Collaboration plays a key role in crafting good public policy. We use a novel data set of over 140,000 pieces of legislation considered in US state legislatures in 2015 to examine the factors associated with women's collaboration with each other. We articulate a theory that women's collaboration arises from opportunity structures, dictated by an interaction of individual and institutional characteristics. Examining the effect of a combination of characteristics, we find support for an interactive view of institutions, where women's caucuses accelerate collaboration in Democratic-controlled bodies and as the share of women increases. Collaboration between women also continues in the face of increased polarization in the presence of a caucus, but not absent one. Our findings speak to the long-term consequences of electing women to political office, the importance of institutions and organizations in shaping legislative behavior, and the institutionalization of gender in politics.

As the role of US congressional parties in the legislative process has increased, so has the importance of understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican House leaders with their rank-and-file. We consider how members' characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords. Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members' attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so.
Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party-building activity.

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll-call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll-call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine legislators conducted in 2007-08. Our findings indicate that partisanship is the most important determinant of legislative voting, leaving little room for personal ideological position to affect legislators' behavior.

Selection and Incentives in the Electoral Security-Constituency Communication Relationship

The relative importance of selection and incentives is essential for understanding how elections structure politicians' behavior. I investigate the relative magnitudes of these two effects in the context of US House members' constituency communication. Consistent with previous research, I find that there is a negative
cross-sectional relationship between electoral security and the intensity of constituency communication. The negative relationship holds in a panel-data setting where only within-legislator variation in electoral security is used to identify the effect of electoral security on legislator behavior. Due to the likely presence of myopic voters, the impact of electoral security increases as the election approaches. Point estimates suggest that the total effect is almost entirely driven by incentives, and I am able to reject the hypothesis that the incentive effect is zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.

@article{heuwieser_submissive_2018,
  title = {Submissive {Lobby} {Fodder} or {Assertive} {Political} {Actors}? {Party} {Loyalty} of {Career} {Politicians} in the {UK} {House} of {Commons}, 2005-15},
  volume = {43},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12184},
  abstract = {Are career politician members of parliament (MPs) more or less likely to vote against the party line than their peers? Despite growing interest in the behavior of career politicians across parliamentary systems, answers to this question are marked by considerable theoretical and empirical uncertainty. I derive the two most common (but opposing) behavioral predictions before testing them over all legislative votes of two UK House of Commons terms (2005-15) using multilevel modeling of new and disaggregated data on MPs' occupational backgrounds. The finding that career politicians are more likely to rebel challenges conventional wisdom and provides an important empirical foundation for the ongoing debate.}
}

@article{hassell_principled_2018,
  title = {Principled {Moderation}: {Understanding} {Parties}' {Support} of {Moderate} {Candidates}},
  volume = {43},
  issn = {0362-9805},
}
Recent scholarship has argued that parties strategically support more moderate, and thus more electable, candidates. Using interviews with party elites and new data on the party support and the ideology of primary candidates for the US Senate, I show that parties do support moderate candidates. However, using evidence from districts with different levels of competitiveness and over time, I find that support of moderate candidates appears not to be strategic. Rather, party support of moderate candidates appears to be the result of the ideological preferences of party leadership rather a strategic effort to win elections.

In response to my characterization of ideological congruence as an illusion, Powell (this issue) demonstrates that incongruence, while common, tends to be only moderate in most cases, a conclusion with which I agree. Nevertheless, I argue that the concept of ideological congruence is misleading when applied as Powell does, and problematic, if not meaningless, when applied in the alternative ways proposed by Best, Budge, and McDonald. For these reasons, the term continues to obscure more than it reveals.

We endorse G. Bingham Powell's cautionary corrective to challenge Paul Warwick's conclusions that the median mandate thesis needs to be jettisoned because there is not a close match between
median voter and government left-right positions. More to the point, however, we go beyond Powell's mild caution to challenge Warwick's rejection more assertively and thoroughly. We show his rejection mistakes responsiveness for congruence, misapprehends how and why the median mandate thesis distinguishes between those two concepts, and fails to take account of a measurement artifact associated with his survey data.

@article{powell_ideological_2018,
  title = {Ideological {Congruence}: {Illusion} or {Imperfection}?},
  volume = {43},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12177},
  abstract = {Paul Warwick () argues that much of the research on ideological congruence leaves the erroneous impression that a close match of median left-right voter opinions and government ideological positions usually emerges from elections. I propose further clarifications. I offer a natural metric based on the average distances from the median voter of the most distant and the closest parties competing in all these countries' elections. I suggest that by these standards average ideological congruence in the Western liberal democracies in the last 20 years has been fairly successful, but not as successful as it could be.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Powell, G. Bingham},
  month = feb,
  year = {2018},
  note = {WOS:000425469900002},
  pages = {21--32}
}

@article{powell_comment_2018,
  title = {Comment on {Symposium}: "{Ideological} {Congruence}: {Illusion} or {Imperfection}?"},
  volume = {43},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12180},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Powell, G. Bingham},
  month = feb,
  year = {2018},
  note = {WOS:000425469900003},
  pages = {11--20}
}
Extant literature demonstrates that holding public office is financially lucrative. Yet little is known about which sitting legislators profit from office. Relying on original data of members of the Florida legislature, I estimate predictors of income growth among sitting legislators. I find that legislators whose vote share increases by 10 percentage points between elections report income growth of nearly $20,000. This finding is robust to estimation technique and model specification, indicating that electoral safety is tied to income growth. Lawmakers appointed to legislative posts with agenda-setting power do not obtain additional income. These data demonstrate the market values of electorally dominant legislators.

Congress packages pork-barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll-call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home-state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within-legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.
In bicameral legislatures, the protection of small states often motivates the malapportionment of the upper house. Using a legislative bargaining model, I show that malapportionment may produce the opposite effect. Under unicameralism, same-state legislators are shown to not inherently be coordinated to cooperate, diminishing the fear of a big-state conspiracy. By contrast, under bicameralism, preference complementarities enable upper-house legislators to effectively coordinate their state delegations, and this skews the expected allocation in favor of big states. Hence, unless bicameralism significantly increases their agenda power, small states will fare even worse under bicameralism whenever they are disadvantaged under unicameralism.

We propose a multilevel account of legislative Court curbing in order to assess existing explanations as to why such proposals come about. We argue that although Court curbing is commonly seen as the result of institutional conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court, it is best understood as a product of three interrelated factors: the individual motivations on the part of lawmakers, the partisan context in which they operate, and institutional disagreements between Court and legislature. We find evidence that micro-level factors offer an important insight into Court curbing that institution-focused explanations alone cannot.
In many systems, legislators find themselves accountable to multiple principals. This article seeks to further answer how legislators decide between their principals and what factors condition legislators to choose one over the other. We argue that electoral uncertainty, operationalized as electoral volatility, pushes legislators towards the principal that has the greatest influence over their re-election. Using European Parliament electoral results and roll-call data from the second to the sixth European Parliaments (1984-2009), we show that increases in electoral volatility decreased European group cohesion and pushed legislators to side more with the positions of their national parties over their European group when the two disagreed.

Congressional parties are commonly viewed as unified legislative teams, but recent intraparty battles have revealed serious ideological divisions within the House Republican caucus. Using annual ratings from nearly 300 interest groups, we estimate the ideological locations of Republican legislators in order to map their party's factional structure. Based on the distribution of interest-group support from 2001 to 2012, we detect three Republican factions that we characterize as worker oriented, pro-business, and ethno-radical. We find that Republican leaders block bills by legislators in the worker
and ethno-radical subgroups and that they advance bills by members in the corporate faction.

@article{wojcik_men_2017,
  title = {Men Idle, Women Network: How Networks Help Female Legislators Succeed},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12169},
  abstract = {Why do some lawmakers form denser professional networks than others? We extend existing theories of gendered networks, arguing that legislators use networking as a strategy to compensate for a challenging institutional environment. Using original data from Brazil, we provide survey-based evidence that female representatives in the Chamber of Deputies engage in higher rates of intragender networking and have more profuse and diverse legislative networks than male deputies. We also provide suggestive evidence that these profuse legislative relationships pay off for women in the form of higher vote shares at election time.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wojcik, Stefan and Mullenax, Shawnna},
  month = nov,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000423272300003},
  pages = {579--610}
}

@article{mills_dont_2017,
  title = {Don't Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12171},
  abstract = {In contrast to the dramatic growth in the size and influence of the executive branch over the past 40 years, congressional committee staffing levels are at an all-time low. Faced with growing demands to produce legislation and to conduct oversight of executive branch policymaking, Congress can and does supplement its existing staff by borrowing personnel, known as detailees, from federal agencies. Using an original dataset of detailees from 1997 to 2015, we analyze the degree to which congressional committees rely on detailees to increase legislative capacity. We find that committees in
the House and Senate use detailees in different ways to further both legislative and oversight initiatives.

@article{aleman_party_2017,
  title = {Party {Strategies}, {Constituency} {Links}, and {Legislative} {Speech}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12174},
  abstract = {This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote-seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking debates. We argue that parties resolve this dilemma by organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches and lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators are more likely to speak. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our theory with data on congressional speeches.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Aleman, Eduardo and Ramirez, Margarita M. and Slapin, Jonathan B.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000423272300005},
  pages = {637--659}
}

@article{gelman_rewarding_2017,
  title = {Rewarding {Dysfunction}: {Interest} {Groups} and {Intended} {Legislative} {Failure}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12173},
  abstract = {Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as

}
interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead-on-arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority-party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.

@article{rogowski_electoral_2017,
  title = {Electoral {Institutions} and {Legislative} {Particularism}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12153},
  abstract = {How do electoral institutions affect legislative behavior? Though a large body of theoretical scholarship posits a negative relationship between multimember districting and the provision of particularistic goods, empirical scholarship has found little evidence in support of this expectation. Using data on the provision of US post offices from 1876 to 1896, a period during which many states elected congressional representatives from at-large districts, and a differences-in-differences approach, I find that counties represented by at-large representatives received approximately 8\% fewer post offices. The results have important implications for studying how electoral institutions affect incentives for legislative behavior.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Rogowski, Jon C.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000407194200001},
  pages = {355--385}
}

@article{eslava_legislative_2017,
  title = {Legislative {Fragmentation} and {Government} {Spending} in {Presidential} {Democracies}: {Bringing} {Ideological} {Polarization} into the {Picture}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12152},
  abstract = {We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance

between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives as in presidential democracies. Using cross-country data over time, we test the empirical validity of our claim finding that, in presidential democracies, there is indeed a positive effect of fragmentation only when polarization is sufficiently high. The same is not true for parliamentary democracies.

\cite{payson_when_2017}

\cite{van_coppenolle_political_2017}
political dynasty. Tenure can create opportunities to promote relatives. A regression discontinuity design for re-election races helps to rule out the confounding influence of inheritable traits. There is no evidence for a causal effect of tenure length on establishing or continuing a dynasty. Established families may have constrained further dynasty development, explaining the null result of tenure.

