed Republican election
gains. The 44 conservative initiatives we identified include many of
the most important policy issues considered during the period. Our
findings challenge the idea that the majority party has consistently
enjoyed a veto over which initiatives reach the floor, and they
underscore the limits of roll-call-vote analysis in assessments of
agenda control.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Schickler, Eric and Pearson, Kathryn},
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    note = {WOS:000272502100002},
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@article{parker_making_2009,
  title = {Making a {Good} {Impression}: {Resource} {Allocation},
{Home} {Styles}, and {Washington} {Work}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009789869709},
  abstract = {Members of Congress engage in a variety of
representational activities, but existing research suggests that the
effect of these activities on reelection margins is mixed. Reframing
the question, we examined whether or not constituents notice the home
styles of members and members' efforts to communicate their activities
through the allocation of official resources. Combining new data on
members' office expenditures with data from the American National
Election Studies, we found evidence that constituents perceive the
representational activities of their members in a meaningful fashion.
Franking, office expenditures, and travel back home to the district
provide positive benefits to incumbents, shaping how constituents view
these members and their activities.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Parker, David C. W. and Goodman, Craig},
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@article{lublin_has_2009,  
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{Usefulness}? {In} a {Word}, "{No}"},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009789869673},  
  abstract = {Race-conscious redistricting remains crucial to the  
election of an overwhelming number of African American and Latino  
officials. We present descriptive evidence, easily interpretable by  
nonspecialists, from recent elections at the state and federal levels  
to support our claims. The Voting Rights Act remains a valuable tool  
to protect the ability of minorities to elect their preferred  
candidates.},  
  number = {4},  
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  author = {Lublin, David and Brunell, Thomas L. and Grofman,  
Bernard and Handley, Lisa},  
  month = nov,  
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@article{carroll_comparing_2009,  
  title = {Comparing {NOMINATE} and {IDEAL}: {Points} of  
{Difference} and {Monte} {Carlo} {Tests}},  
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  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009789869727},  
  abstract = {Empirical models of spatial voting allow us to infer  
legislators' locations in an abstract policy or ideological space  
using their roll-call votes. Over the past 25 years, these models have  
provided new insights about the U.S. Congress, and legislative  
behavior more generally. There are now a number of alternative models,  
estimators, and software packages that researchers can use to recover  
latent issue or ideological spaces from voting data. These different  
tools usually produce substantively similar estimates, but important  
differences also arise. We investigated the sources of observed  
differences between two leading methods, NOMINATE and IDEAL. Using  
data from the 1994 to 1997 Supreme Court and the 109th Senate, we  
determined that while some observed differences in the estimates  
produced by each model stem from fundamental differences in the  
models' underlying behavioral assumptions, others arise from arbitrary  
differences in implementation. Our Monte Carlo experiments revealed  
that neither model has a clear advantage over the other in the  
recovery of legislator locations or roll-call midpoints in either  
large or small legislatures.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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author = {Carroll, Royce and Lewis, Jeffrey B. and Lo, James and  
Poole, Keith T. and Rosenthal, Howard},  
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@article{clinton_simulate_2009,  
title = {To {Simulate} or {NOMINATE}?},  
volume = {34},  
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doi = {10.3162/036298009789869691},  
abstract = {Carroll et al. (2009) Summarize the similarities and  
differences between the NOMINATE and IDEAL methods of fitting spatial  
voting models to binary roll-call data. As those authors note, for the  
class of problems with which either NOMINATE and the Bayesian  
quadratic-normal model can be used, the ideal point estimates almost  
always coincide, and when they do not, the discrepancy is due to the  
somewhat arbitrary identification and computational constraints  
imposed by each method. There are, however, many problems for which  
the Bayesian quadratic-normal model can be easily generalized, so as  
to address a broad array of questions and take advantage of additional  
data. Given the nature and source of the differences between NOMINATE  
and the Bayesian approach-as well as the fact that both approaches are  
approximations of the decision-making processes being modeled-we  
believe that it is preferable to choose the more flexible Bayesian  
approach.},
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number = {4},  
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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volume = {34},  
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number = {3},  
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},  
month = aug,  
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@article{butler_effect_2009,  
  title = {The {Effect} of the {Size} of {Voting} {Bloc}s on  
{Incumbents}' {Roll}-{Call} {Voting} and the {Asymmetric}  
{Polarization} of {Congress}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897763},  
  abstract = {Candidates face a trade-off in the general election  
between taking a more-moderate position that appeals to swing voters  
and a more-extreme position that appeals to voters in the party's  
base. The threat of abstention by voters ill the party's base if their  
candidate takes a position too moderate for them moves candidates to  
take more-extreme positions. I discuss hypotheses regarding how this  
trade-off affects candidate positioning and describe my tests of those  
hypotheses using data on House members in the 107th Congress and  
Senate members for the period 1982-2004. I then present data on how  
the distribution of voters in the electorate has changed over the past  
three decades and discuss how, in light of my empirical findings,  
these changes might explain the observed pattern of asymmetric  
polarization in Congress in recent decades.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Butler, Daniel M.},  
  month = aug,  
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  pages = {297--318}  
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@article{parker_divided_2009,  
  title = {Divided {We} {Quarrel}: {The} {Politics} of  
{Congressional} {Investigations}, 1947-2004},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897790},  
  abstract = {Are congressional committee investigations into  
alleged executive-branch wrongdoing more common during periods of  
divided government'? We analyze original data tracking congressional  
committee investigations into alleged fraud, waste, and abuse by the  
executive branch between 1947 and 2004. Countering David Mayhew's  
(1991) empirical finding, we show that divided government generates  
more and more-intensive congressional investigations, but this  
relationship is contingent on partisan and temporal factors. Our  
findings shed new light on the shifting dynamic between partisan  
institutional politics and congressional oversight.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Parker, David C. W. and Dull, Matthew},  
  month = aug,  
  year = {2009},  
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    pages = {319--345}
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@article{lazarus_different_2009,
  title = {Different {Houses}: {The} {Distribution} of {Earmarks}
in the {US} {House} and {Senate}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897772},
  abstract = {Nearly all studies of pork-barrel politics in the
U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how
politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward
factors that are active in the House. This article highlights
differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We
identify four important differences between the House and Senate,
generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the
distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data
from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers
for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four
hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different
motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical
accounts of pork-barrel spending need to account for these
interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of
legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important
differences in legislative structure and organization.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lazarus, Jeffrey and Steigerwalt, Amy},
  month = aug,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000269176500004},
  pages = {347--373}
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@article{battista_why_2009,
  title = {Why {Information}? {Choosing} {Committee}
{Informativeness} in {US} {State} {Legislatures}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897808},
  abstract = {Using a new dataset drawn from American state
legislatures, I modeled the informativeness of legislative committees
as a choice over institutions. I found higher informativeness to be
associated with better preparedness for information transfer, more-
partisan chambers, and higher demand for information combined with
greater incentives to control committee assignments. These
associations shed light on congressional committee informativeness. A
simple model of committee informativeness can predict the
informativeness of the U.S. House's committees.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

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author = {Battista, James Coleman},
month = aug,
year = {2009},
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@article{casellas_institutional_2009,
  title = {The {Institutional} and {Demographic} {Determinants} of
{Latino} {Representation}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897781},
  abstract = {Under what conditions are Latino candidates elected
to Congress and state legislatures? How much does the ethnic
composition of a district affect the chances that a Latino candidate
will be elected in that district? Latinos constitute the single
largest minority group in the country, one that is growing at an
exponential rate. Post-2000 redistricting created more majority-Latino
districts, but the absolute number of Latino legislators did not
increase correspondingly. My analysis demonstrates that states with
citizen legislatures and with higher legislative turnover rates are
more conducive to the election of Latino candidates than are other
states. Institutional and demographic differences among states affect
the states' Latino descriptive representation. Namely, the
institutional design of the legislature matters in terms of electoral
responsiveness, with Arizona and California being the most responsive
bodies and New York and the U.S. House the least responsive.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Casellas, Jason P.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000269176500006},
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@article{wilson_latino_2009,
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  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897754},
  abstract = {Do Latino representatives enhance or "enlarge" Latino
representation (Walsh 2002)? I examined the content of websites posted
by members of the 110th Congress and found that the websites of Latino
representatives are not more accessible to Spanish-speaking users than
the websites of non-Latino representatives, nor are the sites more
likely to exhibit pro-immigrant positions or offer immigration
assistance. The websites of Latino representatives are, however, more
likely to present Latino perspectives. Latino representatives enhance
Latino representation in this forum by enlarging or broadening the
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presence of a Latino voice in policy discussion.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wilson, Walter},
  month = aug,
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@article{loewenberg_introduction_2009-2,
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  volume = {34},
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  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = may,
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@article{hix_after_2009,
  title = {After {Enlargement}: {Voting} {Patterns} in the {Sixth}
{European} {Parliament}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314282},
  abstract = {We examined how voting behavior in the European
Parliament changed after the European Union added ten new member-
states in 2004. Using roll-call votes, we compared voting behavior in
the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (July 2004-December
2006) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999-2004). We
looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of
voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels
of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around
the left-right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the
strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement
of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works
inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of
the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained
the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also
played a role.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hix, Simon and Noury, Abdul},
  month = may,
  year = {2009},
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    pages = {159--174}
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@article{hedlund_partisan_2009,
  title = {Partisan {Stacking} on {Legislative} {Committees}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314318},
  abstract = {One aspect of the partisan model for legislative
committee development that is rarely studied is the degree to which
the majority party seeks to control legislative committees-and,
thereby, chamber decisions-via numerically "overproportional" majority
party representation on standing committees. This form of "party
stacking" is often mentioned in the literature but has received little
systematic examination and hypothesis testing. Using data from state
legislative committees for all 49 partisan legislatures in the 2003-04
and 2005-06 sessions, We found Support for the partisan model:
majority party stacking is associated with a slim majority party
advantage in a state legislative chamber.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hedlund, Ronald D. and Coombs, Kevin and Martorano,
Nancy and Hamm, Keith E.},
  month = may,
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  note = {WOS:000266575000003},
  pages = {175--191}
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@article{minta_legislative_2009,
  title = {Legislative {Oversight} and the {Substantive}
{Representation} of {Black} and {Latino} {Interests} in {Congress}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314336},
  abstract = {When determining whether or not legislators are
representing their constituents' interests, scholars using voting
studies may overstate the role of strategic factors, such as
reelection goals and constituent influence, while understating the
effect of descriptive characteristics. I argue that race and ethnicity
matter in congressional oversight of bureaucratic policymaking. My
examination of hearing transcripts from the 107th Congress indicates
that minority legislators are more likely than white legislators to
participate in racial-oversight hearings but not more likely than
whites to participate in social welfare hearings. The results show
that descriptive representation contributes to Substantive
representation, even if the costs of participating outweigh the
electoral benefits.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Minta, Michael D.},

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    month = may,  
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@article{murakami_minority_2009,  
  title = {Minority {Status}, {Ideology}, or {Opportunity}:  
{Explaining} the {Greater} {Retirement} of {House} {Republicans}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314291},  
  abstract = {Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives tend  
to retire at a higher rate than Democrats-a fact with potentially  
important electoral and policy ramifications-but research on the  
possible explanations for this partisan disparity has been scarce. I  
test various explanatory hypotheses using multilevel statistical  
analyses and find that Republicans are more likely to retire-not  
because they have been the predominant minority party, had more  
political opportunities, or had different private-sector experiences,  
but because they harbor more conservative ideologies than their  
Democratic colleagues.},  
  number = {2},  
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@article{rosenson_congressional_2009,  
  title = {Congressional {Frequent} {Flyers}: {Demand}- and  
{Supply}-{Side} {Explanations} for {Privately} {Sponsored} {Travel}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314327},  
  abstract = {Privately sponsored congressional travel raises  
questions about the influence of interest groups oil lawmakers and  
about legislative behavior. I used Multiple regression to explain  
variation in congressional travel, looking at 15,825 trips, both  
domestic and overseas, taken by House and Senate members and their  
staff between 2001 and 2004. I found that both supply-side and demand-  
side factors influence congressional travel. Electoral vulnerability  
corresponds with reduced trip-taking, and institutional power is  
associated with greater trip-taking, although not to the extent that  
rent-seeking theory might predict. Members' racial or ethnic minority  
status also corresponds with greater trip-taking in the House. Pending  
retirement also influences trip-taking, but in the opposite direction  
from what some "shirking" theories would predict.},  
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{patterson_candidates_2009,
    title = {Candidates, {Votes}, {Outcomes}: {A} {Method} for
{Evaluating} {Nomination} {Strategies} in {MMD}/{SNTV} {Electoral}
{Systems}},
    volume = {34},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298009788314309},
    abstract = {While characterized by disagreement, all scholarly
work on multimember district electoral systems in which each voter
casts a single, nontransferable vote (MMD/SNTV) is alike in one way:
it evaluates party nominations under the assumption that votes are
invariant under alternative strategies. But party votes may, in fact,
vary with different nomination strategies. Moreover, depending on how
much party votes vary under alternative nomination strategies, a
method that considers such changes may evaluate nominations
differently than previous studies in the literature have. In this
article, I address party-vote variance, proposing a method that
estimates how much a party's obtained votes change under alternative
nomination strategies and using this method to reevaluate the
nominating behavior of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party.},
    number = {2},
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    author = {Patterson, Dennis},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
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@article{schwindt-bayer_making_2009,  
  title = {Making {Quotas} {Work}: {The} {Effect} of {Gender}  
{Quota} {Laws} {On} the {Election} of {Women}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009787500330},  
  abstract = {Gender quota laws are intended to increase the number  
of women elected to legislatures, but initial evidence suggests that  
many laws have had little effect. I present a cross-national,  
statistical test that analyzes how three key dimensions of candidate  
quota laws affect women's representation. My results show that quotas  
that require more women to be on party ballots lead to the election of  
more women, independent of placement mandates and enforcement  
mechanisms, but rules governing where female candidates are listed on  
the ballot and sanctions for noncompliance amplify that effect.  
Candidate quotas can increase women's representation, but the quotas'  
effectiveness depends on their design.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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  month = feb,  
  year = {2009},  
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@article{woon_issue_2009,  
  title = {Issue {Attention} and {Legislative} {Proposals} in the  
{US} {Senate}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009787500367},  
  abstract = {This analysis of bill sponsorship across a variety of  
issues and Congresses shows that committee membership is the single  
most important factor shaping a senator's level of issue attention.  
Constituency demand is of secondary importance. Ideology,  
partisanship, and national conditions play little or no role.  
Consistent with a theoretical cost-benefit framework, the results  
suggest that senators are motivated by the prospect of electoral and  
policy rewards from successful legislation rather than from mere  
position taking. The findings attest to the enduring importance of the  
committee system in a highly individualistic and increasingly partisan  
Senate.},  
  number = {1},  
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  note = {WOS:000264419600003},  
  pages = {29--54}  
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@article{kousser_who_2009,  
  title = {Who {Blinks} {First}? {Legislative} {Patience} and  
{Bargaining} with {Governors}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009787500321},  
  abstract = {When legislators and governors clash over the size of  
American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins?  
Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter  
models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted  
legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state  
budget negotiations that follows the "staring match" logic captured by  
divide-the-dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often  
be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the  
executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to  
endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this  
article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising  
gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the  
states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical  
support for our predictions.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Kousser, Thad and Phillips, Justin H.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {2009},  
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@article{aleman_comparing_2009,  
  title = {Comparing {Cosponsorship} and {Roll}-{Call} {Ideal}  
{Points}},  
  volume = {34},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298009787500358},  
  abstract = {We use bill cosponsorship and roll-call vote data to  
compare legislators' revealed preferences in the U.S. House of  
Representatives and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. We estimate  
ideal points from bill cosponsorship data using principal-component  
analysis on an agreement matrix that included information on all bills  
introduced in the U.S. House (1973-2000) and Argentine Chamber (1983-  
2002). The ideal-point estimates of legislators' revealed preferences  
based on cosponsorship data strongly correlate with similar estimates  
derived from roll-call vote data. Also, cosponsorship activity in the  
U.S. House has lower dimensionality than cosponsorship has in the  
Argentine Chamber. We explain this lower discrimination as a function  
of individual- and district-level factors in both countries.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Aleman, Eduardo and Calvo, Ernesto and Jones, Mark P.
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and Kaplan, Noah},
  month = feb,
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  pages = {87--116}
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@article{saiegh_recovering_2009,
  title = {Recovering a {Basic} {Space} from {Elite} {Surveys}:
{Evidence} from {Latin} {America}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009787500349},
  abstract = {I used elite survey data and scaling techniques to
estimate the location of political actors (parties, chief executives,
and legislators) from nine countries in a common ideological space.
The recovered ideological configuration of each country accurately
reflects the description of that country's political landscape given
by the popular press and in the scholarly literature. My findings
demonstrate that data generated by survey responses can be reliably
used to locate legislators' ideological positions in a low-dimensional
space in a manner analogous to the roll-call-based methods commonly
used in the scholarship on the U.S. Congress. My approach has two
important advantages over methods that use roll-call data, expert
surveys, or some combination thereof. First, it does not rely on
recorded votes and so is unaffected by concerns about the validity of
roll-call data as unbiased indicators of legislator preference. And,
because it does not require access to voting records, this approach
can be applied to any legislature in the world. Second, my method can
be used to estimate the location of political actors in a common
ideological space.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  month = feb,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000264419600006},
  pages = {117--145}
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@article{loewenberg_introduction_2008,
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  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403105},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = nov,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000261367400001},
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    pages = {499--500}
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@article{loewenberg_contribution_2008,
  title = {The {Contribution} of {Comparative} {Research} to
{Measuring} the {Policy} {Preferences} of {Legislators}},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403114},
  abstract = {Comparative legislative research has contributed to
an examination of the validity of roll-call votes as measures of
legislators' policy preferences. It has prompted an awareness of the
influence of legislative structure on the composition of the voting
record. Comparative research on members' ideal points has confronted
the problems of selection effects, abstentions, the influence of the
agenda setter, and the effect of party strategy. It has encouraged the
search for alternate measures of members' preferences, including
members' speech, cosponsorship, survey responses, and party
manifestos. In the non-American setting, ideal points have been
regarded as group-level, as well as individual-level, variables. The
game-theoretic approach to the study of legislatures has led to the
formulation of hypotheses relating legislative structure to members'
ideal points.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhagd},
  month = nov,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000261367400002},
  pages = {501--510}
}

@article{clinton_laws_2008,
  title = {Laws and {Roll} {Calls} in the {US} {Congress}, 1891-
1994},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403097},
  abstract = {Recent empirical studies of lawmaking activity by
legislatures rely heavily on roll call based measures and assume that
roll call activity reflects lawmaking activity. We question this
assumption for the case of the U.S. Congress. We examine several
plausible sources of dissonance between the set of enacted public
statutes and the universe of recorded votes in the U.S. Congress,
using a comprehensive dataset of public enactments and roll call
activity between 1891 and 1994. Because only 11.9\% of the bills
signed into law receive a recorded vote in the House, only 7.9\%
receive a recorded vote in the Senate, and only 5.5\% receive a
recorded vote in both the House and Senate, we provide guidance as to
when studying voting behavior is likely a reasonable proxy for
lawmaking behavior. There are sometimes important differences between

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the laws that do and do not receive a roll call that researchers should account for when using roll calls to study lawmaking in the U.S. Congress.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Clinton, Joshua D. and Lapinski, John},
month = nov,
year = {2008},
note = {WOS:000261367400003},
pages = {511--541}

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@article{carrubba_legislative_2008,

title = {Legislative {Voting} {Behavior}, {Seen} and {Unseen}:
{A} {Theory} of {Roll}-{Call} {Vote} {Selection}},

volume = {33},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298008786403079},

abstract = {The empirical study of legislative behavior largely relies on roll-call vote analysis, but roll-call votes in many legislatures represent only a sample of legislative votes. We have good reasons to believe this sample is particularly poor for inferring party effects on legislative behavior. The selection of votes for roll call may be endogenous to exactly the characteristics of voting behavior (for instance, party cohesion) that we want to study. We must understand the roll-call vote institution and account for its selection effects before we can draw inferences about legislative behavior from roll-call results. This article develops a game-theoretic model of roll-call vote requests predicated on party leaders requesting votes to enforce party discipline. The model offers general and testable predictions about the selection process and how it affects observed and unobserved legislative voting behavior, particularly party cohesion.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Carrubba, Clifford and Gabel, Matthew and Hug, Simon},
month = nov,
year = {2008},
note = {WOS:000261367400004},
pages = {543--572}

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@article{rosas_models_2008,

title = {Models of {Nonresponse} in {Legislative} {Politics}},
volume = {33},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298008786403088},

abstract = {Tools dedicated to inferring the ideological leanings of legislators from observed votes-techniques such as NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or the item-response-theory model of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004)-rest on the assumption that the political

process that generates abstentions is ignorable, an assumption not always easy to justify. We extended the item-response-theory model to analyze abstention and voting processes simultaneously in situations where abstentions are suspected to be nonrandom. We applied this expanded model to two assemblies where the existing literature gives reason to expect nonrandom abstentions, and we demonstrate how our extensions yield nuanced analyses of legislative politics. We also acknowledge limits to our ability to decide on the adequacy of alternative assumptions about abstentions, since these assumptions are not readily verifiable.},

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    number = {4},  
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  title = {Legislative {Productivity} in the 93d-105th  
{Congresses}},  
  volume = {33},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403123},  
  abstract = {We exploit a large new dataset in order to revisit  
the determinants of "legislative success" in Congress. Previous  
studies have focused on one or (rarely) two Congresses. Ours is the  
first study based on panel data, allowing us to better measure such  
causal effects as how a members productivity increases when they  
become a committee chair or their party attains a majority. While  
corroborating several previous findings, we also differ on several  
important points-e.g., whereas the most sophisticated previous study  
finds greater seniority and committee leadership posts boosting  
productivity in neither party, we find them boosting productivity in  
both.},
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  number = {4},  
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  author = {Cox, Gary W. and Terry, William C.},  
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  pages = {603--618}  
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  title = {Strategic {Voting} in {Multi}-{Office} {Elections}},  
  volume = {33},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403060},  
  abstract = {What are the incentives for voters to vote
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strategically when legislative policy outcomes are constrained by a system of checks and balances? The policy-balancing theory supposes that moderate voters split their tickets because such splitting is the only way these voters can achieve moderate policy outcomes. I show that a different type of strategic voting, policy stacking, is characteristic of legislatures that endow the majority party with only limited institutional powers. Focusing on voting for the president and House of Representatives in the United States reveals that a substantial proportion of voters engage in policy-stacking behavior, but very few engage in policy-balancing behavior.},

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    number = {4},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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    number = {3},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},  
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@article{fowler_seen_2008,  
    title = {Seen but not heard: {Committee} visibility and  
institutional change in the {Senate} national security committees,  
1947-2006},  
    volume = {33},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.3162/036298008785260862},  
    abstract = {Scholars have neglected the effect of the press on  
political institutions in favor of media influences on campaigns or on  
voters' trust and information about government. This article examines  
senators' committee preferences in response to declining media  
coverage of Congress, focusing on the Senate Armed Services and  
Foreign Relations Committees from 1947 to 2006. The research relies on  
new, continuous measures of committee desirability and a unique  
dataset of congressional press coverage. Although both committees'  
visibility and attractiveness have declined dramatically over 60  
years, statistical analyses indicate that change in internal rules and  
external events are the most important influences on senators'}
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investment in committee careers.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fowler, Linda L. and Law, R. Brian},
  month = aug,
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@article{malhotra_disentangling_2008,
  title = {Disentangling the relationship between legislative
professionalism and government spending},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008785260880},
  abstract = {Recent movements to deprofessionalize American state
legislatures have been driven partly by the notion that professional
legislators spend more than their citizen counterparts. This article
explores the relationship between legislative professional ism and
government spending, a connection complicated by the possibility that
legislators in high-spending states may choose professional
institutions to handle their responsibilities more effectively. I
employed propensity score matching, an increasingly used technique of
causal inference, to disentangle the relationship. Contrary to
previous academic work and popular notions, I found that professional
legislatures do not spend significantly more than part-time bodies do,
if one accounts for the fact that legislatures in high-spending states
have a greater need to be professionalized and therefore select those
structural frameworks. These findings have important implications for
the study of the effects of legislative institutions on public
policies more generally and attest to the utility of recently
developed techniques of causal inference to disentangle these
relationships.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Malhotra, Neil},
  month = aug,
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  note = {WOS:000258859400003},
  pages = {387--414}
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@article{bagashka_invisible_2008,
  title = {Invisible politics: {Institutional} incentives and
legislative alignments in the {Russian} {Duma}, 1996-99},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008785260853},
  abstract = {Previous analysis of legislative voting has focused
on the behavior of nominal legislative parties, regardless of whether
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the country under examination was an established democracy or a newly democratized country. This approach is inadequate for countries with Young party systems. To establish the extent to which legislative coalitions are party based, scholars must allow for the possibility that institutional incentives predominate over party influence. For this study, I applied a Bayesian discrete latent variable method to identify the legislative coalitions in the 1996-99 Duma. I found that legislative alignments cut across party lines: electoral incentives and support for the president contribute to divides within parties that lack coherent platforms. Here I present a novel methodological approach to the identification of intraparty divisions and the major determinants of legislative coalitions in many legislative settings. This approach allows a comparison of the importance of party influence relative to other institutional incentives. It is especially useful for analyzing legislative voting in young party systems and where constitutional frameworks and electoral systems subject legislators to competing pressures.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{fogarty_strategy_2008,
  title = {The strategy of the story: {Media} monitoring
legislative activity},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008785260899},
  abstract = {To what degree do the news media provide voters with
the information needed to hold House members accountable for their
actions in Congress? Previous studies have simply debated whether or
not local news media cover politicians' actions, but this article
considers the news media as a strategic actor when covering House
members. I developed a set of theoretical expectations about the
conditions under which local news media would be more or less likely
to monitor the actions of members of Congress outside of election
seasons. I tested these expectations using an extensive content
analysis of local newspapers in both descriptive and multivariate
settings. I find that local news media are strategic in their coverage
of local members of Congress. Local newspapers invest more resources
to cover out-of-step members than they do to follow members with
policy preferences congruent with the district's. In addition,
coverage of out-of-step members tends to be less positive than
coverage of in-step members.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fogarty, Brian J.},
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    month = aug,
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    pages = {445--469}
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@article{habel_consequences_2008,
    title = {The consequences of electoral institutions for
careerism},
    volume = {33},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298008785260871},
    abstract = {Although electoral institutions have been shown to
have a variety of effects, scholars have not investigated if certain
voting rules enable politicians to enjoy longer legislative careers. I
took advantage of a natural experiment-a Sudden transition from a
semiproportional voting rule to single-member districts with plurality
voting (SMDP)-to measure the effect of electoral institutions on
careerism. My analysis revealed that voting rules have a profound
influence on the dynamics of legislative careers: politicians elected
under SMDP are far less likely to suffer electoral defeat or to retire
than those elected via cumulative voting. The findings of this study
not only provide additional insight into the seat safety of
politicians elected in first-past-the-post systems, but moreover offer
new criteria by which to evaluate the choice of electoral
institutions.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Habel, Philip D.},
    month = aug,
    year = {2008},
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    pages = {471--494}
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@article{loewenberg_introduction_2008-2,
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    volume = {33},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298008784310966},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
    month = may,
    year = {2008},
    note = {WOS:000256205700001},
    pages = {167--170}
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@article{cox_agenda_2008,
    title = {Agenda power in the {Italian} {Chamber} of {Deputies}},

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1988-2000},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784311028},
  abstract = {We present strong evidence that governing coalitions
in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing
parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is
lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20\% on
all final-passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from
the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than
government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing
parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their
benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates
on decree-conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills -
results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing
procedures used in each case.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Cox, Gary W. and Heller, William B. and Mccubbins,
Mathew D.},
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@article{lee_agreeing_2008,
  title = {Agreeing to disagree: {Agenda} content and {Senate}
partisanship, 1981-2004},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784311000},
  abstract = {This article presents evidence that the recent
increase in partisanship in Senate roll-call voting is partly due to
changes in the content of the Senate agenda. The analysis draws on an
original dataset classifying Senate roll-call votes from 1981 to 2004
according to substantive issue content. Over the past two decades, the
types of issues that were most divisive along partisan lines in
earlier periods became progressively more prominent on the Senate
roll-call agenda. Even when one controls for the effects of other
electoral and institutional factors, one finds that the shifting
agenda notably contributed to the rise in Senate partisanship.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lee, Frances E.},
  month = may,
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  note = {WOS:000256205700003},
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@article{brunell_descriptive_2008,  
  title = {Descriptive representation, district demography, and  
attitudes toward congress among {African} {Americans}},  
  volume = {33},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784310957},  
  abstract = {We examined the effects of subjective and objective  
descriptive representation and district demography on African  
Americans' attitudes toward their member of Congress and the U.S.  
Congress as an institution. We investigated whether or not African  
Americans in more-racially homogeneous districts differ in their  
attitudes from counterparts in districts with fewer African Americans.  
We also studied the effects of descriptive representation and district  
demography to determine if these effects are contingent on voters'  
perceptions of descriptive representation. We found that living in a  
district with a higher proportion of blacks enhances African American  
voters' feelings toward their representative and marginally elevates  
these voters' evaluations of Congress. This effect is mediated,  
however, by the election of a black representative to Congress.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Brunell, Thomas L. and Anderson, Christopher J. and  
Cremona, Rachel K.},  
  month = may,  
  year = {2008},  
  note = {WOS:000256205700004},  
  pages = {223--244}  
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@article{highton_job_2008,  
  title = {Job approval and {Senate} election outcomes in the  
{United} {States}},  
  volume = {33},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784311019},  
  abstract = {A growing body of congressional scholarship  
investigates variation in the incumbent electoral advantage that  
depends on factors such as competence, political skill, and  
ideological extremity. This article contributes to this line of work  
by providing analysis of the relationship between senators' home-state  
approval ratings and their electoral fortunes using newly available  
data from the Job Approval Ratings (JAR) collection. The findings show  
that senatorial job approval affects retirement, quality-candidate  
emergence, campaign spending, and outcomes. The myriad indirect  
effects suggest that strategic political actors are central to the  
process by which incumbents are held accountable for the reputations  
they develop in their constituencies.},  
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    year = {2008},
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@article{finocchiaro_search_2008,
  title = {In search of killer amendments in the modern {US}
{House}},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784310984},
  abstract = {Numerous studies have examined the incidence of
killer amendments in Congress, but most of these studies have been
either case specific, focusing on the legislative maneuverings around
a single issue or bill, or temporally limited, focusing on strategic
activity in only one or two Congresses. In this article, we present
the beginning of a comprehensive research agenda for the systematic
study of killer amendments. Using roll-call data from the 83d through
the 108th U.S. House (1953-2004), we identified those bills that (a)
were successfully amended and (b) subsequently went down to defeat, a
necessary condition for the existence of a killer amendment. We then
examined these cases in greater detail, using both spatial analyses
and case studies. Our analysis uncovered five cases, four of which are
new, that appear to have the characteristics of true killer
amendments, thus setting the stage for future analyses across time and
legislative chambers and bodies.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Finocchiaro, Charles J. and Jenkins, Jeffery A.},
  month = may,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000256205700006},
  pages = {263--294}
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@article{kriner_divided_2008,
  title = {Divided government and congressional investigations},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784310993},
  abstract = {This article explores the political determinants of
congressional investigatory activity. Using Mayhew's list of high-
profile probes updated through 2006, we developed five measures of the
frequency and intensity of investigative oversight. Contra Mayhew, we
found that divided government spurs congressional investigatory
activity. A shift from unified to divided government yields a five-
fold increase in the number of hearings held and quadruples their
duration. Conditional party government models also offer explanatory
leverage because homogeneous majorities are more likely to investigate
the president in divided government and less likely to do so in
unified government. This dynamic is strongest in the House, but

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analyses of the Senate also afford consistent, if muted, evidence of partisan agenda control.},

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    number = {2},  
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    pages = {295--321}  
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@article{richman_uncertainty_2008,  
    title = {Uncertainty and the prevalence of committee outliers},  
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    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.3162/036298008784310975},  
    abstract = {Political scientists often suppose that the  
informational model of legislative organization predicts an absence of  
committee outliers. In fact, the model predicts that committee  
outliers will be more common when the floor is more uncertain than its  
committees. Data limitations have largely prevented testing this  
uncertainty-outlier prediction, until now. For this article, I  
investigated whether or not the informational model correctly predicts  
under what scenarios outliers will be more frequent. As predicted,  
more uncertainty is associated with more committee outliers in U.S.  
state legislatures. Legislatures in which the floor is less informed  
than the committees are more likely to have committee outliers.},
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    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},  
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@article{pereira_agenda_2008,
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    title = {Agenda power, executive decree authority, and the mixed
results of reform in the {Brazilian} congress},
    volume = {33},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298008783743309},
    abstract = {This article examines how institutional change in the
use of extraordinary legislation affects delegation of power and
unilateral action in new democracies. From 1988 to 2001, Brazilian
presidents were able to reissue decrees indefinitely and thus had
substantial legislative power. In 2001, Congress amended the
constitution so as to restrict the president to a single reissue of
each lapsed decree. This reform has had mixed results: although it
ended the practice of infinite reissues, it induced Presidents Cardoso
and Lula to use more decrees than previous executives had.
Presidential agenda power, rather than being reduced, has been
sharpened. By analyzing patterns of presidential initiatives from 1995
to 2005, we demonstrate the mixed results of this constitutional
reform.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Pereira, Carlos and Power, Timothy J. and Renno, Lucio
R.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2008},
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    pages = {5--33}
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@article{finocchiaro_war_2008,
    title = {War for the floor: {Partisan} theory and agenda control
in the {US} house of representatives},
    volume = {33},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298008783743273},
    abstract = {This article extends recent research on partisan
agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives to the issue of
procedural control of the legislative agenda via special rules. In
particular, we draw out a facet of cartel and conditional party
government theories that has not been addressed in prior analyses: the
simultaneous interrelationship between positive and negative agenda
control. Using roll-call data on two procedural matters-votes to order
the previous question on a special rule and votes to adopt a special
rule-over the 1953-2002 period, we found that, in the area of
procedural control of the floor agenda, the majority party's amount of
agenda control depends to a significant degree upon the party's
homogeneity and power.},
    number = {1},
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    author = {Finocchiaro, Charles J. and Rohde, David W.},
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@article{den_hartog_value_2008,
  title = {The value of majority status: {The} effect of
{Jeffords}'s switch on asset prices of republican and democratic
firms},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {Using the change in party control of the Senate that
resulted from Jim Jeffords's 2001 change in party affiliation, we
compare competing partisan and partyless legislative theories. We
offer a reconceptualization of agenda control that provides a new and
promising basis for studying parties and policymaking in the Senate.
Also, we present a novel methodology-an "event study"-to test partisan
and partyless hypotheses. Our results show that, when Jeffords
switched, the stock prices of Republican-supported energy firms
dropped and prices for Democrat-supported firms rose, supporting the
hypothesis that the majority party influences Senate decisions.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Den Hartog, Chris and Monroe, Nathan W.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000254187300004},
  pages = {63--84}
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@article{adler_intended_2008,
  title = {Intended consequences: {Jurisdictional} reform and issue
control in the {US} house of representatives},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008783743318},
  abstract = {The power of congressional committees rests in large
part on their ability to set the legislative agenda in particular
issue areas. But how do committees acquire their issue jurisdictions?
Existing research points to informal committee turf wars-not
collective reforms-as the roots of jurisdictional allocations (King
1994, 1997). Yet the House of Representatives has made nearly 150
formal changes to its committees' jurisdictions since 1973. We
investigated the effects of one prominent instance of extensive
jurisdictional changes, the Bolling-Hansen reforms of 1975, and found
that this body of reforms advanced collective goals of improved policy
coordination and enhanced information sharing.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Adler, E. Scott and Wilkerson, John D.},
  month = feb,
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    note = {WOS:000254187300005},
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@article{mcghee_cohort_2008,
  title = {Cohort effects and the incumbency advantage},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008783743255},
  abstract = {The literature on the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections has focused mostly on political variables, such as competition and incumbent resources. For this article, I identify an important sociological variable: a cohort effect that separates older generations from younger ones. Younger generations have been more likely to vote for incumbents, and the difference has endured over time, even as the political environment itself has changed and become more partisan. Moreover, the results hold even when one controls for partisan identification and general time-period effects. The incumbency advantage may be a broader and more-enduring part of American politics than has previously been recognized.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Mcghee, Eric},
  month = feb,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000254187300006},
  pages = {113--129}
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@article{hirano_third_2008,
  title = {Third parties, elections, and roll-call votes: {The} populist party and the late nineteenth-century {US} congress},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008783743282},
  abstract = {What effect do electorally successful third parties have on congressional roll-call votes? There is widespread belief among scholars that third parties influence the policies of the major parties, but there is little systematic evidence of this influence. I exploit the unique historical context surrounding the Populist Party formation in 1892 to examine the effect of the Populist Party's electoral success on congressional roll-call votes related to Populist issues. The results are consistent with two claims. First, co-optation of the Populist Party's issues occurred even before the formation of the party. Second, the co-optation of Populist policies does not appear to be correlated with the electoral success of the Populist candidates.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hirano, Shigeo},
  month = feb,

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@article{loewenberg_legislative_2007,
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  volume = {32},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298007782398459},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = nov,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000251362300001},
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@article{kriner_iraq_2007,
  title = {Iraq casualties and the 2006 senate elections},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007782398486},
  abstract = {Prior scholarship on the effects of war casualties on
U.S. elections has focused on large-scale conflicts. For this article,
we examined whether or not the much-smaller casualty totals incurred
in Iraq had a similar influence on the 2006 Senate contests. We found
that the change in vote share from 2000 to 2006 for Republican Senate
candidates at both the state and county level was significantly and
negatively related to local casualty tallies and rates. These results
provide compelling evidence for the existence of a democratic brake on
military adventurism, even in small-scale wars, but one that is
strongest in communities that have disproportionately shouldered a
war's costs.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Kriner, Douglas L. and Shen, Francis X.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000251362300002},
  pages = {507--530}
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@article{grose_iraq_2007,
  title = {The {Iraq} {War}, partisanship, and candidate
attributes: {Variation} in partisan swing in the 2006 {U}.{S}. {House}
elections},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007782398495},

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abstract = {Although partisan swing is often assumed to be uniform across congressional districts, our analysis of the 2006 House elections demonstrates that systematic variation exists. In addition to incumbency status, partisanship, spending, and scandal, variation in the local salience of national issues across districts affects vote shifts in these districts. Notably, partisan swing in Republican districts proved highly sensitive to the number of Iraq war deaths from that district and, to a lesser degree, to the roll-call vote of Republican House members on the war resolution. These findings have implications for theories of anticipatory representation, retrospective voting, and electoral accountability.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Grose, Christian R. and Oppenheimer, Bruce I.},
month = nov,
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@article{swers_building_2007,
title = {Building a reputation on national security: {The} impact of stereotypes related to gender and military experience},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007782398512},
abstract = {in a post-9/11 world, all senators must establish their national security credentials with voters. Yet senators do not compete for leadership on an equal basis. Through an analysis of bill sponsorship, Sunday talk show appearances, and interviews with Senate staff, I demonstrate that defense policy is made in a partisan and gendered context. Gender stereotypes favoring male defense leadership create an additional hurdle for women, particularly Democratic women, as they seek to establish their reputations on security. By contrast, a record of military service facilitates senators' efforts to achieve action on their proposals and gain media attention for their views.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Swers, Michele},
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year = {2007},
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@article{miler_view_2007,
title = {The view from the hill: {Legislative} perceptions of the district},
volume = {32},
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    abstract = {This article addresses legislative perceptions of
constituents' interests and develops a theory of perception that
highlights the role of information accessibility in the formation of
legislative offices' views of their districts. I used original data
regarding health policy in the U.S. House to analyze perceptions of
constituents' interests. I found that legislators do not see all
constituents in their district, nor do they see the largest
constituencies. Rather, legislators are more likely to see active and
resource-rich constituents. These findings provide unique evidence of
the influence of money in Congress and suggest that legislative
misperception is both common and systematically biased.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Miler, Kristina C.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2007},
    note = {WOS:000251362300005},
    pages = {597--628}
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@article{herrnson_presidential_2007,
    title = {Presidential campaigning in the 2002 congressional
elections},
    volume = {32},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298007782398468},
    abstract = {Theories involving coattails, surge and decline,
presidential popularity, and the economy ascribe little importance to
presidential efforts to influence congressional elections. Since such
efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president campaigns for
fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush's decisions to
campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the
effect of his visits on Republicans' electoral successes. Both the
competitiveness of a race and the president's electoral self-interest
increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a candidate. Neither
party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect. We
conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance
candidates' electoral prospects.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Herrnson, Paul S. and Morris, Irwin L.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2007},
    note = {WOS:000251362300006},
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@article{snyder_multimember_2007,
    title = {Do multimember districts lead to free-riding?},
    volume = {32},
    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298007782398503},
    abstract = {We studied the effects of districting on
intergovernmental aid by state governments to local governments in the
United States. We found that metropolitan areas receive relatively
more aid when represented in the state legislature by an at-large
delegation than when divided into single-member districts. This
suggests that the free-riding that may occur with at-large
representation is more than counterbalanced by other factors. The
estimated effects are robust to the effects of other confounding
factors as well as the choice of estimators.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Snyder, James M. and Ueda, Michiko},
    month = nov,
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    volume = {32},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
    month = aug,
    year = {2007},
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    pages = {337--340}
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@article{roberts_statistical_2007,
    title = {The statistical analysis of {Roll}-call data: {A}
cautionary tale},
    volume = {32},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298007781699636},
    abstract = {Roll-call voting and congressional procedures are two
of the most heavily studied aspects of the U.S. Congress. To date,
little work has focused on the effect of procedures on the composition
of the roll-call record. This article takes a step in this direction
by demonstrating the effect of chamber rules and institutional
constraints on House and Senate roll-call data, as well as on the
inferences that scholars have drawn from the roll-call record. More
specifically, I focus on recent efforts to measure party effects and
ideological alignments, and I demonstrate that the composition of the
roll-call record can affect these measures.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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author = {Roberts, Jason M.},
month = aug,
year = {2007},
note = {WOS:000249232800002},
pages = {341--360}
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@article{basinger_candidates_2007,
  title = {Candidates, campaigns, or partisan conditions?
{Reevaluating} strategic-politicians theory},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699654},
  abstract = {According to strategic-politicians theory, political
elites help ensure electoral responsiveness even when the mass public
is deficient. Testing this theory requires measuring the effects of
candidate experience and campaign spending, but one must confront
endogeneity problems, because the theory requires potential candidates
and campaign contributors to be responsive to district partisan
conditions and national partisan tides. By applying an instrumental-
variable method to control for selection bias, we found that
challenger experience only matters indirectly, through its effect on
campaign expenditures, but partisan context matters both directly and
indirectly. We theorize that challenger experience is best understood
as an informational short-cut: it signals incumbent vulnerability to
potential campaign contributors.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Basinger, Scott J. and Ensley, Michael J.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000249232800003},
  pages = {361--394}
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@article{macdonald_us_2007,
  title = {The {US} {Congress} and the institutional design of
agencies},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699690},
  abstract = {Theories of agency design maintain that lawmakers
impose requirements on how bureaucratic agencies make policy
decisions, preventing those agencies from undermining lawmakers'
political and policy goals. Empirical support for these theories is
limited, however, by the difficulty of measuring critical variables
hypothesized to influence the use of this tool of political control.
For this study, I employed a methodology particularly well suited, but
not previously employed, to study variance in the use of agency-design
provisions: interviews with congressional committee staff. Staffers'
responses support several theories, cast doubt on one explanation, and
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point to nuances in other explanations of agency design.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Macdonald, Jason A.},
  month = aug,
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  note = {WOS:000249232800004},
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@article{gamble_black_2007,
  title = {Black political representation: {An} examination of
legislative activity within {US} house committees},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699663},
  abstract = {How minority legislators influence policy development
in Congress remains a relevant question for those interested in race
and political representation. This article addresses this question
using evidence from participation in committee work-a vantage point
that has received minimal attention in scholarship on black political
representation. I interpret racial differences in participation in
House committees across a range of policy areas, demonstrating that
black members participate at higher rates within committees than
whites on both black interest and nonracial bills. The results suggest
that race has a substantive effect on members' policy priorities and
their legislative activity within committees.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Gamble, Katrina L.},
  month = aug,
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  note = {WOS:000249232800005},
  pages = {421--447}
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@article{barnello_bridging_2007,
  title = {Bridging the gender gap in bill sponsorship},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699645},
  abstract = {Under what circumstances do men sponsor issues that
are traditionally regarded as salient primarily to women? By examining
the sponsorship of legislation in the upper and lower chambers of 15
state legislatures in 2001, we explored the conditions under which men
are likely to focus attention on policy areas involving women's issues
and children's issues. We found little effect of institutional context
(such as party control of the legislature or diversity within the
legislature) on the sponsorship behavior of either men or women.
Personal characteristics such as race, education, age, and family
circumstances are associated with sponsorship by men, but not by
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women. Committee service is also strongly associated with sponsorship behavior, particularly for men. Differences in sponsorship are relatively marked in the sponsorship of legislation that focuses on reproduction or other health issues particularly relevant to women. We conclude that the boundaries of the set of issues traditionally defined as "women's issues" may be changing over time and that it is important to recognize that the influences on the sponsorship of women's issues can be different for men than they are for women.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Barnello, Michelle A. and Bratton, Kathleen A.},
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    note = {WOS:000249232800006},
    pages = {449--474}
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@article{schaffner_political_2007,
  title = {Political parties and the representativeness of
legislative committees},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699672},
  abstract = {What role do parties play in determining which
interests committees represent? In this article, I compare committee
organization and representativeness in Nebraska's nonpartisan
legislature with those in the partisan senates of Kansas and Iowa. I
demonstrate that when parties do not organize legislative conflict,
committees are less representative of the full chamber. I argue,
however, that committee representativeness does not necessarily result
from parties actively working to create representative committees.
Rather, when legislative conflict has a definitive partisan structure
and the committees are always controlled by the majority party,
representative committees will result as a simple by-product of the
partisan structure and organization.},
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    number = {3},
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  volume = {32},
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  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
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@article{manow_legislative_2007,
  title = {Legislative self-restraint under divided government in
{Germany}, 1976-2002},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907941},
  abstract = {Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative
autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated
the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of
government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a
strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually
does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to a
government's legislative self-restraint. We tested the hypotheses
following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all
legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show
that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and
anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and
Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Manow, Philip and Burkhart, Simone},
  month = may,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000247083000002},
  pages = {167--191}
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@article{wirrls_golden_2007,
  title = {The "golden age" senate and floor debate in the
antebellum congress},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907932},
  abstract = {An image of an antebellum "golden age" of Senate
debate and deliberation has passed virtually unblemished from one
generation of historians and political analysts to the next. In what
ways, if any, is the image of a more deliberative Senate evident in
the realities of antebellum House and Senate debates? In this article,
I present a series of case studies to examine elements of the quantity
and quality of floor debate in each chamber. By providing comparative
evidence about House and Senate debate during the antebellum period, I
offer an assessment and critique of the bicameral implications of the
largely untested "golden age" understanding of the Senate and join
other recent efforts to reassess the nature of the early Senate and