@article{bernhard_clustering_2017,
  title = {A Clustering Approach to Legislative Styles},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12162},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bernhard, William and Sewell, Daniel and Sulkin, Tracy},
  month = aug,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000407194200005},
  pages = {477--506}
}

@article{wolak_public_2017,
  title = {Public Expectations of State Legislators},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12147},
  abstract = {When members of Congress neglect the needs of their districts or vote contrary to the wishes of their constituents, their public approval suffers. Does the same hold true for representatives at the state level? Using experiments, I explore whether people dole out similar rewards and penalties to state legislators and members of Congress for their successes and shortfalls in representing constituents. I find that a similar model of political accountability travels from national politics to state politics. People value policy representation, casework, and attention to the district as much from state legislators as they do from members of Congress.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wolak, Jennifer},
  month = may,
  year = {2017},
}
Lyndon Johnson woke up studying whip counts, went to bed reading the Congressional Record, and invested countless hours in between translating that political intelligence into a lobbying offensive. The result, famously christened The Johnson Treatment, remains the archetype practitioners and political scientists cite when appraising presidential leadership on Capitol Hill. Yet Beltway folklore aside, we know little about how LBJ helped forge winning legislative coalitions. Stepping back from the (countless) colorful anecdotes, this study offers a new and systematic look at Lyndon Johnson's lobbying. Specifically, after exploring theoretical models of presidential coalition building, we then investigate their operational tenets using original data on all President Johnson's contacts, with each member of Congress, in both chambers, for every day he was president.}

Number = {2},
Journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
Author = {Beckmann, Matthew N. and Chaturvedi, Neilan S. and Garcia, Jennifer Rosa},
Month = {May},
Year = {2017},
Note = {WOS:000400294800002},
Pages = {211--234}

@article{hanretty_dyadic_2017,
title = {Dyadic {Representation} in a {Westminster} {System}},
volume = {42},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/lsq.12148},
abstract = {Is policy representation in contemporary Westminster systems solely a function of programmatic national parties, or does the election of legislators via single-member districts result in MPs whose policy positions are individually responsive to public opinion in their constituencies? We generate new measures of constituency opinion in Britain and show that, in three different policy domains and controlling for MP party, the observed legislative behavior of MPs is indeed responsive to constituency opinion. The level of responsiveness is moderate, but our results do suggest a constituency-MP policy bond that operates in addition to the well-known bond between voters and parties.},
number = {2},
Previous scholarship argues that House members' partisan relationship to the president is among the most important determinants of the share of federal dollars they bring home to their constituents. Do presidential politics also shape distributive outcomes in the Senate? Analyzing the allocation of more than $8.5 trillion of federal grants across the states from 1984 to 2008, we show that presidential copartisan senators are more successful than opposition party members in securing federal dollars for their home states. Moreover, presidents appear to target grants ex post to states that gain presidential copartisans in recent elections.

The Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) developed by Fish and Kroenig (2009) is the most important effort to date to measure legislative power in cross-national perspective, but it has been criticized on both theoretical and methodological grounds. We build on the 32-item PPI to develop an alternative indicator of legislative strength that is based on an expert survey of 296 political scientists in 2014. We reweight each of the powers by expert opinion, creating a new Weighted Legislative Powers Score (WLPS) for the 158 national legislatures in the Fish and Kroenig data set. In
addition, the article reports the expert-assigned weight factors for the entire set of 32 powers contained in the original PPI, thus allowing researchers to innovate alternative, disaggregated indicators of legislative power.

@article{aldrich_party_2017,
  title = {Party, {Policy}, and the {Ambition} to {Run} for {Higher} {Office}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12161},
  abstract = {This article examines why some state legislators run for Congress and others do not. Our main argument is that there are differences in the expected value of a state legislative seat and the expected benefits of being a member of Congress. One key component of this value is how closely the candidate fits with her party. We find that the probability of seeking congressional office increases among state legislators who are distant from the state party and proximate to the congressional party and decreases among those who are distant from the congressional party and proximate to the state party.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Aldrich, John H. and Thomsen, Danielle M.},
  month = may,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000400294800006},
  pages = {321--343}
}

@article{park_lab_2017,
  title = {A {Lab} {Experiment} on {Committee} {Hearings}: {Preferences}, {Power}, and a {Quest} for {Information}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12139},
  abstract = {In principle, committees hold hearings to gather and provide information to their principals, but some hearings are characterized as political showcases. This article investigates conditions that moderate committee members' incentives to hold an informative hearing by presenting a game-theoretic model and a lab experiment. Specifically, it studies when committees hold hearings and which types of hearing they hold by varying policy preferences of
committee members and the principal and political gains from posturing. Findings provide new insights to how preferences and power distribution affect individuals' incentives to be informed when they make decisions as members of a committee in many contexts.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Park, Ju Yeon},
  month = feb,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000397262600001},
  pages = {3--31}
}

@article{anzia_polarization_2017,
  title = {Polarization and {Policy}: {The} {Politics} of {Public}- {Sector} {Pensions}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12145},
  abstract = {For decades, America's state and local governments have promised their workers increasingly generous pensions but failed to fully fund them, producing a fiscal problem of staggering proportions. In this article, we examine the politics of public pensions. While mainstream theoretical ideas in the American politics literature would suggest the pension issue should be polarized, with Democrats pushing for generous pensions over Republican resistance, we develop an argument-rooted in more traditional theoretical work by Schattschneider, Lowi, Wilson, and others-implying that both parties should be expected to support generous pensions during normal times and that only after the onset of the Great Recession, which expanded the scope of conflict, should the parties begin to diverge. Using a new data set of state legislators' votes on hundreds of pension bills passed between 1999 and 2011, we carry out an empirical analysis that supports these expectations.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Anzia, Sarah F. and Moe, Terry M.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000397262600002},
  pages = {33--62}
}

@article{shomer_conditional_2017,
  title = {The {Conditional} {Effect} of {Electoral} {Systems} and {Intraparty} {Candidate} {Selection} {Processes} on {Parties}' {Behavior}},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12141},
  abstract = {How do electoral systems and intraparty candidate
selection procedures affect party unity? In this article, I distinguish theoretically and empirically between electoral systems and candidate selections and argue that the influence of selection processes on parties' behavior is conditional on electoral system (and vice versa). Measuring parties' unity using Rice and weighted Rice scores, and applying hierarchical models to a new data set of 249 parties in 24 countries, I find support for the claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral systems that encourage personal vote-seeking incentives than under electoral systems that encourage party centeredness.

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@article{shomer_selection_2017,
  title = {Selection procedures affect party unity? In this article, I distinguish theoretically and empirically between electoral systems and candidate selections and argue that the influence of selection processes on parties' behavior is conditional on electoral system (and vice versa). Measuring parties' unity using Rice and weighted Rice scores, and applying hierarchical models to a new data set of 249 parties in 24 countries, I find support for the claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral systems that encourage personal vote-seeking incentives than under electoral systems that encourage party centeredness.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Shomer, Yael},
  month = feb,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000397262600003},
  pages = {63--96}
}

@article{hanni_presence_2017,
  title = {Presence, Representation, and Impact: How Minority MPs Affect Policy Outcomes},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12142},
  abstract = {Many ethnic minorities demand (adequate) descriptive representation in parliament because they expect it to affect the responsiveness of governments towards their demands. However, the mechanism of how minority representatives affect policy outcomes remains unclear. I argue that descriptive representation mainly has an effect if representatives possess additional leverage to influence policy outcomes. The argument is tested with hierarchical time-series models from 88 minority groups in 47 countries multi-ethnic democracies. The analysis shows that descriptive representatives are most successful in influencing policy outcomes if they are included in the government, the legislature is powerful, and a group is comparatively large.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hanni, Miriam},
  month = feb,
  year = {2017},
  note = {WOS:000397262600004},
  pages = {97--130}
}

@article{smith_political_2017,
  title = {Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers},
  volume = {42},
  issn = {0362-9805},
We investigate whether politicians whose family relatives previously served in parliament and cabinet enjoy a competitive "legacy advantage" in progressing from the backbenches to cabinet. This advantage may stem from two potential mechanisms: a direct effect attributable to the informational advantages of legacies or an indirect effect that operates through greater electoral strength. We evaluate the relative contribution of each mechanism using candidate-level data from Irish parliamentary elections and cabinets from 1944 to 2016. Our results reveal that politicians with a family history in cabinet do enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection, and that this advantage cannot be attributed simply to greater electoral popularity.\(^{1}\)

@article{palanza_congressional_2017,
    title = {Congressional Institutionalization: A Cross-National Comparison (vol 41, pg 7, 2016)},
    volume = {42},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12166},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Palanza, V. and Scartascini, C. and Tommasi, M.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2017},
    note = {WOS:000397262600006},
    pages = {167--167}
}

@article{lucardi_effect_2016,
    title = {The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983-2007},
    volume = {41},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.1111/lsq.12137},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Lucardi, E.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2016},
    note = {WOS:000397262600005},
    pages = {131--165}
}
experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.

@article{lucardi_experience_2016,
  title = {Experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lucardi, Adrian and Pablo Micozzi, Juan},
  month = nov,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000388578400001},
  pages = {811--840}
}

@article{park_partisanship_2016,
  title = {Partisanship, Sophistication, and Public Attitudes about Majority Rule and Minority Rights in Congress},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12140},
  abstract = {The balance between majority rule and minority rights is a central issue in the design and operation of democratic institutions and remains a contested issue in debates of policy-making processes. Remarkably, public attitudes about this balance are not subjected to scholarly investigation. In this article, we report the findings of the first survey experiment in which the American public's attitudes about majority rule and minority rights in legislative bodies are explored. We find robust support for both majority rule and minority rights, discover that only a few Americans distinguish between the US House of Representatives and Senate in the application of these principles, and demonstrate that views of majority rule and minority rights can be moved once we introduce respondents to the partisan implications of procedural rules. Moreover, with conflicting theoretical expectations about the effect of political sophistication on attitudes about majority rule and minority rights, we find that higher levels of political sophistication are associated with stronger partisan effects on attitudes about the balance between majority rule and minority rights in Congress.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Park, Hong Min and Smith, Steven S.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000388578400002},
  pages = {841--871}
}

@article{geys_limits_2016,
  title = {The Limits of Electoral Control: Evidence from Last-Term Politicians},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12140},
  abstract = {The balance between majority rule and minority rights is a central issue in the design and operation of democratic institutions and remains a contested issue in debates of policy-making processes. Remarkably, public attitudes about this balance are not subjected to scholarly investigation. In this article, we report the findings of the first survey experiment in which the American public's attitudes about majority rule and minority rights in legislative bodies are explored. We find robust support for both majority rule and minority rights, discover that only a few Americans distinguish between the US House of Representatives and Senate in the application of these principles, and demonstrate that views of majority rule and minority rights can be moved once we introduce respondents to the partisan implications of procedural rules. Moreover, with conflicting theoretical expectations about the effect of political sophistication on attitudes about majority rule and minority rights, we find that higher levels of political sophistication are associated with stronger partisan effects on attitudes about the balance between majority rule and minority rights in Congress.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Geys, Tom and van Aelst, Stijn},
  month = nov,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000388578400003},
  pages = {841--871}
}
In modern democracies, politicians' accountability is often linked to the disciplining mechanism of electoral control. For politicians in their final term, this mechanism is impaired. Using a novel data set covering 910 members of the UK House of Commons active within the period 1997-2010, we investigate how reduced electoral control affects last-term MPs' trade-off between work effort inside parliament, leisure, and outside interests. Our main contributions lie in providing the first explicit consideration of (1) MPs' final-term intra-/extraparliamentary work balance and (2) MPs' reasons for leaving parliament (i.e., retirement, career change, electoral defeat). These extensions provide important fresh insights concerning the boundaries of elections' disciplining power.

Research stresses that congressional committees increase their oversight of the bureaucracy during divided government. We extend this research by developing an explanation, rooted in a more dynamic view of policymaking, for why Congress would sometimes conduct vigorous oversight under unified control as well. In short, committees seem to engage in what we call retrospective oversight and take advantage of newly friendly executive administration to refocus existing policy made under a past opposition president. We assess our perspective using two separate sources of data on oversight hearings spanning more than 60 years and find support for our claims regarding retrospective oversight.

Tarnishing Opponents, Polarizing Congress: The
Existing research on congressional parties tends to focus almost exclusively on the majority party. I argue that the inattention to the House minority party hampers our understanding of the construction of the roll-call record and, consequently, our understanding of the sources of polarization in congressional voting. Employing an original data set of House members' requests for recorded votes between 1995 and 2010, I demonstrate that votes demanded by the minority party are disproportionately divisive and partisan and make Congress appear considerably more polarized based on commonly used measures. Moreover, minority-requested votes make vulnerable members of the majority appear more partisan and ideologically extreme.

Though considerable research focuses on formal institutions in Congress, scholars have long acknowledged that much of what guides legislative behavior is unwritten. To advance this area, we leverage a tool that allows appropriators to redirect billions of dollars from mandatory programs to discretionary projects. Changes in mandatory program spending known as CHIMPs show that existing institutions are often maintained by the strategic action of legislators. In the case of CHIMPs, we find their use is largely a response to formal constraints and that they are preserved through avoidance of minimum reform coalitions. This highlights that the legislative process and budgetary outcomes in particular cannot be understood without attention to procedures which remain off the books.
Why do opposition political parties choose to run for parliament in semiauthoritarian systems? Existing literature emphasizes the benefits that these parties derive from campaigning and running for elections, while paying little attention to the politics that occurs within legislative institutions under these regimes. Supplementing election-centric theories, we argue that opposition actors in semiauthoritarian systems also benefit directly from serving in weak parliaments and that this helps explain their participation in biased elections. We demonstrate this by examining the Muslim Brotherhood's legislative performance in Mubarak's Egypt, highlighting the mechanisms through which it used its minority presence in parliament to its advantage.

This article analyzes voting for Congress in presidential election years. The national Democratic vote for the House increases with the Democratic vote for president but decreases with the Democrats' perceived chances of winning the presidency (anticipatory balancing). The evidence for coattails and for balancing become visible only when statistically controlling for the other. The aggregate evidence for coattails and balancing in presidential years is reinforced by the analysis of National Election Studies (NES) survey respondents. That analysis shows that politically informed voters are more likely to vote for Congress against the party that they believe will win the presidency.
I propose a theory of legislator-to-constituent communication that describes a relationship between the types of votes a legislator reveals and the partisan composition of her constituency. To test this theory, I use an original data set of 40,000 official communications containing 30,000 vote revelations from the 111th Congress. I find evidence substantiating this theory; the extent to which a legislator endeavors to appear more ideologically extreme in communications varies systematically with the relative amounts of different types of voters in her district. This result is contrasted with an analysis of voting extremism where I find that the ideological preferences of donors better explain voting patterns.

Legislators' actions are influenced by party, constituency, and their own views, each weighted differently. Our survey of state legislators finds that legislator's own views are the strongest influence. We also find that institutions are an important source of party leaders' influence. Legislators in states where members rely more on party leaders states without term limits, with less professional legislatures, and where the majority party controls the agendaput more weight on leaders' preferences. Beyond direct party influence, the views of party leaders are preemptively incorporated into legislators' preferences when the rules of the legislature make party leaders more powerful.
All major legislation in the House necessitates a special rule from the Rules Committee before it can be brought to the chamber floor. These rules often strictly limit floor amendments to bills considered by the House. Scholars of political parties have argued that the House majority party can bias policy output away from the floor median through its usage of restrictive rules. In this article, we argue that in order to secure the passage of restrictive rules, the majority often makes concessions to centrist legislators through the amending process. We examine this theory using a newly collected data set that includes all amendments considered by the Rules Committee during the construction of structured rules in the 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses (2005-2010). Our results are mixed, but they do suggest that moderate members of the majority party often receive concessions via amendments for their support of the majority party's agenda-setting regime. 

Legislators are often placed in the position of representing the interests of their constituents against the preferences of their own party leaders. We develop a theoretical framework indicating that these cross-pressured legislators are more likely to initially support legislation and subsequently change their minds than are legislators whose constituents and leaders share similar preferences. Moreover, we expect this pattern to be most pronounced among members of majority parties than minority-party
members. We test our expectations using data on bill cosponsorship and final passage votes from 46 lower state legislative chambers and the US House, finding considerable support for our theory.},

@article{bendix_bypassing_2016,
  title = {Bypassing Congressional Committees: {Parties}, {Panel} {Rosters}, and {Deliberative} {Processes}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12125},
  abstract = {Although scholars have examined committee rosters extensively, no study has considered the relationship between the ideological composition of panels and their participation in bill drafting. I thus ask: Which committees are frequently excluded from legislative deliberations? Does the composition of committees affect the degree to which they contribute to bill development? Using DW-NOMINATE data, I calculate ideological scores for congressional panels between 1989 and 2010 to see whether certain committees are routinely bypassed. I find that moderate panels, polarized panels, and panels with moderate chairs are often excluded, while extreme committees in the majority direction tend to retain bill-writing duties.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bendix, William},
  month = aug,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000380717000006},
  pages = {687--714}
}

@article{klein_electoral_2016,
  title = {Electoral {Rules} and {Party} {Switching}: {How} {Legislators} {Prioritize} {Their} {Goals}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12128},
  abstract = {Stemming from ambition theory, a vast body of studies has demonstrated how politicians' pursuits of different goals can explain their behaviors. Among other goals, politicians strive for re-election or to attain a better office. However, little is known about the way politicians prioritize these goals. This article uses the phenomenon of legislative party switching to address this void and examines how hierarchy between goals determines legislator strategies.}
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Kirkland, Justin H. and Harden, Jeffrey J.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000380717000005},
  pages = {657--686}
}
The study exploits the 2008 Romanian electoral reform, which rendered the electoral system more candidate centered. Drawing on data from more than 3,900 individual-level observations over the period from 1996 to 2012, this article shows how vote incentives alter the trade-offs between re-election and office motivations. The findings suggest that politicians will pursue office goals only if the goal of re-election is to be achieved.

@article{ringe_pinpointing_2016,
  title = {Pinpointing the {Powerful}: {Covoting} {Network} {Centrality} as a {Measure} of {Political} {Influence}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12129},
  abstract = {This article introduces centrality in covoting networks as a measure of influence. Based on a simple cueing dynamic, it conceptualizes those lawmakers as most central and thus as having the greatest signaling influence who impact the greatest number of colleagues' voting decisions. A formal proof and an agent-based simulation show that cue-providers are always more central than followers; hence, we can use real-world voting data to identify the most influential legislators. To confirm the measure's construct validity, we predict covoting centrality in the European Parliament and find those factors that are expected to impact legislators' influence to predict their centrality.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ringe, Nils and Wilson, Steven L.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000380717000008},
  pages = {739--769}
}

@article{giannetti_rules_2016,
  title = {Rules and {Speeches}: {How} {Parliamentary} {Rules} {Affect} {Legislators}' {Speech}-{Making} {Behavior}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12130},
  abstract = {By extending existing theories of legislative speech making, this study explores the importance of parliamentary rules governing floor debates for government and opposition parties. An
The original data set including speeches of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies between 2001 and 2006 is used to test two hypotheses under different institutional scenarios, that is, rules either restricting or granting open access to the floor. Parliamentary rules are found to affect allocation of speaking time within both governing and opposition parties. Governing parties' leaders exploit their agenda control to a higher degree when allocating speaking time. Under restrictive rules, government party leaders control their MPs by essentially limiting the number of speeches and allocating them to frontbenchers. Restrictive rules give opposition party leaders an important chance to select MPs who are closer to their own position.
To improve representation and alleviate polarization among US lawmakers, many have promoted open primaries-allowing voters to choose candidates from any party—but the evidence that this reform works is mixed. To determine whether open primaries lead voters to choose ideologically proximate candidates, we conducted a statewide experiment just before California's 2012 primaries, the first conducted under a new top-two format. We find that voters failed to distinguish moderate and extreme candidates. As a consequence, voters actually chose more ideologically distant candidates on the new ballot, and the reform failed to improve the fortunes of moderate congressional and state senate candidates.

Appeals for bipartisan diplomacy pepper popular commentary, often with wistful references to a bygone era where leaders (like Lyndon Johnson and Everett Dirksen) set aside partisan point scoring to serve the public interest. Here we reconsider the elements driving bipartisan contact in Washington. Stepping back from popular narratives, we situate the president-opposing leader relationship within a more general class of institutional bargaining, leading to the prediction that bipartisan negotiation emerges from a particular combination of incentives and institutions—namely, when the president is strong politically (rendering opposing leaders willing to compromise) but opposing party leaders are strong institutionally (rendering them crucial to passing the deal). Utilizing Presidential Daily Diaries, hypotheses are tested against original data on presidents' personal interactions with opposing Senate leaders across 40 years, 20 Congresses, and eight presidencies (1961-2000).
Direct democracy is sometimes described as a "gun behind the door," but how do legislators react when voters pull the trigger? Leveraging the high-profile referendum defeat of a controversial law passed by the Ohio legislature, I examine how legislators respond to voter disaffection. Using interest groups to "bridge" votes before and after the election, I show that the measure's defeat induced moderation on the part of the Republican legislative majority, while leaving the behavior of opposition Democrats largely unchanged. The results suggest that direct democracy has the potential to restrain legislative excesses and alleviate polarization in state legislatures.

Using survey data from more than 500 legislative candidates in 17 states during the 2008 election, I examine whether state house candidates who devote more time to their campaign win a larger share of the major-party vote. Consistent with previous work studying campaign spending in state legislative elections, I find a positive and significant association between campaign time and vote percentage for challengers—but not incumbents—in incumbent-contested elections.
While each election provides the Canadian House of Commons with a fresh batch of politicians, no consideration has been given to the question of whether the quality of politicians is improving. Yet improving quality has been the focus of several commissions urging increases in MP compensation. This article addresses the competence and compensation questions by asking whether changes in levels of compensation might make a difference to the educational qualifications of political leaders. We assemble a unique dataset of 1,291 federal politicians elected to the Canadian House of Commons from 1993 to 2011 and show that prime ministers do have a preference for more highly educated MPs when filling ministerial and other executive positions. Our findings suggest that certain subgroups of MPs, particularly educated women, may be attracted by upward shifts in compensation. We discuss the reasons for these effects and the relative importance of compensation in career decisions.