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its relation to the House. My results show the conventional wisdom to be an oversimplification, at least in its implications about the scope and depth of House debates. The House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day.},

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    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = may,
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@article{thames_searching_2007,
  title = {Searching for the electoral connection: {Parliamentary}
party switching in the {Ukrainian} rada, 1998-2002},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907888},
  abstract = {Studies of legislative behavior almost universally
begin with the assumption that legislators desire reelection. For
scholars who study the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, this assumption is
perhaps tenuous, given the weaknesses of political parties and the
significant party switching. Yet an analysis of party switching
between 1998 and 2002 using a new method that controls for selection
bias demonstrates that, although turnover among parties was high, this
turnover followed an electoral logic: deputies changed parties, in
part, to secure reelection. Thus, the electoral connection, assumed in
so much of the legislative behavior literature, existed even in the
chaotic Rada.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Thames, Frank C.},
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  note = {WOS:000247083000004},
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@article{marshall_strategic_2007,
  title = {Strategic position taking and presidential influence in
congress},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907923},
  abstract = {The rise and fall of presidential success in Congress
remains a central puzzle in the literature. We model success as two
interrelated processes: presidential position taking and Congress's
decision to support or oppose the president. The analysis emphasizes
the importance of strategic position taking in determining
presidential success. We show that presidential approval significantly
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influences success, not only because it affects congressional behavior, but also because it shapes presidential decisions to take positions. Moreover, we explain that legislative success during the honeymoon period is driven by presidential position taking. Our findings highlight the role of a president's strategic decisions for theories explaining congressional-executive relations.},

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    number = {2},
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    title = {Strategic retirements: {The} influence of public preferences on voluntary departures from congress},
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    volume = {32},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298007780907897},
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    abstract = {Are members of Congress responsive to public preferences in their decisions to seek reelection or retire, or do members simply rely on the advantages of incumbency to secure reelection? I argue that members of Congress consider their electoral vulnerability when deciding whether or not to seek reelection, informing their reelection odds with the same short-term electoral forces that influence election outcomes: partisan preferences, economic evaluations, and congressional approval. Considering aggregate rates of voluntary departures from the House and Senate from 1954 to 2004, I show that rates of retirement reflect, not only institutional environments within Congress, but also the mood of the electorate.},
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    month = may,
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    year = {2007},
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    title = {The policymaking role of state supreme courts in education policy},
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    volume = {32},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298007780907914},
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    abstract = {In this article, I examine the relationship between courts and legislatures from a comparative perspective. Specifically, I discuss how (1) the ideological composition of the bench, (2) the
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propensity of court involvement in a given policy area, and (3) the presence of an advisory opinion affect the number of bill introductions and policy enactments by state legislatures. Examination of education policy in the American states reveals that ideologically distant courts limit the number of bill introductions and bill enactments in state legislatures. Alternatively, the presence of an advisory opinion increases policy introduction and enactment in state legislatures. A fundamental implication of these findings is that courts exert the greatest impact on policy during the introduction stage of the legislative process. Previous studies have not examined the introduction stage and have therefore marginalized the real impact of court influence on policy.},

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    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Wilhelm, Teena},
    month = may,
    year = {2007},
    note = {WOS:000247083000007},
    pages = {309--333}
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  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = feb,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000245071700001},
  pages = {1--3}
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@article{druckman_communist_2007,
  title = {Communist successor parties and coalition formation in
{Eastern} {Europe}},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007X201967},
  abstract = {One of the most distinctive features of new
democracies is the presence of political parties associated with the
old, repressive regime. This article investigates whether or not the
Eastern European variant of these parties, which we call communist
successor parties (CSPs), has affected coalition politics. It finds
that CSPs do have significant effects on the dynamics of coalition
formation. CSPs are less likely than other parties to be included in
governing coalitions; coalitions that include CSPs are more likely to
be oversized (that is, to include superfluous parties); and CSPs that
make it into government are penalized, insofar as they receive less
than their fair share of governing portfolios. We attribute these
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results to the salience of the regime divide-the affective dislike of many citizens for the legacies of communism. Our results extend research on coalition behavior to Eastern European contexts and show how affective dislike combined with vote-seeking motivations can affect governing behavior.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Druckman, James N. and Roberts, Andrew},
month = feb,
year = {2007},
note = {WOS:000245071700002},
pages = {5--31}

}

@article{meinke_slavery_2007,

title = {Slavery, partisanship, and procedure in the {US} house: {The} gag rule, 1836-1845},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007X201976},
abstract = {From the 24th through the 28th Congresses, the House of Representatives operated under versions of a "gag rule" that blocked petitions dealing with abolition and related matters. This article presents the gag rule as not only a historically important window into slavery deliberations in Congress but also a case study in majority party restrictions of minority rights-and in the boundaries that constituency politics can place on majority power. Through analysis of vote choices and voting changes over time, I demonstrate that the gag rule's partisan origins gave way as northern members voted against party and with specific constituency pressures as well as general sectional sentiment. The gag rule shows the power of electoral considerations and constituency in the early U.S. House, and it also illustrates the force that constituency can have over majority procedural maneuvering.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Meinke, Scott R.},
month = feb,
year = {2007},
note = {WOS:000245071700003},
pages = {33--57}

}

@article{young_vote_2007,

title = {Vote switchers and party influence in the {US} house},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007X201985},
abstract = {Party-centered theories of Congress often rely on the critical assumption that some majority party members vote against their preferences when granting their leadership procedural powers,

Such as closed rules. Such an assumption renders these approaches ad hoc, and thus theoretically dubious, unless firm Support for the assumption can be found. Firm support is elusive largely because it is difficult to separate party and preference effects. In this article, we produce a simple but critical test of the party persuasion assumption that largely avoids these measurement problems. Specifically, we use a "switcher analysis" (Krehbiel 1998) to compare votes on final passage of the legislation with the votes on the closed rule. Our analysis of all closed rule-final passage vote pairs for the 104th-108th Congresses reveals vote patterns that cannot exist absent significant party effects.},

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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Young, Garry and Wilkins, Vicky},
    month = feb,
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    note = {WOS:000245071700004},
    pages = {59--77}
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@article{brady_primary_2007,
  title = {Primary elections and candidate ideology: {Out} of step with the primary electorate?},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007X201994},
  abstract = {This article draws on a new dataset of House primary- and general-election outcomes (1956-98) to examine the relationship between primary elections and candidate ideology. We show that, like presidential candidates, congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma: should they align themselves with their general- or primary-election constituencies? Relative to general-election voters, primary voters favor more ideologically extreme candidates. We show that congressional candidates handle the dilemma by positioning themselves closer to the primary electorate. This article thus Supports the idea that primaries pull candidates away from median district preferences.},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Brady, David W. and Han, Hahrie and Pope, Jeremy C.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2007},
    note = {WOS:000245071700005},
    pages = {79--105}
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@article{haider-markel_representation_2007,
  title = {Representation and backlash: {The} positive and negative influence of descriptive representation},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298007X202001},
    abstract = {For this article, I built on previous studies of
representation by exploring the potential positive and negative
impacts of descriptive representation in the policy process.
Specifically, I examined the influence of openly lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) state legislators on the amount and
types of LGBT-related state legislation introduced from 1992 to 2002.
My findings suggest that higher LGBT representation in state
legislatures leads to greater substantive representation. The results
also suggest, however, that descriptive representation is associated
with the amount of anti-LGBT legislation introduced. Additional
analysis reveals that the net policy influence of increased LGBT
representation is positive for the LGBT Community.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = feb,
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    pages = {107--133}
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@article{goodliffe_campaign_2007,
  title = {Campaign war chests and challenger quality in {Senate}
elections},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007X202010},
  abstract = {This article presents the first comprehensive
analysis of the role of war chests in U.S. Senate elections. Using
data on races from 1980 to 2000, I demonstrate the effect of an
incumbent senator's war chest on a campaign. War chests do not deter
strong general-election challengers and have an insubstantial or
insignificant effect on primary elections, challenger spending, and
other electoral variables. Also, war chests are not raised in
anticipation of a tough electoral battle but are instead the result of
money left over from the previous campaign.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Goodliffe, Jay},
  month = feb,
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@article{loewenberg_legislative_2006,
  title = {Legislative studies quarterly - {Introduction}},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201887},
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    number = {4},
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    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
    month = nov,
    year = {2006},
    note = {WOS:000242501000001},
    pages = {465--468}
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@article{ansolabehere_television_2006,
  title = {Television and the incumbency advantage in {US}
elections},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201896},
  abstract = {We use the structure of media markets within states
and across state boundaries to study the relationship between
television and electoral competition. In particular, we compare
incumbent vote margins in media markets where content originates in
the same state as media consumers versus vote margins where content
originates out of state. This contrast provides a clear test of
whether or not television coverage correlates with the incumbency
advantage. We study U.S. Senate and state gubernatorial races from the
1950s through the 1990s and find that the effect of TV is small,
directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ansolabehere, Stephen and Snowberg, Erik C. and Snyder,
James M.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000242501000002},
  pages = {469--490}
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@article{schaffner_local_2006,
  title = {Local news coverage and the incumbency advantage in the
{US} {House}},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201904},
  abstract = {Much of he incumbency advantage in he U.S. House of
Representatives is attributed to incumbents' efforts to address
constituents' needs. Yet House members do not win reelection simply by
performing well in office, but also by informing constituents of how
well they are doing their jobs. I examined the value of local news
coverage for legislators seeking to publicize their legislative work
on behalf of constituents. I found that incumbents who win more
newspaper coverage are viewed as being more in touch with the district
and are more likely to win support from constituents during bids for
reelection.},

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number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Schaffner, Brian F.},
month = nov,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000242501000003},
pages = {491--511}
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@article{binder_parties_2006,
  title = {Parties and institutional choice revisited},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201913},
  abstract = {Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median-voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median-voter model may be time-bound to the twentieth century-after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Binder, Sarah A.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000242501000004},
  pages = {513--532}
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@article{harvey_pulling_2006,
  title = {Pulling punches: {Congressional} constraints on the {Supreme} {Court}'s constitutional rulings, 1987-2000},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201922},
  abstract = {To date, no study has found evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court is constrained by Congress in its constitutional decisions. We addressed the selection bias inherent in previous studies with a statute-centered, rather than a case-centered, analysis, following all congressional laws enacted between 1987 and 2000. We uncovered considerable congressional constraint in the Court's constitutional rulings. In particular, we found that the probability that the Rehnquist Court would strike a liberal congressional law rose between 47\% and 288\% as a result of the 1994 congressional elections, depending on the legislative model used.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Harvey, Anna and Friedman, Barry},
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    note = {WOS:000242501000005},
    pages = {533--562}
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@article{malhotra_government_2006,
  title = {Government growth and professionalism in {US} state legislatures},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201931},
  abstract = {This article analyzes the professionalization of American state legislatures since the 1960s and expands on previous studies by considering the strategic incentives of members. Fiorina and Noll's (1978a, 1978b) theory that reelection-minded legislators serve as "ombudsmen to the bureaucracy" on behalf of their constituents suggests that legislatures have professionalized in response to growth in public spending in order to strengthen members' abilities to handle increased facilitation duties. I used longitudinal analysis and instrumental variables regression to test this hypothesis and disentangle causal directionality, since professional legislators may have the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts. Both methods revealed empirical support for the Fiorina and Noll hypothesis that spending increases caused legislators to become more professional.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Malhotra, Neil},
  month = nov,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000242501000006},
  pages = {563--584}
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@article{woods_legislative_2006,
  title = {Legislative professionalism and influence on state agencies: {The} effects of resources and careerism},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201940},
  abstract = {Legislative professionalization typically involves two concomitant processes: increasing institutional resources and increasing careerism among state legislators. These processes, we argue, entail different effects for legislative influence on state administrative agencies. Greater legislative resources serve to increase legislative influence, but greater political careerism among state legislators serves to decrease it. Because these two processes
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are normally intertwined within the process of legislative professionalization, the net effect of professionalism is uncertain, although our analysis suggests that the negative effect of careerism may outweigh the positive effect of institutional resources. These results have significant implications for the democratic responsiveness of executive branch agencies.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Woods, Neal D. and Baranowski, Michael},
    month = nov,
    year = {2006},
    note = {WOS:000242501000007},
    pages = {585--609}
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  title = {Untitled},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201823},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = aug,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000239882100001},
  pages = {319--321}
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@article{taylor_size_2006,
  title = {Size, power, and electoral systems: {Exogenous}
determinants of legislative procedural choice},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201832},
  abstract = {I tested hypotheses about the relationship between
exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a
unique cross-sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55
legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three
entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have
theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative
power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are
selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have
decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of
chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal
vote.},
  number = {3},
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  author = {Taylor, Andrew J.},
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    note = {WOS:000239882100002},
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@article{miquel_legislative_2006,
  title = {Legislative effectiveness and legislative careers},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201841},
  abstract = {We studied an underutilized source of data on
legislative effectiveness and exploited its panel structure to uncover
several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises
sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we
control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation,
and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out
to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to
electoral attrition and selective retirement, but to learning-by-
doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of "positive
sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators
moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power.
Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral
success and on the probability of legislators moving to higher office.
These findings have important implications for arguments about term
limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Miquel, Gerard Padro I. and Snyder, James M.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000239882100003},
  pages = {347--381}
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@article{herron_term_2006,
  title = {Term limits and pork},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201850},
  abstract = {We describe a model of electoral selection and
legislative policy choice that explores the effects of term limits on
legislative spending. In the model, self-interested voters in a
collection of districts prefer representatives who deliver pork over
representatives who maximize aggregate social welfare. Term limits
can, in some cases, inhibit voters from selecting representatives who
deliver particularistic benefits, and, in these cases, term limits
reduce pork spending. On the other hand, when pork is extremely
socially inefficient, representatives who want to deliver pork to
their districts have incentives to refrain from doing so to reduce
future pork in other districts. In this scenario, term limits actually
prevent legislators from promoting future spending moderation and thus
paradoxically increase pork spending.},

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    number = {3},
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@article{griffin_senate_2006,
  title = {Senate apportionment as a source of political
inequality},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201869},
  abstract = {Political scientists have long known that the equal
representation of states in the U.S. Senate and the placement of state
lines might disadvantage politically relevant groups, granting some
citizens greater voting weight in the chamber. Yet we lack systematic,
longitudinal evidence that identifies the groups disadvantaged by
Senate malapportionment, the sources of this disadvantage, and probes
the policy consequences. In this article, I compare each state's
liberalism and racial composition with its relative voting weight in
the Senate over time. Additionally, I examine whether roll-call
coalitions in the Senate map onto these patterns of state ideology and
racial composition.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Griffin, John D.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000239882100005},
  pages = {405--432}
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@article{yamane_religion_2006,
  title = {Religion in the legislative arena: {Affiliation},
salience, advocacy, and public policymaking},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201878},
  abstract = {Religion is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon
that informs politics in various ways. This article examines the
effects of religious affiliation, religious salience, and religious
group advocacy on roll-call voting in the Wisconsin state legislature.
Various studies have demonstrated the impact of religious affiliation
on legislative politics, but our use of additional religious
indicators allows us to model the religious effect in a more accurate
and nuanced manner. Using data from an original survey of state
legislators, we utilized structural equation modeling to measure the
direct and indirect effects of these religious factors on both the

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general pattern of roll-call voting and voting on a high-salience issue, abortion. Ultimately, the findings indicate that, even when we control for political party affiliation, which is a dominant influence on roll-call voting, conservative Protestant religious affiliation and high religious salience influence legislative voting. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for future studies of religion in the legislative arena.},

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    number = {3},
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = may,
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  pages = {149--152}
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  title = {How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201760},
  abstract = {Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call "mega-seats." We consider the selection of three different types of mega-seats-cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs-in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega-seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega-seats (one important payoff of "winning"), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.},
  number = {2},
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    year = {2006},
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    pages = {153--174}
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@article{salmond_proportional_2006,
  title = {Proportional representation and female
parliamentarians},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201779},
  abstract = {This article asks, "What effect does the choice of a
nation's electoral system have on the gender composition of its
parliament over time?" I find that the electoral system has an
important part to play, but previous work has overstated, by factors
of between two. and three, how much of a difference an electoral
system can make. This article contributes an updated nonlinear theory
of female representation, an improved dataset on women's
representation across space and time, and more modern statistical
techniques than previously used in research on this question.},
  number = {2},
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  author = {Salmond, Rob},
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@article{martorano_balancing_2006,
  title = {Balancing power: {Committee} system autonomy and
legislative organization},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201788},
  abstract = {The most recent explanations for the existence of
committee systems in legislative chambers have posited that committees
are the agents of one of three very different principal actors: (1)
individual members (distributive theory), (2) the full chamber
(informational theory), or (3) the major political party (partisan
theory). In addition to defining and operationalizing the concept of
institutional committee system autonomy, I put forth and test several
hypotheses linking these three explanations to committee system
autonomy. In the end, the results show empirical support for the
informational theory over the distributive and partisan theories.},
  number = {2},
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  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000238030500004},

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    pages = {205--234}
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@article{jenkins_impact_2006,
  title = {The impact of party and ideology on roll-call voting in
state legislatures},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201797},
  abstract = {To assess the relative impact of party and ideology
on legislative behavior, I utilize survey-based measures of legislator
ideology to examine voting in five state legislatures. The results
suggest that, although party and ideology both influence voting, the
impact of party is greater. The magnitude of this impact varies,
however, from chamber to chamber. The activity of parties in the
electoral arena explains part of this variance, with more active
parties having more influence. Thus, research on legislative behavior
should focus on the context surrounding the decision-making process in
order for us to understand the influences on voting.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Jenkins, S.},
  month = may,
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  pages = {235--257}
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@article{apollonio_term_2006,
  title = {Term limits, campaign contributions, and the
distribution of power in state legislatures},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201805},
  abstract = {Using campaign contributions to legislators as an
indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on
the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we
perform a cross-state comparison of the relative influence of party
caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file legislators before
and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse
power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions
to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders
relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across
legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the
upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term
limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Apollonio, D. E. and La Raja, R. J.},
  month = may,
  year = {2006},
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    note = {WOS:000238030500006},
    pages = {259--281}
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@article{smith_judicial_2006,
  title = {Judicial procedures as instruments of political control:
{Congress}'s strategic use of citizen suits},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201814},
  abstract = {Citizen suit provisions, which give proregulatory
interests access to the federal courts, can be used by Congress to
increase the courts' role in regulatory policy. I analyze 284
environmental regulation bills reported favorably out of committee and
show that committee support for citizen suits is a function of the
committee's policy goals and the political context in which the bills
are generated. These findings indicate that Congress deliberately uses
judicial procedures as instruments of political control and that
scholars examining judicial policymaking must include legislative
goals in the list of explanatory factors.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Smith, J. L.},
  month = may,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000238030500007},
  pages = {283--305}
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@article{loewenberg_introduction_2006-1,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201706},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000235471000001},
  pages = {1--3}
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@article{remington_presidential_2006,
  title = {Presidential support in the {Russian} {State} {Duma}},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201715},
  abstract = {Recent comparative research on presidential systems
has analyzed the ways in which presidents build majorities for their
legislative agendas. Through an analysis of roll-call votes from the

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2000-03 Russian State Duma on a set of issues reflecting President Putin's legislative agenda, I examine the impact of parliamentary party affiliation, policy preferences, issue type, and electoral mandate type on structuring floor support for the president. I also assess the implications of a mixed electoral system for building legislative coalitions in multiparty legislatures. Further, my findings shed light on Putin's recent reforms of the Duma's rules and procedures and the country's electoral system.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Remington, T. F.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000002},
pages = {5--32}

}

@article{lawrence_who_2006,

title = {Who wins? {Party} effects in legislative voting},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298006X201724},
abstract = {Political scientists have long attempted to measure and describe the modest and contingent effects of party on the behavior of members of Congress. Recent efforts have extended the debate to the more specific question of whether or not party influences are sufficiently strong to move policy outcomes away from the median position. In this article, we specify four theories of legislative behavior. One is a preference-based, or partyless, theory of behavior. This theory posits that there are no party effects independent of preferences and that equilibrium outcomes are located at the chamber's median. The other theories rely on different conceptions of the foundations of party effects and yield distinctive predictions about the legislators who will support bills on final passage votes. After testing, our conclusion is that strong party influences can be found in final passage voting in the House: the partyless theory receives little support, but a model based on majority party agenda control works well. Legislative outcomes are routinely on the majority party's side of the chamber median.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Lawrence, E. D. and Maltzman, F. and Smith, S. S.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000003},
pages = {33--69}

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@article{volden_how_2006,

title = {How strong should our party be? {Party} member preferences over party cohesion},

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    volume = {31},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298006X201733},
    abstract = {In this article, we seek to explain when and why
political parties pressure their members to vote with the party. We
model party cohesion as an endogenous choice of preference alignment
by party members. Couched in Krehbiel's (1996, 1998) pivotal politics
model, the formal theory advanced here shows party cohesion to be
related to the initial preference alignment of party members, the
divergence in preferences between parties, the cohesion of the
opposing party, the party's size, and the party's majority or minority
status. We solved the model analytically for generalized-partial
equilibrium results and further analyzed it through computer
simulations. We tested the model's predictions in the U.S. Senate
using Rice party cohesion scores from the 46th through 104th
Congresses. The data analyses show strong support for this theory of
endogenous choice of party pressure.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Volden, C. and Bergman, E.},
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    year = {2006},
    note = {WOS:000235471000004},
    pages = {71--104}
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@article{carey_effects_2006,
    title = {The effects of term limits on state legislatures: {A}
new survey of the 50 states},
    volume = {31},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298006X201742},
    abstract = {Term limits on legislators were adopted in 21 states
during the early 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the limits legally barred
incumbents from reelection in I I states, and they will do so in four
more by 2010. In 2002, we conducted the only survey of legislators in
all 50 states aimed at assessing the impact of term limits on state
legislative representation. We found that term limits have virtually
no effect on the types of people elected to office-whether measured by
a range of demographic characteristics or by ideological
predisposition-but they do have measurable impact on certain behaviors
and priorities reported by legislators in the survey, and on the
balance of power among various institutional actors in the arena of
state politics. We characterize the biggest impact on behavior and
priorities as a "Burkean shift," whereby term-limited legislators
become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical
districts and more attentive to other concerns. The reform also
increases the power of the executive branch (governors and the
bureaucracy) over legislative outcomes and weakens the influence of
majority party leaders and committee chairs, albeit for different
reasons.},
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    number = {1},
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Moncrief, G. F.},
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    year = {2006},
    note = {WOS:000235471000005},
    pages = {105--134}
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@article{murakami_old_2006,
    title = {An old trend for a new majority: {Explaining} the higher
retirement rate of {Republicans}.},
    volume = {31},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Murakami, M.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2006},
    note = {WOS:000235471000007},
    pages = {135--135}
}

@article{razaghian_confirmation_2006,
    title = {Confirmation delay: {Executive} branch nominations in
committee and on the {Senate} floor, 1885-1995.},
    volume = {31},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Razaghian, R. and McCarty, N. M.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2006},
    note = {WOS:000235471000008},
    pages = {136--136}
}

@article{rosenson_party_2006,
    title = {Party leaders under investigation: {Three} ethics
committee cases over the past 25 years.},
    volume = {31},
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    number = {1},
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gender differences in defense policy participation in the {US}  
{Senate}.},  
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  author = {Witko, C. M. and Friedman, S.},  
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@article{wolfensberger_questions_2006,  
  title = {Questions of privilege in the house: {Minority} party  
tools for unity, accountability, and reform.},  
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    title = {A multi-institutional explanation for the emergence of
standing committees in the {House} and {Senate}, 1789-1825.},
    volume = {31},
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    title = {The powers and limits of parties in the {US} {Senate}.},
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    volume = {31},
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@article{bertelli_measuring_2006,
    title = {Measuring constituency influence in congressional voting
decisions.},
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  title = {Political institutions, competing principals, and party
unity in legislative voting.},
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  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
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    title = {Principled and unprincipled partisanship: {Analyzing}
conflict in contemporary {Senate} roll call voting.},
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voting in the {US} {House} of representatives.},
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    number = {1},
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balance in democratic systems.},
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    pages = {143--143}
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    number = {1},
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@article{roberts_coalition_2006,
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Roberts, A.},
    month = feb,
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    volume = {30},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201635},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, G.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2005},
    note = {WOS:000233264600001},
    pages = {475--477}
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@article{krehbiel_joe_2005,
    title = {Joe {Cannon} and the minority party: {Tyranny} or
bipartisanship?},
    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201644},
    abstract = {The minority party is rarely featured in empirical

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research on parties in legislatures, and recent theories of parties in legislatures are rarely neutral and balanced in their treatment of the minority and majority parties. This article makes a case for redressing this imbalance. We identified four characteristics of bipartisanship and evaluated their descriptive merits in a purposely hostile testing ground: during the rise and fall of Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, "the Tyrant from Illinois." Drawing on century-old recently discovered records now available in the National Archives, we found that Cannon was anything but a majority-party tyrant during the important committee-assignment phase of legislative organization. Our findings underscore the need for future, more explicitly theoretical research on parties-in-legislatures.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Krehbiel, K. and Wiseman, A. E.},
month = nov,
year = {2005},
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pages = {479--505}

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@article{andeweg_modes_2005,

title = {Modes of political representation: {Toward} a new typology},

volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201653},

abstract = {The mandate-independence controversy still features prominently in studies of political representation even though the problems with its theoretical foundation and empirical operationalization have long been recognized. This article proposes an alternative typology of modes of representation. By combining type of control (ex ante or ex post) with direction of the interactions (bottom-up or top-down), our study captures the most important aspects of the relationship between voters and representatives. We demonstrate how the typology can be used in a survey instrument by comparing the attitudes toward representation of Dutch members of Parliament with the attitudes held by voters, and by relating the views of the members to their behavior.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Andeweg, R. B. and Thomassen, J. J. A.},
month = nov,
year = {2005},
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pages = {507--528}

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@article{druckman_influence_2005,

title = {Influence without confidence: {Upper} chambers and government formation},

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    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201662},
    abstract = {In most parliamentary democracies, governments must
maintain the confidence of a single legislative chamber only. But in
bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of
government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary
governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to
collapse sooner than those with upper-house majorities. In this
article, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of
upper-chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation
decisions. After controlling for a host of "usual suspect" variables
concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of
coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129
bargaining situations, we found that potential coalitions that control
upper-house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are
those with upper-house minorities. Our findings are important for
students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and,
perhaps most significantly, for those who study policymaking in
parliamentary democracies.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Druckman, J. N. and Martin, L. W. and Thies, M. F.},
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@article{box-steffensmeier_incidence_2005,
    title = {The incidence and timing of {PAC} contributions to
incumbent {US} house members, 1993-94},
    volume = {30},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201671},
    abstract = {In this article, we discuss how donor and recipient
characteristics affected the incidence and timing of political action
committee (PAC) contributions to incumbent members of the U.S. House
of Representatives during the 1993-94 election cycle. We contribute
to the campaign finance literature by modeling the timing of
contributions, which is important because timing affects the
perception of political actors about the competitiveness of elections
and the loci of power among members of Congress, interest groups, and
between members of Congress and interest groups. Split-population
event history models allow us to compare and contrast determinants of
whether and when contributions are made, across various types and
sizes of PACs.},
    number = {4},
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  title = {Will she stay or will she go? {Career} ceilings and
women's retirement from the {US} {Congress}},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201680},
  abstract = {This article offers the first broad-based,
systematic, times-series assessment of the gender dynamics underlying
congressional retirement. We extend the body of work on gender and
representation by using the congressional retirement literature to
develop an argument that accounts for the gender gap in the average
length of congressional service. Our results indicate that women are
less willing than men to remain in Congress when their ability to
influence the legislative agenda stalls. Because of women's relatively
early departures from the House of Representatives, our analysis
suggests that prospects for women's representation are less promising
than the conventional wisdom suggests.},
  number = {4},
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{The} spiraling costs of the permanent campaign},
  volume = {30},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201699},
  abstract = {In this article, we document and analyze the increase
in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during
the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution
activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign
committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased
their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional
campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a
function of that member's institutional position: the greater the
position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more
campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition
for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise
surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy
positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the

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institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.},
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  volume = {30},
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  abstract = {Despite their political prominence, cabinet
reshuffles have not attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. We
provide a theory of cabinet reshuffles that emphasizes both systematic
and time-varying causes. In particular, we argue that prime ministers
employ cabinet reshuffles to retain power in the face of both
intraparty and electoral challenges to their leadership. We use
repeated-events duration models to examine the timing of cabinet
reshuffles in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom in the period 1960-2001, and find support for several of our
hypotheses.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Kam, C. and Indridason, I.},
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examination of differing career tracks},
  volume = {30},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201590},
  abstract = {We examine the degree to which parties act as
procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictions from the
party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). We gain
leverage on the question of party influence in Congress by focusing on
three types of House members: reelection seekers, higher-office
seekers, and retiring members. We argue that retiring House members
are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect
means (when compared to higher-office seekers and reelection seekers)
to determine the existence of party influence. Results from a pooled,
cross-sectional analysis of the 94th through 105th Congresses (1975-
98) suggest that party influence is indeed present in Congress,
especially where the party cartel theory predicts: on procedural,
rather than final-passage, votes. Moreover, we find that procedural
party influence is almost exclusively the domain of the majority
party. This latter finding is especially important because most prior
studies have been limited to investigating interparty influence
only.},
  number = {3},
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  author = {Jenkins, J. A. and Crespín, M. H. and Carson, J. L.},
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gets "what, when, how?"},
  volume = {30},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201608},
  abstract = {What are the political consequences for members of
Congress who switch parties? Roll-call and electoral consequences of
congressional party switching have been studied, but other
implications of party defections have yet to be systematically
explored. In this article, I examine the committee assignments of
House party switchers and argue that party leaders seek to reward
members of the opposing party who join their ranks. Using committee
assignment data from the 94th House (1975-76) through the 107th House
(2001-02), I show that party switchers are more likely than
nonswitchers to be the beneficiaries of violations of the seniority
norm. The findings from this article are of interest to students of
political parties and legislative institutions, and fill a gap in the
literature on party switching.},
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{An} analysis of sex differences in cosponsorship activity},
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  abstract = {Women-and-politics research emphasizes the importance
of social identity as a determinant of legislative behavior, yet
congressional scholars largely ignore identity and focus on the impact
of constituency, party, and institutional factors. To examine the link
between descriptive and substantive representation, I utilize an
original database of cosponsorship activity in the 103d and 104th
Congresses that encompasses five social welfare issues that reflect
the gender gap in the mass public. I find that the policy preferences
of elites do reflect gender differences in the mass public and voter
expectations concerning the policy expertise of women candidates.
These differences are constrained by changes in the political and
institutional contexts since women increase their activity on social
welfare issues when they gain access to strategic positions of power,
particularly majority party status, to a greater extent than do
similarly situated men.},
  number = {3},
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  title = {Unintended consequences: {Anticipation} of general
election outcomes and primary election divisiveness},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201626},
  abstract = {This article offers the first theory to explain the
relationship between primary election divisiveness and general
election outcomes that is grounded in candidates' own behavior.
Conventional wisdom holds that divisive primaries cause candidates to
do poorly in general elections. I show that primary divisiveness does
not cause this or any other pattern of general election results.
Rather, expectations about general election results cause primaries to
be divisive. Non-incumbents enter races they think they can win, and
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they think they can win where the incumbent is vulnerable. More candidates enter those races than others, splitting the vote among them. This stampede creates divisive primaries in which incumbents are most likely to do poorly, and challengers well, in the general elections. As a result, divisiveness is associated with (but does not cause) better general election performances among challengers and worse performances among incumbents. In this manner, primary divisiveness is an unintended consequence of behavior directed towards the goal of winning the general election. I tested these propositions using data from major-party House primaries between 1976 and 1998 and found that (a) candidate expectations of victory determine when and where divisive primary elections occur, (b) those expectations drive the correlation between primary divisiveness and general election results, and (c) primary divisiveness correlates with incumbents doing poorly, and challengers well, in general elections.},

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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{wawro_peculiar_2005,
  title = {Peculiar institutions: {Slavery}, sectionalism, and
  minority obstruction in the antebellum senate},
  volume = {30},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201509},
  abstract = {This article examines obstruction in the U.S. Senate,
  focusing on political conflict in the antebellum period. I consider
  different theories that predict when obstruction should occur and
  conduct individual-level analysis of the use of and support for
  dilatory tactics. The analysis investigates how the costs of
  obstruction, the probability that obstruction succeeds, the policy
  preferences of the senator, and the salience of legislation relate to
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decisions to obstruct. I find that both sectional and partisan factors influence obstruction, with the former being especially important for legislation related to slavery. In particular, Southern senators' concerns about being in the minority led them to obstruct to protect their interests in slavery.},

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    number = {2},
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    month = may,
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@article{jacobi_senatorial_2005,
    title = {The senatorial courtesy game: {Explaining} the norm of
informal vetoes in advice and consent nominations},
    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201518},
    abstract = {Despite the contentiousness of advice and consent
nominations, the Senate usually rejects a candidate to whom a home
senator objects. Using game theory, this article explains the
persistence of senatorial courtesy and maps its effects on which
candidates succeed. The greater salience of a home nomination allows
retaliation and reciprocity in a repeated game to elicit support for a
veto, even under adverse conditions. Comparative statics indicate the
range of the president's feasible nominees and show which players gain
and lose from the practice. Most notably, the president can benefit
from an exercise of senatorial courtesy.},
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    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{roberts_minority_2005,
    title = {Minority rights and majority power. {Conditional} party
government and the motion to recommit in the house},
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    volume = {30},
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    abstract = {Students of legislative politics have struggled to
explain and measure party influence on voting and outcomes in
Congress. Proponents of strong party effects point to the numerous
procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority party as evidence of
party effects, yet recent theoretical work by Krehbiel and Meirowitz
(2002) argues that House rules guaranteeing the minority a motion to
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recommit with instructions effectively balances the procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority. This article identifies and tests the empirical implications of the Krehbiel and Meirowitz theory, using roll-call data from the 61st to 107th Congresses (1909-2002). The results call into question the validity of Krehbiel and Meirowitz's conclusions about party government in the House and provide support for the theory of conditional party government.},

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Roberts, J. M.},
month = may,
year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000229463900004},
pages = {219--234}

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@article{mcdermott_congressional_2005,
title = {Congressional performance, incumbent behavior, and voting in senate elections},
volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201536},
abstract = {Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using multiple state-level exit polls of Senate voting conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {McDermott, M. L. and Jones, D. R.},
month = may,
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pages = {235--257}

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@article{moser_strategic_2005,
title = {Strategic ticket splitting and the personal vote in

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mixed-member electoral systems},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201545},
  abstract = {This article examines ticket splitting in five
different mixed-member electoral systems-Germany, New Zealand, Japan,
Lithuania, and Russia-and indicates the shortcomings inherent in any
analysis of such ticket splitting that does not take into account the
presence of the personal vote. We find that the personal vote plays a
central part in shaping ticket splitting in all of our cases except
for Germany, a heavily party-oriented system in which we find evidence
of only a weak personal vote but evidence of substantial strategic
voting.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E.},
  month = may,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000229463900006},
  pages = {259--276}
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@article{maestas_national_2005,
  title = {National party efforts to recruit state legislators to
run for the {US} house},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201554},
  abstract = {We explore factors that influence the chances that a
state legislator will be the target of national party recruitment to
run for the U.S. House. Using data from a sample of legislators in 200
U.S. House districts, we find that national party contact reflects
strategic considerations of party interests. State legislators serving
in professional institutions and in competitive districts are most
likely to be contacted by national party leaders. In addition, the
analysis suggests that national party leaders may be sensitive to the
potential costs to the state legislative party: legislators in
institutions that are closely balanced between the parties are
slightly less likely to be contacted.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Maestas, C. D. and Maisel, L. S. and Stone, W. J.},
  month = may,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000229463900007},
  pages = {277--300}
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@article{reynolds_reserved_2005,
  title = {Reserved seats in national legislatures: {A} research
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    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201563},
    abstract = {As competitive democracy is crafted in ethnically
plural and postconflict nation-states, the question of whether or not
to reserve legislative seats for communal groups-ethnic, national, or
religious-is increasingly a topic of debate. This research note
provides an overview of targeted electoral mechanisms designed to
ensure the inclusion in national parliaments of representatives of
ethnic, racial, national, or religious communities. The data show that
the existence of reserved seats in national legislatures for such
groups is much more widespread, and less idiosyncratic, than many
scholars previously thought. This finding, along with current
discussions in high-profile cases of constitutional design, suggests
that the occurrence and impact of reserved seats should be analyzed in
greater detail.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Reynolds, A.},
    month = may,
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@article{loewenberg_untitled_2005-1,
    title = {Untitled},
    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201419},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, G.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2005},
    note = {WOS:000227578600001},
    pages = {1--4}
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@article{hettinger_explaining_2005,
    title = {Explaining the incidence and timing of congressional
responses to the {US} {Supreme} {Court}},
    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201428},
    abstract = {Sparked by interest in game-theoretic representations
of the separation of powers, empirical work examining congressional
overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions has burgeoned in recent
years. Much of this work has been hampered, however, by the relative
rarity of such events; as has long been noted, congressional attention
to the Court is limited, and most Court decisions represent the last
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word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. By adopting an approach that allows us to separate the factors that lead to the event itself (that is, the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those that influence the timing of the event, we find that case-specific factors are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, whereas Congress- and Court-specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our study yields a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation-of-powers system.},

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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Hettinger, V. A. and Zorn, C.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2005},
    note = {WOS:000227578600002},
    pages = {5--28}
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@article{rogers_empirical_2005,
  title = {Empirical determinants of bicameral sequence in state legislatures},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201437},
  abstract = {In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this "first-mover advantage" implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = feb,
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    pages = {29--42}
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@article{batto_electoral_2005,
  title = {Electoral strategy, committee membership, and rent seeking in the {Taiwanese} legislature, 1992-2001},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201446},
    abstract = {While the electoral system undoubtedly influences
legislative behavior, it does not necessarily have a uniform effect on
all legislators. In this article, I argue that the different
strategies that candidates choose in the quest for office result in
differing incentives once the candidates have been elected. In the
Taiwanese context, candidates who adopt a campaign strategy based on
organization will tend to engage in more rent-seeking activities once
in the legislature, in order to offset the heavy financial burden of
this strategy. From 1992 to 2001, Taiwanese legislators whose votes
were highly concentrated in a small number of precincts tended to
serve significantly more time on committees with the most rent-seeking
opportunities than did legislators with far less concentrated support.
Legislators whose votes were spread more evenly across the entire
electoral district and legislators elected from the party lists tended
to serve more time on committees with little rent-seeking potential.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Batto, N. F.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2005},
    note = {WOS:000227578600004},
    pages = {43--62}
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@article{kimball_priming_2005,
    title = {Priming partisan evaluations of congress},
    volume = {30},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298005X201455},
    abstract = {Congress has been the scene of increasingly partisan
and ideologically polarized conflict in recent years. I examine the
extent to which the national political climate mutes or amplifies the
effect of partisanship on evaluations of Congress. Using data from the
National Election Studies and a content analysis of national media
coverage, I find that public evaluations of Congress divide most
sharply along party lines when elite-level discourse is most partisan
(as during an election season or a highly charged partisan debate in
Congress). This finding is consistent with an opinion leadership or
priming hypothesis of public opinion. In addition, the most
knowledgeable citizens are most likely to be primed by the partisan
political climate in Washington. In contrast, less attentive citizens
tend to rely on nonpartisan cues when evaluating Congress. I discuss
the implications of these findings for public opinion and improving
the public standing of Congress in an increasingly partisan climate.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Kimball, D. C.},
    month = feb,
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    pages = {63--84}
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@article{bianco_last_2005,
  title = {Last post for "{The} greatest generation": {The} policy
implications of the decline of military experience in the {US}
{Congress}},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201464},
  abstract = {This paper characterizes the behavioral and policy
implications of the decline in the number of military veterans in the
U.S. Congress, from more than 70\% of legislators in the early 1970s
to less than 30\% in the contemporary House and Senate. Many scholars
argue that military service shapes information and beliefs, and that
this decline has had negative effects on defense policy. The analysis
tests these arguments using voting data from the House and Senate in
the 1990s and the House in the 1970s, showing that the impact of
veteran status on votes is generally small and has a relatively minor
effect on legislative outcomes.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bianco, W. T.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000227578600006},
  pages = {85--102}
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@article{meinke_long-term_2005,
  title = {Long-term change and stability in house voting
decisions: {The} case of the minimum wage},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201473},
  abstract = {Although members of Congress exhibit considerable
stability in their voting decisions on similar, recurring issues,
members' long-term voting histories reveal evidence of systematic
instability as well. I argue that members reverse positions in
predictable ways when the vote history loses value as a decision cue,
and I present empirical evidence for this behavior in the context of
the highly salient and regularly repeated House decisions on
increasing the federal minimum wage. The empirical findings suggest
that reversals of member positions are related to institutional,
electoral, and constituency factors. I conclude by discussing the
importance of these findings to understanding congressional decision
making and representation.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Meinke, S. R.},
  month = feb,
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    year = {2005},
    note = {WOS:000227578600007},
    pages = {103--126}
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@article{harris_orchestrating_2005,
  title = {Orchestrating party talk a party-based view of one-
minute speeches in the house of representatives},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201482},
  abstract = {Previous studies of House members' speech-giving
behavior treat the behavior as a product of members' individual goals.
By uncovering leadership memoranda soliciting member participation in
one-minute speech giving, I find, first, that parties significantly
structure one-minute speech giving, with party-orchestrated message
campaigns accounting for about one-third of the speeches given.
Second, I find that a party-based explanation illuminates individual
members' speech-giving behavior. Ideological proximity to the party
leadership and party organizational factors strongly influence a
member's willingness to be "on message." These findings have important
implications for studies of both party message politics and members'
speech-giving behavior.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Harris, D. B.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000227578600008},
  pages = {127--141}
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@article{loewenberg_editors_2004,
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  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201267},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000225454400001},
  pages = {483--486}
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@article{ansolabehere_using_2004,
  title = {Using term limits to estimate incumbency advantages when
office holders retire strategically},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},

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    doi = {10.3162/036298004X201276},
    abstract = {Empirical study of U.S. elections over the last 50
years has documented a strong electoral advantage to incumbency in
state and federal elections. Recently, however, critics have argued
that traditional estimates of the incumbency advantage may overstate
the advantage by as much as 100\% because the estimates fail to
consider strategic retirements. This article directly examines whether
or not strategic retirement biases conventional regression estimates
of incumbency advantages. We use term limits in state executive and
legislative elections as instrumental variables to correct for
strategic retirement. We find that, as an empirical matter, strategic
retirement is not substantively important. Estimates of incumbency
advantages that take account of strategic retirement actually are
marginally larger than estimates that do not.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J. M.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2004},
    note = {WOS:000225454400002},
    pages = {487--515}
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@article{maddox_opportunity_2004,
  title = {Opportunity costs and outside careers in {US} state
legislatures},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201285},
  abstract = {Cost-benefit models of career choice predict that
potential legislators choose legislative careers when they expect
greater utility from legislative service than from other options. In
state legislatures, the utility of legislative service includes the
monetary value of outside careers. I hypothesize that legislators are
more likely to pursue outside careers when financial opportunity costs
are higher or when they derive less non-monetary value from
legislative service. In particular, I posit that individual
characteristics that predict labor market value (such as age,
education, race, and sex) and legislative salary predict outside
careers. I test this model employing a new dataset of individual
outside-career activity derived from financial disclosure reports. The
findings strongly support the hypothesis that outside-career behavior
is a function of the financial opportunity costs of legislative
service. In addition, I find that Republicans are more likely to hold
outside careers than are Democrats. This research has important
implications for the study of state legislative participation,
legislative organization, and the Democratic bias hypothesis.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Maddox, H. W. J.},
  month = nov,
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    year = {2004},
    note = {WOS:000225454400003},
    pages = {517--544}
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@article{nokken_congressional_2004,
  title = {Congressional party defection in {American} history},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201294},
  abstract = {In this paper, we analyze the roll-call voting
behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation
during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who
switched during the stable periods of the three major two-party
systems in American history: the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican
system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic-Whig System (20th to
30th Congresses), and the Democratic-Republican System (46th to 106th
Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the
roll-call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during
periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections
during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras
because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second
dimension of ideological conflict.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Nokken, T. P. and Poole, K. T.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000225454400004},
  pages = {545--568}
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@article{burden_preferences_2004,
  title = {Preferences, partisanship, and whip activity in the {US}
house of representatives},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201302},
  abstract = {Using Democratic whip counts from the 92d House, we
compare representatives' stated intentions to their actual roll-call
votes to detect evidence of party pressure. After arguing that this
strategy understates real party influence, we nonetheless point to
evidence of member conversion by party leaders. On 16 bills analyzed,
two-thirds of the switches between the count and the vote occur in the
direction favored by party leaders. We examine one bill in depth,
showing how the efforts of party leaders were consequential to the
outcome. The pattern of movement on this bill, along with data from
the larger set of bills, provides evidence that leaders act
strategically, targeting the members whose persuasion requires the
fewest resources.},
  number = {4},

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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{solberg_communicating_2004,
  title = {Communicating to the courts and beyond: {Why} members of
  congress participate as amici curiae},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201311},
  abstract = {Members of Congress engage in discretionary
  behaviors, such as making speeches and cosponsoring bills, which are
  generally motivated by either electoral needs or policy preferences.
  We examine a discretionary behavior that engages the judicial branch
  in the conversation: the participation of members of Congress as amici
  curiae before the Supreme Court. Amicus curiae briefs provide members
  of Congress with a direct avenue of communication with the judiciary,
  and this characteristic suggests that cosigning would be a method of
  creating good public policy. Using data from the 1980-97 terms of the
  Supreme Court, however, we find that members of Congress cosign onto
  amicus curiae briefs as a means of "taking stances," akin to
  cosponsoring a bill. The action allows the member to speak indirectly
  to an audience beyond these governmental institutions. Evidence shows
  that ideological extremism and committee jurisdiction promote
  participation as amicus curiae.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Solberg, R. L. S. and Heberlig, E. S.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000225454400006},
  pages = {591--610}
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@article{sheafer_production_2004,
  title = {Production assests, new opportunities, and publicity for
  legislators: {A} study of {Irsraeli} {Knesset} members},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201320},
  abstract = {This study proposes a number of theoretical and
  methodological innovations in an attempt to better understand how
  legislators compete for media coverage. We make a distinction between
  those variables that determine the potential newsworthiness of a
  legislature (production assets) and those that are related to the
  political and media environment in which the legislators operate (news
  opportunities). We then put forth five hypotheses and test them by
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examining the political standing, charismatic communication skills, and radio exposure of 54 members of the Israeli Knesset. The results confirm that political standing and charismatic communication skills are important predictors of media exposure and that the relative importance of these factors changes during different political seasons.},

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    number = {4},
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  issn = {0362-9805},
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  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ahuja, S.},
  month = nov,
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  title = {Editor's introduction},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201195},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G. O.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000223089100001},
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@article{crisp_multicountry_2004,
  title = {Multicountry studies of {Latin} {American} legislatures:
{A} review article},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201203},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    author = {Crisp, B. F. and Botero, F.},
    month = aug,
    year = {2004},
    note = {WOS:000223089100002},
    pages = {329--356}
}

@article{moncrief_time_2004,
    title = {Time, term limits, and turnover: {Trends} in membership
stability in {US} state legislatures},
    volume = {29},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298004X201212},
    abstract = {Increases in legislative professionalization along
with the implementation of term limits in about one-third of the
American states raise significant questions about the path of state
house and senate turnover. We first update turnover figures for all
states, by chamber, from the mid-1980s through 2002. We then compare
turnover rates in states with and without term limits. We find that
turnover rates, overall, continued to decline through the 1980s but
that the long downward trend abated in the 1990s as a result of term
limits. The effects of term limits vary depending on the length of the
term limit and the opportunity structure in the state. There is also a
strong relationship between the presence of term limits and
interchamber movement. In addition to term limits, professionalization
levels, redistricting, the presence of multi-member districts, and
partisan swings explain differences in turnover rates between
states.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Moncrief, G. F. and Niemi, R. G. and Powell, L. W.},
    month = aug,
    year = {2004},
    note = {WOS:000223089100003},
    pages = {357--381}
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@article{reenock_agency_2004,
    title = {Agency design as an ongoing tool of bureaucratic
influence},
    volume = {29},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298004X201221},
    abstract = {Theoretical work assumes that legislators use ex ante
design to gain bureaucratic influence, not only at an agency's
appointment stage but also as an ongoing tactic. Yet no empirical work
has investigated whether or not legislators prefer to use design to
exert influence after an agency's appointment stage. Using a mail
survey of more than 2,500 legislators, we model legislators'
preferences for ex ante design as a function of both institutional
factors and individual legislators' characteristics. Our results

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suggest that the feasibility of agency design as an ongoing tactic of bureaucratic influence is more limited than theoretical work indicates and that both institutional- and individual-level factors explain legislators' preferences.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Reenock, C. and Poggione, S.},
month = aug,
year = {2004},
note = {WOS:000223089100004},
pages = {383--406}

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@article{forgette_party_2004,

title = {Party caucuses and coordination: {Assessing} caucus activity and party effects},

volume = {29},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.3162/036298004X201230},

abstract = {Party caucuses are increasingly important to members' allocation of time. This article reports findings from new data on the minutes, frequency, timing, and attendance of House party caucus meetings. I argue that the party caucuses increasingly affect political and policy information flows to members. This growing party coordination has resulted in a greater bonding and shared strategic information among rank-and-file copartisans. This research also contributes to the party effects literature. Earlier research on congressional partisanship has used roll-call data to measure both member preferences and party effects. I investigate whether or not members' attendance at party caucus meetings immediately prior to key congressional votes imposes partisan cohesion beyond members' preferences. The results indicate that party coordination contributes to greater congressional party unity on key floor votes at both the bill and member level controlling for members' ideological preferences. This party coordination effect occurs even during a period of high intraparty preference homogeneity.},

number = {3},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Forgette, R.},

month = aug,

year = {2004},

note = {WOS:000223089100005},

pages = {407--430}

}

@article{grant_job_2004,

title = {The job of representation in {Congress}: {Public} expectations and representative approval},

volume = {29},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.3162/036298004X201249},

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abstract = {Few concepts are more central to democratic theory than that of representation. Theories of representation are commonly premised on the belief that citizens' expectations of their representative are politically consequential, yet we know little about the nature of these expectations and precisely how they matter. Using individual-level data from a recent national survey, we investigate the influence of constituents' job expectations on their approval of their representative in Congress. We find that citizens' job expectations condition the effects of members' legislative activities on their job approval.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Grant, J. T. and Rudolph, T. J.},
month = aug,
year = {2004},
note = {WOS:000223089100006},
pages = {431--445}
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@article{yoon_explaining_2004,
title = {Explaining women's legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa},
volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201258},
abstract = {This study examines the relative impacts of social, economic, cultural, and political determinants on women's legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa by using an ordinary least squares multiple regression model. Under study are sub-Saharan African countries that held democratic legislative elections between January 1990 and June 30, 2001. Only the latest election in each country is included for analysis. My study finds that patriarchal culture, proportional representation systems, and gender quotas are statistically significant. This study, by focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, fills a gap in the extant literature, which has focused on women's legislative representation in advanced industrialized democracies.},
number = {3},
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@article{green_rivals_2004,
  title = {Rivals for power: {Leadership} challenges in the {US}
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from a formal perspective.},
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@article{jacobson_assessing_2004,
    title = {Assessing the president's role as party agent in
congressional elections: {The} case of {Bill} {Clinton} in 2000},
    volume = {29},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298004X201131},
    abstract = {Presidents have become their parties' chief fund-
raisers and thus have the capacity to further their parties'
collective fortunes by imposing a more efficient distribution of
campaign resources than might otherwise prevail. In order to succeed,
presidents must, first, accurately target their efforts where they
will best improve candidates' prospects for winning seats, and second,
either directly or indirectly (through signaling to other donors)
generate sufficient new resources to affect the election outcome.
Analyses of Bill Clinton's extensive fund-raising efforts during the
1999-2000 election cycle confirm that presidents can indeed use their
unmatched fund-raising ability to help their parties win congressional
contests they might otherwise lose. But analysis of the Clinton record

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also shows that presidential fund-raising activities may be shaped by other purposes that lead to a distribution of effort that is suboptimal for the party.},

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in the house and senate},
  volume = {29},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201140},
  abstract = {Because they represent different kinds of
constituencies-states versus parts of states-senators and House
members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive
programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized
benefits, House members need to use policy tools-earmarks and narrow
categorical programs-that target funds to their constituencies.
Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula
grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money.
Examining House-Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive
programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show
that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate
structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and
affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.},
  number = {2},
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  title = {Gender turnover and roll-call voting in the {US} {House}
of {Representatives}},
  volume = {29},
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  abstract = {A number of studies suggest that the gender of a
legislator affects his or her congressional ideology. We argue that
these studies may have produced misleading results because of
insufficient controls for constituency influences. To better account
for constituency effects, we use a longitudinal research design based
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on electoral turnover, which holds constituency constant while allowing gender and party to vary. We apply ordinary least squares regression to data from the 103d, 104th, and 105th Houses of Representatives and estimate the effect of gender turnover on changes in DW-NOMINATE roll-call voting scores. We find that, when we sufficiently control for both party and constituency influences, gender is not a determinant of the liberalness of a representative's roll-call voting behavior.},

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{Brazil}},  
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    abstract = {This article explores the impact of federalism on  
national party cohesion. Although credited with increasing economic  
growth and managing conflict in countries with diverse electorates,  
federal forms of government have also been blamed for weak party  
systems because national coalitions may be divided by interstate  
conflicts. This latter notion has been widely asserted, but there is  
virtually no empirical evidence of the relationship or even an effort  
to isolate and identify the specific features of federal systems that  
might weaken parties. In this article, I build and test a model of  
federal effects in national legislatures. I apply my framework to  
Brazil, whose weak party system is attributed, in part, to that  
country's federal form of government. I find that federalism does  
significantly reduce party cohesion and that this effect can be tied
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to multiple state-level interests but that state-level actors' impact on national party cohesion is surprisingly small.},

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  volume = {29},  
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  abstract = {Because of senatorial courtesy, scholars typically  
assume that presidents defer to home state senators from their party  
when selecting judges for the federal courts. We challenge this view,  
arguing that presidents face structural incentives that encourage them  
to consult broadly with senators across the partisan and ideological  
spectrums in choosing nominees. Using new data on the fate of judicial  
vacancies on the federal district courts between 1947 and 1998, we  
show how institutional and political forces increase interested  
senators' leverage in choosing federal judges. Senatorial courtesy, we  
conclude, has its limits, given presidents' incentives to consult with  
institutionally empowered senators in selecting nominees. Instead of  
giving advice and consent on a President's nominee, senators block all  
but their own. Once the President yields to their choices, they are  
then easily wheeled to confirmation. Editorial, New York Times(1).},  
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coalition unity in {Brazil}},  
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  abstract = {How do subnational factors affect the proclivity of  
legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together? We  
estimate the effects of two institutional forces operating at the  
state level-intralist electoral competition and alliance with  
governors-on voting unity among coalition cohorts to the Brazilian  
Chamber of Deputies. Larger cohorts, in which the imperative for  
legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, are  
less unified than smaller cohorts. We find no net effect of alliance  
with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant  
brokers of legislative coalitions, a result suggesting that the net  
gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape governors'  
influence relative to that of national-level legislative actors.},  
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  abstract = {I analyze the legislative interaction between  
representatives from big and small states in a bicameral legislature  
that decides on the allocation of a fixed resource among the states. I  
assume that the two houses are malapportioned and that the big states  
are underrepresented in the upper house. By studying the effect of  
this and other institutional features on the relative welfare of big  
and small states and on equilibrium coalitions, I find that, contrary  
to common belief, an increase in the representation of small states  
may reduce those states' expected payoff, ceteris paribus. Also,  
contrary to interpretations of minimum-winning-coalition theorems, I  
demonstrate that excess majorities may occur in one of the two houses.  
When proposal making tends to be dominated by big (small) states,  
excess majorities occur in the upper (lower) house. I also find that  
higher proposal power increases the payoff of a group of states.  
Changes in the majority requirements in the two houses and expansion  
to encompass more small (big) states have non-monotonic effects on the  
relative welfare of the two groups. I conclude my analysis with an  
empirical application using calibrations results for the 103d U.S.  
Congress and the legislative institutions of the European Union before  
and after the Treaty of Nice. "The equality of representation in the  
senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of  
compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small  
states, does not call for much discussion." James Madison (1788).  
Time: "Did the battle over the relative weight of big and small  
countries overshadow more important matters at Nice?" Verhofstadt: "It  
was absolutely necessary. What they tried to do in Nice was make a  
directorate of the big countries. The European Union can't survive  
like that." Interview of Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium  
TIME (2000).},  
  number = {1},  
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    title = {Committee outliers in state legislatures},
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    abstract = {In this paper, we extend recent work exploring the
prevalence of outlying committees in American state legislatures.
Using an expanded sample of 45 states and measures of legislator
preferences generated by a single, federated group, we find that most
legislative committees are representative of the parent chambers from
which their members are selected. Furthermore, we test multivariate
models designed to account for theoretically relevant patterns in
variations in outlier percentages among control and noncontrol
committees. The fact that our models are such poor predictors of
nonrepresentative committees speaks to the idiosyncratic nature of the
relatively small percentage of outlying committees in the states. This
conclusion, in turn, provides further support for the proposition that
representative committees are simply rational.},
    number = {1},
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    author = {Overby, L. M. and Kazee, T. A. and Prince, D. W.},
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    volume = {29},
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    abstract = {Tokens, or low levels of minority or female
representatives in state legislatures, have been studied with respect
to their perceptions of self-efficacy and political attitudes but not
with respect to their actual influence on the passage of public
policy. This paper uses state-level data from the child support
program between the years 1976-84 to measure the influence of women
tokens on the policy process. Using ordered probit models, I explore
policy adoption under three configurations: (1) a test of the
independent impact of tokens, (2) a dynamic test of the differential
impact of tokens and nontokens to analyze potential backlash effects
and the potential diffusion of policy preferences, and (3) an
interactive test on the potential for tokens to form coalitions. My
analysis strongly suggests that tokens make a policy difference
independently and to a greater extent than when they are on the cusp
of becoming nontokens, but I found less support for the idea that
tokens successfully form coalitions to achieve specific policy
goals.},
    number = {1},
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  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
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@article{neto_inefficient_2003,
  title = {The inefficient secret revisited: {The} legislative
input and output of {Brazilian} deputies},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200962},
  abstract = {Shugart and Carey (1992) posit that presidential
democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of
representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not
offered highly identifiable choices over national policies. Such
systems are driven by an inefficient secret, which is essentially a
nonpartisan representation of the policy process. To check the
propositions of the inefficient secret model (ISM), this article
investigates the aggregation level, effect, and subject of Brazilian
deputies' legislative input and output. Our empirical analysis
indicates that, although some ISM-related factors drive legislative
output, there is partisanship in deputies' legislative input. This
result means that the ISM underestimates the prospects for
programmatic parties (especially in opposition) to emerge within
systems where the electoral and constitutional rules encourage
particularism.},
  number = {4},
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@article{jenkins_out_2003,

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    title = {Out in the open: {The} emergence of viva voce voting in
house speakership elections},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200971},
    abstract = {We examine the internal politics that preceded the
House adoption in 1839 of viva voce (voice) voting for Speaker and
other House officers. First, we find that the struggles over the
rule's adoption actually centered on the election of the House
Printer. These struggles were tied to attempts by the two major
parties to establish effective newspaper networks to assist in
national political campaigns. Democrats generally favored public
election of House officers, whereas Whigs generally opposed. In the
short term, the change to public voting for Speaker and other House
officers had the expected effect of instilling greater partisan
regularity among House members. As sectional divisions grew in the
nation at large, however, the public election of the Speaker made it
increasingly difficult for House leaders to forge the transregional
coalitions necessary to organize the House.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Jenkins, J. A. and Stewart, C.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2003},
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    pages = {481--508}
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@article{rogers_impact_2003,
    title = {The impact of bicameralism on legislative production},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200980},
    abstract = {It is generally accepted by scholars, as well as by
cameral partisans, that adding a second chamber to an otherwise
unicameral legislative process will decrease the volume of laws that a
legislature enacts. This study challenges the conventional wisdom.
First, I offer a simple theoretical argument that shows that when
second chambers can originate as well as reject legislation,
bicameralism will have an indeterminate impact on legislative
production. Second, I provide historical data gathered from the four
U.S. states that have experienced cameral transitions. Although very
rudimentary, the historical evidence, when coupled with the
theoretical argument, raises serious doubt regarding the traditional
claim that bicameralism reduces the production of legislation.},
    number = {4},
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    pages = {509--528}
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@article{rocca_military_2003,
  title = {Military base closures and the 1996 congressional
elections},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200999},
  abstract = {This article examines the extent to which changes in
distributional benefits influence congressional election outcomes.
Although conventional wisdom holds that a direct link exists between
distributional benefits and electoral outcomes (Mayhew 1974b), recent
evidence suggests that this link only exists under certain
circumstances (Stein and Bickers 1994). In this article, I use 1995
military base closures to test the nature of the relationship.
Contrary to recent research on the politics of pork barreling, my
findings indicate support for a direct relationship between major base
realignments and closures and House electoral outcomes. Specifically,
major realignments and closures significantly decreased first-year
Democrats' vote margins in the 1996 House elections.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Rocca, M. S.},
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  note = {WOS:000186424400005},
  pages = {529--550}
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@article{currinder_leadership_2003,
  title = {Leadership {PAC} contribution strategies and house
member ambitions},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X201006},
  abstract = {Leadership political action committees (PACs) are
committees headed by federal politicians but separate from the
politicians' personal campaign committees. Like other PACs, leadership
PACs receive donations from individuals and groups, then make
contributions to the political candidates that they support. Previous
research indicates that member contribution strategies reflect both
party-based and personal goals. Using a range of data from before and
after the 1994 "Republican Revolution," this study fills a void in the
existent research by testing whether or not House members with
leadership PACs switch contribution strategies once their party status
changes. My analysis reveals that a shift in party status tends to
produce a subsequent shift in contribution strategy. My findings also
suggest that members, while acting within a party-based framework, may
target their contributions in ways that also reflect their personal
goals.},

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    number = {4},
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@article{loewenberg_editors_2003,
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  volume = {28},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200890},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = aug,
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@article{schickler_remaking_2003,
  title = {Remaking the {House} and {Senate}: {Personal} power,
  ideology, and the 1970s reforms},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200908},
  abstract = {Although much has been written on the critical
  congressional reforms of the 1970s, few studies have analyzed support
  for reform systematically. In this article, we draw upon previously
  untapped sources of information that make an individual-level,
  quantitative analysis possible. We analyze 20 indicators that measure
  support for a wide variety of reforms in both chambers. Our results
  reveal a remarkably consistent pattern: in virtually every case,
  junior members and liberals were more pro-reform than were senior
  members and conservatives. Also, Republicans were often more likely
  than Democrats to back reform. Our findings challenge the view that
  the reform movement was essentially a Democratic party phenomenon;
  liberals and junior members in both parties-not just Democrats-
  supported reform.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Schickler, E. and McGhee, E. and Sides, J.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2003},
  note = {WOS:000184606000002},
  pages = {297--331}
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@article{battista_ambition-theoretic_2003,  
  title = {An ambition-theoretic approach to legislative  
organizational choice},  
  volume = {28},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200917},  
  abstract = {Understanding legislative organization requires that  
we understand internal institutional choice; we must be able to  
describe and predict variation in internal structures across  
legislatures rather than simply explain a given structure. Currently,  
models that would enable us to do so are largely unavailable. This  
article offers a more general model, based on a variant of ambition  
theory, with the explicit purpose of examining variation in internal  
organization rather than a particular structure. Theoretical results  
indicate that legislators' strategic preferences over structures will  
fall into distinct and opposed types. This finding implies that  
legislatures themselves should fall into the same types and that  
structures, rules, and norms should appear in organized, relatively  
coherent bundles linked to varying legislator types.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Battista, J. S. C.},  
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@article{anderson_keys_2003,  
  title = {The keys to legislative success in the {US} {House} of  
{Representatives}},  
  volume = {28},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200926},  
  abstract = {Our research addresses how individual member behavior  
and institutional variables affect legislative success in the U.S.  
House of Representatives. Using new measures of activity from the 103d  
Congress (1993-94), a count dependent variable, and negative binomial  
regression, our analysis assesses member effectiveness. We find that a  
member's activity level encourages legislative success, but gains are  
limited when members speak or sponsor too frequently. Our results  
provide a clearer picture of the role of legislative context and the  
relevance of institutions in determining a member's legislative  
successes and failures.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Anderson, W. D. and Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. and  
Sinclair-Chapman, V.},  
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  year = {2003},  
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    pages = {357--386}
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@article{king_congressional_2003,
  title = {Congressional vote options},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200935},
  abstract = {Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders
often secure "hip-pocket votes" or "if you need me" pledges from rank-
and-file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders
exercise sufficient options-pay legislators to convert to favorable
votes-when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release
the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders
produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are,
on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns,
hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key
votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non-key votes from the 106th
Congress (1999-2000).},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {King, D. C. and Zeckhauser, R. J.},
  month = aug,
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@article{lipinski_what_2003,
  title = {What happens when {House} members "{Run} with congress"?
{The} electoral consequences of institutional loyalty},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200944},
  abstract = {This article characterizes the electoral consequences
of messages of institutional loyalty and disloyalty sent by incumbent
House members to their constituents. We show that, for the
contemporary House, there is variation in these messages-not all
incumbents in the contemporary House "run for Congress by running
against Congress." Moreover, we show that these messages can, under
the right conditions, have significant electoral consequences, even
after controlling for party affiliation and district political
factors. In addition to demonstrating the electoral relevance of
legislators' presentations, our results show an incumbent-level link
between constituents' trust in government and their voting behavior-a
link created by interaction between constituents' perceptions,
legislators' party affiliations, and the messages that legislators
send to their constituents.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lipinski, D. and Bianco, W. T. and Work, R.},

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    month = aug,
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@article{loewenberg_introduction_2003,
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    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200836},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, G.},
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    year = {2003},
    note = {WOS:000183112500001},
    pages = {143--145}
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@article{bailey_politics_2003,
    title = {The politics of the difficult: {Congress}, public
opinion, and early {Cold} {War} aid and trade policies},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200845},
    abstract = {Many foreign policies central to American cold war
efforts were politically difficult. Understanding the politics behind
these policies is important for understanding the capacity of
democracies to implement difficult but strategically important
policies. I argue that we must recognize the important role of public
opinion. When the public is unified, popular preferences permeate and
dominate the entire political system. For the case of the early cold
war, I present quantitative evidence that public attitudes about
national security influenced Senate voting on security aid and trade
issues. My tests employ previously unused opinion data and take
advantage of methodological advances in the analysis of panel data.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Bailey, M. A.},
    month = may,
    year = {2003},
    note = {WOS:000183112500002},
    pages = {147--177}
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@article{moreno_subnational_2003,
    title = {Subnational determinants of national multipartism in
{Latin} {America}},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},

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    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200854},
    abstract = {Recent research points to the importance of
subnational elections as variables shaping the national party system
in federal states (Jones 1997b; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels
2000). I propose that the effects of subnational elections are not
limited to federal states but instead can be seen throughout the
region. This paper examines the impacts of gubernatorial elections
across eighteen Latin American countries during the most recent
democratic period. The analysis suggests that intermediate subnational
elections do exert an influence on national party systems, whether the
state is federal or not, and particularly influence how many parties
are elected to a legislature's lower house.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Moreno, E.},
    month = may,
    year = {2003},
    note = {WOS:000183112500003},
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@article{schaffner_tactical_2003,
    title = {Tactical and contextual determinants of {US} {Senators}'
approval ratings},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200863},
    abstract = {This paper focuses on U.S. senators and their home-
state approval ratings from 1981 to 1997. We examine these ratings to
assess the relative impacts of tactical factors, such as the senators'
bill sponsorship and media activity, and contextual influences, such
as economic performance, state population size, and the evaluations
and behavior of other elected officials. We find that the senators'
own tactical behavior affects the approval ratings, but a stronger
influence is the context in which the senators operate.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Schaffner, B. F. and Schiller, W. J. and Sellers, P.
J.},
    month = may,
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@article{koger_position_2003,
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    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200872},
    abstract = {Bill cosponsorship has become an important part of
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the legislative and electoral process in the modern House of Representatives. Using interviews with congressional members and staff, I explain the role of cosponsorship as a signal to agenda setters and a form of position taking for constituents. Regression analysis confirms that cosponsoring varies with a member's electoral circumstances, institutional position, and state size, but generally members have adapted slowly to the introduction of cosponsorship to the rules and practice of the House.},

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    number = {2},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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@article{bergara_modeling_2003,  
    title = {Modeling {Supreme} {Court} strategic decision making:  
{The} congressional constraint},  
    volume = {28},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200881},  
    abstract = {This paper addresses the contradictory results  
obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the  
impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's  
decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood  
model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that  
the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional  
preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average  
probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one-  
third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the  
product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We  
also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of  
Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.},  
    number = {2},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Bergara, M. and Richman, B. and Spiller, P. T.},  
    month = may,  
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author = {Loewenberg, G.},
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@article{chaisty_defending_2003,
  title = {Defending the institutional status quo: {Communist}
leadership of the second {Russian} {State} {Duma}, 1996-99},
  volume = {28},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200782},
  number = {1},
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@article{kada_role_2003,
  title = {The role of investigative committees in the presidential
impeachment processes in {Brazil} and {Colombia}},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200791},
  abstract = {One of the most important political debates today
regards how to design institutions to ensure the accountability of
public officials. The impeachment process is one mechanism of
accountability check available to legislatures. It is, however,
susceptible to misuse. What determines how the impeachment process
functions? In this paper, I argue that control of information by
congressional investigation committees is a crucial factor in deciding
the outcome of the impeachment process. I show how the difference in
information control by the investigative committees in Brazil and
Colombia contributed to the removal of a president in one country and
a president's acquittal in the other.},
  number = {1},
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@article{grose_electoral_2003,
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incumbent members of {Congress}, 1947-2000},
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    volume = {28},
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parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch
fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich
and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all
candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators
who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of
incumbent representatives who have ran for Congress under more than
one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and
general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after
the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching
causes the primaries in the switcher's party and in the the opposing
party (the switcher's "old" party) to become more competitive in the
short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switcher's new
party are less competitive than those in the old party before the
switch.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Grose, C. R. and Yoshinaka, A.},
    month = feb,
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    note = {WOS:000180798200004},
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@article{frendreis_testing_2003,
    title = {Testing spatial models of elections: {The} influence of
voters and elites on candidate issue positions},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200818},
    abstract = {This research tests spatial models of electoral
competition using survey data on state legislative candidates' policy
positions and ideology in eight U.S. states. Our data support several
hypotheses: 1) candidates' issue positions do not converge; 2) party
elites have more extreme positions than do candidates; 3) candidate
issue positioning is a function of party-elite issue positions and
union involvement in the campaign, as well as constituency
characteristics; and 4) when candidates rely heavily on elite
resources during their campaign, elites become more important in
shaping candidate issue positions.},
    number = {1},
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    author = {Frendreis, J. and Gitelson, A. R. and Jenkins, S. and
Roscoe, D. D.},
    month = feb,
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@article{hogan_sources_2003,  
  title = {Sources of competition in state legislative primary  
elections},  
  volume = {28},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200827},  
  abstract = {Primaries are an important but understudied component  
of American elections. In this article, I examine competition in state  
legislative primaries across 25 states during the 1994 and 1996  
election cycles. My findings indicate that competition varies greatly  
and is affected by a number of factors on the state and district  
levels. The presence of an incumbent reduces competition, but strong  
district support for a party. leads' to greater competition in that  
party's primaries. Population size and social diversity do little to  
affect competition, but urbanism and unified party control have a  
positive impact. Further, legislative professionalism is associated  
with greater competition, particularly in open-seat races. Overall,  
the results have important implications for theories about the  
conditions that enhance or inhibit competition across different types  
of elections.},  
  number = {1},  
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@article{loewenberg_editors_2002,  
  title = {Editor's introduction},  
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  doi = {10.3162/036298002X200701},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2002},  
  note = {WOS:000178721400001},  
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@article{wolak_much_2002,  
  title = {Much of politics is still local: {Multi}-state lobbying  
in state interest communities},  
  volume = {27},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/3598658},
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    abstract = {We explore the nationalization of state lobbying
communities by examining all lobbying registrations held by
organizations in the 50 states in 1997, with special attention given
to the frequency of multi-state registrations. Following discussion of
the meanings and sources of nationalization among state interest
communities, we develop and analyze several measures of the level of
localism, examining what factors drive variation in multiple state
registrations across group types and states. Finally, we discuss the
substantive and measurement implications of the nationalization of
state interest communities. Our findings identify an interesting
paradox of interest representation before state legislatures: although
lobbying responses and techniques may have become more nationalized,
the composition of state interest communities remains predominantly
local.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Wolak, J. and Newmark, A. J. and McNoldy, T. and
Lowery, D. and Gray, V.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000178721400002},
    pages = {527--555}
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@article{wilkins_influence_2002,
    title = {The influence of governors on veto override attempts:
{A} test of pivotal politics},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298002X200729},
    abstract = {Using the "switcher" analysis developed by Krehbiel
(1998), we examine the ability of Missouri governors to sway
legislators on veto override attempts. Our initial results closely
mirror Krehbiel's finding that the chief executive successfully
achieves influence at and around the veto pivot, but these results
change once we take into account the political party of the
legislators. Governors are far more likely to influence legislators
from their own party, regardless of legislator ideology. Our study
provides a rare systematic analysis of gubernatorial influence in the
legislative arena, while also contributing to the current debate over
preference-based versus partisan-based theories of legislatures.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Wilkins, V. M. and Young, G.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000178721400003},
    pages = {557--575}
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    title = {The economic sources of congressional approval},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298002X200738},
    abstract = {Models of congressional approval have, in both theory
and specification, often imitated models of presidential approval.
Through their modeling decisions, researchers have implicitly assumed
that the economic determinants of presidential and congressional
approval are identical. Such assumptions have discouraged other
researchers from testing competing hypotheses about the economic
determinants of congressional approval. Using aggregate-level time-
series analysis, this study investigates the question of whether or
not the economic determinants of approval vary by the target of
political judgment. I find that presidential approval is driven
largely by sociotropic propections, a result consistent with previous
research. In contrast, I find the public relies most heavily upon
egocentric retrospections when judging the U.S. Congress.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Rudolph, T. J.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000178721400004},
    pages = {577--599}
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@article{green_institutional_2002,
    title = {Institutional change, party discipline, and the {House}
{Democratic} {Caucus}, 1911-19},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598661},
    abstract = {The House Democratic Caucus of 1911 to 1919 is a
largely understudied institution in the literature on congressional
party government, despite the claims of many scholars that the caucus
functioned as a significant instrument of party government by binding
legislators' floor votes. An analysis of roll-call votes, new data
from the caucus journal, and contemporary accounts from the period
indicate that these claims are largely exaggerated, although the
caucus did, on occasion, improve floor discipline within the party. I
find that intraparty homogeneity on crosscutting issues was related to
caucus success. In addition, I argue that the adoption and use of the
binding caucus can best be understood from the "multiple goals"
viewpoint of congressional politics. These findings have important
implications for understanding the development of party-based
institutions in Congress.},
    number = {4},
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    note = {WOS:000178721400005},
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@article{shvetsova_gaining_2002,
  title = {Gaining legislative control through strategic district
nomination: {The} case of the {Russian} left in 1995},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598662},
  abstract = {The greater the importance of the legislative goals
for a party, the more it will concern itself in the electoral campaign
with the parliament's ultimate composition, rather than simply its own
seat gains. While unquestionably the dominant force in the political
left, the Communist Party in Russia was also uniquely positioned in
the 1995 election to take advantage of the combination of electoral
and parliamentary institutions and to devise a nomination strategy
that made the rest of the parliament's left wing fully dependent on
the Communists, thus giving the Communists effective control over the
legislature despite their minority status.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Shvetsova, O.},
  month = nov,
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  note = {WOS:000178721400006},
  pages = {635--657}
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@article{mutalib_constitutional-electoral_2002,
  title = {Constitutional-electoral reforms and politics in
{Singapore}},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598663},
  abstract = {The existence of a dominant one-party system in
Singapore makes legislative passage of constitutional and electoral
system reforms easy. Such a system has enabled the ruling People's
Action Party (PAP) government to formulate and implement sweeping
reforms with little difficulty, however controversial they are. Since
1980, the Singapore government has instituted nonconstituency MPs,
nominated MPs, group representation constituencies, and an elected
presidency. Although not necessarily intended, one consequence of
these reforms has been the consolidation of the government's power.},
  number = {4},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298002780094921},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Ahuja, S.},  
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@article{shabad_emergence_2002,  
  title = {The emergence of career politicians in post-communist  
democracies: {Poland} and the {Czech} {Republic}},  
  volume = {27},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/3598567},  
  abstract = {Despite party system fluidity and high rates of  
electoral volatility in the first decade after the transition to  
democracy in Poland and the Czech Republic, career politicians are  
emerging. Using data on all parliamentary candidates in the last  
election before the fall of communism and in all elections since then,  
we show that, in both countries, parliamentary carryover rates have  
risen substantially, a growing number of incumbents are seeking  
reelection, and an increasing proportion of candidates for legislative  
office have competed in previous parliamentary elections. Moreover, we  
demonstrate that prior political experience has a persistent and  
positive effect on winning office. We argue that the rise of career  
politicians facilitates the consolidation and effectiveness of these  
new democracies.},  
  number = {3},  
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    author = {Shabad, G. and Slomczynski, K. A.},
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    pages = {333--359}
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@article{herron_electoral_2002,
    title = {Electoral influences on legislative behavior in mixed-
member systems: {Evidence} from {Ukraine}'s {Verkhovna} {Rada}},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    abstract = {This article addresses how mixed-member systems that
combine proportional representation (PR) and single-member districts
(SMD) into a single election can influence legislators' voting
behavior. Scholars have generally extended standard expectations of
behavior to mixed-member systems by assuming that legislators
occupying PR seats in mixed-member parliaments should be more
cohesive-than those occupying SMD seats. I argue that controlling for
seat type alone does not take into account the interaction between PR
and SMD in mixed-member systems. Using voting data from Ukraine's
Verkhovna Rada, I show that controlling for dual candidacy and the
"safety" of the deputy's district or list position increases our
understanding of the factors motivating legislative cohesion.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Herron, E. S.},
    month = aug,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000177386400003},
    pages = {361--382}
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@article{newman_explaining_2002,
    title = {Explaining seat changes in the {US} {House} of
{Representatives}, 1950-98},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    abstract = {Recent U.S. House elections have challenged existing
models of congressional elections, raising the question of whether or
not processes thought to govern previous elections are still at work.
Taking Marra and Ostrom's (1989) model of congressional elections as
representative of extant theoretical perspectives and testing it
against recent elections, we find that the model fails. We augment
Marra and Ostrom's model with new insights, constructing a model that
explains elections from 1950 to 1998. We find that, although
presidential approval ratings and major political events continue to
drive congressional elections, the distribution of open seats must
also be taken into account.},
    number = {3},
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    author = {Newman, B. and Ostrom, C.},
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@article{wattenberg_partisan_2002,
    title = {Partisan turnout bias in midterm legislative elections},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598570},
    abstract = {Lower salience elections present greater
opportunities for representational bias at the polls than do elections
with higher levels of political interest. We hypothesize that turnout
bias is most likely to occur during Midterm congressional elections in
which there are clear short-term forces that exploit the low turnout
setting. The effects of these forces are more likely to be observable
among registered nonvoters than citizens who are not registered to
vote because registrants have access to the polls and are likely to
have voted in previous presidential contests. Using midterm National
Election Study data from 1918 to 1998, we find that registered
nonvoters ate frequently more Democratic than midterm election voters,
particularly in 1994 and 1998. The historic 1994 congressional
election seat losses for Democrats may be partially explained by the
finding that voters going to the polls were clearly more conservative
than registered nonvoters.},
    number = {3},
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    month = aug,
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    note = {WOS:000177386400005},
    pages = {407--421}
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@article{brewer_northern_2002,
    title = {Northern democrats and party polarization in the {US}
{House}},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598571},
    abstract = {Over the last 25 years, there has been a steady
increase in party voting in the U.S. House, with much of this increase
attributed to changes in the South. We argue that changes in the North
are also important. Democrats now win a higher percentage of elections
in the North, and a larger percentage of the congressional party comes
from the North. Northern Democrats became steadily more liberal in the
1980s and 1990s, which increased the liberal record of the entire
party. We examine two factors in the rise in liberal voting in the
North. First, Democrats now win more seats in urban, lower-income,

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nonwhite districts that tend to generate liberal voting records. Second, there has been an increase in the number of districts that tend to produce liberal-voting Democrats. Together, these changes have resulted. in more liberal Democratic Party voting and greater polarization between the par-ties.},