This article captures the nature of legislators' ambitions and explores to what extent their career paths within a context of party competition lead to progressive versus static ambition. The findings show that their previous career path and retrospective loyalty towards the party influences which offices they seek. Progressively ambitious legislators also seek offices in less competitive environments, but this finding holds for the regional executive branch or the presidency. An additional robust finding shows that ideologically conservative legislators tend to be statically ambitious. This is a first step towards mapping out ambitions in Latin America by drawing on cross-national data.
Does representatives' legislative activity have any effect on their electoral performance? A broad theoretical literature suggests so, but real-world evidence is scarce as empirically, personal and party votes are hard to separate. In this article, we examine whether bill initiation actually helps MPs to attract preference votes under flexible list electoral systems. In these systems, voters can accept the party-provided rank order or vote for specific candidates, which allows a clear distinction between personal and party votes. The empirical analysis uses data on bill initiation by Belgian MPs in the period 2003-2007 to explain their personal vote in the 2007 elections. We find that particularly single-authored proposals initiated shortly before the upcoming elections are associated with a larger personal vote.
substantially from median opinion, forming a pattern that is clearly bilateralist or two-sided rather than center-concentrated.

@article{baum_constraining_2016,
  title = {Constraining a {Shadowy} {Future}: {Enacting} {APAs} in {Parliamentary} {Systems}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12121},
  abstract = {Single-party parliamentary governments often have no institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom. Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden have all done so in the past 30 years. We argue that the possibility of losing power motivates parliamentary governments, both single-party and coalition, to trade current policy loss for future gain with APAs.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Baum, Jeeyang Rhee and Jensen, Christian B. and McGrath, Robert J.},
  month = may,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000374971200010},
  pages = {471--499}
}

@article{metz_hierarchical_2016,
  title = {Hierarchical, {Decentralized}, or {Something} {Else}? {Opposition} {Networks} in the {German} {Bundestag}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12122},
  abstract = {Members of the German parliament may force government to publicly answer questions by issuing minor interpellations (kleine Anfragen). We use 3,608 interpellations from the session 2009-13 that have been signed by authoring and supporting members to construct the social network of support relations among members within the three opposition parties. We find that parties differ markedly in terms of internal structure. While social democrats organize hierarchically,
Greens cooperate horizontally. The network for socialist Linke in contrast shows signs of homophily and social segregation. Our approach yields a novel perspective on intraparty politics in parliamentary systems which are notoriously difficult to analyze.}

@article{palanza_congressional_2016,
  title = {Congressional {Institutionalization}: {A} {Cross}-{National} {Comparison}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12104},
  abstract = {This article explains variations in levels of institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from beliefs and investments made by political actors. Drawing insights from work on US congressional institutionalization and congressional organization, and on comparative party system institutionalization, it provides an index to measure congressional institutionalization. Using this index, it explores the constitutional factors that affect levels of congressional institutionalization. The empirical results raise a warning with respect to building comparative implications from an excessive focus on one particular case.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Palanza, Valeria and Scartascini, Carlos and Tommasi, Mariano},
  month = feb,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000370329800002},
  pages = {7--34}
}

@article{thames_electoral_2016,
  title = {Electoral {Rules} and {Legislative} {Parties} in the {Ukrainian} {Rada}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12105},
  abstract = {Critics of Ukraine's single-member district majoritarian and mixed-member majoritarian electoral systems argue that they undermined the efficiency of the Supreme Rada by permitting nonpartisan single-member district deputies to enter the legislature in large numbers. Such deputies changed parties and ignored party
positions. This article argues that the effect of the differences in how legislators are elected is dependent upon whether legislators are partisans. The statistical analysis of party switching and party cohesion in the Rada from 1998 to 2002 shows that nonpartisan single-member district deputies were the most likely to switch parties and the least cohesive.

@article{sieberer_mapping_2016,
  title = {Mapping and Explaining Parliamentary Rule Changes in Europe: A Research Program},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12106},
  abstract = {We outline a comprehensive research program on institutional reforms in European parliaments. Original data show that parliamentary rules in Western European parliaments have been changed frequently and massively during the period from 1945 to 2010 suggesting that actors use institutional reforms as a distinct strategy to pursue their substantive goals. We discuss how institutional instability affects existing theoretical and empirical arguments about institutional effects. Furthermore, we present four ideal-typical approaches to analyzing rule changes, present new software tools for identifying and coding changes in large text corpora, and demonstrate their usefulness for valid measurement of the overall change between subsequent text versions.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Meissner, Peter and Keh, Julia F. and Mueller, Wolfgang C.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000370329800004},
  pages = {61--88}
}

@article{bonvecchi_legislative_2016,
  title = {Legislative Knowledge Networks, Status Quo Complexity, and the Approval of Law Initiatives},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12107},
  abstract = {In this article, we explore the role of legislative knowledge networks (LKN) in the enactment of tax policy in Argentina.

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Findings show that legislative innovation follows a hierarchical (power law) structure with a few distinct issue areas dominated by key enacted bills. Taxation in Argentina is well described by three main issue areas: the VAT laws, the income tax, and the revenue-sharing legislation. We provide evidence that complexity in the status quo, as described by a larger number of important precedent laws, reduces the likelihood of final approval. Our research departs from existing models of delegation by considering complexity in the status quo rather than complexity in the proposal. We argue that more complex status quo should be accounted for when trying to assess whether legislators draft more or less detailed law initiatives.

@article{bonvecchi_legislative_2016,
  title = {Legislative \textit{Studies} \textit{Quarterly}},
  volume = {41},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bonvecchi, Alejandro and Calvo, Ernesto and Stein, Ernesto},
  month = {feb},
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000370329800005},
  pages = {89--117}
}

@article{harden_campaign_2016,
  title = {Do \textit{Campaign} \textit{Donors} \textit{Influence} \textit{Polarization}? \textit{Evidence} from \textit{Public} \textit{Financing} in the \textit{American} \textit{States}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12108},
  abstract = {Does the source of campaign funds influence legislative polarization? We develop competing theoretical expectations regarding the effects of publicly financed elections on legislative voting behavior. To test these expectations, we leverage a natural experiment in the New Jersey Assembly in which public financing was made available to a subset of members. We find that public financing exerts substantively negligible effects on roll-call voting. We then find a similar result in an examination of state legislatures. We conclude that, counter to the logic of the US Supreme Court, pundits, and reformers, the source of campaign funds exerts minimal influence on polarization.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Harden, Jeffrey J. and Kirkland, Justin H.},
  month = {feb},
  year = {2016},
  note = {WOS:000370329800006},
  pages = {119--152}
}

@article{ban_challenger_2016,
  title = {Challenger \textit{Quality} and the \textit{Incumbency} \textit{Advantage}},
  volume = {41},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}
}
Most estimates of the incumbency advantage and the electoral benefits of previous officeholding experience do not account for strategic entry by high-quality challengers. We address this issue by using term limits as an instrument for challenger quality. Studying US state legislatures, we find strong evidence of strategic behavior by experienced challengers. However, we also find that such behavior does not appear to significantly bias the estimated effect of challenger experience or the estimated incumbency advantage. More tentatively, using our estimates, we find that 30-40% of the incumbency advantage in state legislative races is the result of scaring off experienced challengers.

Some studies of policy representation test hypotheses about the relationship between citizens' views and elites' positions on multiple issues by proceeding one issue at a time. Others summarize citizens' and elites' preferences with ideology scores and test hypotheses with these. I show that approach is flawed. It misinterprets citizens' ideology scores as summaries of policy preferences, but these scores actually measure ideological consistency across areas: how often citizens' ideal policies are liberal or conservative. Examples show how attending to this distinction overturns conventional wisdom: legislators appear similarly moderate as citizens, not more extreme; however, politically engaged citizens appear especially moderate.

Legislative Studies Quarterly

Bann, Pamela and Llaudet, Elena and Snyder, James M.
February 2016

Approaches to Studying Policy Representation

Broockman, David E.
February 2016

Introduction

Crisp, Geoffrey
February 2016
@article{squire_introduction_2015,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12086},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = nov,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000363516800001},
  pages = {503--507}
}

@article{golden_incumbency_2015,
  title = {Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12087},
  abstract = {We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives over 10 legislatures (1948-92) elected using open-list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no re-election advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for re-selection by their political party. We interpret re-election advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Golden, Miriam A. and Picci, Lucio},
  month = nov,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000363516800002},
  pages = {509--538}
}
Over a third of state legislators do not face challengers when seeking reelection. Existing analyses of state legislative contestation almost exclusively focus on the stable institutional features surrounding elections and ignore conditions that change between elections. I remedy this oversight by investigating how political contexts influence challenger entry. State legislators—particularly members of the governor's party—more often face opposition during weak state economies, but the president's copartisans are even more likely to receive a challenger when the president is unpopular. My findings suggest that both national- and state-level political conditions have an important impact on challengers' entry strategies.

Few political institutions are as central to theories of lawmaking as the executive veto. Despite its importance, institutional continuity at the national level has precluded identification of empirical effects of the veto on legislative behavior. We address this limitation and present evidence from the states demonstrating how the veto affects the formation of legislative coalitions and, indirectly, executive influence over policymaking. We find consistent evidence that the presence and strength of gubernatorial veto powers affect the lawmaking behavior of state legislatures. Our analysis shows how institutional provisions condition executives' ability to affect policy outcomes in separation-of-powers systems.
@article{fukumoto_effects_2015,
  title = {The {Effects} of {Election} {Proximity} on {Participatory} {Shirking}: {The} {Staggered}-{Term} {Chamber} as a {Laboratory}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12090},
  abstract = {This study discusses a downside of electoral pressure. As elections approach, legislators reduce their effort in legislative activities, albeit while increasing their efficiency. To show this, we propose a new, natural experimental design exploiting staggered legislative election calendars to identify the effect of approaching elections. Two-way natural blocking improves the balance of pretreatments and an instrumental variable approach addresses noncompliance by retirees. Our analysis of the Japanese House of Councillors demonstrates that legislators up for election show up in the chamber less often than those not facing election; however, when they do show up and speak, they tend to speak longer.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fukumoto, Kentaro and Matsuo, Akitaka},
  month = nov,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000363516800005},
  pages = {599--625}
}

@article{herrnson_impact_2015,
  title = {The {Impact} of {District} {Magnitude} on {Voter} {Drop}-{Off} and {Roll}-{Off} in {American} {Elections}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12091},
  abstract = {This study demonstrates that multimember districts (MMDs) complicate ballots, reduce voter information, and increase incentives for strategic voting in ways that reduce voter participation. Using data from three states that elect members of at least one legislative chamber from both single-member districts (SMDs) and MMDs, we test hypotheses about the impact on MMDs on ballot drop-off (selecting fewer candidates for an office than permissible) and roll-off (not voting in down-ballot races). We find support for both sets of hypotheses, with the strongest results related to ballot drop-off. The results have broad implications for voter participation, representation, and election administration in the many states and localities that use MMDs to elect public officials.},
  number = {4},
Increasing party polarization in Congress is a vexing phenomenon for political scientists, as it offers a theoretical conundrum. Members of Congress have become increasingly ideologically divided by party in recent years, which seems counterintuitive as the public electorally punishes representatives for excessive partisanship and ideological behavior. One explanation for this result is that members receive benefits for such behavior during primaries. This article examines the effect of ideological and partisan behavior on primary challenges and primary vote totals for incumbent House members. The results show that incumbents receive benefits in the primary from greater levels of partisanship but not greater levels of ideological extremity. This finding is substantively important as it provides further insight into the motivation of congressional incumbents and offers a partial explanation for the rise in congressional polarization.
national gender quotas policies that require a certain percentage of women candidates or legislators are becoming more effective over time. Using data on 145 countries from 1990 to 2010, we document this trend with latent growth-curve models. Part of the explanation for increasing effectiveness is that countries have ratcheted up targets for women's inclusion and that quotas are increasingly written in ways that make them more effective at achieving stated goals. Activists, political elites, and policy makers have learned over time which quota policies are most effective, resulting in quotas with provisions that more often lead to success. But, changes in rules alone do not account for the increasing effectiveness of quotas over time. It appears that changing norms about women's incorporation in politics are also increasing quota effectiveness regardless of policy design.}