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    number = {3},
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@article{fisher_whistle_2002,
  title = {Whistle while you work: {Job} satisfaction and retirement from the {US} {House}},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298002X200675},
  abstract = {The literature analyzing the effects of job satisfaction on congressional retirement has been inconclusive. The problem with this literature is its reliance on indirect measures of job satisfaction. We use a direct measure of job satisfaction to demonstrate that job satisfaction does have a significant independent effect on congressional retirement. The findings imply that the indirect measures of job satisfaction measure frustration as opposed to job dissatisfaction, a conceptually different variable. The fact that members' job satisfaction affects their career length suggests that a Congress that keeps its members-happy will have greater retention and will, presumably, keep its best members.},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  title = {Public support for term limits: {Another} look at conventional thinking},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598573},
  abstract = {Americans are enamored with term limits for elected officials at all levels of government. Explanations of public support for term limits focus on partisanship, group underrepresentation, voter dissatisfaction with specific political institutions, political cynicism, and ideology. We qualify the conventional wisdom that term
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limits are mostly a Republican issue: Support for term limits is more a function of the incongruence between an individual's expressed partisanship and the party of their representative than of the individual's party affiliation. Further, the effect of unsatisfactory representation is strongly related to a voter's engagement with politics and willingness to monitor political affairs actively.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Stein, R. M. and Johnson, M. and Post, S. S.},
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year = {2002},
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@article{austin_seats_2002,

title = {Seats that may not matter: {Testing} for racial polarization in {US} city councils},

volume = {27},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.2307/3598574},

abstract = {Critics of the Voting Rights Act claim that electoral structures used by city councils lead to racially polarized legislatures in which African American members are consistently outvoted by white majorities. Using council votes from six cities, this study shows that the critics' claim is exaggerated. In only one city were African American council members generally less likely to be on the winning side of votes because of their race. Polarization is more of a concern for particular issues: members with large black constituencies were less likely to be on the winning side of votes on housing or police affairs in four cities.},

number = {3},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Austin, R. A.},

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note = {WOS:000177386400009},

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volume = {27},

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number = {2},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Loewenberg, G.},

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    pages = {159--162}
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@article{pelizzo_stability_2002,
  title = {Stability in parliamentary regimes: {The} {Italian}
case},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598527},
  abstract = {In this article, we distinguish legislative stability
from government stability and argue that the character of the
relationship that exists between them is a complex one in which
various combinations are possible. We focus on Italy because of the
manner in which it has combined legislative stability with government
instability. Our findings indicate that the relationship between
legislative and government stability in Italy is best seen as
curvilinear, that the analysis of government stability must take the
number of governments as well as the duration of governments into
account, and that the attributes of the party system that stabilize
the legislature destabilize governments. Given these findings, we
discuss their implications for explaining stability in parliamentary
regimes in terms of events, "strong parties," and strategic
calculation. We conclude that legislative stability should not be
treated simply as a secondary or derivative effect of government
stability and that Italy can serve as a benchmark for further study of
the nature and determinants of the relationship between the two in
other parliamentary systems.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Pelizzo, R. and Cooper, J.},
  month = may,
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@article{krehbiel_minority_2002,
  title = {Minority rights and majority power: {Theoretical}
consequences of the motion to recommit},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598528},
  abstract = {Motivated by the U.S. Congress's motion to recommit
with instructions to report forthwith, we analyze a simple spatial
model to clarify the relationship between early-stage agenda-setting
rights of a committee or the majority party, a late-stage minimum
parliamentary right of the minority party or a noncommittee member,
and the distribution of power over outcomes. The extent to which
certain parliamentary rights empower agents is dependent on the
relative locations of the exogenous status quo and the preferences of
the legislators. We derive comparative statics on the relationship
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between proposal order and power by considering a model that allows preference heterogeneity and status quo centrality to vary. Finally, we relate the findings to recurring substantive debates on majority party power and committee power.},

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    number = {2},  
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@article{hibbing_how_2002,  
    title = {How to make {Congress} popular},  
    volume = {27},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    abstract = {Conventional wisdom holds that Congress is unpopular because it does not measure up to the people's populist expectations. Instead of being the "citizen's legislature" that the people desire, it is an institutionalized legislature with well-paid, longtime members and an elaborate infrastructure of committees, caucuses, parties, and perquisites. The people, it is alleged, desire more of a voice in the decisions made by Congress, they want congressional procedures to be more open so ordinary people know what is going on in the halls of power, and they want more accountability and more representation of the interests of real people. In this paper, I argue that the enactment of this populist reform agenda would actually make Congress substantially less popular with the people, In other words, I contend that the more Congress gives people voice, accountability, representation, and open, visible procedures, the more the people will be dissatisfied with Congress. The real cause of congressional unpopularity is not that people would rather make decisions themselves but that people do not trust members of Congress to make decisions in a non-self-interested fashion.},
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    number = {2},  
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@article{jones_ideological_2002,  
    title = {Ideological distance from the majority party and public approval of {Congress}},  
    volume = {27},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    abstract = {We analyze whether or not perceived ideological distance from the congressional majority party influences individuals'
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approval of the way Congress as a whole handles its job. We argue that, to the extent citizens see the majority party as representing an ideological stance that is distant from their own, they are unlikely to feel that Congress is representing them and therefore will be less supportive toward Congress. In contrast, when members of the public feel that the congressional majority is close to them ideologically, they are likely to feel well represented by and thereby approve of Congress. Using cross-sectional data covering periods of Democratic, Republican, and split party control of Congress (1980-98), this analysis provides strong support for the ideological proximity argument.},

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    number = {2},  
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    month = may,  
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@article{lynch_midterm_2002,  
    title = {Midterm elections and economic fluctuations: {The  
response of voters over time},  
    volume = {27},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/3598531},  
    abstract = {Recent empirical work (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995;  
Erikson 1990) has shown that economic conditions may not have  
influenced House midterm elections since 1915. I argue that economic  
conditions may have influenced House midterms in the late 19th and  
early 20th centuries, when Congress dominated economic policy-making,  
parties offered starker positions on economic issues, and national  
issues dominated House elections. As the 20th century progressed,  
congressional power over the economy declined, the parties converged  
over certain economic policies, and district-level forces grew more  
important in elections. I test the stability of the relationship  
between the economy and House midterms over time, using F-tests to  
show how the impact of macroeconomic conditions has changed in House  
midterm elections from 1872 to 1994. The results indicate that the  
gross national product (GNP) influenced House races before 1913 but,  
as the 20th century continued, the importance of the economy an House  
midterms declined.},
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    number = {2},  
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@article{haynie_color_2002,  
  title = {The color of their skin or the content of their  
behavior? {Race} and perceptions of {African} {American} legislators},  
  volume = {27},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/3598532},  
  abstract = {Previous studies have shown that, because of their  
race, African American candidates for public office are often  
evaluated less favorably than their colleagues by voters. Does this  
dynamic continue when black candidates become elected officials? Using  
data on the North Carolina General Assembly, I address this question  
by examining the effects of race on perceptions of legislative  
effectiveness. When the dependent variable is the average  
effectiveness rating given by three groups-lobbyists, journalists, and  
other legislators-there is evidence that African American  
representatives are evaluated negatively because of their race. When  
the dependent variable is disaggregated into the separate  
effectiveness ratings given by each of the respondent groups  
individually, these negative perceptions of blacks on account of race  
remain on the part of lobbyists and other legislators, but not for  
journalists. Moreover, the negative perceptions of black  
representatives are not mitigated by these representatives possessing  
certain characteristics (e.g., seniority and leadership positions)  
that previous studies have found to be correlated with positive  
effectiveness evaluations. The presence of an African American Speaker  
in one legislative session did, however, seem to attenuate the  
negative perceptions.},  
  number = {2},  
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  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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@article{reich_executive_2002,
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    title = {Executive decree authority in {Brazil}: {How} reactive
legislators influence policy},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598517},
    abstract = {At first glance, wide-ranging presidential decree
authority suggests executive branch domination of legislatures.
However, decree power may also be a rational delegation of authority
by legislators, in accord with their political objectives. Seen in
this light, the key issue for legislators is not halting decree
authority but reducing the agency losses that result from delegation.
This paper shows how decree authority, as practiced in Brazil,
constitutes an example of rational delegation by a legislature in
which seniority and policy specialization are relatively undervalued.
Brazilian legislators prefer to endow presidents with broad decree
power and then monitor presidents on an issue-by-issue basis by
amending executive decrees. This method of "oversight after
delegation" lowers the transaction costs of delegation and speaks to
the influence of Brazilian legislators over what is typically seen as
an important source of presidential power.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Reich, G.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000173645200002},
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@article{lowry_party_2002,
    title = {Party differentiation in {Congress}},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598518},
    abstract = {At times, the American political parties are so
close in terms of policy positions that critics denounce the lack of a
"dime's worth of difference" between them. At other times, the gap
between them on a left-right dimension is huge. How can we explain
this variation? We argue that parties can behave rationally as
collective units, and that shifts in divergence and convergence can be
explained as rational responses to changes within governmental
institutions and to shifts in conditions outside. We analyze this
argument using adjusted ADA scores (Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder
1999) to compare voting score differences between the Democratic and
Republican parties in Congress from 1952 to 1996. We pose specific
hypotheses for potentially important factors shaping party behavior
and test them with a multivariate model. Our results support the
argument that the variation in the behavioral gap between the two
parties in Congress can be explained as rational party responses to
internal and external stimuli.},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    pages = {33--60}
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@article{marshall_explaining_2002,
    title = {Explaining the role of restrictive rules in the
postreform house},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598519},
    abstract = {Four competing explanations have emerged regarding
restrictive rules in Congress. Informational theory claims that rules
reduce information costs and facilitate committee specialization. The
distributional perspective suggests that rules enforce legislative
bargains and help members achieve gains-from-trade. Another claim is
that rules increase the Rules Committee's independent influence over
policy. Lastly, partisan theory asserts that rules are used to
increase the majority party's influence over policy. This analysis
tests these claims during the 97th, 98th, 104th, and 105th Congresses.
The findings demonstrate that theoretical constructs developed in
earlier analyses of special rules are not robust over time and across
legislative contexts. The results refute majoritarian assertions that
rules are used as informational devices. Similarly, little evidence
supports the claim that Rules Committee preferences independently
affect rule assignment. Instead, a partisan principal-agent framework
emerges as the most useful construct to explain procedural choice in
the postreform. House.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Marshall, B. W.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000173645200004},
    pages = {61--85}
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@article{grofman_congressional_2002,
    title = {Congressional leadership 1965-96: {A} new look at the
extremism versus centrality debate},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598520},
    abstract = {An examination of the differences between the
ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House
of Representatives (1965-96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend
to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and
Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median

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Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.},

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    number = {1},
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@article{hall_changes_2002,
  title = {Changes in legislative support for the governors program over time},
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  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This study examines changes in legislative support for the governor's legislative agenda in Georgia during the governor's first term in office (1991-94). I analyze the factors that led legislators to support the governor's agenda, as well as how the level of support changed between election years and off-years. I use multivariate OLS models of gubernatorial support to determine how support varied (1) between the parties, (2) between factions within parties, and (3) over time. I find that there was wide variation in support among factions in the majority party and that support varied widely between election years and off-years.},
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@article{weissert_legislative_2002,
  title = {Legislative demands for bureaucratic policymaking the case of state medical boards},
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  volume = {27},
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  abstract = {While much is known about the relationship between Congress and regulatory agencies, there has been little examination of the role state legislatures play in the activities of state regulatory bodies, particularly those activities related to timely, salient policy issues. This article explores the relationship of state legislatures to medical boards, which are increasingly becoming more policy active. We find that state legislative involvement and
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influence are the most important determinants of policy-active state medical boards; institutional elements play a secondary role. Major changes in the private health care delivery system affect legislative involvement and play an indirect role in predicting policy activism. We drew our data from a 50-state survey of executive directors of state medical boards.},

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    title = {"{Musical} chairs: {The} changing seniority system in congress."},
    volume = {27},
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  pages = {143--143}
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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{Continuity} and change."},
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  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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roll-call voting},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440269},
  abstract = {We assess the importance of parties in Congress by
comparing roll-call voting behavior against the preferences of members
of the House as expressed in surveys conducted during the 1996 and
1998 elections. The surveys were conducted by Project Vote Smart. Our
findings support two key conclusions. First, both party and
preferences mattered in predicting roll-call behavior in the 103d,
104th, and 105th Congresses. Second, the independent effects of party
were present in only about 40\% of roll calls. The incidence of party
effects was highest on close votes, procedural votes, and key "party"
issues. It was lowest on matters of conscience, such as abortion, and
"off-the-first-dimension" issues, such as affirmative action and gun
control.},
  number = {4},
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  author = {Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J. M. and Stewart, C.},
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  note = {WOS:000172040200002},
  pages = {533--572}
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  title = {The importance of issues in senate campaigns:
{Citizens}' reception of issue messages},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440270},
  abstract = {In this paper, we examine whether or not
representatives are successful at communicating their policy
priorities to their constituents. We focus our attention on the
campaign period because campaigns serve as the primary mechanism for
communication between elected representatives and the represented. We
examine 57 campaigns for the U.S. Senate between 1988 and 1992 and
determine to what extent voters became aware of the specific messages
articulated during the course of the campaigns. We find convincing

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evidence that when candidates and the news media focus on a particular issue (i.e., the economy, health care, environment, education), citizens are more likely to recognize the issue as a campaign theme.},

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  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440271},
  abstract = {One striking manifestation of the twentieth-century
transformation of Southern politics is the liberalization of roll-call
voting behavior of Southern Democrats on civil rights issues. One
explanation for this shift focuses on the leftward pull of an
increasingly mobilized black electorate. A second explanation cites
the leftward push of a growing Republican Party. Using data for
Southern senators and states from 1969 to 1996, we implement a time
series cross-sectional analysis to evaluate the competing
explanations. We find that the liberalization of voting patterns was a
joint result of the mobilization of the black electorate and the
growth of Southern Republicanism.},
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  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440272},
  abstract = {Congressional scholars generally take the position
that members of Congress don't have to descriptively mirror their
constituents in order to be responsive. Yet ample scholarship has
shown that legislators work very hard at identifying with their
constituents, at conveying the impression that they are alike in
interests and opinions. Matching the race of the House member to their
constituents' ratings in the 1996 National Black Election Study, I
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find that blacks consistently express higher levels of satisfaction with their representation in Washington when that representative is black, even controlling for other characteristics of the legislators, such as political party. This study underscores the value of descriptive representation in the black community and highlights the need for additional empirically based studies of political representation.},
number = {4},
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title = {Influencing from impaired administrations: {Presidents}, {White} {House} scandals, and legislative leadership},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440273},
abstract = {Journalists and scholars alike have suggested that scandal has a harmful effect on the effectiveness of the political system. Little systematic evidence exists to validate this claim, but we address the problem by offering theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that White House scandal-independent of other influences such as public approval of the president-has a negative effect on presidential support in Congress. We analyze individual House members' votes on key legislation during the Watergate, Iran-contra, and Monica Lewinsky scandals, employing as an independent variable an innovative measure of scandal presence and intensity. Our empirical tests show that the usual contextual influences on congressional voting are significant and that scandal has a strong, negative effect on presidential support. After detailing these findings, we conclude with a discussion of implications both for presidential politics and for the presidential leadership literature.},
number = {4},
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author = {Meinke, S. R. and Anderson, W. D.},
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volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},

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    doi = {10.2307/440274},
    abstract = {Do state interest group systems develop independently
of the legislatures they lobby? The Energy-Stability-Area model
developed by Gray and Lowery (1996) implicitly suggests they do. I
argue that legislative professionalism conditions how group systems
respond to environmental factors. As legislatures professionalize,
their demand for information from lobbyists decreases. Groups are in
this and other ways less effective in professional legislatures and
more likely to exit a crowded group system. I model interest density
with professionalism as a contextual variable. The results have
implications for the number and mix of interests, the impact of
lobbying regulations, and the consequences of legislative de-
institutionalization.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    title = {Joseph {G}. {Cannon}: {Majoritarian} from {Illinois}},
    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440328},
    abstract = {Congressional scholars regularly identify Speaker
Joseph G. Cannon as the personification of centralized authority and
partisan strength in the United States Congress. This paper assesses
the conventional wisdom on Cannonism by employing the Groseclose-
Stewart (1998) method for estimating values of committee seats to
study variation in member-specific committee portfolio values. The
data are useful both for reassessing the historical thesis of Cannon
as tyrant and for testing more recent political science hypotheses
about the underpinnings of a strong majority party. The findings fail
to corroborate the notions of majority party power and Cannon as
tyrant, and, if anything, support a new portrait of Cannon as a
majoritarian.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Krehbiel, K. and Wiseman, A.},
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    year = {2001},
    note = {WOS:000170284100001},
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    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440329},
    abstract = {In an earlier paper, Lee and Oppenheimer (1997) found
that apportionment has generally functioned as a check on majority
rule since the institution of direct Senate elections. Also, according
to the authors, apportionment has consistently worked to the advantage
of Republicans since 1956. Its influence, however, was more pronounced
between 1980 and 1986 than in the 6-year electoral cycle ending in
1994. As a result, the authors surmise that the most recent Republican
control of the Senate may outlive that of the 1980s. This analysis
reconsiders the impact of apportionment on Senate elections. The
findings indicate that apportionment's check on majority rule occurred
less frequently than originally claimed; that apportionment's pro-
Republican bias began at least two decades after its alleged onset in
1956; and that the size of apportionment bias is generally smaller
than that estimated by Lee and Oppenheimer. Finally, bias did not vary
significantly during the two most recent periods of Republican control
of the Senate. Hence, apportionment appears irrelevant to any forecast
about the endurance of the current Republican majority.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Mattei, F.},
    month = aug,
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    note = {WOS:000170284100002},
    pages = {391--409}
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    title = {Gender and the decision to run for office},
    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440330},
    abstract = {Despite an electoral system that appears to present
excellent opportunities for women to win elective office, the number
of women candidates remains low. While the initial decision to run for
office is critical in understanding women's continued under-
representation in elective office, very little research explores this
subject. To examine the manner in which gender affects the decision to
seek an elective position, we investigated how men and women in the
"pool of eligible candidates" in New York State perceived running for
office. Two central findings emerged from our data. First, contrary to
findings in previous research, women and men in our sample expressed
roughly equal levels of political ambition and viewed the campaign
environment similarly. Our second central finding, however, is that
important gender differences emerged in the factors that contributed
to the decision to run. In other words, women considered many more
factors when thinking about running for office, whereas men of all
types felt more freedom to launch a candidacy. These findings tend to
reinforce the notion that broad patterns of sex-role socialization
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continue to impede women from full inclusion in the electoral process.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Fox, R. L. and Lawless, J. L. and Feeley, C.},
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year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000170284100003},
pages = {411--435}

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title = {Dancing with the one who brought you: {The} allocation and impact of party giving to state legislators},

volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440331},

abstract = {Like their national counterparts, the state parties play an increasingly significant role in the campaigns of their members. Nowhere is that more evident than in the allocation of direct contributions to party candidates. For the parties, the allocation of party support provides opportunities to both win elections and promote subsequent party unity. Yet, as events in Florida in the 1990s indicate, winning elections in these politically tumultuous times may make the link between party money and party unity problematic. In 1996 and 1998, Democratic and Republican officials were able to target party funds to those house races where they were likely to do the most good-in competitive races in which party members faced well-funded opponents. At the same time, the receipt of party money did not translate into party support in the 1997 and 1999 legislative sessions.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Schechter, D. L. and Hedge, D. M.},
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year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000170284100004},
pages = {437--456}

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@article{jewett_partisan_2001,

title = {Partisan change in southern legislatures, 1946-95},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440332},

abstract = {What accounts for partisan change in southern legislatures between 1946 and 1995? I draw my hypotheses from general theories of partisan change and tailor them to the South based on history and previous research to explain the variance in southern Republican legislative strength. I estimate a pooled time series analysis of the eleven former Confederate states to test the path

model. The model uses Democratic elite liberalism as an endogenous variable in order to determine the overall effect of several important independent variables including black population, black political influence, urbanization, white northern migration, and wealth. Determinants of state legislative partisan change include the following: secular forces such as wealth, urbanization, and migration; political forces such as presidential midterm losses, party organizational strength, and political scandal; party issue stances on race and general party ideology; changes in national party preferences that precede change at lower levels; and finally, rules governing the structure of political opportunity such as reapportionment and participation.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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pages = {457--486}

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title = {Determinants of home style: {The} many incentives for going home in {Colombia}},

volume = {26},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.2307/440333},

abstract = {A legislator's behavior in his or her electoral district, "home style," reveals much about awareness of constituents' wishes and the importance attributed to district matters. Legislators who frequently travel home represent their constituents differently than those who do not. In the Latin American country of Colombia, home style is a contentious issue. The country is plagued by violence and corruption, but the national legislature devotes much of its time to "pork barrel politics." We use data from Colombia, a presidential democracy, to test competing explanations of home style, evaluating several political factors as determinants of variation in legislators' propensity to go home. We find that higher district magnitudes, spatially concentrated vote patterns, failure to solidify electorally dominated bailiwicks, and electoral invulnerability all contribute to a legislator's fixation on district concerns. If needed political reforms are to succeed, reform-minded presidents will need allies in the legislature who are relatively less likely to focus on district matters.},

number = {3},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {Ingall, R. E. and Crisp, B. F.},

month = aug,

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@article{anonymous_editors_2001,  
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  volume = {26},  
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  number = {2},  
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  author = {Anonymous},  
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@article{cox_agenda_2001,  
  title = {Agenda setting in the {US} {House}: {A} majority-party  
monopoly?},  
  volume = {26},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440199},  
  abstract = {How strongly does the majority party control the  
agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives? In this article, I  
contrast two spatial models of U.S. House committees-one in which each  
committee's agenda is set by the full committee, one in which it is  
set by the committee's majority-party contingent. These two models  
lead to clearly different predictions about(1) who dissents on final  
passage votes in committee and (2) who tiles dissents to committee  
bill reports. Data from the 84th through the 98th Congresses gibe with  
the partisan model. Majority-party members with a given ideological  
location dissent substantially less often than do minority-party  
members with comparable ideological locations. And majority-party  
dissent rates are extremely low on an absolute scale, with over 50%\%  
of majority-party members never dissenting.},  
  number = {2},  
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  title = {It's {Monica}, stupid: {The} impeachment controversy and  
the 1996 midterm election},  
  volume = {26},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
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  abstract = {This paper tests three competing explanations for the  
outcome of the 1998 midterm election: a normal politics explanation, a
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peace-and-prosperity explanation, and a scandal backlash explanation. After examining the evidence from the 1998 National Election Study, I conclude that the most important reason for the Republican party's poor showing in the 1998 midterm election was a voter backlash against Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr and congressional Republicans over their handling of the presidential sex scandal and impeachment inquiry. I then address the question of why congressional Republicans acted as they did, and I examine what implications these findings may have for the ability of the GOP to maintain control of Congress in future elections.},

number = {2},
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@article{arnold_distribution_2001,
title = {The distribution of senate committee positions: {Change} or more of the same?},

volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440201},
abstract = {Recent work on the United States Senate has focused on its transformation from a clublike dominance of a few members to one in which individual senators play significant roles in the policymaking process regardless of seniority (Ripley 1969; Sinclair 1989a). Some argue that part of this transformation was the democratization of committee assignments (Sinclair 1988). I examine the degree to which the Senate has democratized its committee assignments and test possible explanations for this democratization process. I argue that changes in committee assignment practices that gave junior members improved assignments were the result of institutional reform rather than membership changes or changes in the Washington environment alone.},

number = {2},
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@article{gilmour_powell_2001,
title = {The {Powell} amendment voting cycle: {An} obituary},
volume = {26},
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doi = {10.2307/440202},

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    abstract = {The adoption of the Powell amendment on a bill to
provide federal aid to education in 1956 is the most widely cited
instance of a voting cycle in the U.S. House of Representatives. This
article shows, however, that it was not a voting cycle and that the
adoption of the Powell amendment was not responsible for the bill's
defeat. Using evidence of members' preferences derived from their
votes on similar measures the next year, I show that the status quo of
not passing a bill would have defeated both the original bill and the
amended bill.},
    number = {2},
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    title = {Multiple-method measurement of legislators' ideologies},
    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440203},
    abstract = {I offer empirical evidence on the validity and
reliability of measures of legislator ideology derived from three
different methods: survey research, content analysis of news stories
about the legislators from their initial election campaigns, and
inferring individual legislators' ideologies from that of a relevant
co-partisan elite. The analysis is replicated for independent samples
of U.S. Senators and House members, and indicates that all three
methods produce ideology measures of high validity and reliability.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Hill, K. Q.},
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@article{leveaux-sharpe_congressional_2001,
    title = {Congressional responsiveness to redistricting induced
constituency change: {An} extension to the 1990s},
    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440204},
    abstract = {According to Glazer and Robbins (1985), House members
were responsive to redistricting induced changes in the partisan
composition of their districts in the 1970s and 1980s. In this paper,
I extend the Glazer and Robbins model to the 1990s. It is possible
that the high turnover rates observed in the House in the 1990s
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reflect constituency dissatisfaction with House members' ability or willingness to modify their roll-call vote behavior after redistricting. Using House members' NOMINATE scores as the dependent variable, I examine the effect of changes in the Democratic composition of House districts, on roll-call conservatism. The findings reveal that when the Democratic composition of a district decreases due to redistricting, the roll-call vote behavior of the House member becomes more conservative. Although there is much speculation as to what caused the high levels of turnover in the 1990s, a lack of responsiveness on the part of incumbent House members is not the answer. Furthermore, in contrast to the Glazer and Robbins study, I find that senior members seem to be less responsive than their junior counterparts, a finding that suggests a generational effect may be taking place.},

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  doi = {10.2307/440205},
  abstract = {This paper provides the first model of legislative behavior in nondemocratic settings. Many authoritarian regimes have sought to maintain a facade of democracy by creating "puppet" legislatures. These legislatures should always support the regime since uncooperative behavior risks career-ending punishments. But in spite of potentially high costs, legislators do sometimes rebel against military executives. I show how legislative rebellion can be a rational strategy-even under authoritarian rule. When applied to data from Brazil, the model reveals the durable power of the electoral connection and patronage politics. The methods and model could be easily applied to other cases of legislative rebellion against nondemocratic executives.},
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speakers},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440206},
  abstract = {This study examines the power of state House Speakers
to test the theory that legislative leaders act as agents of their
followers. To accomplish this task, I created an index of the
Speakers' institutional powers for all forty-nine state lower houses.
I then examined how these powers are affected by the competitiveness
of the state's electoral system, the professional character of the
state's legislature, and the career opportunities offered to
legislators. The data analysis indicates that the distribution of
power is shaped predominantly by the strength of electoral competition
and the career opportunity structure. The paper explains why these
findings are consistent with principal-agent theory.},
  number = {2},
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  title = {D-NOMINATE after 10 years: A comparative update to
congress: A political-economic history of roll-call voting},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440401},
  abstract = {This paper updates the findings in Congress: A
Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting and compares them to
findings for both European legislatures and the United Nations General
Assembly. Congress argues that important episodes in American
political and economic history can be better understood by
supplementing or reinterpreting more traditional analyses with the
basic space theory of ideology. In Congress, we measured ideology with
D-NOMINATE scores. Here we summarize new estimations that are complete

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through the 105th Congress. We find that the trend to polarization and unidimensionality identified in Congress has continued unabated. The shift to Republican control after the 1994 elections is part of this trend and does not represent a sharp break in roll-call-voting behavior. Comparison of NOMINATE results for the United States to those for other legislatures both further indicates the ideological character of roll-call voting in Congress and suggests that low-dimensional spatial models apply as well to multiparty systems as to two-party systems.},

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    title = {When experience fails: {The} experience factor in congressional runoffs},  
    volume = {26},  
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    abstract = {Ambition theory identifies political experience as a major correlate of holding higher office. We explore the possibility that under certain conditions, political experience may do little to promote election. Specifically, in runoff primaries experience may not promote a candidate's prospects for nomination. When an experienced candidate, such as a former state legislator, fails to win a majority in the initial primary, it may indicate that any advantages derived from experience have been discounted by the electorate. The relationship between experience and runoff election success is explored using 87 U.S. House elections from 1982 through 1994. The evidence shows that in runoffs experienced candidates who led their primaries have no advantage, while the greater the experience of the primary runner-up, the more likely it is that the front-runner will be nominated.},
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    title = {Quiet influence: {The} representation of diffuse interests on trade policy, 1983-94},  
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    doi = {10.2307/440403},
    abstract = {A core tenet of many approaches to American trade
politics is that diffuse interests exert little or no influence on the
process. This paper argues, however, that there are theoretical and
empirical reasons to believe that diffuse interests can and do
influence congressional trade politics. Members of Congress respond to
these interests in order to preempt their mobilization by political
rivals, interest groups, the president, and the media. This mechanism
does not preclude interest group influence but rather points our
attention to an additional influence on congressional trade voting.
Evidence for this view comes from statistical analyses of ten years of
House and Senate trade voting in the eighties and nineties. The
results indicate that skilled labor-an interest that receives diffuse
benefits from trade but lacks direct organization-has been a
statistically significant, consistent, and substantial influence on
congressional trade voting.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Bailey, M.},
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    note = {WOS:000166828300004},
    pages = {45--80}
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@article{lipinski_effect_2001,
    title = {The effect of messages communicated by members of
congress: {The} impact of publicizing votes},
    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440404},
    abstract = {Although much of the literature examining
congressional behavior presumes that representatives can influence how
their constituents view them, there is little evidence supporting this
belief. Focusing on members' attempts to convey their positions on two
high-profile votes-the 1991 Persian Gulf War Use of Force Resolution
and the 1993 Budget-Reconciliation Conference Report-I show that these
efforts can indeed be successful. Members' messages to constituents
are proxied by the content of official newsletters. Employing National
Election Study survey data, I demonstrate that respondents whose
representatives put forth the effort to publicize these votes were
significantly better able to state correctly their representatives'
positions on these issues.},
    number = {1},
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@article{morris_reexamining_2001,  
  title = {Reexamining the politics of talk: {Partisan} rhetoric in  
the 104th house},  
  volume = {26},  
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  doi = {10.2307/440405},  
  abstract = {Drawing off the work of Maltzman and Sigelman (1996),  
this paper looks at the propensity of members to speak on the House  
floor during one minute speeches in the 104th Congress. I used a  
negative binomial event count model to predict not only who will  
participate in "one minutes" in general, but also who will engage in  
partisan rhetoric, which was such an important aspect of the volatile  
104th Congress. The model finds that, while general participation can  
be predicted, we can also use a number of explanatory variables, such  
as tenure, electoral insecurity, ideological intensity, party rank,  
constituency time zone, and party identification to understand why  
some members engage in partisan rhetoric during one minutes and why  
others do not. The findings have implications both for understanding  
partisan behavior in the 104th Congress and for understanding and  
predicting one minute speaking practices in the future.},  
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  volume = {26},  
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  doi = {10.2307/440406},  
  abstract = {A general theory developed in industrial psychology,  
career anchor theory, can be used to aid in understanding legislators'  
orientations toward their careers. To determine if legislative anchors  
exist, I used data from a survey conducted in 1995 of North Carolina  
legislators. I employed factor analysis of thirteen closed-ended items  
previously associated with career anchors and the results showed that  
three legislative anchors do exist: power, service, and  
specialization. I then assigned factor scores to legislators. A  
cluster analysis uncovered five groups of legislators, each with a  
different pattern of association toward the three anchors. Legislative  
career orientation was associated with attainment of a leadership  
position, political ambition, and acceptance of legislative norms.},  
  number = {1},  
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    year = {2001},
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    title = {Parliamentary agenda control and legislative outcomes in
{Western} {Europe}},
    volume = {26},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440407},
    abstract = {This article gives a comprehensive account of the
rules and practices of agenda setting that were typically in force in
the lower or single Houses of Western European (national) parliaments
during the 1980s. From this account, comparative indices for control
of both the budgetary agenda and the lawmaking agenda are developed.
These indices are then used to check the empirical validity of
hypotheses that expect, as legislative outcomes from agenda control, a
reduction of budget deficits and legislative inflation. Finally,
possible trade-offs between parliamentary agenda control and control
by other decision-making structures outside parliament are explored.},
    number = {1},
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@article{bovitz_electoral_2001,
    title = {The electoral consequences of position-taking in
congress: {Exploring} the relationship between roll call behavior and
house election returns.},
    volume = {26},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Bovitz, G. L. and Carson, J. L.},
    month = feb,
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    note = {WOS:000166828300010},
    pages = {167--167}
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@article{burden_representation_2001,
    title = {Representation versus self-interest in {US} politics:
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    volume = {26},
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@article{hall_lobbying_2001,
    title = {Lobbying as legislative subsidy.},
    volume = {26},
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@article{jones_position-taking_2001,
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@article{engstrom_state_2001,
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elections on party control of the house of representatives, 1840-
1940},
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    title = {The electoral basis of partisan polarization in
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@article{l Larson_redistricting_2001,
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J.},
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@article{herrick_publics_2001,
    title = {The public's need for ethical lawmakers: {An}
examination of the linkage between political scandals and public
support for {Congress}.},
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run for the {US} {House}.},
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votes, money, and the {Clinton} impeachment.},
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activities, 1979-1997},
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strategy in congress.},
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@article{theriault_impact_2001,
    title = {The impact of national media coverage and ideological
extremity upon {U}.{S} senate campaign contributions.},
    volume = {26},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{jenkins_sophisticated_2001,
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elections of 1849 and 1855-56.},
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{US} {Senate}: {Do} both parties do it?},
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explanations of turf control in energy policy.},
  volume = {26},
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    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Anonymous},
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    note = {WOS:000165163900001},
    pages = {529--532}
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@article{krutz_getting_2000,
    title = {Getting around gridlock: {The} effect of omnibus
utilization on legislative productivity},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440433},
    abstract = {Omnibus legislating-the practice of combining
numerous measures from disparate policy areas in one massive bill-has
become a standard part of the legislative landscape in Washington and
alters lawmaking in important ways; yet we know little about it. In
this paper, I consider whether or not the omnibus method positively
affects legislative productivity, as is suggested by many observers in
Washington and academia. To test this hypothesis, I estimate two
different models of legislative production. I find omnibus usage to be
a positive and significant independent influence on legislative
productivity in both models.},
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@article{schickler_intergenerational_2000,
    title = {Intergenerational warfare: {The} senate decentralizes
appropriations},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440434},
    abstract = {Most accounts portray the 1890-1910 period of

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congressional history as an exemplary instance of highly centralized party government. However, we contend that this interpretation obscures other important forces driving institutional development during this time. In 1899, the Senate approved a rule change dispersing jurisdiction over appropriations bills. This change added a significant centrifugal element to the Senate committee system. Taking advantage of new evidence, in particular a petition circulated by supporters of the reform, we assess competing explanations for the appropriations decentralization. We find that junior senators' demands for increased access to power played an important role in this change. By contrast, partisan considerations played an insignificant role. The 1899 reform indicates the relevance of a causal variable that scholars have typically ignored: "intergenerational warfare" among members of Congress who differ in seniority level. Sectional differences were another key motivation for decentralization. This change, therefore, not only forces a reevaluation of the depiction of the turn-of-the-century Senate as a highly centralized institution, but also suggests the multiple kinds of coalitions that drive congressional development.},

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    number = {4},
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@article{cohen_state-level_2000,
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  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440435},
  abstract = {The effect of public presidential approval on congressional support for the president has been the subject of considerable debate and controversy. Systematic, quantitative studies have been unable to demonstrate convincingly that public approval leads to greater legislative support for the president. The lack of constituency-level public approval data has hindered resolution of the controversy. Studies have relied upon either election results or national-level approval data as substitutes, but both alternatives are problematic as measures of public approval at the constituency level. In this paper, we use new data gathered from 50 state surveys in September 1996 that asked respondents, among other things, to rate the job performance of the president. We test whether or not public approval in the states affects senators' support for the president and also look at some hypotheses: whether or not minority party status, running for reelection, electoral vulnerability, and presidential coattails interact with constituents' approval of the president to affect senators' roll-call support for the president. With controls
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for partisanship and ideology of the senator and the state, analysis indicates no support for the hypothesis that public approval of the president leads to greater presidential support among senators.},

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    number = {4},
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@article{bardwell_puzzling_2000,
  title = {The puzzling decline in house support for free trade:
{Was} fast track a referendum on {NAFTA}?},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440436},
  abstract = {In 1993, both houses of Congress passed and President
Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Just
four years later, fast-track legislation stalled short of a vote in
the House of Representatives, despite the endorsement of the president
and majority-party leaders. Using interest group "head counts" in lieu
of roll-call data, I test the theory that fast track was a referendum
on the district-level economic impact of NAFTA. The findings show that
economic and political aftershocks from NAFTA, including trade-related
job losses in many members' districts, helped to undermine House
support for fast track in 1997.},
  number = {4},
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  title = {Multimember district congressional elections},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440437},
  abstract = {In the Apportionment Act of 1842, the House of
Representatives mandated single-member districts (SMDs) for elections
of its members. Before this act, many states had multimember districts
(MMDs), and even after this act, Congress permitted some exceptions up
until 1967. This paper addresses several questions related to the
election of representatives in MMD elections. Herein, I develop a
model of MMD elections that predicts that one party will sweep all the
seats in this type of election. I then perform empirical analyses to
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examine and validate the four key assumptions of the model. My prediction that one party will sweep all the seats in an MMD election is verified by examining the actual results of all MMD House races in history. In this paper, I also show that, in general, the diversity of a state's House delegation increases when the state shifts from general-ticket to single-member districts, but diversity decreases when the state moves in the opposite direction.},

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state legislators in {US} {House} elections},  
    volume = {25},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440438},  
    abstract = {This study investigates the hypothesis that term  
limits at the state level increase electoral competition for seats in  
the U.S. House. With a greater number of ambitious state legislators  
being unwillingly turned out of office, we can expect that those  
individuals interested in legislative careers will increasingly turn  
their attention to Congress. In order to assess whether or not state  
legislators are more likely to run for Congress in states with  
legislative term limits, I specified and tested logistic regression  
models. The models were derived from our prior knowledge of the  
behavior of strategic politicians and included control variables for  
theoretically important national-and district-level factors. The  
results presented in this study provide support for the hypothesis  
that state legislators are more likely to run for the House in states  
with legislative term limits.},  
    number = {4},  
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@article{maestas_professional_2000,  
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{Policy} responsiveness of state institutions},  
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    abstract = {This paper examines the relationship between
professionalism, progressive ambition, and legislative responsiveness
in state legislatures. I argue that professional legislatures that
foster and support: progressive ambition will be more responsive to
aggregate constituency concerns than will less professional
legislatures. Institutions that attract progressively ambitious
members create a natural incentive for representation because
legislators are motivated to identify and respond to the interests of
broad-based constituencies in preparation to pursue higher office.
Consistent with this argument, I find that states with more
professional legislatures and more opportunities for members to
progress to higher office have greater aggregate opinion-policy
congruence, even after controlling for the effects of electoral
competition and alternative policy influences.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    volume = {25},
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voting},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440412},
    abstract = {Despite the general recognition that incumbency has
influenced voters' decisions to split their ballots for president and
the House, past research has not focused on the specific magnitude of
this effect and its responsibility for growing ticket-splitting in the
United States. In this study, I find that incumbency was a powerful
determinant of the step jump in ticket-splitting that occurred from
the 1956-68 to 1972-92 periods. This is in contrast to the weak
expansive force exerted by declining partisan intensity in the
electorate. Incumbency's impact, however, was confined to districts
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where members of the losing presidential party run for reelection; in districts with campaigning incumbents of the winning presidential party, it made for only about the level of ticket-splitting that could be expected in open seats.},

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subconstituency matter?},
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    volume = {25},
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    doi = {10.2307/440413},
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voting literature have been attributed, in part, to scholars' failure
to identify appropriately the subconstituencies to whom legislators
appeal when making decisions (Jackson and Kingdon 1992). This paper
develops and examines a new model of legislator behavior that accounts
for the prospective constituency-the subset of the legal constituency
to whom legislators are likely to appeal in the next election. The
prospective constituency is based on the idea that legislators
consider the views not only of past supporters but also of swing
voters and moderate opposing partisans as well. Results from this
model are compared to results generated by a traditional model-one
that does not account for subconstituency. Models incorporating the
prospective constituency find constituency to influence senators'
roll-call decisions, and they offer an explanation for the conflicting
results of past studies.},
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    number = {3},
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    title = {Dynamics of congressional loyalty: {Party} defection and
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    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440414},
    abstract = {I seek to determine whether or not political parties
have significant independent effects upon the roll-call behavior of
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their members. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I analyze the roll-call behavior of those members of the House and Senate from 1947 to 1997 who changed party affiliation while in office. Using data from the 80th to 105th Congresses, I find that Democrats who become Republicans, for instance, start to vote like Republicans at the time they " cross aisles." This finding is consistent with the claims made in a growing literature that emphasizes the partisan aspects of congressional organization, and it supports the contention that party plays a direct role in determining members' roll-call behavior.},

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congressional roll-call voting},  
    volume = {25},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440415},  
    abstract = {Research on political cognition suggests that  
individuals absorb and retain more information consistent with their  
political predispositions than they do information at odds with those  
predispositions. When citizens view a member of Congress favorably,  
they should thus be more likely to recall that member's vote on a bill  
if it is in agreement with their own positions; additionally, if they  
do not recall, they will tend to assume that the member voted in  
accordance with their own preferences. When citizens view a  
representative negatively, the opposite patterns should obtain. Here,  
we find considerable evidence for both of these effects-concordance  
and projection. Attitude toward the representative and agreement on  
the issue substantially drive citizen perceptions of congressional  
roll-call voting.},
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transformation of house committee chairs, 1959-94},  
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    doi = {10.2307/440416},
    abstract = {Standing committee chairs in the House, as a group,
are now dramatically more supportive of their party, its leaders, and
their agenda than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. I present original
data analysis that tests the two dominant explanations for this
transformation-first, that it was the direct result of the Caucus
reelection requirement for committee chairs and the dramatic removal
of three incumbents under this new rule in 1975, and second, that it
was simply an artifact of the general increases in partisanship across
this same period. The results show that the critical transformation
occurred immediately after the new rule was first used in 1975 but
well in advance of the resurgent aggregate-level partisanship of the
1980s. This change is statistically significant, even after
controlling for general levels of partisanship and other factors
commonly expected to have affected the voting behavior of committee
chairs between 1959 and 1994.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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turnover in {Brazil}},
    volume = {25},
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    doi = {10.2307/440417},
    abstract = {Despite Brazil's electoral laws, which would appear
to encourage incumbency, legislative turnover in Brazil consistently
exceeds 50\% with each election. In this article, I explain this
phenomenon as a function of two factors: the nature of political
ambition and the dynamics of electoral competition. Political ambition
accounts for about half of the turnover because a sizeable portion of
incumbent legislators decides to run for nonlegislative office.
Electoral competition accounts for the other half. Since many
potentially strong candidates for reelection decide to run for another
office the group of incumbents running for reelection is relatively
weak. In addition, a wide-open nomination process ensures that
incumbents running for reelection face a pool of extremely strong
challengers. Finally, Brazil's at-large, open-list proportional
representation electoral system undermines incumbents' attempts to
protect their status. Given these factors, many incumbents lose. I
provide evidence for the impact of ambition and competition on
legislative turnover in Brazil, place Brazil in comparative
perspective, and suggest avenues for further research.},
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author = {Samuels, D.},
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hypothesis: {The} case of {Washington}, 1948-96},
  volume = {25},
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  doi = {10.2307/440418},
  abstract = {This study examines the hypothesis that voters seek
political moderation by balancing one party with the other. Washington
State's weak parties and its bicameral, multimember legislative
districts are especially conducive to examining this idea. Therefore,
I analyze state legislative election outcomes in Washington State from
1948 to 1996. While divided legislative districts are more
ideologically moderate, the variety of patterns by which districts are
divided, the frequency with which the same district is both divided
and unified, and the frequency of unique patterns of division and
unification make it very difficult to infer that district voters are
consistently and systematically balancing parties in search of
moderation. Divided outcomes are also associated with several measures
of mobilization, suggesting that such outcomes are instead by-products
of district circumstances, a conclusion also reached by research using
individual-level data.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    title = {On the effects of legislative rules},
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    abstract = {In this essay, I consider how a legislature's rules
of procedure can affect both the process and the outcome of
legislation. I begin by asking whether or not rules of procedure
should have any effects at all, given that they can often be changed
by simple majorities of legislators. The second part of the essay
classifies the effects that rules have. Rules can change the set of
bins that plenary sessions of the legislature consider; they can
change the menu of amendments to any given bill considered in the
plenary; they can affect how members vote; and-putting the first three
effects together-they can affect which bills pass. I review evidence
that rules do in fact have the suspected effects.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = may,
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    note = {WOS:000086827000002},
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@article{smith_positive_2000,
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    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440368},
    abstract = {In recent years, positive theories of congressional
parties have been elaborated to encompass a variety of institutional
features. The seasoning of the field is reflected in its contrasting
theoretical accounts of the existence of parties and their effects,
and the return to empirical evidence in a set of insightful studies of
modern congressional decision making. This paper provides a critical
review of this recent literature and suggests some unfinished tasks in
the development of this field.},
    number = {2},
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@article{wright_interest_2000,
    title = {Interest groups, congressional reform, and party
government in the {United} {States}},
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    doi = {10.2307/440369},
    abstract = {The generally accepted explanation for the congressional reforms of the 1970s is that Northern Democrats sought greater control over the legislative process in order to enact a liberal policy agenda. Party leaders, according to this explanation, then acted forcefully and cohesively to satisfy these ideological policy demands. I argue instead that congressional reforms were motivated by the need for House Democrats to raise money for reelection, and that the subsequent policies enacted by party leaders were designed to satisfy important interest group constituencies that supply campaign money. The former argument suggests that interest groups reconcile their policy demands to the ideological policy objectives of the party. My explanation suggests that political parties adjust their policy agendas to satisfy interest group constituencies.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{burden_measuring_2000,
  title = {Measuring the ideologies of {US} senators: {The} song remains the same},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440370},
  abstract = {This research note discusses and compares nine measures of senator ideology. It is motivated by the newest measure of legislator ideology offered by Hill, Hanna, and Shafqat (1997), which seeks to improve on existing measures, particularly those based on roll-can votes. We gather and compare nine different ideological measures from a wide variety of sources. After evaluating them theoretically and empirically, we conclude that existing indicators operationalize ideology as least as well as the newer alternatives.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Burden, B. C. and Caldeira, G. A. and Groseclose, T.},
  month = may,
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  pages = {237--258}
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@article{alter_reexamining_2000,
  title = {Reexamining the filibuster and proposal powers in the {Senate}},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    abstract = {Conventional wisdom views the Senate filibuster as a
protection of minority rights. In this paper we challenge this
intuition by showing that this common belief always holds true only
for specific assumptions about Senate procedures. We show that under
an open rule, while the filibuster option may advantage the minority,
it is also true that the filibuster option may benefit the proposer at
the expense of the minority. Whether the filibuster under an open rule
advantages or disadvantages the minority, the majority, or the
proposer, is a function of the proposer's preferred policy, the status
quo, and the costs faced by potential filibusterers. The use of the
filibuster in today's Senate serves the interests of the minority at
the expense of the majority. Far from preserving the Senate's role as
a deliberative assembly, the filibuster today encourages rampant
individualism and obstructionism, endless delays and unfocused
discussion, hardly conducive to the thoughtful consideration of
measures to solve vexing problems of public policy.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Alter, A. B. and McGranahan, L. M.},
    month = may,
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    title = {Divided government and the legislative productivity of
{Congress}, 1945-94},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440372},
    abstract = {This paper contributes to the literature on divided
government and legislative productivity. We begin by reexamining
Mayhew's data on landmark enactments. We show that Mayhew's claim that
divided government does not affect legislative productivity is a
consequence of aggregating time series that exhibit different
behavior. We then extend Mayhew's analysis by broadening the concept
of significance and creating a new four-category measure that
encompasses all 17,663 public laws enacted in the period of 1945-94.
Using appropriate time-series techniques, we demonstrate that periods
of divided government depress the production of landmark legislation
by about 30\% at least when productivity is measured on the basis of
contemporaneous perceptions of legislative significance. Divided
government, however, has no substantive effect on the production of
important, albeit not landmark, legislation and actually has a
positive effect on the passage of trivial laws.},
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elections},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440373},
  abstract = {We argue that the competitiveness of House
challengers is in part a function of the district in which they run
and its geographic relationship to media markets. When the television
market is well matched to the district, incumbents enjoy less of an
advantage over challengers in making contact with the voters. In
contrast, when the size of the television market is fragmented across
more than one market, incumbents enjoy a bigger edge over challengers
in getting out their name and message. This in turn affects the
likelihood of a challenger defeating an incumbent. We find support for
the idea that challengers who run in districts that are better matched
with television media markets are more competitive than are
challengers running in fragmented districts. But we find, too, that
incumbents also benefit from representing districts with congruent
media markets, which mitigates some of the benefits gained by
challengers.},
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  author = {Levy, D. and Squire, P.},
  month = may,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000086827000008},
  pages = {313--325}
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@article{king_changes_2000,
  title = {Changes in professionalism in {US} state legislatures},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440374},
  abstract = {State legislatures in the United States have changed
in many ways since the drive for reform began in the 1960s. Using a
modification of Squire's legislative professional index, this analysis
demonstrates that a higher degree of professionalism is a general, but
not a universal, trait of state legislatures. Disparities among state
legislatures have increased, with some being no more professional
today than they were 30 years ago. On the other hand, states that have
removed legal restrictions on legislative sessions, whose populations
have grown larger, and whose neighbors have more institutionally

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advanced assemblies have developed more professional legislatures.},
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in {Europe}},
    volume = {25},
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    abstract = {Which voting methods do European parliaments use when
they make choices between multiple, mutually exclusive alternatives?
To what extent are legislative outcomes affected by differences in
floor voting procedures at the final stage of legislative processes?
In the first part of the analysis, I describe the parliamentary voting
procedures applied in Western and East-Central Europe. It turns out
that only two approaches occur: the amendment (elimination) procedure,
and the successive procedure. In the second part of the paper, I
outline and discuss:some normative properties and political
consequences of the two parliamentary:voting procedures, focusing in
particular, on principles of agenda formation.},
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transaction costs},
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relationship between legislatures and agencies-in particular, between
Congress and the bureaucracy in the United States. In the past two
decades, however, there has been a renewed interest in this topic
along with a variety of new theoretical contributions and insights. We
review these relatively recent contributions and examine how
transaction cost and principal-agent approaches have provided many of
them with a theoretical underpinning. Specifically, we examine a
series of basic concepts from these literatures and discuss how these
concepts can be used both to provide theoretical advances and to
suggest empirical tests about the relationship between legislatures
and agencies.},
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  title = {The effects of party advantage on the partisan support
of new {US} house members},
  volume = {25},
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  doi = {10.2307/440393},
  abstract = {We argue that the partisan voting patterns of new
members of:the House of Representatives are affected by national
political conditions. New members of a party advantaged by national
forces should exhibit distinctively partisan voting patterns, while
new members of the disadvantaged party should not. We use a
comparative statics research design to examine eight congresses with
large numbers:of new members that were also characterized by different
national forces. Multivariate OLS models of party support are used to
isolate the effects of first-term status while controlling for other
factors that might influence a member's willingness to support his or
her party. We find that national forces have the expected general
effect on the partisan support of new members of the advantaged party,
and that the size of that effect varies with the particular character
of the national forces.},
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in the {US} {House}},
  volume = {25},
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  doi = {10.2307/440394},
  abstract = {Since party is so highly correlated with ideology,
party-line voting in the U.S. House may indicate members voting their
own preferences. If, however, the reputation of a member's party is
valuable as a cue for voters and other party supporters, then
legislators should be willing to vote against their own preferences
and for those of their party, at least sometimes. To investigate
whether and how often this does occur, we use roll-call data from the
House from the 1950s to 1990s to perform cross-sectional and other
tests that isolate the effects of parties, including analyses of
members who switch parties. Our regression results indicate that party
influence on voting-has varied, but that there is an effect, even when
controlling for ideology.},
  number = {1},
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@article{jenkins_institutional_2000,
  title = {The institutional origins of the {Republican} {Party}:
{Spatial} voting and the {House} speakership election of 1855-56},
  volume = {25},
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  doi = {10.2307/440395},
  abstract = {This study explores the Republican Party's origins at
the institutional level, specifically in the 34th House of
Representatives. We focus on an especially critical event, the House
speakership election of 1855-56, which resulted in the first major
victory for the new party. We conduct our analysis by applying the
spatial theory of voting to the House balloting for Speaker, using a
scaling technique: developed by Poole (1998). Results from our spatial
model suggest that slavery Was the overriding determinant of vote
choice throughout the two-month speakership battle. Its effects were
considerable from the outset, even in multiple candidate rounds, and
proved to be more influential as the balloting progressed. We also
find that the issue of nativism, which was so important in the
previous congressional elections and would continue to affect the
Republicans' electoral fortunes for several more years, had no impact
on members' votes for speaker. Once elected, the new Republican

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speaker, Nathaniel Banks, organized the House around anti-slavery tenets, stacking both committees and chairs with anti-slavery advocates. Overall, these results suggest that while the Republicans would struggle for an electoral identity deep into the 1850s-balancing the competing interests of slavery and nativism to win office-they emerged as a single-issue, anti-slavery coalition at the institutional level as early as 1855.},

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    abstract = {Uncontested seats are far more common in U.S. state legislative elections than in U.S. House elections. But the incidence of uncontested seats varies across the states. In this paper, I attempt to explain that variance. Using pooled data on state legislative elections from 1992 to 1996, I test relationships suggested by the literature on uncontested seats in U.S. House elections. In addition, I also look at important differences among the state legislatures, such as level of professionalization, the competitiveness of the state's electoral system, the use of multimember districts, and the institution of term limits. I find that the value of a seat, measured either by professionalization level or member pay, and the competitiveness of the state's electoral system are powerful variables in explaining the incidence of uncontested seats across the states. Region also is important, with state legislatures in the South suffering a higher percentage of uncontested seats than state legislatures in the North.},
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informational role of committees in the {US} congress.},
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abortion in the {British} {House} of {Commons}.},
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{Obstruction} in the {US} house of representatives.},
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rules with high visibility issues.},
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{US}. house of representatives, 1789-1861.},
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{Lobbying}, litigation, and administrative regulation.},
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policy outcomes.},
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@article{fleisher_partisanship_2000,
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    title = {The roofs of careerism in the {US} {House} of
{Representatives}},
    volume = {24},
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    doi = {10.2307/440258},
    abstract = {In this paper we reexamine the rise of careerism in
the United States House of Representatives. Following the insights of
Gilmour and Rothstein (1993) and Kiewiet and Zeng (1993), we model
careerism as a combination of the desire of incumbents to serve in the
House for long periods and the ability to be reelected. The focus in
this paper is on the probability that incumbents seek reelection, and
conditional on their decision to seek reelection, the probability they
will be elected. The results of our analysis show that different
factors influence electoral safety and the desire to continue holding
office. Namely, institutional innovations such as the Australian
ballot and primaries slightly decreased the probability of seeking
reelection. In addition, bringing pork home and a strong partisan
advantage in the district increased the probability of renomination.
In regard to seat safety, incumbent party advantage, especially post-
1896, increased the probability of winning reelection, as did economic
prosperity.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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legislative effectiveness},
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    abstract = {The investment theory of campaign finance posits that
political action committees invest campaign funds in members who
provide services at a low cost. We build on and directly test this
theory, hypothesizing that PACs give to members who are effective
legislators. Using data collected from the 103d and 104th Congresses
and a direct measure of effectiveness, we find that contributions flow
to members who are successful in getting a large percentage of their
sponsored bills enacted into law. Being an effective legislator is one
way a member can purchase time for his or her Washington work.},
    number = {4},
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preferences versus party debate},
  volume = {24},
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  doi = {10.2307/440260},
  abstract = {Congressional voting studies often use interest group
ratings as proxies for legislator policy preferences. This paper
investigates the extent to which artificial extremism in interest
group ratings affects the ability of such studies to estimate
accurately the impact of legislator preferences and party membership
on roll-call votes. Using a sequence of Monte Carlo experiments, I
find that artificial extremism does not have serious implications for
understanding whether policy preferences impact legislator voting
behavior. However, in many cases artificial extremism can cause
analyses of roll-call votes to draw improper conclusions regarding the
direction and magnitude of the impact of party membership on roll-call
voting decisions.},
  number = {4},
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{Lessons} from the {First} {Federal} {Congress}},
  volume = {24},
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  abstract = {This paper details the transition from a confederated
to a federal legislative system in the United States. Covering the
period 1782 through 1792, I examine how political elites fundamentally
reshaped their legislative institutions. This period in American
history was extremely important. The newly created nation faced
enormous problems reconstituting itself from a loose aggregation of
independent and sovereign states into a unified nation. Almost every
commentator from the period noted the fragile nature of newfound
democratic rights and the importance of this national experiment. The
concluding sections of the paper draw lessons from this period of
American transition to contemporary legislatures in democratizing
systems. While few of these lessons directly apply to current
transitional systems, they shed light on the kinds of issues that
scholars should raise while studying democratizing systems.},
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{Polish} cases},
  volume = {24},
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  doi = {10.2307/440262},
  abstract = {The recent wave of democratization worldwide has
focused attention on the evolution of legislatures in new democracies.
In regimes where potent executives-either presidential, parliamentary,
or hybrid-exist alongside new legislatures, it is necessary to
distinguish the idea of legislative autonomy from that of
effectiveness. We emphasize the centrality of the second concept to
understanding representative institutions in recent transitions. We
provide case studies of the lower legislative chambers in Poland and
the Czech Republic during the past decade, describing the evolution of
the party and committee systems, the structure of legislative
leadership, and its relationship to the executive. Finally, we examine
the role of the legislature in drafting and overseeing the execution
of policy, paying particular attention to budget bills as bellwethers
of legislative autonomy and the cohesiveness of parties and
coalitions. We conclude that both the Polish Sejm and the Czech
Parliament have developed much of the internal institutional framework
to support legislative autonomy, and that in the Czech case in
particular, recent experiences with minority government are
contributing to this trend.},
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  title = {Legislative structure: {Rules}, precedents, and
jurisdictions},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440263},
  abstract = {In this essay, I review and critique the scholarly
literature about rules and other structural arrangements in Congress.
My focus is on empirical research that has been informed by rational
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choice theory. I emphasize three categories of rules-committee jurisdictions, leadership prerogatives, and floor procedure. An implication is that the forces shaping procedural politics vary depending on the aspect of congressional structure under consideration. Structural features within Congress also reflect different levels of institutionalization; procedures often begin as informal practice, gradually become precedent, and eventually are codified as formal rules. Finally, many important aspects of structural development in Congress exhibit significant path dependencies.},

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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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    volume = {24},  
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    author = {Squire, P. and Loewenberg, G. and Collie, M. P.},  
    month = aug,  
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    pages = {329--330}  
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@article{canon_electoral_1999,  
    title = {Electoral systems and the representation of minority  
interests in legislatures},  
    volume = {24},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440349},  
    abstract = {The rules and institutions used to translate  
preferences into electoral outcomes have a profound impact on the  
nature of representation provided in a political system. This is  
especially true when it comes to representing divergent racial and  
ethnic group interests. This essay examines the range of alternatives  
that nations have used to address this fundamental problem, with a  
focus on the representation of minority interests within U.S.  
legislatures. After a brief review of related issues, I examine the  
following questions: how should representation be provided to  
minorities within a majority rule system (the normative literature);  
how can representation be provided (the legal literature); and, how  
are minority interests represented (the partisan implications of  
racial redistricting and the broader empirical literature on
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representation).},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Canon, D. T.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1999},
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  pages = {331--385}
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  title = {Electoral rules and the calculus mobilization},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440350},
  abstract = {In this essay, I consider how electoral laws affect
parties' mobilizational incentives and, hence, turnout. The strategy
is to look systematically at how differing electoral rules affect the
translations from effort-to-votes, votes-to-seats, and seats-to-
portfolios, and hence, parties' incentives to mobilize. Considering
each of these steps in turn leads us to many of the most important
extant claims about how electoral institutions affect turnout. Such an
approach also underscores that, even by a purely instrumental
calculus, both social structure and political context are directly
relevant to explaining mobilization (hence, turnout).},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Cox, G. W.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000081713900003},
  pages = {387--419}
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@article{sinclair_transformational_1999,
  title = {Transformational leader or faithful agent? {Principal}-
agent theory and house majority party leadership},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440351},
  abstract = {Newt Gingrich's phenomenal successes in the 104th
Congress led many political scientists to question the discipline's
prevalent conception of congressional leadership. Most see
congressional leaders as agents who must satisfy members' expectations
to get reelected. Those expectations arise from members' goals and
from the political and institutional context in which they attempt to
advance them. The change in the political context between the 104th
and 105th Congresses provides something of a natural experiment. A
comparison of party leadership in the 104th with leadership before the
104th as well as in the 105th allows us to assess the adequacy of
principal-agent theory for making sense of a complicated, even
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exceptional, case. I assess continuity and change in the rate and type of House majority party leadership activity and in leadership strategies. Compared with the Democratic leaderships of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Gingrich's leadership in the 104th Congress shows considerable continuity but also some distinctive features. The considerable changes in Republican leadership from the 104th to the 105th can be explained by changes in context that altered members' expectations.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Sinclair, B.},
month = aug,
year = {1999},
note = {WOS:000081713900004},
pages = {421--449}

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@article{bianco_party_1999,

title = {Party campaign committees and the distribution of tally program funds},

volume = {24},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440352},

abstract = {This paper uses data supplied by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee to examine the relationship between candidate tallying and party allocations in the 1992 and 1994 elections and, in doing so, to provide a new test of hypotheses concerning the role and powers of the party-in-government in the postwar Congress. The focus is on two hypotheses: a recycling hypothesis (allocations were driven by candidate tallies), and an electioneering hypothesis (allocations were driven by the goal of winning elections). Analysis of the data provides no support for the recycling hypothesis. Rather, consistent with the electioneering hypotheses, DSCC allocations are strongly influenced by political variables, such as the closeness of a race, a candidate's success at fundraising, state population, and the cost of campaigning. These findings confirm a strong redistributive role for the contemporary party-in-government in the electoral process.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Bianco, W. T.},
month = aug,
year = {1999},
note = {WOS:000081713900005},
pages = {451--469}

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@article{squire_editors_1999-1,

title = {Editors' introduction},
volume = {24},
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    number = {2},
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    note = {WOS:000079921000001},
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@article{hibbing_legislative_1999,
  title = {Legislative careers: {Why} and how we should study
them},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440308},
  abstract = {Legislative careers can provide extremely useful
information on political institutions, but only if used wisely. For
example, we cannot assume that the amount of membership turnover in a
legislature is an indication of the degree to which it is
institutionalized. The real variable of interest is the (unfortunately
much more difficult to quantify) consequences of that turnover. And
even if we can determine that the consequences of legislative turnover
are minimal, we cannot conclude that the legislature is
institutionalized since what appears to be legislative
institutionalization may actually be the institutionalization of
political parties. More accurate indications of institutionalization
would be the tendency of members to want to stay in the body
(regardless of whether or not they do), and the length of service in
the body required before leadership positions become a real
possibility.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hibbing, J. R.},
  month = may,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000079921000002},
  pages = {149--171}
}

@article{moncrief_recruitment_1999,
  title = {Recruitment and retention in {US} legislatures},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440309},
  abstract = {Questions of recruitment and retention of legislators
are central to our understanding of the nature of representative
democracy. This essay traces the dominant perspectives and issues
involved in the study of legislative candidates and legislative
careers in the United States. A central theme of this essay is that
congressional and state legislative scholars have tended to ignore
each other's work. This is largely due to a difference in the unit of

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analysis, wherein congressional scholars concentrate on the individual while state legislative scholars concentrate on the institution. But two recent events in state legislatures have the potential to provide linkages between congressional and legislative research. The first is the increase in careerism among state legislators. The second is the effect of term limits.},

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    number = {2},
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    volume = {24},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440310},
    abstract = {This article discusses the recruitment and retention of legislators in Brazil since World War II and identifies the main theoretical challenges for developing comparative research on such an issue. It argues that a comparative analysis on this subject cannot make theoretical headway without an understanding of the reasons by which different countries display different modes of interaction between the legislative branch and the broader political system. The conclusion is that more historical research (and not just more comparative-static analysis and measures of institutionalization) is needed for the investigation concerning the cause of the emergence of different career patterns.},
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    number = {2},
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@article{patzelt_recruitment_1999,
    title = {Recruitment and retention in {Western} {European}
parliaments},
    volume = {24},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440311},
    abstract = {This article reviews and evaluates recent research on parliamentary recruitment in Western Europe. It illuminates the particular difficulties of doing comparative legislative research in Europe and summarizes several important studies and their methodologies. Next, it presents a country-by-country overview of
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comparative and case studies on legislative recruitment. Included are the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece), France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Belgium and the Netherlands, the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), and the European Parliament. Additionally, studies on gender effects in legislative recruitment are reviewed. A final section evaluates several major substantive and methodological issues. These include the strengths and shortcomings of European recruitment research; the types of data collected and research questions answered; the common research methods and their limits; the theoretical frameworks applied; and the neglect of normative research.},

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    number = {2},
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    pages = {239--279}
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  title = {Political cleavage in {US} state legislative houses},
  volume = {24},
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  doi = {10.2307/440312},
  abstract = {Does the income of state legislative districts affect the erection of Republicans and Democrats? If such a relationship exists, is it uniform across states, or do states retain some uniqueness in their party cleavages? This paper assesses the relationship of district income to partisan outcomes across states, using district data from The Almanac of State Legislatures and a file of winners of legislative elections compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures. The results indicate that the association between district income and partisan outcomes varies significantly across the states. The varying partisan cleavages across the states are not just a product of state conditions such as the diversity within states. States have unique patterns of partisan cleavages that we need to explain and incorporate into analyses.},
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  title = {State lobby registration data: {The} anomalous case of {Florida} (and {Minnesota} too!)},
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    volume = {24},
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    doi = {10.2307/440313},
    abstract = {Florida's lobbying community was anomalously large in
1990, a problem that threatens to undermine more general
interpretations of the density of state interest systems. We use time
series and cross-sectional data to better understand just what
happened in Florida. Two explanations are examined, one focusing on
changes in lobbying regulations, and the other based on a population
ecology interpretation of Florida's battle over the sales tax on
services and what should replace it. The data provide circumstantial
support for the latter account, which suggests that Florida is
anomalous only in the extremity of the conditions governing the size
of its interest community in the late 1980s, not the conditions
themselves.},
    number = {2},
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    author = {Brasher, H. and Lowery, D. and Gray, V.},
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  volume = {24},
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  author = {Loewenberg, G. and Collie, M. P.},
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@article{laver_divided_1999,
  title = {Divided parties, divided government},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440298},
  abstract = {The U.S. phenomenon of divided government has its
counterpart in a parliamentary system as a result of the politics of
coalition. One legislative coalition may put the executive in place, a
different legislative coalition may sustain it in a vote of
confidence, while yet another legislative coalition enacts measures
that thwart its day-to-day business. I explain such division between
executive and legislature by relaxing the party-as-unitary-actor
assumption and recognise that executive and legislative elements of
the same party may pursue different strategies. Party leaders may
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enter into commitments to coalition partners that involve implicit or explicit obligations to impose intraparty discipline. Leaders may do this with greater or lesser enthusiasm, and the required discipline may or may not be forthcoming. Thus, governments may be defeated in legislative votes because the legislature fails to honour obligations entered into by the executive. This paper sets out a simple model of this process, begins to analyse it, and elaborates a recent real-world example of the phenomenon.},

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    month = feb,  
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    pages = {5--29}  
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    title = {Paradoxes of parties in {Congress}},  
    volume = {24},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440299},  
    abstract = {This paper identifies four paradoxes of parties.
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These paradoxes illustrate not only substantive problems in their own right but also diverse ways that formal models can help to define and address problems in legislative research. Models are shown to clarify key concepts (such as majority party strength), to sharpen the definition of important problems of inference (observational equivalence of theories), to evaluate widely used measures (party voting), and to derive and test competing hypotheses (majoritarian versus majority-party determinants of legislative organization).},

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    volume = {24},  
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    doi = {10.2307/440300},  
    abstract = {A unidimensional liberal-conservative voting model is  
generally accepted as the pattern that structures Congressional  
voting. Empirical research on mass and elite gender consciousness,  
case studies on congressional handling of women's issues, and feminist  
theory all imply, however, that more than one dimension should be used
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to explain voting for legislation that affects women. Using exploratory factor analysis, I provide evidence of a gender-related dimension in a set of voting indexes and a set of roll-call votes made by both male and female members of the 101st, 102d, and 103d Congresses.},

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  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440301},
  abstract = {Interest group ratings have long been used by social scientists to distinguish between liberal and conservative members of Congress. It is also well known that ratings by different groups are highly correlated with one another. Here, rather than focusing on the similarities between such measures, we focus on the differences between them. Although the relationship between measures is nearly linear, we find systematic robust differences between Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and American Conservative Union (ACU) scores. Using a variety of techniques, we show that interest groups are most interested in distinguishing among their ideological friends and tend to group their ideological enemies near the bottom of the scale. Because of this, using any single interest group score to explain political phenomena (i.e., party loyalty) is likely to produce an inconsistent estimate of the impact of ideology on such phenomena. Finally, we propose and test a method that corrects for this bias.},
  number = {1},
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  author = {Brunell, T. L. and Koetzle, W. and Dinardo, J. and Grofman, B. and Feld, S. L.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000078615000005},
  pages = {87--101}
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@article{gaddie_what_1999,
  title = {What is so special about special elections?},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440302},
  abstract = {Some political scientists have regarded special
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elections as referenda on the approval of presidents-and therefore as products of national forces-while explaining regularly scheduled elections as the product of not only national political forces, but also constituency and candidate attributes specific to particular districts. In this paper we examine whether outcomes in special elections and their nearest counterpart, open-seat elections, are driven by similar or different forces. We used district-level data on U.S. House special elections and open-seat elections from 1973 to 1997 to test a model that integrates constituency, candidate, and presidential approval variables. The results of this analysis indicate that special elections are a subset of open-seat elections, with both types of contests strongly impacted by candidate and constituency influences. We found no evidence of a substantial presidential-approval effect in special elections. The absence of such a relationship underscores the importance of candidates and constituent preferences in structuring elections and indicates the inappropriateness of drawing national implications from special House contests.},

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    number = {1},
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@article{nownes_solicited_1999,
  title = {Solicited advice and lobbyist power: {Evidence} from
three {American} states},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440303},
  abstract = {The work of William P. Browne and Won K. Paik (1993)
suggests that legislators act as "unrestrained entrepreneurs" in an
unstructured legislative environment. As a result, legislators rely
heavily upon lobbyists for information and advice. Using data from a
survey of 595 lobbyists in three American states, this paper asks:
What determines whether or not and how often a lobbyist is approached
for advice by policymakers? My findings suggest that full-time,
experienced lobbyists have the largest "advice advantage." However,
female lobbyists, as well as those who work for governmental bodies,
also appear to have an advice advantage. Ultimately, these findings
provide insight into what makes some lobbyists more influential than
others.},
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  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G. and Collie, M.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000076703100001},
  pages = {465--466}
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@article{thies_when_1998,
  title = {When will pork leave the farm? {Institutional} bias in
{Japan} and the {United} {States}},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440236},
  abstract = {All industrialized countries have seen their
populations "urbanize" over time. In democracies, this demographic
trend ought to have ramifications for politics and policy. In this
paper, I examine the effects of urbanization on agricultural subsidy
programs in Japan and the United States. I show that even after
malapportionment was dealt with, rural retrenchment was delayed by the
balance of power within the majority party in each country. In Japan,
once urban members constituted a majority within the ruling party in
the House of Representatives, government policy changed quickly and
dramatically. In the U.S., powerful House committees and permanent
rural over-representation in the U.S. Senate delayed policy change
much longer than was true in Japan, which has no similar institutional
impediments.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Thies, M. F.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000076703100002},
  pages = {467--492}
}

@article{jenkins_property_1998,
  title = {Property rights and the emergence of standing committee
dominance in the nineteenth-century house},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440237},
  abstract = {Between 1810 and 1825, the bill-referral process in

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the House of Representatives changed dramatically, from a system that channeled a majority of legislation through select committees to a system that was dominated almost exclusively by standing committees. At the heart of this change, I contend, were grants of new rights to both standing committees and individual committee members. To explain this dispensation of new rights, I follow a new institutionalist approach and use a political theory of property-right origination, developed by Riker and Sened (1991), as a theoretical guide. I find that all necessary and sufficient conditions for right emergence, in the form of new bill-referral powers and seat-assignment privileges, are met by the actual macro-level and micro-level events of the early nineteenth century. Specifically, the greater heterogeneity of the Jeffersonian coalition and the self-interested machinations of the House Speaker, Henry Clay, combined to produce an institutional change that served the needs of all major parties in the House.},

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    number = {4},  
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@article{hutchings_issue_1998,  
    title = {Issue salience and support for civil rights legislation  
among southern {Democrats}},  
    volume = {23},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440238},  
    abstract = {Does the size of their black constituency influence  
support for civil rights legislation among southern Democrats?  
Previous research on the subject has produced mixed results. I argue  
that part of the reason for this is that the voting indices typically  
used to measure constituency influence are invariably made up of both  
salient and more obscure roll calls. To illustrate this point I  
examine scores from the 1990 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights  
(LCCR), along with two roll calls of similar impact yet markedly  
different levels of salience-the final vote on the 1990 Civil Rights  
Act and a less publicized amendment. I show that the size of the black  
constituency, as well as other district-level factors, was an  
important determinant of how southern Democratic House members voted  
on the 1990 Civil Rights Act, but not on the more obscure amendment or  
the overall LCCR scores.},
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    number = {4},  
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  title = {Senators' home-state reputations: {Why} do constituents  
love a {Bill} {Cohen} so much more than an {Al} {D}'{Amato}?},  
  volume = {23},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440239},  
  abstract = {Prior analyses of the bases of legislators' popular  
support have provided a mixed set of findings. In this note, we lay  
out a series of hypotheses about the determinants of legislators'  
home-state reputations, and test these expectations using a 1996  
survey in which 40 thousand constituents in all 50 states rated their  
senators' job performance. We find that ideological congruence, state  
demographics, and electoral factors best explain variation in  
senators' reputations. Parochial attention, partisanship, and  
legislative activism do little to boost senators' approval ratings.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Binder, S. and Maltzman, F. and Sigelman, L.},  
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@article{koetzle_impact_1998,  
  title = {The impact of constituency diversity upon the  
competitiveness of {US} {House} {Elections}, 1962-96},  
  volume = {23},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440240},  
  abstract = {There are many good reasons to expect that the  
diversity of a constituency should impact electoral competitiveness.  
However, in the face of these strong expectations, the empirical  
record that has sought to quantify this relationship is at best mixed.  
The work by Bond (1983) is an excellent example. Using a measure of  
diversity (the Sullivan Index) common to other researchers, Bond's  
investigation of House races in the 1970s revealed no relationship  
between district diversity and competitiveness. The principle finding  
of this study is that much of the confusion in the literature is  
caused by the measure of diversity used: the Sullivan Index measures  
the absolute, not political, diversity of a constituency. Thus, I  
develop and examine a measure of diversity that assumes constituency  
characteristics have differential partisan impact. Use of this measure  
clearly demonstrates that for House elections held between 1962 and  
1996, diverse House districts experienced significantly more electoral  
competition than did relatively less diverse House districts.},  
  number = {4},  
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    month = nov,  
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    title = {Electoral career patterns and incumbency advantage in  
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    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440241},  
    abstract = {John Alford and John Hibbing (1981) questioned the  
thesis of generational replacement that explains the improved  
incumbency advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives. They  
presented evidence that improved incumbent performance was uniform  
across all levels of tenure between 1966 and 1978. Alford and Hibbing  
found an almost monotonic increase in non-southern incumbent vote  
percentage across ail levels of tenure, increasing as tenure  
increased. Our purpose in this study is to update and elaborate upon  
the Alford and Hibbing research by examining electoral margins of  
House incumbents from 1980 to 1996. Unlike Alford and Hibbing, we  
examine all House members' (including southern members) vote  
percentages to detect whether these patterns maintain throughout the  
1980s and 1990s. We update the data on incumbency advantage through  
the 1996 elections and compare changes in the South and the non-South.  
Members from both regions earn large victory margins early in their  
careers, but the victories of Southern members are markedly more  
decisive.},  
    number = {4},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Dawes, R. A. and Bacot, A. H.},  
    month = nov,  
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    volume = {23},  
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    doi = {10.2307/440242},  
    abstract = {The Internet not only provides a low cost and  
increasingly popular medium for legislators to interact with  
constituents, but also an opportunity for researchers to test  
established theories of "home style" using a much larger group of  
elected officials. Examining the Web sites of members of the House of  
Representatives during the Internet's introduction into Congress (June  
through August of 1997), we address two questions: (1) What factors
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influence members to invest scarce resources in an official congressional homepage? (2) Of those who go "online," why do some members emphasize constituent casework while others do not? Our findings confirm that legislators use the World Wide Web much as they do other means of constituent contact. Republicans, younger legislators and representatives of more affluent populations are more likely to have homepages. Of those who have a homepage, Democrats and members from electorally marginal districts are more likely to use that Web site to solicit casework.},

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    number = {4},
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  volume = {23},
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  doi = {10.2307/440357},
  abstract = {The policy-distance assumption stipulates that a party's incentive to join a parliamentary coalition government decreases with the distance between its policies and those of the government. Based on this assumption, recent formal work has posited a connection between the size and relative ideological centrality of the formateur party and the formation of smaller, especially minority, governments. Under these models, policy distance affects government composition in two ways: by influencing how large the government will be, and by influencing which parties will participate in it. This paper tests for these effects at both the government and party levels, using data sets covering West European parliamentary democracies in the 1945-89 era and incorporating two different measures of ideological positions. The findings support both effects, and in addition, show that the emergence of external support parties is influenced by considerations of policy distance. Although the formal
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models are not wholly sustained, the evidence strongly indicates that policy distance is critical to parliamentary government.},

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Agreement (NAFTA) by the House of Representatives in November 1993
depended heavily on lobbying by President Clinton. I show that this
lobbying power does not inhere in the presidency, but was strategic.
Clinton concentrated his lobbying on members who were either undecided
or leaning against NAFTA in September, as well as members who received
large contributions from business and from districts where the
president did well. I use estimates of lobbying efforts derived from
probit analysis to predict the NAFTA vote. This endogenous measure of
contacting had the third greatest effect for Democratic House members
voting on NAFTA (behind only presidential support) and labor political
action committee contributions. But for Republicans, contact seemed to
have a perverse negative effect.},
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    number = {3},
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    abstract = {This article examines domestic agenda setting in
Washington between 1947 and 1994. It finds that House and Senate
majority leaders have, over time, set increasingly more of this
agenda. I examine the role of presidents and congressional committee
chairs in domestic agenda setting, and I evaluate the success of
presidential and congressional proposals within the legislative
process. Recent changes in agenda-setting patterns seem to be the
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product of a number of factors, including more frequent and polarized divided government, as well as changes in the formal rules of Congress and the ideological composition of the legislative parties.},

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    title = {Clarence {Thomas} and the politicization of candidate gender in the 1992 senate elections},
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    abstract = {The Clarence Thomas confirmation battle was a highly politicized, controversial, and symbolic event that clearly affected the 1992 Senate elections. Various hypotheses attempting to explain the controversy's impact on election results have focused on mass voting behavior based on group self-interest, negative voting against incumbent Senators, or on the symbolic impact of the confirmation vote. I focus instead on the actions of strategic political elites, hypothesizing that female elite behavior successfully politicized candidate, rather than voter, gender into an electoral asset in the 1992 Senate elections. As usual, strategic elites translated national political tides into local outcomes, but in the process, female candidate exploitation of the Thomas controversy led to several interesting and unusual implications.},
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    title = {Moving up or moving cut: {Career} ceilings and congressional retirement},
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    abstract = {This research note presents a theory of congressional retirement and tests it with data from the 102d Congress. The results bridge the gap between the 1970s macro retirement studies and the more recent micro-centered approaches by highlighting the importance of career ceilings. Defined as the interaction between formal position
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and years of service, the career ceilings variable can be interpreted as the degree to which the member's career in the House has stagnated. This variable dominates the traditional causes of retirement in the quantitative analysis. In light of the convergence of the unique 1992 retirement-causing factors, its power is especially surprising. Not only was 1992 the first election after redistricting and the House bank scandal, but it was also the last chance for members to convert excess campaign cash to personal income. Nevertheless, career ceilings predict retirement much better than any of the 1992-specific variables.},

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than their male colleagues?},  
    volume = {23},  
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    doi = {10.2307/440362},  
    abstract = {Many hypothesize that the election of more women to  
the U.S. Congress is more than simply an issue of equity, but will  
make a substantive policy difference. I test this hypothesis by  
analyzing the voting records of all representatives in the 103d  
Congress on a set of women's issues. It is my premise that women will  
not necessarily exhibit a more liberal ideology than their male  
counterparts on all issues; however, the more directly an issue  
affects women, the more likely it is that women will vote together  
across party lines. The results of regression analysis on the  
composite score of women's issue votes indicate that gender exerts a  
significant and independent effect on voting for women's issues in the  
face of controls for other major influences on congressional voting.  
These influences include constituency factors, party, personal  
characteristics, and ideology. Interaction terms for gender by party  
indicate that much of the impact of gender is due to the influence of  
Republican women. Legit analysis of the individual votes demonstrates  
that the gender of the representative was most significant on votes  
that dealt with abortion and women's health. The influence of gender  
was overwhelmed by other factors such as party, ideology, and  
constituency concerns on votes that were less directly related to  
women, such as education.},  
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    volume = {23},
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    month = aug,
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    title = {Asian-{American} and {Hispanic} representation in the
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    volume = {23},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = aug,
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    pages = {449--450}
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their representatives' behavior.},
    volume = {23},
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    title = {Legislator-constituency relations: {Perspectives} for a
five-nation study.},
    volume = {23},
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    title = {Candidates, campaign agendas, and voting in
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outcomes: 1988, 1990, 1994, and 1996},
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102d {House} revisited.},
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{Ambition}'s effects on congressional neophytes, 1955-1986.},
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committee assignments in the {US} {House}.},
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{Republican} changes in the {Florida} legislature.},
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incumbency advantage in {British} elections, 1950-92},
    volume = {23},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440279},
    abstract = {British elections are traditionally understood to be
dominated by parties and leaders. Local candidates are taken to be
mere ciphers, whose impact on the outcome is negligible. Recently,
however, several works have documented a change in MP behavior.
Today's members do more constituency service than did their
predecessors, in the belief that this will create a personal vote. If
the MPs are succeeding, incumbency advantage should now be evident, as
it is in American elections. In fact, incumbency advantage does not
seem to have changed over the postwar period: for the major parties,
it remains small and sporadic.},
    number = {2},
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    pages = {167--195}
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    title = {Maintaining congressional committees: {Sources} of
member support},
    volume = {23},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440280},
    abstract = {Within the U.S. House of Representatives, standing
committee recommendations are usually accepted by the full chamber.
Although considerable attention has been paid to the extent that
committee recommendations are ratified by the full chamber, relatively
little research has addressed the sources of committee success.
Committees usually win on the floor, but it is unclear why members of
Congress support committee recommendations, or how we should account
for variation in such support. One explanation for committee success
is that members derive power from the committee system, and thus are
reluctant to challenge committee recommendations. A second explanation
is that committees themselves are partisan institutions, and thus
members support committee recommendations out of partisan loyalty. A
third explanation is that members support committees because

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committees recommend policies that are consistent with members' policy preferences. Unlike previous studies that have relied primarily on single-vote case studies, I use roll-call data from the 98th through the 100th Congresses (1983-88) to construct an aggregate measure of committee support and to test these three competing explanations of the sources of committee support. I conclude that with few exceptions, policy and partisan motivations have a stronger influence on member support for committee recommendations than do incentives stemming from members' institutional positions.},

number = {2},
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pages = {197--218}

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title = {Congressional party leadership: {Utilitarian} versus majoritarian incentives},

volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440281},

abstract = {By making procedural decisions about how individual bills are referred, scheduled, subjected to amendments, and sent to conference, majority party leaders exert important influence on legislative outcomes. In this paper, I use a sequence of formal models to analyze regularities in the preferences of party leaders, regularities that determine how procedural decisions are made. I find that the goal of maintaining party strength causes leaders to make procedural decisions based on the preference intensity of the rank and file. Leaders will make procedural decisions in ways that benefit intense minorities within the party whenever the party minority's stake in the bill is greater than that of the less-intense party majority. The desire to keep a leadership position, however, creates an incentive to please a party majority. I show, however, that this majoritarian incentive will generally have only limited influence on procedural decisions. Its impact is limited in particular by shifting coalitions within the majority party and by backbenchers' preferences for party maintenance.},

number = {2},
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pages = {219--243}