@article{gelman_opportunistic_2015,
  title = {The [Opportunistic] [President]: [How] [US] [Presidents] [Determine] [Their] [Legislative] [Programs]},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12080},
  abstract = {The president is the most influential policy actor in US politics, and his legislative program greatly influences Congress's agenda. Yet little research has focused on what factors affect the president's choices when constructing his agenda. We develop a theory that determines when a president will include an issue in his program. We hypothesize that presidents structure their agendas around the congressional calendar for consideration of expiring laws and salient issues. Using data over 28 years and across 12 policy areas, we find presidents build their programs around these policymaking opportunities. We assert that presidential agendas are less driven by individual priorities than previous accounts have concluded.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
}
The information theory of legislative organization suggests that legislative committees are designed to provide their parent chamber with necessary information to legislate. Despite empirical evidence for various aspects of the theory, we have limited knowledge of committees' influence on legislative outputs. I argue that informative committees are more than information providers, that they also substantively impact legislative outcomes. With supportive evidence from the US state legislatures, this article shows that the presence of an informative committee system not only lowers the number of bills introduced to the legislature but also enhances the chamber's efficiency in transforming legislative proposals into laws.

Building on the theory of the personal roots of representation, we argue that a legislator's likelihood of switching positions depends on whether the issue is central to their personal values. We evaluate this claim using a data set including senators' religious affiliations and culture war votes from 1976 to 2004 and find that different religious groups vary in their voting consistency on issues such as abortion, public prayer, and gay and lesbian rights.
@article{martin_parties_2015,
  title = {Parties and Electoral Performance in the Market for Political Consultants},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12083},
  abstract = {We investigate whether the hiring relationships of candidates and political consulting firms better resembles the predictions of the adversarial or allied models of consultant-party interaction. We find that the highest-quality consultants are not allocated to the most competitive races, consultant-candidate relationships persist even as candidates' electoral prospects change, and firms who work for challengers face a higher risk of market exit than firms working for incumbents. The market focuses entirely on win-loss records and ignores the information on consultant performance available in candidates' vote shares. These findings depict a market driven by individual candidate, rather than aggregate party, goals.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Martin, Gregory J. and Peskowitz, Zachary},
  month = aug,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000358328900006},
  pages = {441--470}
}

@article{wirls_staggered_2015,
  title = {Staggered Terms for the US Senate: Origins and Irony},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12084},
  abstract = {This article provides the first detailed study of the origins of staggered Senate terms, which typically have been interpreted as part of the framers' intent to create an insulated, stable, and conservative Senate. I draw upon three sources of evidence—the meaning and application of rotation in revolutionary America, the deliberations and decisions at the Constitutional Convention, and the arguments during Ratification—to show that the origins of and intentions behind staggered terms offer little support for the dominant interpretation. Instead, staggered terms, a mechanism to promote rotation or turnover of membership, were added to the Constitution as a compromise to offset, not augment, the Senate's longer terms by exposing a legislative chamber with long individual
tenure to more frequent electoral influence and change.

@article{squire_introduction_2015-2,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12071},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = may,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000354730100001},
  pages = {175--178}
}

@article{baumann_personal_2015,
  title = {Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12072},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Baumann, Markus and Debus, Marc and Mueller, Jochen},
  month = may,
  year = {2015},
  abstract = {Theoretical and empirical models of legislative decision making in parliamentary democracies typically neglect the policy preferences of individual MPs and instead focus on political parties and possible institutional constraints. We argue that MPs actually make judgments and decisions on the basis of their preferences, which are shaped by their personal characteristics. However, given the strength of parties in most parliamentary systems, the impact of personal characteristics on legislative behavior is rarely visible. Therefore, we examine a moral issue. Looking at cosponsorship, parliamentary speeches, and votes in the German Bundestag, we analyze the legislative procedure on the regulation of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in Germany in 2011. We show that the legislative behavior of MPs does not only reflect partisan conflict but is also influenced by the preferences of the constituents and MPs' own personal characteristics such as: religious denomination, gender, and parental status.},
}
We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.

I report findings from survey experiments that improve our understanding of how people want individual Senators to approach their role as representatives. The findings show that people are committed to the idea that Senators should prioritize their states' preferences over those of the national public. This preference persists in situations where a Senator's advocacy for her state plays a key role in defeating nationally supported legislation. This finding contradicts popular claims that voters are hungry for Senators who prioritize national preferences over those of their constituents. I also find that people who support a piece of legislation but not those who oppose it evaluate a Senator who helps to defeat the legislation by filibustering substantially less favorably than one who accomplishes the same ends through majoritarian means. This suggests that how people respond to some procedural characteristics of politicians' behavior depends on how they feel about the outcomes it yields.
@article{howard_politics_2015,
  title = {The {Politics} of {Obstruction}: {Republican} {Holds} in the {US} {Senate}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12076},
  abstract = {A defining feature of the modern US Senate is obstruction. Almost all pieces of legislation considered in the Senate are affected either directly or indirectly by obstruction. Obstruction takes many forms in the modern Senate, but one of the most prevalent, yet least studied, is the hold. Using a newly created dataset on Republican Senate holds, we cast light on this important practice. Our results suggest that a variety of factors including timing, party status, and a senator's voting record are related to both the prevalence of holds and the success of legislation subject to holds in the Senate.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Howard, Nicholas O. and Roberts, Jason M.},
  month = may,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000354730100005},
  pages = {273--294}
}

@article{thomsen_why_2015,
  title = {Why {So} {Few} {({Republican})} {Women}? {Explaining} the {Partisan} {Imbalance} of {Women} in the {US} {Congress}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12075},
  abstract = {This article examines why the percentage of Democratic women in Congress has increased dramatically since the 1980s while the percentage of Republican women has barely grown. The central claim is that ideological conformity with the party influences the decision to run for office, and I suggest that partisan polarization has discouraged ideological moderates in the pipeline from pursuing a congressional career. The findings have gendered implications because, first, Republican women in the pipeline have historically been to the left of their male counterparts, and second, there is a dearth of conservative women in the pipeline.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Thomsen, Tore},
  month = may,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000354730100006},
  pages = {295--314}
@article{binder_challenges_2015,
  title = {Challenges {Ahead} for {Legislative} {Studies}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12063},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Binder, Sarah A.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000348851200002},
  pages = {5--11}
}

@article{box-steffensmeier_examining_2015,
  title = {Examining {Legislative} {Cue}-{Taking} in the {US} {Senate}},
  volume = {40},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12064},
  abstract = {We examine congressional cue-taking theory to
determine its extent, conditionality, and various forms in the US
Senate. Using a novel data-collection technique (timed C-SPAN
footage), we focus on temporal dynamics via event history analysis.
Examining the effects of senator characteristics across 16 votes from
the 108th Congress, we find that committee leadership and seniority
generally predict cue-giving, while other types of characteristics
predict cue-giving on certain types of votes. Our results underscore
the importance of considering the order and timing of voting when
studying congressional behavior.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Box-Steffensmeier, Janet and Ryan, Josh M. and Sokhey, Anand Edward},
  month = feb,
  year = {2015},
  note = {WOS:000348851200003},
  pages = {13--53}
}

@article{birkhead_role_2015,
  title = {The {Role} of {Ideology} in {State} {Legislative} {Elections}},
In this article, I examine the effect of incumbent ideology on elections in 45 state legislatures, showing that ideological extremists are more likely to be opposed in the general election than are moderates and that extremists tend to do worse in challenged elections than moderates do. I also explore the intervening role of legislative professionalism, finding that in the majority of state legislatures moderation is rewarded, though in the most professionalized legislatures, incumbents are actually rewarded for extremism. These results show that despite the informational disadvantage of the electorate, the ideology of state legislators is an important factor in elections.

There is widespread agreement that the Australian ballot fundamentally altered the American electoral system. One common approach to test the effects of ballot reform is to examine legislators elected under the party and secret ballot. An alternative research design, which we adopt here, compares changes in the behavior of legislators who were elected under both ballot types. We use this approach to investigate whether ballot reform directly influenced legislators' decisions to seek renomination and their behavior within the institution. Our results raise a number of important implications for understanding the effects of electoral reform on political behavior.
Distributive politics plays an integral role in theories of legislative politics because it represents a fundamental aspect of legislators' electoral connection to constituents. We argue that because distributive politics is at its core a constituency-centered process, it is essential to take geography into account in both substantive and statistical terms. Our analysis, which employs Geographic Weighted Regression, reveals substantial spatial heterogeneity in traditional models of pork-barreling. The results challenge the implicit assumption that one size fits all when modeling the behavior of members of Congress in the realm of distributive politics.

Previous research on term-limited legislators suggests they have few incentives to engage in pork-barreling. Using the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term-limited, I find legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the lack of a reelection incentive. I argue term-limited legislators are progressively ambitious and use interventions into the budget process to further their careers. I find legislators elected in single-member districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to pursue future office. I also find governors and gubernatorial elections influence the submission of budget amendments, which is related to gubernatorial influence over political careers.
In influential theories of democratization, elites’ fear of the redistributive consequences of democratic reform as an important limit on democratization. They also argue that landowners are more likely than capital owners to fear redistribution, as their assets are less mobile and thus more vulnerable to expropriation. To test these claims on the micro level, this article uses the 1867 U.K. Reform Act, which doubled the enfranchised population to include much of the urban working class, as a case study. Using an original dataset on the members of the 1865-68 House of Commons, this article finds that in fact, the most substantively important variable for votes on democratization was partisanship, which has been neglected by the distributional conflict literature. Material interests, particularly landowning, do matter, but they are crucially mediated by strategic partisan electoral concerns.
The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of democratic politics in the United Kingdom by expanding the voting franchise and remedying legislative malapportionment. Analyzing parliamentary debates and divisions, we investigate why reform successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. We consider why reform passed under a minority Conservative government yet failed under a majority Liberal government despite no election or change in membership. Though partisanship is most influential for parliamentary voting, it is an incomplete explanation given the absence of modern party institutions. Rather, we argue that the narrowed scope of debate under the Conservatives was crucial in passing reform.