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@article{hood_boll_1998,

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    title = {Boll weevils and roll-call voting: {A} study in time and
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    volume = {23},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    abstract = {Using a pooled time-series analysis of southern
congressional districts from 1983 to 1992, we evaluate theories
associating constituency and institutional factors with recent shifts
in the voting patterns of southern Democrats. While we find that
Democrats serving areas with larger minority populations and more
progressive white populations tend to be more liberal, the greatest
portion of the aggregate liberalization of voting patterns is
attributable to cohort change. Voting records of southern Democrats
elected prior to 1982 remained relatively constant, and we find no
evidence of any general trend in the recent voting patterns of
southern Democrats when controlling for other factors.},
    number = {2},
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    author = {Hood, M. V. and Morris, I. L.},
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@article{carey_effects_1998,
    title = {The effects of term limits on state legislatures},
    volume = {23},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440283},
    abstract = {Legislative theory suggests that anticipatory effects
of term limits would first affect the types of individuals elected to
office and only later influence the legislature itself. Our results,
based on a 1995 survey of nearly 3000 state legislators nationwide,
indicate otherwise. There are no systematic differences between term
limit and non-term limit states in the composition of the legislature
(e.g., professional backgrounds). Yet with respect to legislative
behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing
pork, and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state
and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At
the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term
limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party
leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers.},
    number = {2},
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    author = {Carey, J. M. and Niemi, R. G. and Powell, L. W.},
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  author = {Francis, W. L. and Collie, M. P. and Loewenberg, G.},  
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  doi = {10.2307/440211},  
  abstract = {Much of the recent literature on the topic of divided  
government has concentrated on explanations for its occurrence at the  
national and state levels. In this article I use agency data from  
twenty states to assess the effects of divided government on budgetary  
conflict between governors and legislatures. After controlling for  
state party system characteristics and gubernatorial power, I found  
that divided government indeed contributes to conflict, but only when  
the legislative chambers are united against the governor. If split  
partisan control of the legislature exists, the governor's position  
with respect to agency spending levels is supported.},  
  number = {1},  
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@article{squire_membership_1998,  
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legislation},  
  volume = {23},  
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  doi = {10.2307/440212},  
  abstract = {Is membership turnover related to the ability of a  
legislature to efficiently process legislation? I examine this  
question using pooled data on state legislatures from 1989 to 1993.  
Membership turnover is not related to the number of bills enacted per  
legislative day, nor to the percentage of bills passed. Instead,  
legislative efficiency is related to the number of interest groups in  
a state, the number of bills legislators introduce, and a
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legislature's level of professionalization. Legislative rules also influence efficiency. The implications of these findings for the debate on term limits is discussed.},

number = {1},
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@article{gartzke_thinking_1998,

title = {Thinking globally or acting locally? {Determinants} of the {GATT} vote in {Congress}},

volume = {23},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.2307/440213},

abstract = {While there exist many influences on legislators' votes, the U.S. system of plurality districts should ensure that constituent interests weigh most heavily. However, in marked contrast both to theories of legislative influence and to representatives' own explanations for their votes, quantitative analysis of congressional roll-call voting has largely failed to show a significant relationship between constituent interests and congressional behavior. We examine the 1994 House and Senate votes on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in light of this incongruence between empirical research, anecdotal evidence and theoretical argument. Unlike previous studies, we compile data at the level of congressional districts. Our analysis pays special attention to the construction of competing economic models of constituent interest and welfare. Finally, our research supports the argument that congressional committees are pivotal in the legislative decision-making process. We assess the impact of committees on the GATT bill in terms of partisanship, personal ideology and constituent interests of committee members. Better data, a more precise research design, and introduction of committees allows a better assessment of this paradox of congressional voting.},

number = {1},

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author = {Gartzke, E. and Wrighton, J. M.},

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year = {1998},

note = {WOS:000071773000004},

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@article{soherr-hadwiger_military_1998,

title = {Military construction policy: {A} test of competing explanations of universalism in {Congress}},

volume = {23},

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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440214},
    abstract = {Theories of universalism are based upon questionable
assumptions that distributive benefits tend to be allocated
universally, and that this pattern of allocation leads to near-
unanimous floor support for many distributive benefit programs. I
offer an alternative, general (or collective) benefit explanation to
interpret patterns of allocation of distributive benefits and the size
of floor coalitions supporting these programs. The case study of
military construction policy is used to test the relative effect of
general benefit and distributive benefit considerations on the size of
floor support coalitions in the U.S. House of Representatives. The
findings suggest important modifications of extant universalism
theories.},
    number = {1},
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{House}? {Evidence} from a natural experiment},
    volume = {23},
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    doi = {10.2307/440215},
    abstract = {In this note we use the Senate's six-year election
cycle to explain why the "iron law of midterm loss" that applies so
consistently to the House works with less certainty in the Senate; in
fact, since 1946 there have been three instances (1962, 1970, and
1982) where the Senate has experienced no midterm loss. To explain the
differing nature of midterm seat change in the Senate, we employ a
natural experiment in which Senate midterm elections (1946-1994) are
categorized in the following way: (1)The same party controlled the
White House two and six years prior to the midterm; or (2) a different
party held the presidency six years as compared to two years before
the midterm. We hypothesize that, in the first situation, midterm loss
forces are mutually reinforcing; thus, the Senate experiences large
and unidirectional seat changes against the party that holds the White
House. In the later situation, however, the electoral cycle effects
(t-2 and t-6) run counter to one another and, therefore, seat change
is not unidirectional, midterm loss is lessened, and there is even the
potential for midterm gain. In fact, all of the midterm gains in the
Senate in the 20(th) century occur in this situation.},
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    author = {Grofman, B. and Brunell, T. L. and Koetzle, W.},
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  title = {Institutionalizing {Chinese} legislatures. {Trade}-offs
between autonomy and capacity},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440216},
  abstract = {Some leaders of Chinese local people's congresses
emphasize autonomy in order to promote decentralization and enhance
representation. Other legislative insiders favor sacrificing autonomy
in order to strengthen capacity and improve oversight. Tight coupling
between congresses appeals to local legislators because it offers
opportunities to mobilize supporters, obtain resources, and expand
jurisdiction, while representatives of higher congresses often oppose
closer ties in order to preserve local initiative, safeguard
elections, and reduce conflict with Party committees. In a reforming
communist state, single legislatures may not be the right unit of
analysis for assessing autonomy. Established boundaries, in the early
stages of institutionalization, may apply to the legislative system as
a whole rather than to its parts. And softening boundaries between
congresses at different levels can harden boundaries against other
bureaucracies.},
  number = {1},
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  author = {O'Brien, K. J. and Luehrmann, L. M.},
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@article{matland_womens_1998,
  title = {Women's representation in national legislatures:
{Developed} and developing countries},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440217},
  abstract = {This note expands research on representation of women
in national legislatures. Existing models are tested on newer data in
advanced industrialized democracies, and these models are then applied
to a sample of democracies in developing countries. There are striking
differences across the two samples. While a proportional
representation electoral system, women's participation in the labor
force, the cultural standing of women, and the country's level of
development all have positive effects on female representation in OECD
democracies, none of these variables have a statistically significant
and positive effect in less developed countries. These findings

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strongly suggest the existence of a threshold. Only after that threshold is passed do proportional representation, labor force participation, and cultural standing exert positive influences on the representation of women.},

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congressional change.},
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@article{herrick_political_1998,
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@article{kolodny_republican_1998,
    title = {Republican party heterogeneity and negative agenda
setting. {The} {Tuesday} {Lunch} {Bunch} and the {Republican} majority
in the {House} of {Representatives}.},
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@article{box-steffensmeier_linking_1998,
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constituents' voting behavior.},
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{American} electorate.},  
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electoral competitiveness.},  
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distribution of public opinion.},  
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@article{lee_ethnic_1998,
    title = {Ethnic underpinnings of voting preference. {Latinos} and
the 1996 {US} senate election in {Texas}.},
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@article{buchman_save_1998,
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commissions affects incumbency in state legislatures.},
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@article{renka_election_1998,
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{Representatives}.},
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  author = {Sellers, P. J. and Holian, D. B.},
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@article{carey_incumbency_1998,
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legislative elections.},
  volume = {23},
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  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  month = feb,
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@article{donovan_contested_1998,
  title = {Contested local elections and active campaigns. {The}
effects of cumulative voting and districting.},
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  note = {WOS:000071773000029},
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@article{banducci_citizens_1998,
  title = {Citizen's attitudes about democracy after electoral
reforms. {Institutional} change in {New} {Zealand}.},
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{hamm_committee_1998,
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the twentieth century. {Do} legislatures tap the talents of their
members?},
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    pages = {153--153}
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@article{colton_spatial_1998,
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@article{johnston_new_1998,
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elections: {{Implications}} for the campaign.},
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@article{kitschelt_issues_1998,
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emerging {Russian} party system in comparative perspective.},
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@article{moncrief_turnover_1998,
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and legislative turnover in the {Australian} states.},
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@article{mainwaring_party_1997,
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{Congress}},
  volume = {22},
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  abstract = {This paper focuses on 1988 roll-call votes in the
1987-88 Brazilian Constitutional Congress in an analysis of party
discipline within the Congress. Because of the large number (1021) of
roll-call votes during the Constitutional Congress and the
availability of an excellent database, the Brazilian Constitutional
Congress offers an opportunity for one of the most detailed studies
ever conducted on party discipline in a third-world legislature. We
begin by discussing how we calculated discipline scores, given some
distinctive features of the Brazilian party system and the
Constitutional Congress. We show that the biggest Brazilian parties of
this period were comparatively undisciplined, and we also show that
the leftist parties were a powerful exception to this general
tendency. We demonstrate that legislators who switched parties during
the Constitutional Congress were more likely than others to be
undisciplined before switching, and that their discipline increased
markedly after their move to new parties. Finally, we attempt to
explain why discipline was low in all but the leftist parties.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Mainwaring, S. and Linan, A. P.},
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@article{heller_bicameralism_1997,
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parliamentary structure on government spending},
  volume = {22},
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  doi = {10.2307/440340},
  abstract = {In this study I look at the relationship between
bicameralism and government budget deficits. The more actors there are
who can kill legislation or influence its content, the more deals must
be cut to pass a budget. Bicameralism sets up a bilateral veto game
between legislative chambers, which leads to higher government budget
deficits, all else constant. Since it is easier to cut deals to raise
spending than to raise taxes, the need to cut deals across the
chambers of a bicameral legislature generally leads to higher spending
and, hence, higher deficits. I test this hypothesis on a sample of
deficits from 17 countries, from 1965 to 1990.},
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    note = {WOS:A1997YG57400003},
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group influence},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440341},
  abstract = {In addition to structuring the rules governing
legislator-lobbyist interactions, legislators also affect their
interactions with lobbyists by promoting lobbying enterprises, which
are groups of like-minded lobbyists and their legislative allies, all
of whom seek to coordinate their efforts. The long-term relationships
inherent in lobbying enterprises reduce uncertainties, insure ready
access to legislators, and allow lobbyists to reach undecided
legislators indirectly. Lobbying enterprises complement staff systems,
the committee system, and members' constituent contact committees.
This article concludes with specific suggestions for incorporating
concepts developed here into empirical and formal theoretic work on
lobbying influence.},
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ainsworth, S. H.},
  month = nov,
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  title = {Information, recall and accountability: {The}
electorate's response to the {Clarence} {Thomas} nomination},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440342},
  abstract = {In order to further our understanding of the
empirical value of the constituency control model of representation,
we seek to determine whether differences in voter information and
recall affect the capacity of elections to serve as instruments of
accountability. We address this question by focusing on the degree to
which voters held their senators accountable for their votes on the
Clarence Thomas nomination in the 1992 senate elections. We find that
policy-specific accountability requires voters to correctly recall
their incumbent's roll-call behavior. Reliance on more general cues
such as party identification and ideology leads some voters to
mistakenly hold their representatives accountable for something they
did not do. Since these cues are not so helpful on cross-cutting
issues like the Thomas nomination, citizens who invest in detailed
information will minimize errors in judgment made in the frequent

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instances when legislators' actions cross partisan and ideological lines. The high school civics texts may be right about the importance of an informed citizenry to democratic practice after all.},

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    number = {4},  
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    title = {Voter contact techniques in state legislative campaigns:  
{The} prevalence of mass media advertising},  
    volume = {22},  
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    doi = {10.2307/440343},  
    abstract = {What methods of voter contact are used by candidates  
running for state legislative office? A number of studies on the  
congressional level suggest that mass media advertising, particularly  
on television, is becoming the predominant form of voter contact.  
However, few studies have questioned whether these findings are  
generalizable to state legislative races. This analysis of itemized  
expenditure data for 583 primary and general election candidates in  
Texas and Kansas shows that state legislative campaigns differ  
dramatically from congressional campaigns in their methods of voter  
contact. in both primary and general election campaigns, state  
legislative candidates allocate a preponderance of their voter contact  
dollars to direct forms of contact, such as mailings and pamphlet  
distribution. However, some candidates do allocate resources to  
advertising in mass media. District-level features condition the  
choice more than do candidate type, level of expenditures, or  
electoral competition.},  
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {Hogan, R. E.},  
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    title = {Party targeting and electoral success},  
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    abstract = {ORVIS, a measure of partisan strength calculated from  
the precinct-level vote share in previous statewide elections, has  
been used since 1988 to target Republican efforts in Georgia state  
legislative contests. The top-down approach implied in the use of this
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targeting device has paid dividends. Successful Republican challengers come disproportionately from districts with high ORVIS scores. The relationship between ORVIS scores and the share of the vote going to Republican candidates persists after factors such as campaign funding are controlled. The party's past success in statewide contests is a much better predictor of performance than is the showing in the previous legislative contest.},

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in {Congress}, 1947-1993.},
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C.},
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sophisticated vote: {An} analysis of senate roll-call votes on the
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{Placing} the caucus within house voting patterns.},
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  month = aug,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997XV26700001},
  pages = {289--291}
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  title = {As a matter of factions: {The} budgetary implications of
shifting factional control in {Japan}'s {LDP}},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440318},
  abstract = {For 38 years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
maintained single-party control over the Japanese government. This
lack of partisan turnover in government has frustrated attempts to
explain Japanese government policy changes using political variables.
In this paper, we look for intraparty changes that may have led to
changes in Japanese budgetary policy. Using a simple model of agenda
setting, we hypothesize that changes in which intraparty factions
control the LDP affect the party's decisions over spending priorities
systematically. This runs contrary to the conventional wisdom
expressed in the voluminous literature on LDP factions, which asserts
that factions, whatever their raison d'etre, do not exhibit different
policy preferences. We find that strong correlations do exist between
which factions comprise the agenda-setting party mainstream and how
the government allocates spending across pork-barrel and public goods
items.},
  number = {3},
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  author = {McCubbins, M. D. and Thies, M. F.},
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  title = {Executive-legislative relations in an era of accelerated  
reform: {Reshaping} government in {Israel}},  
  volume = {22},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440319},  
  abstract = {Israel's democracy is in the midst of a dramatic and  
comprehensive restructuring, a so-called ''constitutional  
revolution.'' Because it lacks a written constitution, Israel turns to  
its parliament, the Knesset, as both the source and the target of most  
governmental reforms. As a result of these reforms, the 13th Knesset  
(1992-96) behaved very differently from its predecessors and changed  
the existing patterns of executive-legislative interaction. The  
reshaping of government in Israel presents an institutionally unique  
and developing political laboratory in which evolving executive-  
legislative relations can be analyzed while the composition and  
construction of the regime continues to unfold. This article has three  
primary aims. I first describe the reforms that were enacted toward  
the end of the 12th Knesset (1988-92) regarding the two branches of  
government. Then I analyze the evolving executive-legislative  
relations in the 13th Knesset. And third, I assess the significance of  
these changes for the stability and governability of Israeli democracy  
in general and the 14th Knesset in particular.},  
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  doi = {10.2307/440320},  
  abstract = {This research note builds on the work of scholars who  
have identified the importance of ideological and partisan criteria in  
the selection of congressional leaders. Viewing leadership selection  
as a problem of agency, we develop a framework for conceptualizing how  
ideology and partisanship affect leadership selection. Testing the  
framework on House leaders from 1875-1987, we find substantial  
variation between the two parties. While Republican leaders conform to  
the ''core'' hypothesis, Democratic leaders behave in accordance with  
the ''polarizer'' hypothesis. We conclude by suggesting that these  
interparty differences are the result of varying levels of intraparty  
heterogeneity.},  
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    author = {Posler, B. D. and Rhodes, C. M.},
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    title = {Constituency opinion, {Ross} {Perot}, and roll-call
behavior in the {US} {House}: {The} case of the {NAFTA}},
    volume = {22},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440321},
    abstract = {This paper examines the extent to which electoral
support for Ross Perot influenced House members' votes on the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Using Perot's share of the
congressional district vote and members' electoral safety as key
predictor variables, we test a legit model, holding constant district
demographic characteristics, members' party and ideology, region, and
labor and business PAC contributions. The results of the analysis
indicate that the magnitude of the Perot vote exerted a significant
effect on the NAFTA vote outcome, specifically for marginal House
Republicans. Thus, we provide evidence that under certain conditions
members respond to Independent political movements and Independent
voters in their districts when deciding on legislation.},
    number = {3},
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    pages = {369--392}
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    volume = {22},
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    abstract = {This study investigates the relationships between
party campaign activity and party unity in the House of
Representatives. Using data from the 1984 and 1992 elections and the
99th and 103d Congresses, we find little support for the hypothesis
that previous party unity influences the distribution of party money
or assistance in campaign management, fundraising, or communications.
There is also little support for the hypothesis that party spending,
campaign assistance, or recruitment efforts lead to greater party
unity on normal roll-call votes. Nevertheless, Democratic candidates
who receive substantial assistance in developing their campaign
messages are more likely than others to vote with their party on key

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votes. Overall, the results show that U.S. political parties are more election than policy oriented.},

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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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pages = {393--415}

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volume = {22},
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doi = {10.2307/440323},

abstract = {Does the professionalization of state legislatures lead to more instances of divided government? Fiorina (1994) persuasively argues that it does. In this article I reexamine that relationship, looking at divided government in the states from 1960 to 1990, the years of the professionalization movement. I argue that few state legislatures are professionalized. But, while most of the other state legislatures have been professionalizing, they have few of the characteristics we would expect of legislatures where entrenched incumbents are equipped to fend off changing political tides the way we expect congressional incumbents to be able to do. I then test several variations on the hypothesis that the level of professionalization is linked to the incidence of divided government. Although some results lend support to the general hypothesis, overall the relationship is not very robust. I conclude by suggesting several reasons for the weak results, pointing in particular to the rise of candidate-centered gubernatorial campaigns and the adoption of professional-like behavior on the part of state legislators in every sort of institutional setting.},

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    abstract = {This work examines constituency-level competition in
U.S. state legislative races for the period 1968-88 using two measures
of competition-proportion of seats marginal and proportion of seats
contested. An incentive model is assessed to determine the impact of
four variables-legislative institutionalization, incumbency, the
likelihood of the minority party taking control of the chamber, and
legislative performance-in a pooled time-series analysis. We find some
support for the impact of the explanatory variables, particularly
legislative institutionalization and incumbency. Finally, we present
both descriptive and statistical evidence that the degree of
constituency-level competition is decreasing during the time period
under study.},
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majorities},
    volume = {22},
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    doi = {10.2307/440380},
    abstract = {Between 1955 and 1995, although the GOP occasionally
controlled the Senate and won landslide presidential election
victories, the Democratic party controlled the majority of seats in
the U.S. House. This paper argues that Republican, indeed, any
minority party's problems stem from the interaction between career
decisions and electoral prospects. We argue that there is a previously
overlooked link between the incumbency advantage and the long-term
persistence of legislative majorities. We develop a model that shows
how the incumbency advantage can produce higher retirement rates among
the minority party, which in turn decreases the likelihood that the
minority party will win a majority of seats in the next election. Data
on actual retirement rates of members of the U.S. House and of the
U.K. Parliament fit the patterns predicted by our model.},

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  title = {Party contributions and the influence of campaign
committee chairs on roll-call voting},
  volume = {22},
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  doi = {10.2307/440381},
  abstract = {Herrnson (1988) hypothesized that the increased
activity of the four congressional campaign committees may increase
the power Of the campaign committee chairs on policy matters. In this
paper I examine Herrnson's hypothesis. First, I analyze selected roll-
call votes from the 98th and 99th Congresses to determine whether the
committees' activities encourage members to be more supportive of
positions advocated by the chairs of the House Democratic and
Republican campaign committees. I then analyze the effect of these
contributions on building party loyalty. I find that although the
committees' activities have some influence on the amount of support
freshman recipients give to the committee chairs, they have no effect
on building support for the party.},
  number = {2},
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government},
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  doi = {10.2307/440382},
  abstract = {Do voters consciously split their tickets in order to
''balance'' the national government between the two major political
parties, as some theories of divided government contend they do? Or do
''sincere'' and ideologically consistent voters split their ballots in
response to elite behavior and party cleavages? Focusing on the 1988
election, the last time divided government was the direct result of
split-ticket voting, we find that most split-ticket voters in national
elections are ideologically conservative in their policy views. These
conservative voters split their tickets in favor of the Republican
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presidential candidate and a Democratic House candidate they perceive to be similarly conservative. Meanwhile, the smaller proportion of voters who split for the Democratic presidential candidate and a Republican House candidate are ideologically liberal, and they respond to House Republicans perceived as similarly liberal. Finally, we discuss the implications of both our theory and our findings for the 1994 Republican midterm victories.},

number = {2},
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title = {Comparing constituency activity by junior legislators in {Great} {Britain} and {Ireland}},

volume = {22},
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doi = {10.2307/440383},

abstract = {To compare the relationship between constituency service and reelection concerns for British junior MPs and Irish junior deputies (TDs), we analyze interviews with 45 British MPs and 40 Irish TDs. Using a comparison of frequencies and Poisson regression analysis, we find support for the familiar expectations that TDs are substantially more active in their constituencies than are MPs, that they are more inclined than MPs to cite reelection as a motive for such activity, and that there is a stronger statistical relationship between reelection motivation and constituency activity for TDs than for MPs. We also find a positive relationship for both countries between distance from the capital and number of days per week spent in the constituency doing constituency work.},

number = {2},
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volume = {22},
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doi = {10.2307/440384},

abstract = {How does a legislature's influence over policy outputs affect its members' behavior? This paper examines this

question, a question that has been neglected in the legislative literature. Using an unusual natural experiment in the European Parliament (EP), I investigate whether greater policy influence leads legislators to participate more in parliamentary votes. In addition to the impact of other variables-including the timing of votes, leadership cues, and the requirement that an absolute majority of members vote at certain stages-EP members are stimulated to participate more in votes on legislation where the EP's influence is greater. The implications of this result for legislative theory, and for our understanding of the EP, are discussed in the conclusion.},

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Parliament fit into domestic political careers. It shows that the  
Parliament's four largest national delegations have developed a core  
of MEPs who have made long-term commitments to the European  
institution. There are significant national differences in these  
patterns, but as a whole they make it more likely that future European  
Parliaments will be filled with careerist MEPs who will view the  
Parliament as their principal political arena, and who will seek to  
increase the institution's prestige and power relative to other  
European and domestic institutions.},
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  advantage},
  volume = {22},
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  doi = {10.2307/440288},
  abstract = {This paper examines two unanticipated consequences of
  the equal representation of states on Senate elections-competitiveness
  and partisan advantage. Using a fixed-effects (LSDV) model that
  controls for important intervening variables to test the hypothesis
  that variation in state population size affects the competitiveness of
  Senate elections, we find a far stronger relationship between state
  population and electoral competitiveness than have previous works. In
  addition, Senate apportionment has had implications for the partisan
  composition of the Senate. When we compare the actual outcomes of
  Senate elections over time with hypothetical outcomes, which we derive
  by holding state population constant, we find that Senate
  apportionment has had important consequences for the partisan
  composition of the Senate in several periods. From the mid-1970s until
  (but not including) 1994, Senate apportionment enabled Republicans to
  hold seats disproportionate to their party's share of the national
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  volume = {22},
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  doi = {10.2307/440289},
  abstract = {Over half of all bills introduced in the U.S.
  Congress are cosponsored, and, while many observers assume that
  cosponsorship is crucial to the legislative process, few have analyzed
  what it means. We view cosponsorship as a signal about the content of
  legislation and ask whether it is a meaningful signal for members.
  Specifically we focus on whether cosponsorship influences a bill's
  passage. Three types of signals are considered: bandwagon,
  ideological, and expertise. Using data drawn from the 99th Congress,
  we analyze 8,002 House and Senate bills. Our findings show that

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cosponsorship is common. However, they also show that it is an overrated cue. At best it provides a signal concerning expertise at the outset of the legislative process, but generates a very weak signal thereafter. In short, cosponsorship has become a routine and rarely effective aspect of the legislative landscape.},

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    abstract = {This paper develops a model of incumbency advantage
that takes into account candidate quality, and then estimates the
parameters of that model using panel data on the U.S. House from 1948
to 1990. Our approach allows us to go beyond the previous literature,
which has focused primarily on measurement of incumbency advantage, to
a decomposition of its sources. The primary explanation for the rising
incumbency advantage appears to be the increasing ability of
incumbents to deter high-quality challengers. In contrast, direct
officeholder benefits (e.g., franking privileges, media exposure,
fund-raising advantages, etc.) have been relatively stable over time
and now account for less than half of the overall incumbency
advantage.},
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consultants heavily influence the outcome of election campaigns, and
adding inferences drawn from the few available academic studies of
consultants, we test the hypothesis that professionally run campaigns
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in the 1992 U.S. House races were characterized by higher vote percentages than those without such professionals. We examine only nonincumbent candidates and find clear support for this hypothesis, both according to level of campaign professionalization and according to specific types of political consultants.},

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    abstract = {The difficulty with studying the challenger side of the incumbency effect-the unwillingness of potentially strong challengers to run against U.S. House incumbents-has been in identifying strong potential candidates who, in fact, decide not to run. We rely upon a sample of politically astute informants to identify potential candidates prior to the 1994 elections. Our survey of these potential candidates reveals three common characteristics: they had many of the attributes one would expect of strong House challengers, there was variance in what they stated was the likelihood of their running for the House in 1994, and they were most strongly influenced by what they perceived to be their chances of winning their party's nomination in their district. In addition, they understood that they would be much less likely to receive their party's nomination if they shared party affiliation with the incumbent, a finding that reinforces the incumbency effect. We also find that respondents who held elective office at the time of the survey were more likely to run, and that there is little evidence that personal factors related to the costs and benefits of running weigh heavily in the decision to run.},
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decision procedure, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The theory
characterizes the set of policies that can be adopted and the
equilibrium EU policy as a function of the ideal policies of the
member countries, the Commission, and the Parliament, and the location
of the status quo. The paper examines whether the Parliament has
become a legislator of equal stature to the Council, and discusses the
Commission's power and the extent of indecision under the co-decision
procedure. A comparison with the EU's other principal legislative
procedures yields comparative statements about EU policy and the
institutions' powers.},
    number = {1},
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limits after the 104th {Congress}.},
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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party defections in the {South}.},
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organization of the {Russian} {Duma}.},
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    number = {1},

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    title = {The effects of term limits on state legislatures.},
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    title = {Beyond divided government: {Explaining} vote controversy
on important legislation.},
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    author = {Shaw, T. C. and Shull, S. A.},
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    title = {The determinants of state black caucus legislative
success in an era of increasing {Republican} strength, an assessment
of the {Florida} {House}, 1985-95.},
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    author = {Lewis, A. C.},
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    volume = {22},
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    author = {Moncrief, G. and Hamm, K. and Thompson, J.},
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    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
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    author = {Francis, W. L. and Hibbing, J. R. and Loewenberg, G.},
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    title = {Constituency preferences: {California} ballot
propositions, 1974-90},
    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440457},
    abstract = {What effect do their constituencies' voting
preferences have on legislators' roll-call voting patterns? Through a
study of citizens' votes on statewide ballot propositions and
legislators' votes on roll calls in California, I find that when
aggregated into legislative districts, the revealed preferences of
California voters can be described by a spatial model with just three
dimensions; that the constituency preference dimensions defined by
this spatial model do an excellent job of predicting the overall roll-
call voting patterns in the California legislature; and that there is
evidence of a strong dimension-by-dimension correspondence between
constituency preferences and legislative roll-call patterns. These
findings suggest that the high degree of constraint found in roll-call
voting in many U.S. legislatures may be due to legislator-constituency
linkages.},
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  title = {Is there life after congress? {Patterns} and
determinants of post-congressional careers},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440458},
  abstract = {Little is known about the political activities of
former members of Congress. Political pundits, journalists, and
theories concerning subgovernment politics suggest former members have
lucrative jobs with either bureaucracies or interest groups, but there
is little confirmation of this. In this note we examine the post-
congressional occupations of House members who retired between 1971
and 1992 and find that former members of Congress pursue a wide
variety of careers. While many work for the government or interest
groups, former members are more likely to leave career politics.
Additionally, much of the variation in members' post-congressional
careers can be explained by their interests and opportunities. Members
who express interest in remaining politically active or see career
opportunities in politics outside of Congress are likely to find jobs
with the government or with interest groups. Conversely, members who
are ill or have reached retirement age are likely to leave politics.},
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  title = {Assessing legislative deliberation: {A} preface to
empirical analysis},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440459},
  abstract = {Recent scholarship has stressed the importance of
deliberation in legislative decision making. Yet the empirical basis
for claims about deliberation is weak, and the concept of deliberation
itself needs to be sharpened. In this article I attempt to lay the
groundwork for a systematic analysis of deliberation in real-world
legislatures. I provide a framework for studying deliberation,
consider the largely ignored issue of deliberation quality, and offer
a set of indicators for determining the extent and quality of
deliberation. Additionally, I provide testable hypotheses about
factors that promote deliberation. Perhaps most importantly, I provide
recommendations for analyzing the consequences of deliberation.},
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    pages = {501--519}
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  title = {Estimating the partisan consequences of redistricting
plans - {Simply}},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440460},
  abstract = {Although some judges and political scientists have
recently questioned the idea that it is possible to predict the
partisan consequences of redistricting plans, I demonstrate that it is
simple to do so with a pair of OLS equations that regress voting
percentages on major party registration percentages. I test this model
on data for all California Assembly and congressional elections from
1970 through 1994, and compare it to more complicated equations that
contain incumbency and socioeconomic variables. The simplest equations
correctly predict nearly 90\% of the results. I show that analogous
equations using registration or votes for minor or even major offices
in California, North Carolina, and Texas can also predict outcomes
with considerable accuracy. Using these equations, I show that the so-
called 'Burton Gerrymander' of 1980 had minimal partisan
consequences, while the nonpartisan plan instituted by the California
Supreme Court's Special Masters in 1992 was nearly as biased in favor
of the Republicans as the proposal of the Republican party. I also
introduce a new graphic representation of redistricting plans and
conclude with a discussion of some seemingly methodological choices
that have important substantive implications for assessing the
fairness of redistricting plans.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Kousser, J. M.},
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  year = {1996},
  note = {WOS:A1996VR65600005},
  pages = {521--541}
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@article{hammond_recent_1996,
  title = {Recent research on legislative staffs},
  volume = {21},
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  doi = {10.2307/440461},
  abstract = {In this article, I survey the literature on
legislative staffing from 1983 to the present. Recent studies of the

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staffs of the U.S. Congress, U.S. state legislatures, and legislatures outside of the United States present new data and analyses. Research includes increasingly precise and sophisticated analyses of staff influence and power, and offers perspectives on specialized staff groups, legislative enterprises, and staff members as candidates for elective office. Interesting and significant questions remain for further research.},
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volume = {21},
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Francis, W. L. and Hibbing, J. R. and Loewenberg, G.},
month = aug,
year = {1996},
note = {WOS:A1996VC42000001},
pages = {297--299}
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title = {Revisiting the state of {US} state legislative research},
volume = {21},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440247},
abstract = {Fifteen years ago, in this journal, Malcolm Jewell surveyed the field of state legislative research. In so doing, he identified some topics about which we, as a scholarly community, did not have adequate information. He also suggested some lines of inquiry for further research. In effect, in that 1981 article, Malcolm Jewell helped define the research agenda for a generation of state legislative scholars by discussing the state of our knowledge in seven specific areas. In this article we update the state of our knowledge in those seven areas by surveying more than 160 studies published in the years subsequent to Jewell's ''The State of U.S. State Legislative Research.''},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Moncrief, G. and Thompson, J. A. and Cassie, W.},
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    note = {WOS:A1996VC42000002},
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  title = {Legislative elections and the importance of money},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440248},
  abstract = {In this paper we take the analysis of the role of
money in legislative elections one step beyond the extant literature
by examining the factors that affect the impact of spending on the
vote. We hypothesize that two sets of factors, contextual and
conversion, condition money's effect on the vote. The analysis of data
from 12 state house races finds some significant support for the
notion that spending responds to the context and the characteristics
of the race, findings which have important theoretical and practical
implications.},
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  month = aug,
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  title = {Legislative party voting for the governor's program},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440249},
  abstract = {This research investigates the linkage between the
governor's electoral party coalition and the governor's coalition
within the legislature. Legislators in 10 states in 1983 are examined
for their voting loyalty on the governor's program bills. In the five
states with strong parties, where the parties 'endorse' for
governor, party line voting for or against the governor is quite high;
whereas, in the states with nonendorsing parties, there is less
gubernatorial party support and less partisan voting. Party line
voting is enhanced also by unified rather than divided party control
of government, and the governor receives greater legislative support
following a strong electoral showing in the districts of
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  title = {Political parties as vehicles for organizing {US} state  
legislative committees},  
  volume = {21},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440250},  
  abstract = {In this paper we assess the role of political parties  
in organizing state legislative committees. This research is guided by  
an explanation found in Malcolm E. Jewell's early work on responsible  
political parties in U.S. state legislatures and in his more recent  
assessment of the conditions associated with state legislative control  
by strong political parties. We evaluate majority party representation  
(MPR) on the membership of all standing committees in 10 state  
legislative chambers for the last two sessions in each decade of the  
twentieth century. Findings from two of our earlier studies of  
majority party representation on committees are also included.},  
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Hedlund, R. D. and Hamm, K. E.},  
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elections},  
  volume = {21},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440251},  
  abstract = {Our understanding of congressional campaign finance  
and party behavior is incomplete because scholars have not yet  
examined the millions spent in soft money by the national parties.  
This analysis of soft-money spending shows that federalism and  
campaign finance regulations provide both opportunities and  
constraints that influence the parties' ability to turn soft-money  
'straw' into hard-money 'gold.' A party's level of hard-money  
wealth significantly shapes how it spends soft money and helps explain  
why the parties pursue different strategies. The analysis suggests  
that the parties play a larger role in congressional campaign finance  
than has been previously reported, since parties spend soft money in  
ways that can benefit House candidates.},  
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  title = {The mobilization of congressional electorates},
  volume = {21},
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  doi = {10.2307/440252},
  abstract = {This study examines voter turnout in congressional
districts during the 1988 and 1990 elections. Drawing heavily from
studies of congressional campaign finance and vote outcomes, the
analyses demonstrate the importance of campaign context. In addition
to the fundamental influence of sociodemographic factors (e.g.,
district education level and population density) on turnout, vigorous
campaigns waged by strategic elites increase political excitement and
the flow of information, which in turn spur aggregate participation.
In races where the House incumbent faces opposition, incumbent efforts
(measured as campaign expenditures) have a significant and positive
influence on turnout. The strategic position of the challenger has
both direct and indirect effects on voter turnout, with a strong
challenge translating into heavier turnout. In a nonpresidential year,
high-profile senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns also get out
district voters. However, a presidential contest provides a largely
overriding stimulus that diminishes the influence of these state-level
races on voter turnout.},
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  author = {Jackson, R. A.},
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  month = may,
  year = {1996},
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  title = {State legislative development: {Observations} from three
perspectives},
  volume = {21},

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    doi = {10.2307/440178},
    abstract = {Political scientists have viewed modern state
legislatures from three perspectives. legislative reform in the 1960s
and 1970s, legislative professionalization in the 1980s, and most
recently legislative institutionalization. Institutionalization is
best indicated by the boundedness of the legislature from the
environment, as specified by personnel differentiation, normative
structure, and managerial autonomy. When various indicators are taken
into account, legislatures appear to be moving in the direction of
deinstitutionalization.},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    title = {Legislative life in the 1990s: {A} comparison of black
and white state legislators},
    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440179},
    abstract = {Although the number of black state legislators has
increased dramatically in the last several decades, there is
relatively little known about these important officeholders and how
they compare to their white colleagues. Through a nationwide survey
conducted in 1991-92, we gain some information on these legislators.
The results depict some similarities among black and white legislators
in terms of background characteristics and public policy concerns. The
more obvious trends in the survey findings, however, are the many
significant racial differences between these lawmakers, especially
their perceptions of black legislative life and racial progress. While
region, racial composition of district, party status, and gender serve
to condition these racial disparities, significant differences in
black-white legislative views remain.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = may,
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440180},
    abstract = {Because fundamental control over the legislative
process occurs not on the floor but in standing committees, and
because assignment to important standing committees increases members'
power to control the legislative agenda, congressional committee
assignments are important in determining the political and electoral
success of incumbents. Changing membership patterns of committees over
time provide some clues on the importance of seats on the committees.
Using data on committee membership for the U.S. Senate for congresses
from World War II to the 103d Congress, we measure the relative value
of seats on Senate committees. We assume that senators who transfer
from one committee to another are increasing their political and
electoral capital. Two different measures developed by Bullock and
Sprague and Munger are employed to create an ordering of Senate
committee membership prestige. Committee assignment allocation
processes in the House of Representatives and the Senate produce
similar, expected rankings of legislator preferences among seats on
standing committees.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Endersby, J. W. and McCurdy, K. M.},
    month = may,
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    note = {WOS:A1996UL42700004},
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@article{squire_further_1996,
    title = {A further examination of challenger quality in senate
elections},
    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440181},
    abstract = {In this note we use survey data from the 1988 and
1990 NES Senate Elections Studies to examine the concept of challenger
quality in greater depth than previous studies have done. We look at
our measures of challenger quality from a number of angles to confirm
their utility. We also use the pooled data to show that they produce
the expected relationships with campaign-related variables, and that
they perform better than other measures of challenger quality.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Squire, P. and Smith, ERAN},
    month = may,
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    title = {The effects of filing fees and petition requirements on
{US} {House} elections},
    volume = {21},
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    doi = {10.2307/440182},
    abstract = {Recent theoretical work suggests that barriers to
entry in political campaigns can affect who runs for office and how
much effort they devote to that enterprise. We investigate the effects
of legal barriers to competition-in the form of filing fees and
petition requirements-on congressional election results during the
1980s. Higher ballot access requirements significantly increase the
frequency of uncontested seats and decrease the frequency of
retirements. Contrary to Supreme Court opinions, petitions pose as
great a burden on potential challengers as filing fees do.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Ansolabehere, S. and Gerber, A.},
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    note = {WOS:A1996UL42700006},
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    title = {The distributive politics of {Cold} {War} defense
spending: {Some} state level evidence},
    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440183},
    abstract = {This study evaluates the distributive politics
theory. We analyze a pooled cross-section time series of data on the
distribution of prime military contracts among the states during the
period 1965-83. Unlike earlier studies, this one finds a significant
relationship between representation on House and Senate defense
committees and the distribution of military contracts.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Rundquist, B. and Lee, J. H. and Rhee, J.},
    month = may,
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    volume = {21},
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  title = {Czar rule in the {Russian} {Congress} of {People}'s
{Deputies}?},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440156},
  abstract = {We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and
structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to
characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting
Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of
preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yields several testable
hypotheses. The model receives some empirical backing, but overall the
results of our analyses do not support it. We therefore attribute the
conflict between the Yeltsin government and the RCPD to fundamental
disagreements over policy and not to internal contradictions in
constitutional design.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Myagkov, M. G. and Kiewiet, D. R.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1996},
  note = {WOS:A1996TY85000002},
  pages = {5--40}
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@article{freeman_explaining_1996,
  title = {Explaining variation in casework among state
legislators},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440157},
  abstract = {What variables affect the provision of casework in
state legislatures? Using survey data of legislators collected in four
states, we examine what influences legislators' commitment of time to
the provision of constituency service. We find that several variables
affect the amount of time legislators devote to casework: state level
factors, the number of demands made on the legislator, and the
legislator's belief about what is important. We also examine the
relationship between the legislator's time commitment and different
types of service activities.},
  number = {1},
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  title = {The old statehouse, if ain't what it used to be},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440158},
  abstract = {This paper reports data from a survey sent to all
state legislators who have served for more than 15 years. The purpose
of the questionnaire was to ascertain the nature and extent of changes
in the legislature during the members' tenure. Veteran legislators
perceived significant changes in influence structures within the
legislature, in the nature of their job, and in the general
environment in which they legislate. Variations in some of their
perceptions are associated with differences between types of
legislatures.},
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  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Moncrief, G. F. and Thompson, J. A. and Kurtz, K. T.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1996},
  note = {WOS:A1996TY85000004},
  pages = {57--72}
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@article{friedman_house_1996,
  title = {House committee assignments of women and minority
newcomers, 1965- 1994},
  volume = {21},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440159},
  abstract = {This paper examines the effects of gender and race on
the prestige of House newcomer committee assignments since 1965. Due
to the advancement of women and minorities in other areas of social
life as well as the changing internal character of Congress, there
should be increasing equity in the prestige of their congressional
committee assignments. Findings generally confirm my expectations,
although periodic surges and declines in the data, particularly for
women, point up the impact of short-run political conditions. More
generally, the data highlight linkages between Congress and the larger
social system; continued equity depends on the nature of these
linkages.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Friedman, S.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1996},
  note = {WOS:A1996TY85000005},
  pages = {73--81}
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@article{miller_bicameralism_1996,  
  title = {Bicameralism and the core: {An} experimental test},  
  volume = {21},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440160},  
  abstract = {While the primary problem confronting democratic  
theorists in the past several decades has been majority rule  
instability, recent formal results suggest that this problem is  
diminished by long-standing constitutional provisions such as  
bicameralism. Bicameralism should theoretically be much more likely to  
create a set of stable and undominated outcomes-a core. This paper  
reports a series of experiments testing whether individuals  
partitioned into two chambers do in face behave as the formal theory  
of bicameralism predicts. In two sets of trials, the outcome chosen  
under a given bicameral partition is almost always in the bicameral  
core for that partition, and a change in the bicameral partition has a  
statistically significant impact on the choice of outcome.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Miller, G. J. and Hammond, T. H. and Kile, C.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {1996},  
  note = {WOS:A1996TY85000006},  
  pages = {83--103}  
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@article{alvarez_constituents_1996,  
  title = {Constituents and legislators: {Learning} about the  
{Persian} {Gulf} {War} resolution},  
  volume = {21},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440161},  
  abstract = {This study examines how much citizens know about a  
highly salient roll-call vote: the Gulf War Use of Force Resolution.  
Citizens' awareness of how their representatives voted, while not  
great, was not trivial. Drawing on survey response theory, the authors  
determine that how well citizens are able to recall or guess their  
representatives' positions is structured by individual characteristics  
and a reasonable set of contextual cues. In their conclusion, the  
authors draw implications for the impact of public opinion on foreign  
policy, the ability of citizens to monitor their representatives in  
noncampaign periods, and for theories of the representation process.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Alvarez, R. M. and Gronke, P.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {1996},  
  note = {WOS:A1996TY85000007},  
  pages = {105--127}
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@article{goidel_reconsidering_1996,  
  title = {Reconsidering the 'myths and realities' of campaign  
finance reform},  
  volume = {21},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440162},  
  abstract = {Our analysis uses simulations to consider the likely  
impact of campaign finance reform on electoral outcomes and electoral  
competitiveness. The analysis improves upon previous research by both  
utilizing more than a single econometric model as a basis for the  
simulations and utilizing a wide range of campaign finance scenarios.  
Conclusions as to the likely impact campaign finance reform has on  
electoral competitiveness rely on the model employed and the type of  
campaign finance reform considered.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Goidel, R. K. and Gross, D. A.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {1996},  
  note = {WOS:A1996TY85000008},  
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@article{loewenberg_editors_1995,  
  title = {{EDITORS} {INTRODUCTION}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {LOEWENBERG, G. and HIBBING, J. and FRANCIS, W.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {1995},  
  note = {WOS:A1995TH05700001},  
  pages = {453--455}  
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@article{remington_development_1995,  
  title = {{THE} {DEVELOPMENT} {OF} {PARLIAMENTARY} {PARTIES} {IN}  
{RUSSIA}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440189},  
  abstract = {Cross-national studies suggest that electoral law,  
the arrangement of political institutions, political cleavages in the  
electorate, and political stability influence the number of  
parliamentary parties and their policy-making role. These factors do  
not yield unambiguous expectations for the parties in Russia's new  
parliament. Nevertheless, the Duma, the lower and more powerful  
chamber of the new Russian Federal Assembly, has developed a strongly
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party-oriented decision-making process. In this paper, we detail the role of parties in the Duma and conclude that the particular sequence of events in late 1993 and early 1944 crucially influenced the emergence of such a strongly party-oriented process.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = nov,
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    note = {WOS:A1995TH05700002},
    pages = {457--489}
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@article{degregorio_leadership_1995,
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    title = {{LEADERSHIP} {APPEAL} {IN} {THE} {US} {HOUSE}-{OF}-
{REPRESENTATIVES} - {COMPARING} {OFFICEHOLDERS} {AND} {AIDES}},
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    volume = {20},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440190},
    abstract = {Relying on the opinions of 97 advocates who actively
participated in steering any one of six diverse and controversial
bills through the 100th Congress, we uncover a network of
congressional leaders comprised of both the unelected and the elected
members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Beyond assembling a
profile of this elite group of policy champions in terms of their
experience, party affiliations, and political ideologies, we test
several theoretical propositions about the personal and structural
attributes of congressional leadership that adhere to officeholders
and aides.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {DEGREGORIO, C. and SNIDER, K.},
    month = nov,
    year = {1995},
    note = {WOS:A1995TH05700003},
    pages = {491--511}
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@article{grofman_house_1995,
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    title = {{HOUSE} {MEMBERS} {WHO} {BECOME} {SENATORS} - {LEARNING}
{FROM} {A} {NATURAL} {EXPERIMENT}},
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    volume = {20},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440191},
    abstract = {Using AFL-CIO COPE roll-call voting scores, we show
that the voting behavior of a House member who moves to the Senate is
virtually indistinguishable from the voting behavior of both the mean
House member and the incumbent senator from the new senator's state
and party, and that the representative's voting behavior exhibits
little systematic change after moving from the House. Moreover, what
change there is cannot generally be interpreted as a move in the
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direction of the state's median voter. However, the directionality of our results is consistent with the Glazer and Robbins (1985a) finding that when their constituencies change, Democrats are likely to be unresponsive to a change in constituency policy preferences unless it involves a shift to the left, while Republicans are likely to be unresponsive to a change in constituency policy preference unless it involves a shift to the right.},