This article examines why after 35 years of repeatedly rejecting the secret ballot, the British House of Commons enacted it with the Ballot Act of 1872. Drawing on roll-call votes, I show that parliamentary opposition to the secret ballot was invariant between 1832 and 1867. In 1867, however, the Second Reform Act significantly extended the electoral franchise and substantially redistributed parliamentary seats; the House elected immediately following these changes to pass the Ballot Act of 1872. I show that a key reason for the change in the House's attitude on the ballot was that anti-ballot MPs whom the redistribution threatened to expose to
electoral competition were disproportionately likely to retire prior to the 1868 election. These results imply that it was the anticompetitive effects inherent in the gross malapportionment of the older electoral system rather than the restricted nature of the franchise that insulated MPs from public pressure and kept parliamentary opinion on the secret ballot in stasis. This is a useful lesson because while almost all modern democracies operate on a universal adult suffrage, many continue to be marked by significant malapportionment.

number = 4, journal = Legislative Studies Quarterly, author = Kam, Christopher, month = nov, year = 2014, note = WOS:000344054100004, pages = 503--530

@article{berlinski_franchise_2014, title = Franchise {Extension} and the {British} {Aristocracy}, volume = 39, issn = 0362-9805, doi = 10.1111/lsq.12057, abstract = Using evidence from the Second Reform Act, introduced in the United Kingdom in 1867, we analyze the impact of extending the vote to the unskilled urban population on the composition of the Cabinet and the background characteristics of Members of Parliament. Exploiting the sharp change in the electorate caused by franchise extension, we separate the effect of reform from that of underlying constituency-level traits correlated with the voting population. Our results are broadly supportive of a claim first made by Laski (1928): there is no causal effect of the reform on the political role played by the British aristocracy.

number = 4, journal = Legislative Studies Quarterly, author = Berlinski, Samuel and Dewan, Torun and Van Coppenolle, Brenda, month = nov, year = 2014, note = WOS:000344054100005, pages = 531--558

@article{camp_catalyst_2014, title = Catalyst or {Cause}? {Legislation} and the {Demise} of {Machine} {Politics} in {Britain} and the {United} {States}, volume = 39, issn = 0362-9805, doi = 10.1111/lsq.12058, abstract = In the nineteenth century, British and American parties competed by hiring electoral agents to bribe and treat voters.
British parties abruptly abandoned this practice in the 1880s. The conventional explanation is that legislation put an end to agent-mediated distribution. But this explanation leaves many questions unanswered. Why did the parties use agents for decades, even though they imposed great expense on candidates and were viewed as untrustworthy? And why, after decades of half-hearted reforms, did the House of Commons pass effective antibribery reforms only in 1883? In our formal model, parties hire agents to solve information problems, but agent-mediated distribution can be collectively suboptimal. Legislation can serve as a credibility device for shifting to less costly strategies.,
To enhance explanations for party polarization in the U. S. Congress, we focus on an unappreciated legal structure known as the sore loser law. By restricting candidates who lose partisan primaries from subsequently appearing on the general election ballot as independents or as nominees of other parties, these laws give greater control over ballot access to the party bases, thus producing more extreme major party nominees. Using several different measures of candidate and legislator ideology, we find that sore loser laws account for as much as a tenth of the ideological divide between the major parties.

At a time of a high level of polarization in Congress, public opinion surveys routinely find that Americans want politicians to compromise. When evaluating legislation, does the preference for bipartisan in the legislative process trump partisan identities? We find that it does not. We conduct two experiments in which we alter aspects of the political context to see how people respond to parties (not) coming together to achieve broadly popular public policy goals. Although citizens can recognize bipartisan processes, preferences for bipartisan legislating do not outweigh partisan desires in the evaluation of public policies.
This article addresses central issues in multiparty presidential systems: the functioning of legislative coalitions and the dynamics of legislative conflict. Since electoral competition has elements of both positive-sum (increase in common support) and zero-sum (exact division of the support) qualities, lawmaking in coalitional systems presents unique challenges. Using legislative data from Brazil, we examine how coalition management and unity affect legislative delay and obstructionism. We find, among others, that: (1) coalition management is pivotal for both faster legislative approval and less obstructionism, but its effect depends on coalition size; and (2) cohesive opposition impedes the legislative process.

Committee jurisdictions are important in legislative organization, but the reorganization of jurisdictions has received scant attention, particularly in state legislatures, where the fluidity of committee organization allows us to examine rationales for change. In this article, I examine whether new majorities use jurisdiction reorganization for agenda-control purposes. Examining 39 state legislatures between 2003 and 2012, I test whether committee patterns are less stable in legislative sessions under new majorities.
and the extent to which reorganization reflects party priorities. I find that new majority parties eliminate committees that reflect the other party's policy priorities and create committees that reflect their priorities.

@article{hall_partisan_2014,
  title = {Partisan Effects of Legislative Term Limits},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12051},
  abstract = {Term limits remain a popular policy reform and have generated a great deal of scholarship as a result. Although many predicted that term limits would benefit the Republican party, the literature finds no marked partisan effects, possibly because termed-out legislators have largely been replaced by copartisans. This article demonstrates that term limits have indeed had partisan effects—just not on electoral outcomes. Term limits have caused a significant reallocation of institutional power from Democrats to Republicans (as measured by contributions from access-oriented interest groups), in large part because they have removed more senior Democrats than Republicans. The partisan effects of term limits therefore point to the institutional value of seniority.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hall, Andrew B.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000340070200006},
  pages = {407--429}
}

@article{squire_introduction_2014-1,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12039},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = may,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000334123700001},
  pages = {143--145}
Electoral rules can motivate politicians to cultivate a "personal vote" through their legislative voting records. However, I argue that candidate-selection procedures have the ability to overpower these electoral incentives. This study—the first systematic study of how candidate selection and electoral rules interact—takes advantage of Lithuania's unique mixed electoral rules and fortuitous candidate-selection procedures. Regardless of electoral rules, MPs whose future careers depend on getting renominated by central party leaders vote against the party less than those whose careers do not. This evidence of a "selectoral connection" suggests candidate-selection procedures must be studied much more seriously.

The collective nature of legislating forces legislators to rely on one another for information and support. This collaborative activity requires a choice about partnerships in an environment of uncertainty. The basic size and organization of a legislature amplifies this uncertainty in relational choices. Analysis of collaborative patterns between all the U.S. state legislators in 2007 corroborates this expectation, indicating that large legislatures have highly partisan collaborative networks with generally low density, while larger legislative committees mitigate these effects. Thus, even when the attributes of legislators do not change, the organizational size of the legislature can shape how those legislators interact.
Interest groups may approach political decision makers in two phases of the legislative process: the pre-parliamentary, administrative phase, in which bills are prepared by bureaucrats; and the parliamentary phase, in which bills are discussed and possibly revised by parliamentary committees. The article investigates the factors that lead groups to engage in these phases based on group proceedings for 225 bills presented to the Danish parliament in the 2009/2010 session. We conclude that resourceful groups are clearly more active in both arenas, but the parliamentary arena is also a venue for voicing discontent and defending gains achieved in the administrative arena.

Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor-law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations.
I examine the hypothesis that race affects citizens' perceptions of candidates' ideologies. In the past, systematic tests of this hypothesis have relied almost entirely on data drawn from experiments. While experimental research designs have contributed much to the analysis of political stereotypes and heuristics, the extent to which experimental research on this hypothesis is externally valid is open to question. Moreover, experimental approaches are not well-suited to estimating the magnitude of the effects of stereotypes in real-world situations, especially in the context of complex political phenomena such as election campaigns. In this article, I develop a statistical model of the effects of race on perceptions of candidates' ideologies and estimate the model using data on incumbent candidates from the American National Election Studies. The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, white citizens will tend to perceive black candidates to be more liberal than ideologically similar white candidates. In contrast, the perceptions of black respondents are not affected by the race of candidates, although black respondents' perceptions are more strongly correlated with candidates' positions on issues of particular interest to minorities than the perceptions of white respondents. I discuss the implications of these findings with respect to descriptive representation in the United States, the accountability of office holders, and the study of voting behavior.
a more detailed account of Senate polarization. The results reveal that the Senate polarized in two distinct phases. Member replacement accounts for nearly all of the increase from the early 1970s through the mid-1990s after which ideological adaptation emerges as the dominant force behind polarization. In addition, I find that a few brief periods of intensified partisanship account for most of the increase in polarization since the mid-1990s, suggesting that these episodes have had significant and lasting effects.},

@article{stiglitz_appointment_2014,
  title = {Appointment Politics and the Ideological Composition of the Judiciary},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12032},
  abstract = {Scholars have advanced a wide range of theories regarding the role of Senate confirmation in judicial appointments. In this article, I directly test the predictions of these models using a novel measure of the ideology of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The main results indicate that the filibuster and majority party have predominated in appointment politics. Prompted by recent events, I also conduct a simulation-based exercise to examine the ideological composition of the judiciary under a confirmation regime in which the filibuster is not present. This exercise suggests that the Senate filibuster induces moderation in judicial appointments; the elimination of the filibuster is likely to result in a more contentious, if less dilatory, confirmation process and a more polarized judiciary.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Stiglitz, Edward H.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000330862900003},
  pages = {27--54}
}

@article{mcghee_measuring_2014,
  title = {Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12033},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bonica, Adam},
  month = feb,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000330862900002},
  pages = {5--26}
}
abstract = {In recent decades, the literature has coalesced around either symmetry or responsiveness as measures of partisan bias in single-member district systems. I argue neither accurately captures the traditional idea of an efficient gerrymander, where one party claims more seats without more votes. I suggest a better measure of efficiency and then use this new measure to reconsider a classic study of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the original study findings, I show that the effects of party control on bias are small and decay rapidly, suggesting that redistricting is at best a blunt tool for promoting partisan interests.},

@article{chasquetti_subnational_2014,
  title = {The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior in Uruguay},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12034},
  abstract = {How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in Uruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Chasquetti, Daniel and Pablo Micozzi, Juan},
  month = feb,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000330862900005},
  pages = {87--112}
}

@article{rich_party_2014,
  title = {Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan},
  volume = {39},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {In recent decades, the literature has coalesced around either symmetry or responsiveness as measures of partisan bias in single-member district systems. I argue neither accurately captures the traditional idea of an efficient gerrymander, where one party claims more seats without more votes. I suggest a better measure of efficiency and then use this new measure to reconsider a classic study of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the original study findings, I show that the effects of party control on bias are small and decay rapidly, suggesting that redistricting is at best a blunt tool for promoting partisan interests.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {McGhee, Eric},
  month = feb,
  year = {2014},
  note = {WOS:000330862900004},
  pages = {55--85}
}
How do mixed-member legislative systems influence legislator voting? While the literature remains inconclusive, this article suggests party influence as an intervening variable. Through an analysis of roll-call data from Taiwan and Korea, no deviation is evident between district legislators and legislators elected by proportional representation. Further disaggregation of what it means to vote against one's party again finds little evidence of a tier distinction, while party variables remain significant. The findings are suggestive of a contamination effect between tiers, consistent with the influence of parties.


Concerns about endogeneity often complicate attempts to estimate a causal link between public opinion and the voting records of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In this article, I overcome this problem by exploiting a rare natural experiment—the surprising and exogenous revelation of Irish public opinion that resulted from Ireland's ratification of the Nice treaty. I find that the Irish electorate's rejection of Nice caused Ireland's European Parliament delegation to vote in a more conservative manner, while its subsequent ratification caused a partial reversal of this shift. My finding of an electoral connection on the Nice treaty casts doubt on the claim that MEPs are largely unconstrained by voter preferences on European issues, despite claims of a democratic deficit in European institutions.