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    number = {4},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {GROFMAN, B. and GRIFFIN, R. and BERRY, G.},  
    month = nov,  
    year = {1995},  
    note = {WOS:A1995TH05700004},  
    pages = {513--529}  
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@article{gray_interest_1995,  
  title = {{INTEREST} {REPRESENTATION} {AND} {DEMOCRATIC}  
{GRIDLOCK}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440192},  
  abstract = {What accounts for variation in the ability of  
governments to introduce and enact legislation? We examine how  
interest organization populations, and especially their properties of  
density and diversity, influence introductions, enactments, and the  
ratio of bill enactments to introductions. After reviewing a number of  
hypotheses about interest organizations and legislative activity, we  
test their competing expectations with data on state legislative  
activity during 1990 and 1991. Along the way, we test the divided  
government hypothesis as well. Finally, we discuss the implications of  
our findings for further study of the influence of interest  
organization populations.},
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    number = {4},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {GRAY, V. and LOWERY, D.},  
    month = nov,  
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    pages = {531--552}  
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@article{dilger_state_1995,  
  title = {{STATE} {LEGISLATIVE} {PROFESSIONALISM} {AND}  
{GUBERNATORIAL} {EFFECTIVENESS}, 1978-1991},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440193},  
  abstract = {This is the first systematic study to explore the  
determinants of gubernatorial effectiveness from a contemporary,  
comparative state perspective. Factor analysis is employed to devise
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valid and reliable index-based measures of gubernatorial powers, enabling resources, and state legislative professionalism Next, using data from all 50 states for the biennial periods from 1978 to 1991, we test a multivariate probabilistic model of determining whether a most effective governor is currently in office. The logistic regression results indicate that gubernatorial effectiveness in office is associated with the presence of a highly professionalized state legislature, relatively high state economic growth, and joint increases in gubernatorial institutional powers and enabling resources. This suggests that both institutional and environmental considerations influence gubernatorial effectiveness in office and that the power relationship between the governor and the state legislature is not necessarily a zero-sum game, with one institution gaining influence at the expense of the other.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {DILGER, RJ and KRAUSE, GA and MOFFETT, RR},
    month = nov,
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    note = {WOS:A1995TH05700006},
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@article{amed_development_1995,
  title = {{THE} {DEVELOPMENT} {OF} {PARLIAMENTARY} {OVERSIGHT}
{IN} {BANGLADESH} - {A} {RESEARCH} {NOTE}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {The parliament of Bangladesh is not primarily a
lawmaking body but one whose main function is to exercise oversight
over the executive. In the first 20 years of the existence of the
Jatiya Sangsad (JS), only its most recent incarnation, elected in
1991, has had a sufficiently large proportion of opposition MPs to
encourage the use of existing oversight procedures. When we compare
the fifth JS to the first JS elected in 1973, we see that the use of
both call-attention motions and questions has increased, and that the
number of committees and committee positions has proliferated in the
fifth JS. We also find that the focus of oversight is surprisingly on
national rather than on local issues.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {AMED, N. and KHAN, S.},
    month = nov,
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    pages = {573--583}
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@article{loewenberg_untitled_1995,
  title = {{UNTITLED} - {EDITORS} {INTRODUCTION}},
  volume = {20},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {LOEWENBERG, G. and HIBBING, JR and FRANCIS, WL},
    month = aug,
    year = {1995},
    note = {WOS:A1995RR48600001},
    pages = {301--303}
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@article{ragdale_candidates_1995,
  title = {{CANDIDATES}, {ISSUES}, {AND} {PARTICIPATION} {IN}
{SENATE} {ELECTIONS}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440223},
  abstract = {The study provides the first thorough empirical
examination of how individuals' knowledge of and opinions about the
candidates and issues of a campaign affect participation. The study
proposes a campaign attention model in which people assess whether
there is someone for whom to vote before deciding whether to vote.
More specifically, the model posits three candidate-based conditions
for participation: knowledge, distinctiveness, and preference. First,
individuals who have knowledge of the candidates or issues are more
likely to vote than those who do not. Second, individuals who perceive
the candidates as distinct from one another are more likely to vote
than others. Third, individuals who judge at least one candidate
favorably are more likely to vote than those who do not. The model is
tested in previously unstudied Senate elections. The results of a
probit analysis for the 1990 midterm Senate races indicate the
importance of the campaign attention model. Individuals' issue
awareness, issue preferences, candidate recognition, perceived
candidate differences, and candidate preferences significantly affect
individuals' decisions to go to the polls, controlling for the effects
of their demographic characteristics, political involvement, and the
electoral context.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {RAGSDALE, L. and RUSK, JG},
  month = aug,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RR48600002},
  pages = {305--327}
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@article{cox_incumbency_1995,
  title = {{THE} {INCUMBENCY} {ADVANTAGE} {IN} {MULTIMEMBER}
{DISTRICTS} - {EVIDENCE} {FROM} {THE} {US} {STATES}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440224},
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abstract = {Studies of the incumbency advantage in U.S. state legislative elections have usually been limited to the relatively few states that use single-member districts exclusively. In this paper we provide a method for computing the incumbency advantage in multimember districts, based on the Gelman-King (1990) estimator for single-member districts, and use it to estimate the incumbency advantage in 40 U.S. states over the period 1970-86. We find that the incumbency advantage has increased in states using multimember districts but at a substantially lower average rate than in states with single-member districts. We also find that states in which legislators have more opportunity or ability to perform casework services for their constituents are also those in which the incumbency advantage is larger.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {COX, GW and MORGENSTERN, S.},
month = aug,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RR48600003},
pages = {329--349}

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@article{donnay_public_1995,
title = {{PUBLIC} {FINANCING} {OF} {LEGISLATIVE} {ELECTIONS} -
{LESSONS} {FROM} {MINNESOTA}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440225},
abstract = {In 1976, when a system to publicly finance
Minnesota's state legislative elections was introduced, the
legislation's proponents claimed it would make elections to the
legislature more competitive. An observer, however, might conclude
that the incumbency advantage has increased since the introduction of
public financing. When we introduce a variety of controls and examine
the data with multivariate regression, we find that public financing
did in fact go a long way toward increasing the competitiveness of
Minnesota's legislative elections.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {DONNAY, PD and RAMSDEN, GP},
month = aug,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RR48600004},
pages = {351--364}

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@article{freeman_comparative-analysis_1995,
title = {A {COMPARATIVE}-{ANALYSIS} {OF} {SPEAKER} {CAREER}
{PATTERNS} {IN} {US} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},

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    doi = {10.2307/440226},
    abstract = {In this paper, I use Polsby's (1968) theory of
institutionalization to study change in the career patterns of state
legislative speakers. I find that in certain ways leadership is
institutionalizing. Most speakers today had previous leadership
experience, and in a majority of chambers there is a specific career
path to the speakership. Both previous experience and career path are
indicators of institutionalization. However, the career path in
virtually all chambers is flexible. Further, the more professionalized
legislatures are more likely to lack a specific career path than are
less professionalized institutions. These findings add to the
literature that suggest that state legislatures do not show a
consistent pattern of institutionalization.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {FREEMAN, PK},
    month = aug,
    year = {1995},
    note = {WOS:A1995RR48600005},
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@article{meernik_congress_1995,
  title = {{CONGRESS}, {THE} {PRESIDENT}, {AND} {THE} {COMMITMENT}
{OF} {THE} {US} {MILITARY}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440227},
  abstract = {Control over deployment of U.S. armed forces has been
one of the most hotly contested issues in foreign policy between the
president and Congress in recent years. Yet despite the lingering
legacy of Vietnam, Congress has never fully forced presidents to
curtail U.S. military activities through use of the War Powers
Resolution, its appropriations powers, or other legislation. I attempt
to show that although Congress generally leaves military policy to the
executive branch, it occasionally tries to interject itself into
policy-making when there are sufficient political incentives. I
develop a model to explain what leads Congress to periodically use the
War Powers Resolution and other legislation in an attempt to curtail
U.S. military operations abroad, and find that public opinion,
protracted conflicts, divided government, and violence against United
States citizens all exercise statistically significant impacts on
congressional behavior.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MEERNIK, J.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RR48600006},
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@article{mayer_closing_1995,  
  title = {{CLOSING} {MILITARY} {BASES} ({FINALLY}) - {SOLVING}  
{COLLECTIVE} {DILEMMAS} {THROUGH} {DELEGATION}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440228},  
  abstract = {In 1988 Congress established the Independent  
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and gave it nearly complete  
authority to determine which domestic military bases would be closed.  
I analyze both the structure of the base-closing process and the  
procedural requirements imposed on the commission, and find that two  
factors explain the extensive delegation of power (which was unusual).  
First, legislators reduced the costs of any potential adverse  
commission activity by insisting that the process be nonarbitrary and  
by restricting the commission's authority to a narrow jurisdiction.  
Second, legislators lowered the risk of political retribution by  
insulating themselves from the commission's actions, providing a  
mechanism that allowed them to demonstrate concern for affected  
constituents and insuring that the public would accept the  
commission's decision as legitimate.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {MAYER, KR},  
  month = aug,  
  year = {1995},  
  note = {WOS:A1995RR48600007},  
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  title = {{THE} {NET} {IMPACT} {OF} {MEDIA} {EXPOSURE} {ON}  
{INDIVIDUAL} {VOTING} {DECISIONS} {IN} {US} {SENATE} {AND} {HOUSE}  
{ELECTIONS}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440229},  
  abstract = {We examine the impact of media exposure in United  
States Senate and House elections and find that high levels of media  
exposure are associated with an increased likelihood that individual  
respondents will vote for House incumbents. In addition, we find that  
the effects of media exposure in Senate elections are mediated by  
challenger political quality. We also find that, within House  
elections, media exposure appears to have its most dramatic impact  
among independents and similar partisans.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {SHIELDS, TG and GOIDEL, RK and TADLOCK, B.},  
  month = aug,  
  year = {1995},  
  note = {WOS:A1995RR48600008},
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    pages = {415--430}
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@article{leyden_interest_1995,
  title = {{INTEREST} {GROUP} {RESOURCES} {AND} {TESTIMONY} {AT}
{CONGRESSIONAL} {HEARINGS}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440230},
  abstract = {This article examines the types of organized
interests that get included in the policy-making process. To examine
this question, I propose a theory that emphasizes the importance of
costly organizational resources and I test it using as a dependent
variable whether or not groups are invited to testify at congressional
hearings. The analysis demonstrates that if a group expects to
testify, it must have a substantial degree of organizational
resources. The findings underscore the importance of organization and
money in explaining successful interest group articulation.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {LEYDEN, KM},
  month = aug,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RR48600009},
  pages = {431--439}
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  title = {{UNTITLED} - {INTRODUCTION}},
  volume = {20},
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  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {LOEWENBERG, G. and HIBBING, JR and FRANCIS, WL},
  month = may,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RA25100001},
  pages = {157--159}
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@article{mayer_impact_1995,
  title = {{THE} {IMPACT} {OF} {PUBLIC} {FINANCING} {ON}
{ELECTORAL} {COMPETITIVENESS} - {EVIDENCE} {FROM} {WISCONSIN}, 1964-
1990 ({VOL} 20, {PG} 69, 1995)},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MAYER, KR and WOOD, JM},
  month = may,
  year = {1995},

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    note = {WOS:A1995RA25100002},
    pages = {159--159}
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@article{judge_member-constituency_1995,
  title = {{MEMBER}-{CONSTITUENCY} {LINKAGES} {IN} {THE}
{HUNGARIAN} {PARLIAMENT}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440445},
  abstract = {Linkage has traditionally been identified as a
central function of legislatures. Given the Parliament's initial
institutional preeminence in Hungary after 1990 and underdeveloped
linkages through organized interests or stable and cohesive parties,
the linkage function of elected representatives was of special
importance. This article examines the pattern of MP constituency
linkage in the first democratically elected Hungarian Parliament
(1990), the political context within which this pattern was
established, and the conceptions MPs held of their representative
focus.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {JUDGE, D. and ILONZKI, G.},
  month = may,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RA25100003},
  pages = {161--176}
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@article{ainsworth_unanimous_1995,
  title = {{UNANIMOUS} {CONSENT} {AGREEMENTS} {AS} {LEADERSHIP}
{TOOLS}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440446},
  abstract = {Unanimous consent agreements are the main tool the
U.S. Senate majority leader uses to perform several functions. The
leader guides floor proceedings by utilizing these agreements to
restrict amendments and to limit time for debate. Scholars have argued
that unanimous consent agreements are a service tool used to appease
the demands of an increasingly individualistic Senate. We use a
bargaining model to demonstrate that these agreements can be a
leadership tool. In addition, we highlight the importance of
institutional innovations leaders have adopted to maintain the
durability of unanimous consent agreements as leadership tools.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {AINSWORTH, S. and FLATHMAN, M.},
  month = may,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RA25100004},

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{ELECTIONS}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440447},
  abstract = {This study examines the impact of presidential
coattails in open-seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives.
Although presidential coattails exert a strong influence on
congressional vote margins, coattails may have determined whether a
party won or lost an open seat in only 34 of 254 races between 1972
and 1992-about 13\% of the time. Where coattails are decisive, they
seem to help Republicans (who frequently need the help) more than
Democrats (who generally do not). parties must continue to increase
the competitiveness of open-seat races before coattails will influence
the outcome of a substantial number of contests.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {FLEMMING, GN},
  month = may,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995RA25100005},
  pages = {197--211}
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@article{vega_effects_1995,
  title = {{THE} {EFFECTS} {OF} {GENDER} {ON} {CONGRESSIONAL}
{BEHAVIOR} {AND} {THE} {SUBSTANTIVE} {REPRESENTATION} {OF} {WOMEN}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440448},
  abstract = {This paper examines how gender affects legislative
behavior and what significance these effects have for the substantive
representation of women. Having examined voting behavior from 1981 to
1992, we confirm that female legislators have voting patterns that are
more liberal, yet not significantly different, from those of their
male counterparts. When regression is applied, gender remains
insignificant in explaining Voting behavior until 1991 and 1992, where
it demonstrates a significant negative effect. Bill introduction data
for the same period reveals that congressional women are introducing
women-related legislation proportionate to their number. Finally,
examining the cohesion of voting patterns reveals that congressional
women are as cohesive as or more cohesive than two ethnic
congressional groups but less cohesive than southern Democrats or
their male partisan counterparts. In combination, the findings suggest
that congressional women display distinctive legislative behavior that
portends a greater representation of women and women's issues.},
  number = {2},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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    month = may,
    year = {1995},
    note = {WOS:A1995RA25100006},
    pages = {213--222}
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@article{barrett_policy_1995,
  title = {{THE} {POLICY} {PRIORITIES} {OF} {AFRICAN}-{AMERICAN}
{WOMEN} {IN} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440449},
  abstract = {Much of the research on African American legislative
behavior has focused on men in office, while the literature on female
legislators has looked primarily at white women. Far less is known of
the growing number of African American female politicians. As the
findings of this paper reveal, black women are similar to nonblack
women in their strong support for prowomen's policy issues, and they
are like black men in their solid support for minority-targeted
policies. On the other hand, they are unlike other groups in their
near unanimous agreement on the policies that are most important to
them and that they are most likely to pursue while in office. Unlike
other race and gender groups, black women in state legislatures seem
to share a strong consensus on which policy areas should receive
priority. To these women, the most pressing issues are education,
health care, economic development, and employment.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {BARRETT, EJ},
  month = may,
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  note = {WOS:A1995RA25100007},
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@article{rosenthal_new_1995,
  title = {{NEW} {PARTY} {OR} {CAMPAIGN} {BANK} {ACCOUNT} -
{EXPLAINING} {THE} {RISE} {OF} {STATE} {LEGISLATIVE} {CAMPAIGN}
{COMMITTEES}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440450},
  abstract = {State legislative caucus campaign committees have
emerged in the 1980s as an important party adaptation in state
politics. This study explores the factors associated with the
existence of these new party organizations and with their levels of
contributions to party candidates. To explain these phenomena, five
hypotheses are investigated concerning the strength of state parties,
the cost of state campaigns, the level of legislative professionalism,

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the degree of party competition, and the regulation of campaign contributions in states where these committees have emerged. Legislative professionalism and party competition are associated with the existence of the caucus committees. Legislative professionalization, party competition, and laws restricting campaign contributions are powerful explanations of the level of expenditure of these committees. Leadership stability and spending by the opposing party also help explain the activity of caucus campaign committees.},

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    number = {2},  
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    pages = {249--268}  
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@article{little_understanding_1995,  
    title = {{UNDERSTANDING} {LEGISLATIVE} {LEADERSHIP} {BEYOND}  
{THE} {CHAMBER} - {THE} {MEMBERS} {PERSPECTIVE}},  
    volume = {20},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440451},  
    abstract = {This paper examines the degree to which legislative  
leaders in the modern era are expected to expend energy on public  
relations, campaign activities, and interaction with other government  
officials, perhaps at the expense of more traditional institutional  
activities. Using data from 120 senators in three state legislatures,  
the author examines an empirical model in an effort to explain  
variations in the proportion of external activities associated with  
legislative leadership. Empirical tests reveal a statistically  
significant relationship between a legislator's institutional,  
electoral, and personal environments and the external nature of the  
individual's expectations of legislative leaders. However,  
characteristics of a member's personal environment-primarily  
experience, ambition, and role orientation-are most strongly related  
to how that member defines appropriate leadership. The vocal and  
visible legislative leadership of modern legislatures is encouraged by  
young, ambitious politicians who perceive themselves as electorally  
vulnerable. This tendency is particularly strong for legislators of  
the executive's party in competitive institutions. Leaders will  
continue to focus attention on external activities as long as members  
perceive such activity as being in their own interest.},
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{FEREJOHN},{JA}, {KUKLINSKI},{JH}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440146},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},  
  month = feb,  
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  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800002},  
  pages = {3--21}  
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{TRANSFORMATION} {OF} {AMERICAN} {POLITICS} - {CARMINES},{EG},  
{STIMSON},{JA}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440146},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},  
  month = feb,  
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  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800001},  
  pages = {3--21}  
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{ZALLER},{JR}},  
  volume = {20},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440146},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},  
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440146},
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{POLITICAL} {PSYCHOLOGY} - {SNIDERMAN},{PM}, {BRODY},{RA},
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  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440146},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},
  month = feb,
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  volume = {20},
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  doi = {10.2307/440146},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},
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  volume = {20},
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{SHAPIRO},{RY}},  
    volume = {20},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440146},  
    number = {1},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},  
    month = feb,  
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    title = {{CHARACTERISTICS} {OF} {PRESS} {COVERAGE} {IN} {SENATE}  
{AND} {GUBERNATORIAL} {ELECTIONS} - {INFORMATION} {AVAILABLE} {TO}  
{VOTERS}},  
    volume = {20},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440147},  
    abstract = {Since campaigns are the mechanisms by which  
candidates communicate with voters, the content of campaigns tells us  
what voters are likely to learn about competing candidates. In this  
study, I conduct a content analysis of newspaper coverage in 24 U.S.  
Senate races and 21 gubernatorial races. The results suggest that  
voters are provided with substantially more coverage, and more  
equitable coverage, of gubernatorial candidates. In addition,  
newspapers apportion space differently to different types of coverage  
in Senate and in gubernatorial campaigns. I explain how these  
differences in coverage may influence the outcome of Senate and  
gubernatorial elections.},  
    number = {1},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {KAHN, KF},  
    month = feb,  
    year = {1995},  
    note = {WOS:A1995QH59800009},  
    pages = {23--35}  
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@article{glazer_strategic_1995,  
    title = {{STRATEGIC} {VOTE} {DELAY} {IN} {THE} {US} {HOUSE}-{OF}-
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{REPRESENTATIVES}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440148},
  abstract = {A legislator often has an incentive to present one
face to constituents and another to party leaders. We examine this
conflict by analyzing how representatives time their votes. In
particular, using C-SPAN Videotapes of roll calls on veto overrides in
the 101st Congress, we find that the House members who vote against
their party delay voting on the floor. Our data also support the
hypothesis that strategic vote delay is greatest when the vote is
likely to be close.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {GLAZER, A. and GRIFFIN, R. and GROFMAN, B. and
WATTENBERG, M.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800010},
  pages = {37--45}
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@article{mooney_citizens_1995,
  title = {{CITIZENS}, {STRUCTURES}, {AND} {SISTER} {STATES} -
{INFLUENCES} {ON} {STATE} {LEGISLATIVE} {PROFESSIONALISM}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440149},
  abstract = {U.S. state legislatures vary substantially in the
degree to which they are professional institutions. Drawing on the
state policy literature, this study identifies three general
categories of potential influence on this variation: the
characteristics of a state's population, its governmental structures,
and the level of legislative professionalism in its peer group states.
Using four measures of professionalism from different periods, the
author tests hypotheses about several such variables in cross-
sectional and panel analyses. He finds that each of these categories
of influence has significant, independent effects on legislative
professionalism, and that taken together these influences account for
most of the observed variation in professionalism across the states.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MOONEY, CZ},
  month = feb,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800011},
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{ELECTORAL} {COMPETITIVENESS} - {EVIDENCE} {FROM} {WISCONSIN}, 1964-
1990},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440150},
  abstract = {Public financing schemes are often promoted as means
of increasing the competitiveness of legislative elections and
changing the way that candidates raise campaign funds. We investigate
the impact that Wisconsin's system of public financing of state
legislative elections, established in 1977, has had on these
variables. Having compared trends in the pre- and postreform period,
we find no evidence that providing challengers with public money has
made elections more competitive, although it has narrowed the spending
gap between incumbents and challengers. Most important, public
financing has not increased the number of challengers, as incumbents
increasingly face no opposition at all. We argue that challengers
consider the overall strategic environment, and not just the question
of fundraising, when making the initial decision to run. The
availability of public money does little to encourage challenges to
safe incumbents. While some changes in Wisconsin's system might
marginally increase the likelihood of challenges, we conclude that
public funding, by itself, cannot significantly change the
competitiveness of legislative elections.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MAYER, KR and WOOD, JM},
  month = feb,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800012},
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@article{smith_interest_1995,
  title = {{INTEREST} {GROUP} {INFLUENCE} {IN} {THE} {US}
{CONGRESS}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440151},
  abstract = {This essay critically reviews research published in
the last decade that explores how lobbyists and interest groups
influence the actions of the U.S. Congress. The research is extensive
and contains a rich, but often conflicting, set of findings about the
influence of interest groups. The purpose of this essay is to
inventory, review, and critique this research in ways that convey as
clearly as possible the status of our current understanding of the
nature and level of interest group influence in the U.S. Congress.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SMITH, RA},
  month = feb,
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    note = {WOS:A1995QH59800013},
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  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {LOEWENBERG, G. and FRANCIS, WL and HIBBING, JR},
  month = nov,
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  note = {WOS:A1994PW06800001},
  pages = {453--455}
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@article{maltzman_principals_1994,
  title = {{PRINCIPALS}, {GOALS}, {DIMENSIONALITY}, {AND}
{CONGRESSIONAL} {COMMITTEES}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440168},
  abstract = {We argue that committee members are best viewed as
agents of multiple principals-their parent chamber and parties, as
well as external constituencies. We propose improvements in measuring
the relationship between the policy positions of committees, parties,
and parent chambers. We find predictable variation across committees
and across issues within committee jurisdictions in this relationship.
We conclude by making some observations about future directions for
research in this area.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MALTZMAN, F. and SMITH, SS},
  month = nov,
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  note = {WOS:A1994PW06800002},
  pages = {457--476}
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@article{sinclair_house_1994,
  title = {{HOUSE} {SPECIAL} {RULES} {AND} {THE} {INSTITUTIONAL}
{DESIGN} {CONTROVERSY}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440169},
  abstract = {The institutional design debate at the heart of much
recent theoretical controversy in legislative scholarship revolves
around two questions: what is the core problem members of the
legislature are attempting to solve in their choice of institutional
arrangements? what is the key institutional mechanism through which

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the problem is tackled? This analysis of special rules in the House aims to contribute to that debate directly and indirectly. I test the predictions that the principal theories make about rule choice and find the party model to be most successful in accounting for contemporary rule choice on major legislation. I then argue that my data and analysis suggest three desiderata for an adequate theory. First, it must incorporate party as a key mechanism, as the importance of party and party leadership in the contemporary House suggests. Second, the theory must be dynamic, as the change in the centrality of party leadership over time suggests; members' answer to the core question-if not the question itself-may change over time. Third, the theory needs to posit multiple goals, as a detailed look at the design of some rules suggests.},

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    number = {4},
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{AND} {THE} {ELECTIONS} {FOR} {THE} 71ST {TEXAS} {HOUSE}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440170},
  abstract = {Because the rules and structures that affect policy
making differ greatly from one state legislature to the next, the
dynamics of contributing to the candidates may differ in corresponding
ways. Contributors presumably make rational decisions about what
investments will gain them influence. Although there is some evidence
about rational contributing in Congress, there is little evidence to
date at the state legislative level. Here we explore the contribution
patterns in races for the Texas House of Representatives, with its
highly centralized power structure, and offer compelling evidence that
contributors are rational in deciding to invest their money in the
most powerful members rather than in committee chairs, as they do in
systems with dispersed power such as the U.S. Congress.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {THIELEMANN, GS and DIXON, DR},
  month = nov,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994PW06800004},
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{COMPENSATION} - {SUCCESS} {FOR} {THE} {REFORM} {MOVEMENT}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440171},
  abstract = {In part because of the state legislature reform
movement, the compensation of state legislators has changed over the
last two decades: the level of real compensation has risen, and the
number of methods of determining compensation has increased. In
previous studies of legislative compensation, institutional rules and
political factors play an important role in explaining the variance of
compensation across states. This article presents a modification of a
model of legislative compensation and explores differences in the mix
of compensation. The empirical evidence suggests that constitutional
and extra-constitutional restrictions no longer play an important role
in determining the level of pay, but limits on length of session
constrain pay.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SOLLARS, DL},
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  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This research note examines some hypotheses about why
members wrote overdrafts on the House bank, the central behavior of
the House bank scandal. We use the negative binomial model, a type of
event-count model, to compare the effects of variables related to
political power (party, seniority, and electoral security) with
personal variables (age and wealth). The results are consistent both
with partisan interpretations (Democrats bounced more checks, even
when their lower average wealth is controlled for) and with more
personalistic interpretations (younger members and members of modest
means also wrote more overdrafts).},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {STEWART, C.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994PW06800006},
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{LEGISLATIVE} {ELECTION} {RESEARCH}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440173},
  abstract = {This review of research over the past decade on
legislative elections employs the concept of electoral responsiveness-
the link between voters' choices and legislatures' decisions. The
article examines the field's three main approaches to responsiveness:
research on collective choice, which focuses on how the electorate
evaluates the legislature's performance, including its handling of the
economy; research on competitive change, which primarily analyzes
incumbency and challenger strength as factors that delimit how voters
influence the composition of the legislature from one election to the
next; and research on voter preferences, which details primarily how
voters' commitments to party and class shape their reactions to
candidates and parties. The study concludes that, although legislative
election research is voluminous, the field lacks a strong theoretical
and comparative focus within which many questions on responsiveness
could best be answered.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {RAGSDALE, L.},
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  author = {LOEWENBERG, G. and HIBBING, JR and FRANCIS, WL},
  month = aug,
  year = {1994},
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  pages = {309--311}
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  title = {A {MODEL} {OF} {A} {LEGISLATURE} {WITH} 2 {PARTIES}
{AND} {A} {COMMITTEE} {SYSTEM}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440135},
  abstract = {In this paper, I propose a model of a legislature
with two political parties and a committee system, similar to the U.S.
House of Representatives. Equilibrium results are developed that
address both the social choice problem and the collective action
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problem of how to make it in at least some members' interests to act on any collectively shared interests of their party. I further suggest that this basic structure has a very long-term stability and that medium-term periods of more party-centered or more committee-centered politics, suggestive of an equilibrium of institutions within this basic stability, may be due to equilibria in the electoral choices of the public and, thus, in the representative nature of the legislature.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {ALDRICH, JH},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PE01700002},
pages = {313--339}

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@article{rohde_parties_1994,

title = {{PARTIES} {AND} {COMMITTEES} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE} -
{MEMBER} {MOTIVATIONS}, {ISSUES}, {AND} {INSTITUTIONAL}
{ARRANGEMENTS}},

volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440136},

abstract = {This analysis focuses on empirical and theoretical issues raised in Krehbiel's (1991) informational analysis of legislative organization in the House of Representatives. I argue that there are insufficient grounds for rejecting significant effects from party leaders and organizations and discuss evidence for such effects. I then propose that the partisan, informational, and distributive perspectives are compatible within a single theory of congressional organization. In this view, these perspectives apply to different domains in Congress, which affect various issues and committees in different but potentially predictable fashions.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {ROHDE, DW},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PE01700003},
pages = {341--359}

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@article{lupia_who_1994,

title = {{WHO} {CONTROLS} - {INFORMATION} {AND} {THE} {STRUCTURE}
{OF} {LEGISLATIVE} {DECISION}-{MAKING}},

volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440137},

abstract = {Legislatures around the world first delegate some of their policy making authority to experts and then accept their

delegates' proposals without question or amendment. Many scholars see this combination of events as evidence that complexity leads elected representatives to lose control of the actions of government. While we agree that complexity and delegation can render legislatures powerful or powerless, we argue that legislators around the world can, and do, overcome these potentially damaging forces. Specifically, we use a model of legislative behavior to show how both institutional characteristics and conditions that allow people to learn from others provide legislators with the faculty to protect their interests. We conclude that certain structural characteristics, such as those found in the United States Congress, allow ordinary legislators to exert considerable control over the actions of government and that other characteristics, such as those found in Britain and Japan, render most legislators relatively powerless.},

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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {LUPIA, A. and MCCUBBINS, MD},
    month = aug,
    year = {1994},
    note = {WOS:A1994PE01700004},
    pages = {361--384}
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@article{forgette_302b_1994,
  title = {302({B}) {OR} {NOT} 302({B}) - {CONGRESSIONAL} {FLOOR}
{PROCEDURES} {AND} {HOUSE} {APPROPRIATORS}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440138},
  abstract = {In the last decade, suballocations made to committees
under section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act have become
increasingly binding. Over the same period, however, House
appropriators have become less affected by floor amendments,
especially amendments to increase appropriations levels. Section
302(b) suballocations have served as a procedural defense for
appropriators against unwelcome floor amendments.},
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    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {FORGETTE, RG and SATURNO, JV},
    month = aug,
    year = {1994},
    note = {WOS:A1994PE01700005},
    pages = {385--396}
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@article{geiger_house-appropriations-committee_1994,
  title = {{THE} {HOUSE}-{APPROPRIATIONS}-{COMMITTEE}, {FY} 1963-82
- {A} {MICRO}-{BUDGETARY} {PERSPECTIVE}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440139},
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abstract = {Using budget data for the same domestic agencies included in Fenno's study of the House Appropriations Committee (1966), this article explores decision making in the committee in fiscal years 1963-82. The data show that the committee increased its budget advocacy in that period; however, it still acted as a budget guardian a majority of the time, as it had in the period studied by Fenno. The findings support Fenno's argument that the committee's response to the president's budget request depended on several factors, including who was president and what agency was involved. Further, this study demonstrates the utility of a micro-budgetary focus on change or stability in the role of the House Appropriations Committee.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {GEIGER, SM},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PE01700006},
pages = {397--416}

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@article{clucas_effect_1994,

title = {{THE} {EFFECT} {OF} {CAMPAIGN} {CONTRIBUTIONS} {ON} {THE} {POWER} {OF} {THE} {CALIFORNIA} {ASSEMBLY} {SPEAKER}},

volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440140},

abstract = {The provision of goods and services is routinely accepted as a primary source of power for legislative leaders, yet few studies analyze how these goods influence members' behavior, or even whether they do. This study tests the hypothesis that the distribution of goods generates an exchange between leaders and followers, increasing the leaders' power over the legislative process. Specifically, the study examines how the distribution of campaign assistance by the past two Speakers of the California Assembly affected support for their positions on major roll-call votes. The findings indicate that recipients of contributions are no more likely than nonrecipients to support the Speaker on these votes.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {CLUCAS, RA},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PE01700007},
pages = {417--428}

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@article{mezey_presidents_1994,

title = {{PRESIDENTS} {AND} {ASSEMBLIES} - {CONSTITUTIONAL} {DESIGN} {AND} {ELECTORAL} {DYNAMICS} - {SHUGART},{MS}, {CAREY},{JM}},
volume = {19},

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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440141},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {MEZEY, ML},
    month = aug,
    year = {1994},
    note = {WOS:A1994PE01700011},
    pages = {429--441}
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@article{mezey_back_1994,
  title = {{BACK} {FROM} {WESTMINSTER} - {CONSTITUENCY} {SERVICE}
{BY} {BRITISH} {MEMBERS} {OF} {PARLIAMENT} - {NORTON},{P},
{WOOD},{DM}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440141},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MEZEY, ML},
  month = aug,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994PE01700010},
  pages = {429--441}
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@article{mezey_reform_1994,
  title = {{REFORM} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE}-{OF}-{COMMONS} - {THE}
{SELECT} {COMMITTEE} {SYSTEM} - {JOGERST},{M}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
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  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MEZEY, ML},
  month = aug,
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  note = {WOS:A1994PE01700009},
  pages = {429--441}
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@article{mezey_parliamentary_1994,
  title = {{PARLIAMENTARY} {CHANGE} {IN} {THE} {NORDIC} {COUNTRIES}
- {DAMGAARD},{E}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440141},
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    month = aug,
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    pages = {429--441}
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@article{shepsle_formal_1994,
  title = {{FORMAL} {MODELS} {OF} {LEGISLATURES} - {INTRODUCTION}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This issue and portions of the next two issues of
this Quarterly are devoted to articles discussing formal theories of
legislatures. They were commissioned and edited by Kenneth A. Shepsle
and Barry R. Weingast who serve as guest editors of this issue. In the
following introduction to this issue the guest editors explain the
origins and purposes of this special series.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SHEPSLE, KA and WEINGAST, BR},
  month = may,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994NV48800001},
  pages = {145--147}
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@article{shepsle_positive_1994,
  title = {{POSITIVE} {THEORIES} {OF} {CONGRESSIONAL}
{INSTITUTIONS}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440423},
  abstract = {This paper surveys the range of formal theories that
have been developed in recent years to accommodate and explain various
legislative practices. The newer theories, especially those
emphasizing informational aspects of decision making and partisan
features of legislative politics, constitute departures from an
earlier tradition of modeling gains from exchange. The authors suggest
how these newer developments blend with their forebears and yet still
constitute critical departures. These approaches, it is argued, may be
distinguished from one another by the weight each places on the demand
side and supply side of legislative decision making.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SHEPSLE, KA and WEINGAST, BR},
  month = may,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994NV48800002},
  pages = {149--179}
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@article{gilligan_gains_1994,

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    title = {{THE} {GAINS} {FROM} {EXCHANGE} {HYPOTHESIS} {OF}
{LEGISLATIVE} {ORGANIZATION}},
    volume = {19},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440424},
    abstract = {Do rational legislators assign parliamentary rights
in accordance with extremity and intensity of particularistic
preferences? In numerous works in legislative studies, the gains from
exchange hypothesis answers yes and asserts that such a legislative
organization is politically efficient, since its outcomes give
individual legislators more benefits in the policy domains they care
about most. Such is the essence of logrolling. Surprisingly, no
explicit and formal derivation of this hypothesis exists in the
literature. This article presents and analyzes a model that embodies
formally the essential features of pins from exchange as described in
informal accounts: (1) different legislators receive differential
benefits from distinct and particularistic policies, (2) bundles of
collectively chosen policies are differentially efficient; and (3)
preferences are such that there is no pure majority-rule equilibrium.
Other forms of legislative organization are analyzed in an infinitely
repeated noncooperative divide the dollar game. When legislators must
choose from only two institutional arrangements-majority cloture and
unanimous cloture-they indeed choose the gains from exchange
institution, as hypothesized elsewhere. Two qualifications are
significant, however. First, in contradiction of earlier informal
theories, we find this result occurs for reasons unrelated to
efficiency. Second, when the range of institutional arrangements is
expanded only slightly, gains from exchange forms of legislative
organization are not chosen and outcomes are inefficient. Students of
legislatures are therefore cautioned against taking informal theories
of gains from exchange at face value.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {GILLIGAN, TW and KREHBIEL, K.},
    month = may,
    year = {1994},
    note = {WOS:A1994NV48800003},
    pages = {181--214}
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@article{cox_bonding_1994,
    title = {{BONDING}, {STRUCTURE}, {AND} {THE} {STABILITY} {OF}
{POLITICAL}-{PARTIES} - {PARTY} {GOVERNMENT} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE}},
    volume = {19},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440425},
    abstract = {The public policy benefits that parties deliver are
allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority
rule. Majority-rule decision making, however, does not lead to
consistent policy choices; it is unstable. In this study, we argue
that institutions-and thereby policy coalitions-can be stabilized by

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extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership, members must support Caucus decisions on the floor on a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence the policy decisions made. in the House. We examine the rules of the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain the essential elements of an effective, extralegislative bonding mechanism.},

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    number = {2},  
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
    author = {COX, GW and MCCUBBINS, MD},  
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    title = {{COMPARING} {COMMITTEE} {AND} {FLOOR} {PREFERENCES}},  
    volume = {19},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440426},  
    abstract = {We propose a statistical model which permits us to  
test whether congressional committees are preference outliers. Unlike  
previous tests, our model acknowledges that each representative's  
policy preferences are unique and that a comparison of committee and  
floor preferences must account for this heterogeneity. We apply our  
model to the House of Representatives over the period 1951 to 1984 and  
identify many more committee outliers than previous research.},
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    number = {2},  
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    month = may,  
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@article{baron_sequential_1994,  
    title = {A {SEQUENTIAL} {CHOICE} {THEORY} {PERSPECTIVE} {ON}  
{LEGISLATIVE} {ORGANIZATION}},  
    volume = {19},  
    issn = {0362-9805},  
    doi = {10.2307/440427},  
    abstract = {This essay presents a sequential choice theory of  
legislative organization as an alternative to social choice theories.  
Because of the sequential process of proposal making and voting,  
sequential choice theory yields equilibrium predictions for both  
particularistic goods programs and unidimensional and multidimensional  
collective goods programs. The theory thus does not require
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legislative organization and procedures to yield stability. Although this study does not present a formal theory of the choice of legislative organization, sequential choice theory allows an assessment of collective and individualistic incentives for the choice of legislative organization and procedures. For example, the legislature has collective incentives to control individualistic incentives and can exercise control by allowing amendments to committee proposals. Sequential choice theory also addresses the durability issue that arises because current legislatures cannot bind future legislatures. In the theory, legislators position programs strategically to limit future changes.},

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    number = {2},
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@article{mishler_support_1994,
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    title = {{SUPPORT} {FOR} {PARLIAMENTS} {AND} {REGIMES} {IN} {THE}
{TRANSITION} {TOWARD} {DEMOCRACY}},
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    volume = {19},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.2307/439797},
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    abstract = {The generation and maintenance of public support is among the most important functions ascribed to legislatures in democratizing or newly democratic regimes. Survey data from six eastern European countries in transition from authoritarian to pluralistic regimes confirm that public support for legislatures is remarkably widespread. Predictably, support is highest among attentive publics and those most satisfied with the performance of the economy. However, the extent of support even among those most dissatisfied with the economy suggests that the basis of support is substantially symbolic or diffuse in nature. As was to be expected, the relationship between legislative and regime support is reciprocal, although support for legislatures is much more a consequence than a cause of support for the regime.},
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    number = {1},
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    author = {MISHLER, W. and ROSE, R.},
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{PROVINCIAL} {ASSEMBLIES} - {COMPARISON} {TO} {UNITED}-{STATES}}
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{STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439798},
  abstract = {The development of legislative professionalization is
well documented in U.S. state legislatures, where it is closely
associated with the advent of careerism. This association is partly
responsible for the term limit movement. In this paper we show that
Canadian provincial legislative assemblies have undergone a similar
trend toward professionalization but that careerism has been less
evident. Turnover rates are higher than under similar conditions in
U.S. state legislatures because the electoral advantage of incumbency
is substantially smaller in Canadian provincial elections. We identify
five reasons why incumbents are less advantaged in the Canadian
system.},
  number = {1},
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  author = {MONCRIEF, GF},
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  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100002},
  pages = {33--48}
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@article{opheim_effect_1994,
  title = {{THE} {EFFECT} {OF} {UNITED}-{STATES} {STATE}
{LEGISLATIVE} {TERM} {LIMITS} {REVISITED}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439799},
  abstract = {Research on how state legislative term limits affect
legislative organization and policy is primarily conjectural, since
these limits have been in place for only a short period. However, the
effects of retroactive term limits can be analyzed and can yield, with
some certainty, the impact of these limits on tenure. Using an earlier
study as a model, I develop a cohort analysis to assess how many state
legislators currently serving would be affected by a retroactive
eight-year term limit. I find that a majority of state legislators
both in states that have not adopted term limits and in the 15 states
that have adopted limits would be forced out of office. Variation in
retention rates is related to chamber, to Squire's opportunity type,
and to legislative professionalism, although the last factor does not
come into play as heavily in states where term limits already exist.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {OPHEIM, C.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100003},
  pages = {49--59}
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@article{krehbiel_deference_1994,
  title = {{DEFERENCE}, {EXTREMISM}, {AND} {INTEREST} {GROUP}
{RATINGS}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439800},
  abstract = {A clearer understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of measures of legislative preferences is essential for
resolving substantive disputes about the composition of standing
committees in legislatures. In criticizing interest group ratings as
measures of legislative preferences, two recent works make important
contributions to understanding these measures (Hall and Grofman 1990;
Snyder 1992a). However, some key methodological issues remain unclear
or unresolved. This paper first formalizes and inspects Hall and
Grofman's claim that interest group ratings bias tests of the
preference-outlier hypothesis to no-difference results when
noncommittee members treat committee proposals with deference. It then
examines Snyder's model of artificial extremism which leads to a
similar conjecture about no-difference results. Within a formal notion
of deference and empirically plausible conditions, Hall and Grofman's
claim is shown not to hold. While Snyder's claim (as Snyder also
notes) is shown not to hold in general, artificial extremism does tend
to produce the conjectured bias on average. The bias is small,
however, and the chance that it leads to faulty inferences is also
small.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {KREHBIEL, K.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100004},
  pages = {61--77}
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@article{shan_legislative_1994,
  title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {RESOURCES} {AND} {ELECTORAL} {MARGINS} -
{NEW}-{YORK}-{STATE} {SENATE}, 1950-1990},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439801},
  abstract = {It is widely argued that legislative resources enable
incumbents to increase their margins of victory. Changes within the
New York Senate provide an opportunity to assess this thesis. Within a
few years during the early 1970s, legislative resources increased
substantially and abruptly. The legislative budget increased, a
legislative office building opened, and district offices were
established. There were also strong political motivations for the
Senate legislative parties to become more concerned with retaining
incumbent legislators. This analysis assesses changes in electoral
margins from 1950 to 1990 and finds a distinct change in average