@article{bernhard_commitment_2013,
  title = {Commitment and {Consequences}: {Reneging} on {Cosponsorship} {Pledges} in the {US} {House}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12024},
  abstract = {We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st-108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bernhard, William and Sulkin, Tracy},
  month = nov,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000325934200003},
  pages = {439--460}}
To date, we are unaware to what extent gains in women's legislative representation have reached minority women. To facilitate cross-national research on minority women in politics, I present and explore new cross-national data on the election of women and men from 431 ethnic, racial, and religious groups to national legislatures in 81 countries between 2005 and 2007. I create a new measure scoring countries by minority women's representation relative to their share of the population—the Minority Women Legislative Index (MWLI). Descriptive analyses show minority women to be substantially underrepresented in national legislatures overall but their level of exclusion varies geographically.

The number of legislators elected in a single district influences many aspects of state legislative elections. However, there is a dearth of research on how district magnitude influences campaign fundraising. We theorize that the greater competition for funds in multimember districts results in candidates raising less money and encourages them to be more entrepreneurial in their fundraising efforts. Specifically, we expect multimember district candidates to raise contributions from more diverse sets of interests than candidates in single-member districts, raise more funds out of state, and create more unique financial constituencies. Using data on candidates for Maryland's House of Delegates in 2006 and 2010, we find support for our hypotheses.
This article examines electoral cycles in legislative budget decisions. Where local structures play an important role in candidate selection and election, legislators' incentives to amend the executive spending proposal can depend on the proximity of elections, leading to more spendthrift behavior in the run-up to popular votes. However, stringent budget institutions can counteract this tendency. Using a unique dataset of executive spending proposals and approved budgets in Sweden, I find strong empirical support for these predictions. Future studies of electoral cycles should pay greater attention to separating the contributions of the legislative and executive stages of the budgetary process and the conditions that foster electoral cyclicality in legislatures.

Lame-duck sessions of Congress have become increasingly common of late. Such sessions are marked by higher levels of ideological and participatory shirking among departing members, creating a more uncertain legislative environment. I investigate the consequences of such shirking on coalition formation and roll-call behavior. I analyze House roll-call votes held in the 12 congresses that convened lame-duck sessions from 1969 to 2010 (91st to 111th Congresses) to assess how roll-call behavior changes across sessions. I find subtle but statistically significant changes across sessions consistent with claims regarding greater uncertainty in roll-call voting in lame-duck sessions.
Scholars of state politics are often interested in the causal effects of legislative institutions on policy outcomes. For example, during the 1990s a number of states adopted term limits for state legislators. Advocates of term limits argued that this institutional reform would alter state policy in a number of ways, including limiting state expenditures. We highlight a number of research design issues that complicate attempts to estimate the effect of institutions on state outcomes by addressing the question of term limits and spending. In particular, we focus on (1) treatment effect heterogeneity and (2) the suitability of nonterm-limit states as good counterfactuals for term-limit states. We compare two different identification strategies to deal with these issues: differences-in-differences (DID) estimation and conditioning on prior outcomes with an emphasis on synthetic case control. Using more rigorous methods of causal inference, we find little evidence that term limits affect state spending. Our analysis and results are informative for researchers seeking to assess the causal effects of state-level institutions.
Parties are seen as vital for the maintenance of parliamentary government and as necessary intermediaries between voters and legislators; an elected parliamentary chamber not controlled by parties is highly anomalous. This study contrasts the party-controlled Tasmanian lower house with its Independent-dominated elected upper house and finds that the major source of constraints on party representation is not a clientelistic style of politics but the persistence of a distinctive institutional design and electoral rules based on fixed terms and annual staggered elections. The consequences of these rules are explored for their effects on voter choice and legislative behaviour.

Oversight hearings should be an important congressional tool for controlling recalcitrant agencies, but it is not clear that this should always be equally true. The logic of principal-agent models of legislative policy control implies that oversight might sometimes, but not always, be superfluous to said control. Here, I reintroduce oversight hearings to theories of policy control and argue that congressional committees conduct oversight hearings primarily as a response to the extent to which agencies have different policy preferences from them and as a function of their capacity to conduct hearings cheaply. I test these hypotheses using committee hearings data (Policy Agendas Project) from both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate from 1947 to 2006 and provide support for theoretical arguments about the institutional nature of
legislative policymaking strategies and ultimately help clarify the role of oversight in legislative-executive relations.

@article{mcgrath_legislative_2013,
  title = {Legislative {Policymaking} {Strategies} and {Ultimately} {Help} {Clarify} the {Role} of {Oversight} in {Legislative}-{Executive} {Relations}},
  volume = {3},
  issn = {1071-568X},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12020},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {McGrath, Robert J.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000321976200004},
  pages = {349--376}
}

@article{neiheisel_use_2013,
  title = {The {Use} of {Party} {Brand} {Labels} in {Congressional} {Election} {Campaigns}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12019},
  abstract = {In spite of the centrality of partisanship to many theories of lawmaking, and the important role that party cues play in shaping voters' evaluations of political candidates, remarkably little is known about the circumstances under which congressional candidates use partisan symbols on the campaign trail. Employing data on candidates' televised advertisements over six elections (1998-2008), the present study explores the supply side of partisan cues and finds that candidates are strategic about their use of party symbols. And while personal and district-level factors influence how candidates utilize partisan rhetoric, we show that the institutional context in which they campaign also matters.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Neiheisel, Jacob R. and Niebler, Sarah},
  month = aug,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000321976200005},
  pages = {377--403}
}

@article{mctague_voting_2013,
  title = {Voting from the {Pew}: {The} {Effect} of {Senators}' {Religious} {Identities} on {Partisan} {Polarization} in the {US} {Senate}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12020},
  abstract = {Partisan polarization in the Senate is in part a product of the increased sorting of evangelical Christians into the Republican caucus. The relationship between senators' religious identities, party affiliation, and ideology has changed since the 1970s. Whereas congressional party caucuses in the past were more diverse in their religious composition, evangelical Christian senators have sorted themselves into the party that most closely resembles the
values of their religious identities, leading to greater overall polarization.

@article{harden_multidimensional_2013,
  title = {Multidimensional {Responsiveness}: {The} {Determinants} of {Legislators}' {Representational} {Priorities}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12009},
  abstract = {American politics scholars typically conceptualize representation narrowly as mass-elite policy responsiveness, with many studies identifying factors that hinder that relationship. These findings contrast with the high reelection rates in American legislatures. I show that policy is only one of several dimensions through which legislators provide representation. I unify policy, service, allocation, and descriptive representation in a model of legislators' priorities and then test it with survey experiments administered to 1,175 state legislators. I posit that legislators systematically emphasize different dimensions to further the goal of reelection. Results show that legislative institutions, district demand, and individual traits structure legislators' strategic representational priorities.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Harden, Jeffrey J.},
  month = may,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000318028200002},
  pages = {155--184}
}

@article{squire_legislative_2013,
  title = {Legislative {Studies} {Quarterly} {Introduction}},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12008},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = may,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000318028200001},
  pages = {151--153}
}

@article{mcTague_PearsonMerkowitz_legislative_2013,
  title = {Legislative {Studies} {Quarterly}},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {McTague, John and Pearson-Merkowitz, Shanna},
  month = aug,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000321976200006},
  pages = {405--430}
}
This study analyzes changes in individual evaluations of Congress immediately before and after enactment of national health care reform in 2010. It tests three alternative hypotheses: that enactment increased the likelihood of approval by demonstrating congressional competence; that it decreased the likelihood of approval by calling attention to partisan processes; or that it differentially affected citizens' evaluations depending on their individual policy preferences. The results show enactment polarized citizens' evaluations of Congress, with supporters of the bill increasing their approval of Congress and opponents decreasing. These findings represent the first concrete evidence that enactments can affect evaluations of Congress.

While the metaphor of House parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the Senate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the Senate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agenda control or special party influence? Using an analysis of individual Senators' behavior on thousands of votes and an assessment of interest group scores, we find that motions to table do not elicit higher party influence or provide much political cover. A desire to speed up the legislative process, rather than to insulate members from electoral scrutiny, seems to motivate the use of motions to table.
State governments have experienced considerable institutional change in the last several decades. None appeared at first glance to be as far-reaching as the legislative term limits that were adopted by over 20 states in the 1990s. The evidence to date suggests that term limits have indeed changed the character of many of the states' legislatures, if not always as predicted by their advocates. We report data on veto dynamics over the period 1989-2008 to determine how term limits have impacted legislative-executive relations. Our data both challenge and support what has become the conventional wisdom, i.e., that term limits will weaken legislatures relative to their governors. States with more stringent term limits experienced fewer gubernatorial vetoes but proved more likely to override those vetoes when they were issued. Taken together the evidence suggests that the relationship between governors and legislatures in the wake of term limits is more complex and variable than scholars and others had previously thought.

This study examines when and why members of the European Parliament (EP) use parliamentary questions as a form of fire alarm oversight. We argue that the multilevel nature of the EU political system allows members of the EP from national opposition parties to use parliamentary questions to alert the European Commission to governments' failures to implement EU policy.
Representation in the EP provides the only avenue for such oversight for national opposition parties. Using a new sample of EP parliamentary questions, we demonstrate that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to alert the Commission to violations of EU law in their own member states. These parliamentary questions may lead the Commission to take legal action against member-state governments.

@article{drutman_inside_2013,
  title = {The Inside View: Using the Enron E-mail Archive to Understand Corporate Political Attention},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12001},
  abstract = {For decades, scholars have debated the role of corporations in American politics. To date, they have relied on either interviews or publicly disclosed spending and lobbying reports. This article presents new methods and data that enable us to consider the internal processes of corporate political attention instead. Aided by automated content analysis, this article uses more than 250,000 internal e-mails from Enron to observe its political attention between 1999 and 2002. These e-mails depict Enron's employees as focused on monitoring and formally participating in political processes, including bureaucratic processes. Only a small fraction of their political attention focused on elections.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Drutman, Lee and Hopkins, Daniel J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000313754600002},
  pages = {5--30}
}

@article{lawrence_publication_2013,
  title = {The Publication of Precedents and Its Effect on Legislative Behavior},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12002},
  abstract = {What was the effect of the publication of the precedents in the House in the late nineteenth century? Empirical
analysis demonstrates a significant effect of the publication of the House precedents on the behavior of members' willingness to appeal decisions of the chair. Publication of the precedents reduced the frequency of appeals, a finding consistent with the qualitative arguments of past parliamentarians but never before demonstrated empirically. Further, parallel analysis of the Senate reveals that the publication effect found for the House is not an artifact of some secular trend in legislative behavior, doing so by showing that no similar pattern occurs in the Senate during the same period of time.