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margins of victory after the early 1970s. In addition, in the era after 1974, legislators experienced significantly larger sophomore surges. The greatest increases were among those whose initial elections were close, a finding which suggests that resources are targeted.},

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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {SHAN, CC and STONECASH, JM},
    month = feb,
    year = {1994},
    note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100005},
    pages = {79--93}
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@article{born_split-ticket_1994,
  title = {{SPLIT}-{TICKET} {VOTERS}, {DIVIDED} {GOVERNMENT}, {AND}
{FIORINA} {POLICY}-{BALANCING} {MODEL}},
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  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439802},
  abstract = {To account for the increase in divided government in
the United States, Fiorina has advanced a purposive theory of split-
ticket voting that emphasizes voters' desire to balance the relative
policy 'tremism of the Democratic and Republican parties. This study
uncovers little empirical evidence to substantiate the policy-
balancing model. Respondents' issue-scale placements of the president
and federal government challenge the premise that national policy is
perceived as a weighted average of the individual positions staked out
by the executive and congressional branches. More importantly,
conditional logit analysis in three of the five presidential-year
elections from 1972 to 1988 provides no support for Fiorina's central
tenet that voters will endorse the presidential-House pair for which
the averaged partisan position is closest to their own ideological
preference. Finally, there is only scattered support for the
propositions that are developed as logical 'tensions of this
theory.},
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  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  month = feb,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100006},
  pages = {95--115}
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@article{fiorina_split-ticket_1994,
  title = {{SPLIT}-{TICKET} {VOTERS}, {DIVIDED} {GOVERNMENT}, {AND}
{FIORINA} {POLICY}-{BALANCING} {MODEL} - {RESPONSE}},
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  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439803},
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    author = {FIORINA, MP},
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    year = {1994},
    note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100007},
    pages = {117--125}
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@article{born_split-ticket_1994-1,
  title = {{SPLIT}-TICKET {VOTERS}, {DIVIDED} {GOVERNMENT}, {AND}
{FIORINA} {POLICY}-BALANCING {MODEL} - REJOINER}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439804},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {BORN, R.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100008},
  pages = {126--129}
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@article{muller_executive-legislative_1993,
  title = {EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE {RELATIONS} {IN} {AUSTRIA} -
1945-1992},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439851},
  abstract = {This article analyzes changes in executive-
legislative relations in Austria over the postwar period. The
intragovernment mode and the opposition mode are identified as the
most important patterns of relations. Two explanations for the changes
within these relations are offered: increasing party system
competitiveness and the differing degrees of executive-legislative
competitiveness of the types of government in postwar Austria. While
both causes are relevant, it is primarily the government types that
have influenced executive-legislative relations and account for their
changes over time. Finally, the Austrian case is put into comparative
perspective. Its peculiar stress on consensus between government and
opposition is explained as a special form of political competition.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MULLER, WC},
  month = nov,
  year = {1993},
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100001},
  pages = {467--494}
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@article{cox_increasing_1993,  
  title = {{THE} {INCREASING} {ADVANTAGE} {OF} {INCUMBENCY} {IN}  
{THE} {UNITED}-{STATES} {STATES}},  
  volume = {18},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/439852},  
  abstract = {This paper uses district-level electoral returns to  
estimate the size of the incumbency advantage in 24 U.S. states over  
the period from 1970 to 1986. Our major findings are two: first, the  
incumbency advantage in the median state roughly doubled over the time  
period investigated; second, this increase can be explained in terms  
of the growth of legislative operating budgets and, by inference, in  
casework and other particularistic services provided by state  
legislators to their constituents.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {COX, GW and MORGENSTERN, S.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {1993},  
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100002},  
  pages = {495--514}  
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@article{gierzynski_money_1993,  
  title = {{MONEY} {AND} {THE} {PARTY} {VOTE} {IN} {STATE} {HOUSE}  
{ELECTIONS}},  
  volume = {18},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/439853},  
  abstract = {The research presented here is designed to answer  
some of the questions that remain regarding the impact of campaign  
expenditures on state legislative elections. Analysis of data from 12  
states indicates that there is a significant relationship between  
campaign expenditures and the party vote in state house elections. The  
effect of expenditures conforms to the principle of diminishing  
marginal returns. The relationship, in several states, attains a level  
that make expenditures among the most important factors in state house  
races. Finally, the analysis uncovers both interstate and partisan  
differences in the importance of expenditures, a finding that opens up  
a whole new set of research questions.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {GIERZYNSKI, A. and BREAUX, DA},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {1993},  
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100003},  
  pages = {515--533}  
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@article{biersack_seeds_1993,  
  title = {{SEEDS} {FOR} {SUCCESS} - {EARLY} {MONEY} {IN}
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{CONGRESSIONAL} {ELECTIONS}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439854},
  abstract = {Campaign professionals maintain that early money is
more valuable than money raised late in the campaign, because it
increases the success of later fund raising. We find that early fund
raising by House challengers does stimulate later receipts, especially
for those who lack experience in elected office. For these candidates,
early money from any source improves later fund raising from all
sources. For candidates who have held elected office, however, only
early money from individual contributors is a significant predictor of
later receipts from PACs.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {BIERSACK, R. and HERRNSON, PS and WILCOX, C.},
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@article{hamman_universalism_1993,
  title = {{UNIVERSALISM}, {PROGRAM}-{DEVELOPMENT}, {AND} {THE}
{DISTRIBUTION} {OF} {FEDERAL}-{ASSISTANCE}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439855},
  abstract = {This article treats universalization as a dynamic
process encompassing the administration of programs within the
political context of a policy subsystem. An analysis of federal mass
transportation programs from 1965 through 1986 finds that
subgovernment actors worked to broaden authorized programs and create
related programs to serve an original core clientele and newer
peripheral constituencies.},
  number = {4},
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{SILBEY}, {J}},
  volume = {18},
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{PATTERNS} {OF} {RECRUITMENT}, {LEADERSHIP}, {AND} {INTERNAL}  
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
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@article{francis_house_1993,  
    title = {{HOUSE} {TO} {SENATE} {CAREER} {MOVEMENT} {IN} {THE}  
{UNITED}-{STATES} {STATES} - {THE} {SIGNIFICANCE} {OF} {SELECTIVITY}},  
    volume = {18},  
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    doi = {10.2307/439828},
    abstract = {This article evaluates political career movement from
house to senate in U.S. state legislatures. The most distinguishing
feature of this movement is that house members are extraordinarily
successful when they do run, winning over four-fifths of their
campaigns for open seats and over two-thirds of the races against
senate incumbents. Their success is explained principally by their
selectivity in deciding whether to run. This analysis details the
rational basis for why House members are so selective.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {FRANCIS, WL},
    month = aug,
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@article{krashinsky_effects_1993,
    title = {{THE} {EFFECTS} {OF} {INCUMBENCY} {IN} {UNITED}-{STATES}
{CONGRESSIONAL} {ELECTIONS}, 1950-1988},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439829},
    abstract = {Using a random coefficients model and regression
analysis, the authors examine the effects of incumbency in U.S. House
and Senate elections since 1950. The model is based on assumptions
about the behavior of voters. A strong effect for incumbency is
demonstrated, amounting to at least 10 percentage points in the
popular vote in elections since 1974. Part of the effect occurs
because incumbents by definition do not run against incumbents. A
significant time trend emerges, and there is a significant difference
in the effect between presidential and nonpresidential years. The
effect is robust, being relatively insensitive to changes in the
specification of the underlying model. The model is also used to
examine changes over time in the attachment of voters to political
parties.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {KRASHINSKY, M. and MILNE, WJ},
    month = aug,
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@article{gilmour_early_1993,
    title = {{EARLY} {REPUBLICAN} {RETIREMENT} - {A} {CAUSE} {OF}
{DEMOCRATIC} {DOMINANCE} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE}-{OF}-{REPRESENTATIVES}},
    volume = {18},
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    doi = {10.2307/439830},
    abstract = {This paper proposes a new explanation for Democratic
dominance in the House of Representatives: the greater propensity of
Republicans to retire. A higher rate of retirement means that
Republicans sacrifice the advantages of incumbency and thereby reduce
the probability that the party will retain a seat after the election.
This factor depresses Republican strength in the House by an amount we
estimate at between 5 and 15 seats. In this paper we document the
phenomenon of early retirement among Republicans and explain the
relationship between retirement and party strength in legislatures. We
then develop a mathematical model to estimate a steady state or
equilibrium partisan balance in the House, based on long-term rates of
retirement, open-seat victories, and incumbent defeats. This model
allows us to estimate the overall impact of early Republican
retirement and other factors on partisan strength.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {GILMOUR, JB and ROTHSTEIN, P.},
    month = aug,
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@article{kenski_where_1993,
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{COMPONENTS} {OF} {THE} 1988 {SENATE} {VOTE}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439831},
    abstract = {Focusing on the 33 Senate races in 1988, this study
explores group differences in voting for Republican and Democratic
candidates. It assesses the extent to which support for Democratic
candidates varied as a function of race or ethnicity, gender, race,
religion, region, economic status, and union membership and estimates
the impact of each of these components on the Democratic coalition.
Explicit comparisons are drawn between these Senate election results
and counterpart results for the 1988 presidential election. The Senate
results are also disaggregated according to whether an incumbent
senator was standing for reelection and how competitive the race
was.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {KENSKI, HC and SIGELMAN, L.},
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    title = {{PAC} {CONTRIBUTIONS} {AND} {CONGRESSIONAL} {VOTING}
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439832},
    abstract = {This paper analyzes how PAC contributions from
defense contractors influence members' votes for prodefense positions
on the floor of the House of Representatives. Previous studies of
defense voting in Congress have emphasized the powerful effects of
ideological predispositions on members' roll-call votes on national
defense. By contrast, PAC contributions are hypothesized to have a
marginal impact. Even at the margins, the influence of PAC money is
not likely to be the same for all members; it is hypothesized to be
greater for moderate members than for liberal or conservative members.
Because of the problem of simultaneous influences of PAC money and
roll-call votes, a two-stage least squares estimation procedure is
employed. The results once again confirm the powerful effects of
ideology on defense voting but also indicate that PAC contributions
exert a statistically significant (though marginal) impact even when
ideological predisposition is controlled. In addition, the results
support the argument that those members with weaker ideological
predispositions are more responsive to the effects of PAC money.
Finally, the results indicate that, even at the margins, PAC
contributions from defense contractors can influence the outcome of
legislative deliberations, especially when the vote margin is not very
large.},
    number = {3},
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@article{flanagan_crime-control_1993,
    title = {{CRIME}-{CONTROL} {IDEOLOGY} {AMONG} {NEW}-{YORK}-
{STATE} {LEGISLATORS}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439833},
    abstract = {Survey research with members of the New York State
Legislature revealed support for differing views on crime causation
and control. Scales measuring support for liberal and conservative
perspectives toward crime and punishment were developed. Multivariate
analyses indicated that legislators' race, gender, and party
affiliation were consistent correlates of crime control ideology. The
characteristics of New York legislators that are associated with crime
control ideology have remained stable over time.},
    number = {3},
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    author = {FLANAGAN, TJ and COHEN, D. and BRENNAN, PG},
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@article{atkinson_studying_1993,
    title = {{STUDYING} {THE} {CANADIAN} {PARLIAMENT}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439834},
    abstract = {In recent years the study of the Canadian Parliament
has lost some of its original momentum. Major gaps in research have
begun to appear, and critics have argued that students of Parliament
take a much too docile, uncritical view of parliamentary government as
it is practiced in Canada. This article reviews recent research on the
Canadian Parliament in light of these criticisms and compares it to
more established work on the subject. The prospects are not as bleak
as the critics maintain, but the authors express concern that
Parliament may no longer pose the kind of intellectual challenge that
attracted researchers in previous generations.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {ATKINSON, MM and THOMAS, PG},
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{APPROPRIATIONS} ({VOL} 18, {PG} 56, 1993)},
    volume = {18},
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    number = {2},
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{CHAMBER} {OF} {DEPUTIES} - {PARLIAMENT}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    abstract = {The permanent, or standing, committees of the Italian

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Parliament have remained largely unexplored by empirical research. This lack of attention reflects the conventional view that the Italian legislature has not developed institutional autonomy, complexity, and stability. This article begins to examine legislative behaviour in committees and explore whether informal rules and patterns may be traced. Evidence suggests that deputies have begun to make full use of the range of formal powers at their disposal. Moreover, some institutional specialization and complexity seems to be taking shape within the committee system, raising questions as to whether the problem of Parliament is still that of its institutionalization.},

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  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439990},
  abstract = {This research reviews techniques for measuring
constituency opinion in policy congruence analyses. It introduces a
new use of referenda votes for investigation of state-national policy
linkages in the Progressive Era. Findings demonstrate the importance
of constituency opinion and of regional and partisan influences in
nationalizing major legislation in three policy areas: labor, woman
suffrage, and prohibition. Analysis of historical congruency patterns
also illustrates the complex interrelationships between democratic
processes and policy outcomes, parallelling contemporary concerns.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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{IN} {CONGRESS} - {A} {VIEW} {FROM} {THE} {COMMITTEES}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439991},
  abstract = {The search for party influence in the U.S. Congress
has focused on floor voting patterns. By shifting the focus of
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attention to the committee setting, this paper shows that previous measures of party influence have generally underestimated the strength of parties in Congress and have invariably presented a simplified version of their activity. Measures of party conflict, unity, and success in four House committees show that, in the differentiated committee system, parties structure voting differently across decision-making environments and are stronger than on the floor. In the legislative environment of the 1980s, voting patterns in all committees and on the floor converged toward partisanship, even as electoral and organizational indicators of party remained relatively weak.},

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{RETIREMENT} - {EVIDENCE} {FROM} {THE} 1980S},  
  volume = {18},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/439992},  
  abstract = {An early scholarly consensus that congressional  
retirements would become increasingly rare as careerism became the  
norm was upset by the surge of retirements in the 1970s. This surge  
led a second wave of theorists to argue that retirements would  
increase in response to a growing disaffection with congressional  
service. Using House and Senate data from the 1980s, we update and  
critique these analyses of congressional retirements. We conclude that  
the 1970s were in fact an aberration. The evidence of the 1980s  
supports earlier explanations of retirement and scholars' more general  
understanding of congressional behavior: the vast majority of members  
seek continued reelection. Retirements are relatively rare, and, to  
the extent that they are systemically driven, are responses to age,  
institutional characteristics, and electoral difficulties. We present  
a model of congressional retirement that uses a discriminant analysis  
and incorporates these factors and their interactions.},
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    title = {{CONSERVATIVE} {COALITION} {SUPPORT} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE}-
{OF}}-{{REPRESENTATIVES}}, 1963-1988},
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    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439993},
    abstract = {Research on the Conservative Coalition has focused
primarily on collective activity and aggregate outcomes. To understand
change in coalition activity over time, this study explores age,
period, and cohort effects. When party is controlled and longitudinal,
cross-sectional, and time-lag differences are explored, period effects
stand out as important determinants of coalition voting. Findings also
indicate that the support of nonsouthern Democrats for the coalition
varies considerably over time.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {NYE, MA},
    month = may,
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    note = {WOS:A1993LA89800006},
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@article{franklin_senate_1993,
    title = {{SENATE} {INCUMBENT} {VISIBILITY} {OVER} {THE}
{ELECTION} {CYCLE}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439994},
    abstract = {Candidate visibility has become a key variable in the
study of congressional elections. There is ample evidence that
visibility is a substantial advantage, one which almost always favors
incumbents. In this paper I trace the visibility of members of the
U.S. Senate between their bids for reelection and over their political
careers. I find that there is a moderate drop off of visibility near
the midpoint of a Senate term, and a fairly sizable rise in prominence
in the two years leading up to a reelection bid. Yet, even in the
middle of the term, incumbent senators remain quite salient in the
minds of the public. Over an entire career, visibility cumulates for
some perceptions and does not cumulate much for others. This
differential accretion of visibility may have important consequences.
Finally, I argue for the need to study perceptions of incumbents
outside of the election period. The time of governing is at the center
of a republican society, yet we have few studies of how governing is
linked to public perceptions of incumbents.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {FRANKLIN, CH},
    month = may,
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@article{caldeira_political_1993,  
  title = {{POLITICAL} {RESPECT} {IN} {THE} {LEGISLATURE}},  
  volume = {18},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440024},  
  abstract = {The legislature is a collective decision-making body  
in which patterns of interpersonal esteem or mutual respect provide a  
foundation for purposive action. We map the networks of legislators'  
choices of respected members among their colleagues, and then we  
elaborate and test a model of interpersonal respect. The coefficients  
in the model are estimated from data drawn from interviews in 1965  
with Iowa state legislators. We demonstrate that respect rests largely  
upon performance, achievement, and formal position, that the bases of  
respect differ from those of political friendship in important ways,  
that Democrats and Republicans accord colleagues respect on the basis  
of different criteria, and that freshman and veteran members respond  
to different forces in nominating respected members.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {CALDEIRA, GA and CLARK, JA and PATTERSON, SC},  
  month = feb,  
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@article{costantini_party_1993,  
  title = {{PARTY} {REGISTRATION} {AND} {PARTY} {VOTE} -  
{DEMOCRATIC} {FALL}-{OFF} {IN} {LEGISLATIVE} {ELECTIONS}},  
  volume = {18},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440025},  
  abstract = {This paper examines the relationship between  
legislative election outcomes in California and the partisan  
predispositions of district electorates as reflected in voter  
registration data. It gauges the extent to which Democratic candidates  
for Congress and the state legislature over a two-decade period have  
failed to receive election-day support commensurate with their party's  
district registration, and it considers how this shortfall is affected  
by a series of intervening variables. The analysis develops and tests  
criteria by which political practitioners and observers can assess the  
electability of legislative candidates. Further, it addresses such  
issues as incumbency effects, the relative weakness of the legislative  
candidates of the president's party in midterm elections, and nascent  
Republican realignment beginning with the 1980 election.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {COSTANTINI, E. and DANNEHL, C.},  
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    year = {1993},
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{APPROPRIATIONS}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440026},
  abstract = {To obtain additional funding after regular
appropriations have been enacted, the president submits requests for
supplemental appropriations to the Congress. Supplemental
appropriations have been considered technical adjustments to various
unpredictables and have received little attention in studies of the
budgetary process. This study addresses the determinants of
supplemental appropriations between fiscal years 1950 and 1989. The
analysis reveals that supplemental appropriations have been used
regularly both for discretionary purposes and to maintain the
budgetary status quo. Ultimately, the need for and use of supplemental
appropriations are much more substantial and politically defined than
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{POLICY} {MASTERY}},
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  abstract = {State legislators have been moving into the House of
Representatives with increasing frequency over the last 30 years. They
enter the House with mastery over both institutional politics and
particular areas of public policy, and they use this mastery to
rapidly attain committee positions from which they can promote policy
ideas developed from their state experiences. The extent of this
mastery and their specific policy interests are shaped by the degree
to which their state legislature is professionalized, the committee
positions they held in the state, and their activeness in state policy
making. Through interviews and analysis of committee assignments, four
types of former state legislators in the House are identified: policy
masters, policy participants, voluntary switchers, and disappointed
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switchers.},
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Representatives on aid to the Nicaraguan contras during the 98th,
99th, and 100th Congresses, in order to examine three theoretical
issues: the importance of ideology as a determinant of congressional
voting behavior, the relative importance of conversion and member
replacement in explaining congressional policy shifts, and the impact
of changes in contextual factors on members' voting decisions. As in
many recent studies of defense and foreign policy issues, the member's
ideology proved to be the predominant factor in explaining contra aid
votes. Party and region were also significant, but the constituency's
ideology and the electoral vulnerability of members were not. Though
membership replacement was a key factor in the shifting balance
between the pro-contra and anti-contra blocs, replacement alone was
not sufficient to explain changes in the House majority. Conversion
was equally important and proved to be a function of President
Reagan's standing in the polls and of events in central America that
altered the political atmosphere of the debate. Public opinion on the
contra aid issue and the content of aid proposals showed no effect.},
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office are now studying the effects that electoral institutions have
on female representation. Within the United States, a number of
scholars have considered the effect of district magnitude on female
representation in state legislatures. A controversy exists as to
whether women are better represented in systems with multimember
districts than in those with single-member districts only. This
article presents the theoretical reasons why multimember districts
should give women an advantage, reviews the empirical literature,
proposes several hypotheses that would reconcile the inconsistent
results in the empirical literature, and then tests those hypotheses
in two states over a 22-year period. The results provide strong
confirmation of the effect of district magnitude and cast serious
doubt on those studies which show little effect. In closing, the
authors suggest that their findings have important public policy
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female candidates in open-seat primary elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives from 1968 through 1990. Female candidates throughout
this period tend to do as well as their male counterparts in acquiring
votes and winning open-seat primaries. They are not appreciatively
older than their male challengers, and they have had equal experience
in public office prior to seeking a seat in the U.S. House. The fact
that women hold few seats in the House is primarily due to the
scarcity of their numbers in these races.},
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legislators to actively represent women and women's concerns? A
behavioral approach to this question might examine the legislators'
roll-call votes and policy priorities. This article, instead, takes an
attitudinal approach, focusing on legislators' predispositions that
may or may not lead to active representation of women. Using data
gathered primarily from interviews with California and Arizona state
legislators, we find that female legislators are, indeed, more likely
than their male counterparts to think of themselves as representatives
of women and to consider women an important constituency group with
particular political concerns. Evidence also suggests that female
legislators tend to believe that, because of their gender, they are
uniquely qualified to or responsible for representing women's
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concerns. More importantly, they are more likely to accept this notion than their male colleagues are to reject it. Finally, interstate differences in these attitudes suggest that the entire issue of political representation of women is more salient in the California legislature than in Arizona legislature.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {REINGOLD, B.},
    month = nov,
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    pages = {509--537}
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@article{hedlund_electoral_1992,
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    title = {{THE} {ELECTORAL} {ANTECEDENTS} {OF} {STATE}
{LEGISLATIVE} {COMMITTEE} {ASSIGNMENTS}},
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    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439865},
    abstract = {In this analysis, data on committee assignment
requests for four state legislatures are analyzed to test the
reelection hypothesis-that legislators receive committee assignments
which help insure their subsequent reelection. In Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Maine, we gathered committee request data for
lower house members elected in 1986. Election data derive from State
Legislative Election Returns in the United States, 1968-86, a data
collection of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research. In general, the analytical results disconfirm the reelection
hypothesis but show that legislators' strategic decisions have
important effects on committee assignment success.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {HEDLUND, RD and PATTERSON, SC},
    month = nov,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992KC05900004},
    pages = {539--559}
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@article{platt_directional_1992,
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{VOTING}-{BEHAVIOR} - {A} {LEGISLATIVE} {COMPARISON}},
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    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439866},
    abstract = {Recent research by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989)
claims that voting behavior is better accounted for by a directional
model than by a traditional proximity or Euclidean model. This paper
compares directional and Euclidean models using congressional roll-
call voting data. For these relatively well-informed voters, we can
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unambiguously reject the directional model in favor of the traditional Euclidean spatial model. We conclude that congressional voting can indeed be very accurately represented by the Euclidean model.},

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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {PLATT, G. and POOLE, KT and ROSENTHAL, H.},
    month = nov,
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    note = {WOS:A1992KC05900005},
    pages = {561--572}
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@article{hickman_effect_1992,
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    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439867},
    abstract = {This research tests the hypothesis that Japanese Lower House (multimember) districts with more open seats attract more strong challengers. Lower House incumbents are reelected at higher percentage rates than challengers are elected. Using data for the 10 most recent elections to the Lower House (1963-90), measures appropriate to the medium-sized district, single-entry ballot electoral system were constructed for the proportion of open seats and the effective number of strong challengers in each district. Analysis shows that strong challengers enter district races in proportion to the opportunities presented by open seats.},
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    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {HICKMAN, J.},
    month = nov,
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    note = {WOS:A1992KC05900006},
    pages = {573--584}
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@article{coats_note_1992,
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    title = {A {NOTE} {ON} {THE} {COST} {OF} {STANDING} {FOR} {THE}
{BRITISH} {PARLIAMENT} - 1852-1880},
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    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439868},
    abstract = {It has been noted that the cost of running for a county parliamentary seat in nineteenth-century Britain was about twice the cost of running for a borough seat. Since there were no residency requirements and no difference in political power between the borough and county MPs, this persistent price discrepancy needs explanation. Higher informational costs in the counties may have led to fewer contested elections.},
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    number = {4},
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    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {COATS, RM and DALTON, TR},
    month = nov,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992KC05900007},
    pages = {585--593}
}

@article{snyder_artificial_1992,
  title = {{ARTIFICIAL} {EXTREMISM} {IN} {INTEREST} {GROUP}
{RATINGS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439733},
  abstract = {This paper shows that interest group ratings based on
roll-call voting records tend to exaggerate the degree of extremism
and bipolarity in Congress. That is, the scores assigned to relatively
moderate members of Congress are typically more extreme than their
true positions. The paper then examines some of the implications of
this bias for empirical studies that use ratings.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SNYDER, JM},
  month = aug,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992JK65400001},
  pages = {319--345}
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@article{canon_party_1992,
  title = {{PARTY} {SYSTEM} {CHANGE} {AND} {POLITICAL} {CAREER}
{STRUCTURES} {IN} {THE} {UNITED}-{STATES} {CONGRESS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439734},
  abstract = {We join concerns with party system change, ambition
theory, and political career structures in a comparative analysis of
the realignments of the 1930s, the Civil War period, and recent
changes in the South. To understand the relationships among elections,
party system change, and policy change, research must focus on the
strategic responses of politicians to electoral change. Our findings
indicate that politicians' interpretations of developing events and
their decisions about how to react in light of their career goals are
integral elements of the realigning process.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {CANON, DT and SOUSA, DJ},
  month = aug,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992JK65400002},
  pages = {347--363}
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@article{grofman_effect_1992,  
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{DEMOCRATS} {AND} {LIBERALS} {TO} {THE} {HOUSE}-{OF}-  
{REPRESENTATIVES}},  
  volume = {17},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/439735},  
  abstract = {We examine the relationships between black population  
and congressional liberalism over three decades, disaggregated by  
region (South, non-South). We show that different types of  
constituency effects have applied in different periods and in  
different regions of the country. Our work is unique in looking at the  
potential political implications of districting schemes that either  
concentrate or disperse black population across congressional  
districts. We show how such redistricting choices might be expected to  
affect mean congressional liberalism and to affect the likelihood that  
Democrats will be elected to the House of Representatives in the  
1990s. We also explore the claim that creating majority black  
districts reduces the mean policy liberalism of Congress by leading to  
Republican and conservative gains in districts that have been stripped  
of black voters.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {GROFMAN, B. and GRIFFIN, R. and GLAZER, A.},  
  month = aug,  
  year = {1992},  
  note = {WOS:A1992JK65400003},  
  pages = {365--379}  
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@article{pritchard_strategic_1992,  
  title = {{STRATEGIC} {CONSIDERATIONS} {IN} {THE} {DECISION} {TO}  
{CHALLENGE} {A} {STATE} {LEGISLATIVE} {INCUMBENT}},  
  volume = {17},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/439736},  
  abstract = {This study seeks to explain why some state  
legislative incumbents draw challengers and others do not. To that  
end, it analyzes decisions to challenge in races for the Florida House  
of Representatives between 1972 and 1980. Although it finds little  
evidence of strategic decision making among challengers in primary  
elections, incumbents who appear to be vulnerable are more likely to  
be challenged in the general election. The conditions which are less  
directly under an incumbent's influence are more likely to influence  
decisions to challenge.},  
  number = {3},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {PRITCHARD, A.},  
  month = aug,
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    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992JK65400004},
    pages = {381--393}
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@article{luttbeg_validity_1992,
    title = {{THE} {VALIDITY} {AND} {ELECTORAL} {IMPACT} {OF} {MEDIA}
{ESTIMATIONS} {OF} {BEST} {OR} {WORST} {STATE} {LEGISLATORS}},
    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439737},
    abstract = {Many news organizations have ranked or rated state
legislators in their state as "best" or "most effective" and "worst"
or "least effective," sometimes using several groups of informants,
such as legislators, lobbyists, agency heads, and capital
correspondents. Other organizations merely give the impressions of
reporters. Obviously those rated worst are displeased with this
evaluation and at least somewhat anxious as to what it will mean when
they next face an election. This study assesses the validity of these
rankings and their impact at the polls. The media rankings cannot be
dismissed as invalid, and legislators cannot dismiss their impact at
the polls. It helps to be ranked as among the best and it hurts to be
among the worst, although the effects are small.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {LUTTBEG, NR},
    month = aug,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992JK65400005},
    pages = {395--408}
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@article{thompson_party_1992,
    title = {{PARTY} {AND} {PAC} {CONTRIBUTIONS} {TO} {NORTH}-
{CAROLINA} {LEGISLATIVE} {CANDIDATES}},
    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/439738},
    abstract = {In this research note we investigate the sources and
distribution of campaign funds for state legislative candidates in
North Carolina, a state categorized by relatively strong interest
groups and weak political parties. Consistent with previous studies,
we find that political action committees (PACs) contribute more money
and a larger proportion of funds to incumbents. In addition, PACs
favor legislative leaders. Conversely, the state Republican party's
strategy appears to be one of funding challengers in close races and
assisting incumbents in competitive districts.},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {THOMPSON, JA and CASSIE, W.},
    month = aug,

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    year = {1992},
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    pages = {409--416}
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@article{lindsay_foreign_1992,
  title = {{FOREIGN} {AND} {DEFENSE} {POLICY} {IN} {CONGRESS} - {A}
{RESEARCH} {AGENDA} {FOR} {THE} 1990S},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439739},
  abstract = {Since the end of the Vietnam War Congress has
reclaimed a role for itself in the making of U.S. foreign and defense
policy. Although the surge in congressional activism has attracted
considerable normative commentary, political scientists have devoted
relatively little effort to exploring the causes and consequences of
Congress's renewed interest in foreign policy. To stimulate more
empirical study in this area, this paper summarizes the existing work
on foreign and defense policy in Congress and identifies opportunities
for new research.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {LINDSAY, JM and RIPLEY, RB},
  month = aug,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992JK65400007},
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@article{andeweg_executive-legislative_1992,
  title = {{EXECUTIVE}-{LEGISLATIVE} {RELATIONS} {IN} {THE}
{NETHERLANDS} - {CONSECUTIVE} {AND} {COEXISTING} {PATTERNS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440056},
  abstract = {In many Dutch and comparative studies of executive-
legislative relations the Dutch case eludes straightforward
classification. Application of King's typology of modes of executive-
legislative relations shows that the pattern of interactions between
ministers and MPs has evolved from a primarily nonparty mode to a
predominantly interparty mode. However, Dutch executive-legislative
relations appear ambiguous primarily because all modes still exist to
some extent, and Parliament can change gear according to the type of
issue that is on the agenda.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {ANDEWEG, RB},
  month = may,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HX03600001},
  pages = {161--182}
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@article{clarke_national_1992,  
  title = {{DO} {NATIONAL} {ELECTIONS} {AFFECT} {PERCEPTIONS} {OF}  
{MP} {RESPONSIVENESS} - {A} {NOTE}},  
  volume = {17},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440057},  
  abstract = {This paper uses 1979-90 national cross-sectional and  
panel data to investigate how the public perceives Canadian MPs'  
representational activities and how these perceptions are influenced  
by the occurrence and outcomes of national elections. Responsiveness  
perceptions are structured in terms of two closely related  
representation and service factors. Although the occurrence of  
elections and identification with the winning national party  
positively influence these perceptions, the effects are modest and, in  
the aggregate, large majorities of Canadians express reservations  
about the responsiveness of MPs. The paper concludes by arguing that  
structural features of the Canadian political system and the brevity  
of parliamentary careers make it difficult for MPs to develop images  
as responsive public servants while leaving them exposed to the free-  
floating discontent that characterizes Canadians' feelings about  
politics and politicians.},  
  number = {2},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {CLARKE, HD and KORNBERG, A.},  
  month = may,  
  year = {1992},  
  note = {WOS:A1992HX03600002},  
  pages = {183--204}  
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@article{hall_measuring_1992,  
  title = {{MEASURING} {LEGISLATIVE} {INFLUENCE}},  
  volume = {17},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440058},  
  abstract = {The study of legislative influence has suffered from  
serious conceptual and methodological problems, and as a result  
important theoretical claims on the subject have proven difficult to  
evaluate. In this paper, I present a technique for measuring  
legislative influence based on a simple survey instrument administered  
to congressional staffers. The instrument elicits information about  
the effect of individual members' preferences on the substance of  
specific pieces of legislation. The measure is simple, is easy to  
administer, and squares well with how legislative scholars typically  
use the concept of influence, while avoiding many of the analytical  
problems associated with general reputational rankings or indicators  
derived from behavioral data. The measure stands up well under  
systematic tests of reliability and validity. And it is applicable to  
a wide range of bills for which plausible assumptions or reasonable
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inferences about member preferences are not easily made.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {HALL, RL},
  month = may,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HX03600003},
  pages = {205--231}
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@article{serra_electoral_1992,
  title = {{THE} {ELECTORAL} {CONSEQUENCES} {OF} {PERQUISITE} {USE}
- {THE} {CASEWORK} {CASE}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440059},
  abstract = {The belief is widespread that incumbents have
enhanced their bid for reelection by using the perquisites of office
skillfully. The evidence supporting this belief is mixed, however.
This study begins by examining how a particular perquisite, casework,
affects incumbent saliency and reputation among constituents. Within
an appropriate research design, the study finds that an incumbent's
ombudsman service creates a more positive evaluation of the incumbent
and increases the incumbent's saliency among constituents. These
results are incorporated into a model used to predict the electoral
consequences of perquisite use. The model suggests that perquisites
have most impact in constituencies in which a relatively small
proportion of voters identify with incumbent's party.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SERRA, G. and COVER, AD},
  month = may,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HX03600004},
  pages = {233--246}
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@article{squire_challenger_1992,
  title = {{CHALLENGER} {QUALITY} {AND} {VOTING}-{BEHAVIOR} {IN}
{UNITED}-{STATES} {SENATE} {ELECTIONS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440060},
  abstract = {A number of aggregate-level studies find that
challenger quality is an important variable in explaining
congressional election outcomes. Using the National Election Studies'
1988 Senate Election Study, I provide individual-level evidence
supporting this claim. I develop and test measures of two aspects of
challenger quality, one based on political experience and the other on
campaign skills. Senate challengers who hold higher profile offices
and those who are good campaigners are better known and better liked
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by voters and are much more likely to get votes, even with partisanship and campaign spending controlled. The findings reaffirm that candidates and campaigns matter in explaining election outcomes.},

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {SQUIRE, P.},
month = may,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992HX03600005},
pages = {247--263}

}

@article{clucas_legislative_1992,

title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {LEADERSHIP} {AND} {CAMPAIGN} {SUPPORT} {IN} {CALIFORNIA}},

volume = {17},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.2307/440061},

abstract = {This article argues that legislative leaders are rational goal-seeking actors but, unlike other legislators, they are motivated preeminently by the desire to retain power. To test this argument, the article examines the strategy used by California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown in distributing campaign support from 1982 to 1986. The findings indicate that Brown has followed a strategy different from the one traditionally associated with congressional leaders but that both act rationally to retain power. The difference in strategy is attributed to the state's control of reapportionment, which puts pressure on the Speaker to maximize his party's position in the Assembly.},

number = {2},

journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},

author = {CLUCAS, RA},

month = may,

year = {1992},

note = {WOS:A1992HX03600006},

pages = {265--283}

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@article{ellickson_pathways_1992,

title = {{PATHWAYS} {TO} {LEGISLATIVE} {SUCCESS} - {A} {PATH} {ANALYTIC} {STUDY} {OF} {THE} {MISSOURI} {HOUSE}-{OF}-{REPRESENTATIVES}},

volume = {17},

issn = {0362-9805},

doi = {10.2307/440062},

abstract = {A causal model depicting personal, environmental, and institutional pathways to legislative success is developed and tested with data drawn from the 1987-88 Missouri House of Representatives. With legislative success conceptualized as a multistep process ending in bill passage, direct paths to success include political party,

seniority, formal office, age, race, and educational level. Institutional variables have the strongest impact on legislative success and environmental factors the weakest. Age, urbanism, seniority, and political party affect legislative success indirectly through their effect on formal office, an intervening variable. The results of the path analysis provide strong support for the proposed model, with over 50\% of the variance in legislative success explained by antecedent variables.},

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    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {ELLICKSON, MC},
    month = may,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HX03600007},
    pages = {285--302}
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@article{vanroozendaal_effect_1992,
  title = {{THE} {EFFECT} {OF} {DOMINANT} {AND} {CENTRAL} {PARTIES}
{ON} {CABINET} {COMPOSITION} {AND} {DURABILITY}}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This article develops a typology of parliamentary
games on the basis of the combined presence or absence of parties that
are dominant and central players in the game. The author uses the
typology to derive predictions with regard to cabinet composition and
durability and tests these predictions with data on 382 cabinets in
western multiparty democracies (1918-88). The results show that the
approach developed here offers a promising perspective for further
research on cabinet composition and durability.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {VANROOZENDAAL, P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HK23900001},
  pages = {5--36}
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@article{moncrief_for_1992,
  title = {{FOR} {WHOM} {THE} {BELL} {TOLLS} - {TERM} {LIMITS}
{AND} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440079},
  abstract = {The move to limit terms of office for state
legislators is one of the most important political phenomena of this
decade. Oklahoma, Colorado, and California passed term limitation
measures in 1990, and about 40 more states considered such action in
1991. This note is an initial effort to assess the potential effect of
enacting such limitations. We develop a cohort analysis to measure how
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many of the legislators currently serving would be affected by term limitations. We find that most state legislators do not stay in the institution for as long as 12 years. Variation in retention rates is related to chamber (house or senate), to Squire's opportunity type, and especially to legislative professionalism.},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {MONCRIEF, GF and THOMPSON, JA and HADDON, M. and HOYER, R.},
month = feb,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992HK23900002},
pages = {37--47}
}

@article{luttbeg_legislative_1992,
title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {CAREERS} {IN} 6 {STATES} - {ARE} {SOME} {LEGISLATURES} {MORE} {LIKELY} {TO}},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440080},
abstract = {We expect more responsiveness to the public in a more competitive political system. This paper focuses on the careers of members of the lower houses of six state legislatures to see how states differ in the competition that legislators typically experience over a career. On many of the measures, states differ as we might expect given previous research on political party competition. All six states lose experienced legislators quickly; few legislators stay beyond 12 years in office. More leave voluntarily than because of electoral defeat. These findings raise the question who is less responsive: the legislator willing to retire voluntarily or the secure incumbent?},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {LUTTBEG, NR},
editor = {RESPONSIVE},
month = feb,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992HK23900003},
pages = {49--68}
}

@article{squire_legislative_1992,
title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {PROFESSIONALIZATION} {AND} {MEMBERSHIP} {DIVERSITY} {IN} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440081},
abstract = {Proponents of state legislative professionalization thought it would increase membership diversity. I assess whether this expectation has been met by examining the relationship between the

level of professionalization and the numbers of blacks, women, and various occupational groups elected to the state legislature. I begin by proposing a new measurement of professionalization, one which uses the United States Congress as a baseline against which to measure the salary, staff, and time in session of all 50 state legislatures. Level of professionalization is found to be positively related to the percentage of blacks in a legislature but negatively related to the proportion of women serving. Occupational diversity also decreases as level of professionalization increases, because more members identify their occupation as full-time legislator.},

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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {SQUIRE, P.},
    month = feb,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HK23900004},
    pages = {69--79}
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@article{nye_civil-rights_1992,
  title = {{CIVIL}-{RIGHTS} {SUPPORT} - {A} {COMPARISON} {OF}
{SOUTHERN} {AND} {BORDER} {STATE} {REPRESENTATIVES}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440082},
  abstract = {This article examines the support for civil rights
bills among members of the U.S. House from southern and border states
over a 20-year period. In the 1960s, members from the deep South were
considerably more opposed to black civil rights than were
representatives from the rim South or border states. Over time, the
distinctiveness of the deep South from the rim South has largely
eroded. The deep South continues to be more conservative on civil
rights than the border states, although differences have moderated.
For most legislative sessions, party is a significant predictor, with
Democrats more liberal than Republicans. Even in the deep South,
Democrats are now more supportive of black civil rights than are
Republicans.},
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    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {NYE, MA and BULLOCK, CS},
    month = feb,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HK23900005},
    pages = {81--94}
}
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@article{rieselbach_actors_1992,
  title = {{ACTORS}, {ATHLETES}, {AND} {ASTRONAUTS} - {POLITICAL}
{AMATEURS} {IN} {THE} {UNITED}-{STATES}-{CONGRESS} - {CANON},{DT}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
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    doi = {10.2307/440083},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {RIESELBACH, LN},
    month = feb,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HK23900007},
    pages = {95--111}
}

@article{rieselbach_new_1992,
  title = {{NEW} {WAYS}-{AND}-{MEANS} - {REFORM} {AND} {CHANGE}
{IN} {A} {CONGRESSIONAL} {COMMITTEE} - {STRAHAN},{R}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440083},
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