@article{martin_citizen_2013,
  title = {Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12003},
  abstract = {This article examines the influence of citizen participation, specifically voter turnout, on congressional policy responsiveness. We argue that higher levels of citizen participation signal to representatives greater surveillance of their actions by their constituents and, thus, a higher probability of sanction. Representatives respond to these signals by deploying resources in ways that provide better intelligence of district needs and preferences. As a consequence, higher citizen participation is rewarded with enhanced policy responsiveness.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Martin, Paul S. and Claibourn, Michele P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000313754600004},
  pages = {59--81}
}

@article{carroll_role_2013,
  title = {The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competition},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12004},
  abstract = {We examine the proposition that incentives for legislative organization can be explained by the nature of electoral competition. We argue that legislators in environments where parties...}
are competitive for majority status are most likely to have delegated power to their leadership to constrain individualistic behavior within their party, which will in turn increase the spatial predictability of individual voting patterns. Using roll-call votes and district-level electoral data from the U.S. state legislatures, we show empirically that increased statewide interparty competition corresponds to more predictable voting behavior overall, while legislators from competitive districts and those in the minority party have less predictable behavior.}

@article{obrien_cross-national_2013,
  title = {A Cross-National Analysis of Party Switching},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12005},
  abstract = {Though instances of party switching have been widely documented, there is little cross-national research on this phenomenon. The prevalence of switching is therefore unknown, and the factors influencing this behavior remain unclear. Using the most comprehensive dataset on party switching ever constructed, we illustrate both that interparty movement is more common than previously assumed and that there are substantial differences in its prevalence across parties. To explain this variation, we examine the relationship between legislators' motivations, institutional arrangements, and switching. We find that motivational explanations are correlated with interparty movement and that institutional arrangements exhibit only limited direct influence on switching.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {O'brien, Diana Z. and Shomer, Yael},
  month = feb,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000313754600006},
  pages = {111--141}
}

@article{squire_introduction_2013-2,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {38},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12000},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Carroll, Royce and Eichorst, Jason},
  month = feb,
  year = {2013},
  note = {WOS:000313754600005},
  pages = {83--109}
}
Although Congress passes spending bills every year, there is great variation in the amount of time it takes. Drawing from rational models of bargaining, we identify factors that systematically affect the duration of legislative bargaining in the appropriations process. Analysis of spending bills for fiscal years 1977 to 2009 shows that delays are shorter when the ideological distance between pairs of key players decreases and distributive content is higher, but they are longer following an election. We find that congressional parties matter but that intraparty conflict matters as well, which suggests that Appropriations Committees retain significant autonomy in Congress.
Incumbents tend to win with higher margins in less ideologically constrained districts. I argue that incumbents are advantaged by this electoral landscape in part because they work harder to cultivate a personal vote. Utilizing data on earmarks, I find that despite winning with a larger margin of victory, these incumbents act much like their colleagues who narrowly escaped electoral defeat. By more accurately measuring perceptions of electoral vulnerability, we also see stronger evidence linking district marginality to distributive politics. Such incentives appear to stem not from the risks of position taking, but from the weaker party attachments among constituents.

This article considers evaluations of U.S. House incumbents under conditions of racial/ethnic congruence and incongruence. We consider whether different racial groups have ordered preferences among nondescriptive alternatives. We pose two theoretical models of descriptive representation and test them using pooled National Election Study data. After controlling for the propensity to recall the Member of Congress, we find the extent of favoritism towards descriptive representatives varies across groups, as does the preference ordering among representatives of different racial and ethnic identification. No evidence of race-based judgment is uncovered among African Americans, while Latinos and Whites demonstrate preferences based on race and ethnicity.

Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels:
Evidence} from the {US} {States},

volume = {37},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00059.x},
abstract = {Procedural cartel theory states that the majority party exerts influence over legislative outcomes through agenda control. This research tests predictions from the party cartel theory in five state legislatures. I assess party influence through comparison of term-limited and nonterm-limited legislators. I argue that term-limited legislators (who are not seeking elective office) are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means to determine the existence of party influence. The results demonstrate that party influence is present in these legislatures. I find that party influence is magnified on the procedural, rather than final-passage, voting record which is precisely where procedural cartel theory predicts. I find lower levels of ideological consistency and party discipline among members for whom the party leadership offers the least those leaving elective office. These results provide support for party cartel theory, demonstrating further evidence of how parties matter in modern democracies.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Clark, Jennifer Hayes},
month = nov,
year = {2012},
note = {WOS:000310541200005},
pages = {491--507}

@article{rogers_responsiveness_2012,
title = {The {Responsiveness} of {Direct} and {Indirect} {Elections}},
volume = {37},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00060.x},
abstract = {Previous research argues the Seventeenth Amendment made Senate elections more responsive. To make this claim, existing work compares the vote-seat relationships of direct and indirect elections before and after the Seventeenth Amendment. I argue this approach is problematic because it does not account for regional variation and compares elections from different time periods using presidential instead of Senate vote. I overcome these problems by simulating indirect elections using state legislatures partisan compositions to evaluate the responsiveness of direct and indirect elections after the Seventeenth Amendment. With this counterfactual approach, my findings suggest direct elections are not necessary for electoral responsiveness.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Rogers, Steven},
month = nov,
A diverse and growing literature ties legislative professionalization and power to career paths. In particular, higher rates of reelection and longer legislative careers should produce more professional, competent, and high-quality legislatures. Legislators have more incentives to strengthen their own institution when they intend to remain there for a long career. Using data from the most recent constitutional convention in Brazil, we show that legislators with greater prospects for long careers were actually less likely to support strengthening the legislative branch. We explain this as part of a local equilibrium where career legislators short-term need for pork trumped their long-term interest in a stronger institution.

In this research note, I discuss results from a recent study assessing the impact that New Zealand's electoral and legislative system reforms had on levels of vote consensus achieved in the House of Representatives. Using a new legislative vote data set spanning from 1987 to 2007, I find evidence that the institutional changes fostered an increase in consensual legislative vote outcomes. I also provide a brief theoretical explanation of the developments and address a few issues concerning the measure of consensus used and the interpretation of the data.
Previous studies have documented that the increase in the incumbency advantage in the 1960s did not decrease the probability of defeat of incumbents in the U.S. House. I define a method for establishing bounds on the probability of incumbent defeat and find that it decreases significantly in the 1950s, before the rise of the incumbency advantage. Incumbency advantage does not have a direct relationship with incumbent defeat rates, raising questions about the use of the incumbency advantage as a means for making inferences about the electoral security of incumbents.

Do term limits impede the ability of legislators to effectively set fiscal policy? To address this question, I examine
state bond ratings from 1996 to 2009. Bond ratings serve as a valuable indicator of a state's fiscal performance, gauging the risk and uncertainty that investors face when buying these bonds. In addition, bond ratings are important policy ends in themselves. High bond ratings make it easier for states to borrow and raise revenue, while lowering interest rates. Results from analyses of Term-Limitedness and legislator experience suggest that term limits negatively impact a state's fiscal performance, leading to lower bond ratings.},

@article{kirkland_multimember_2012,
title = {Multimember Districts' Effect on Collaboration between U.S. State Legislators},
volume = {37},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00050.x},
abstract = {In this article, I demonstrate that multimember districts form a basis for collaboration between two legislators. In order to maximize the limited incumbency advantages they possess, legislators from multimember districts form coalitions in an effort to generate greater credit-claiming opportunities and policy benefits for their district. In order to test this conception, I utilize a natural experiment and an opportunity to observe institutional change in North Carolina's elimination of multimember districts during the 2000-2002 redistricting cycle. Coupled with cross-sectional analysis of several states that use both single-member and multimember districts, empirical evidence strongly corroborates my conception of multimember districts as a basis for collaboration between representatives.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Kirkland, Justin H.},
month = aug,
year = {2012},
note = {WOS:000306735300004},
pages = {329--353}
}

@article{pablo_couyoumdjian_cultivating_2012,
title = {Cultivating Votes in Rural Chile},
volume = {37},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00051.x},
abstract = {In Chile's two-member legislative districts we show there are two groups of swing voters, one group for the first seat won
by the governing coalition, another for the second. We build a model
that allows us to identify the relative prevalence of these voters
across communities. Using data on the allocation of discretionary
agricultural loans, we find that communities with relatively many
voters pivotal for the first seat receive more loans than they
otherwise would have, but we find no systematic advantage for
districts that are pivotal for the second seat.)

@article{desposato_handbook_2012,
  title = {The Handbook of National Legislatures},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00052.x},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Desposato, Scott},
  month = aug,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000306735300006},
  pages = {389--396}
}

@article{fish_response_2012,
  title = {A Response to Desposato},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00054.x},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fish, M. Steven and Kroenig, Matthew},
  month = aug,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000306735300007},
  pages = {397--401}
}

@article{squire_introduction_2012-2,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {37},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00040.x},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, David},
  month = aug,
  year = {2012},
  note = {WOS:000306735300008},
  pages = {403--415}
}
Mapping Dimensions of Conflict at the Federal Convention of 1787

Previous work on the Federal Convention of 1787 hypothesized multiple dimensions of conflict. We evaluate the dimensionality of conflict using a new method for estimating state delegation positions and proposals that incorporates the many divided votes at the convention. The results suggest that three dimensions are adequate for most analyses and the first dimension—proportional representation in the legislature—the most important. Finally, we examine how the agenda unfolds by mapping changes to the status quo throughout the convention. We conclude that, despite the lack of parties, the nature of the conflict is quite organized with a low number of dimensions.

Party Size and Constituency Representation: Evidence from the 19th-Century U.S. House of Representatives

Research on congressional parties assumes, but has not directly shown, that party size affects individual members' calculations. Drawing on a key case from the nineteenth-century House—the secession-driven Republican hegemony of 1861—this article explores the hypothesis that party voting not only declines but also becomes more strongly linked to constituency factors as relative party size increases. The analysis reveals that the jump in party size coincides with (1) a decrease in party voting among individual continuing members, (2) a strengthening association between some constituency factors and party voting, and (3) patterns of decline in individual party voting that are explained in part by constituency...
measures.

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Meinke, Scott R.},
month = may,
year = {2012},
note = {WOS:000302550800003},
pages = {175--197}
}

@article{coman_legislative_2012,
title = {Legislative {Behavior} in {Romania}: {The} {Effect} of the 2008 {Romanian} {Electoral} {Reform}},
volume = {37},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00043.x},
abstract = {This article analyzes the impact of electoral rules on legislators rate of vote defection from their party position in legislatures while accounting for how party-leadership strength mediates this impact. To this end it looks at the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. The reform shifted the electoral system from a closed-list proportional representation to one in which all candidates run in single-member districts. The analysis finds that because party leaders have maintained their leverage intact, the impact of the reform was minimal, with legislators being more likely to defect in less important votes only, in which party leaders allow defection. Also, after the reform legislators are more likely to use other means to impress their voters, such as legislative initiation and cabinet questioning. These forms of behavior are more accepted by party leaders.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Coman, Emanuel Emil},
month = may,
year = {2012},
note = {WOS:000302550800004},
pages = {199--224}
}

@article{makse_strategic_2012,
title = {Strategic {Constituency} {Manipulation} in {State} {Legislative} {Redistricting}},
volume = {37},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00044.x},
abstract = {Scholars often identify gerrymanders by examining changes to districts' partisan composition. However, advantages can also be gained by systematically varying the extent to which incumbents' constituencies remain the same. In this article, I examine the post-2000 redistricting in 22 state legislatures. I find that parties, particularly in legislatures with low turnover levels, gain
advantages from constituency manipulation, but that these advantages are counteracted by geographic redistricting regulations. Lastly, I find that ostensibly bipartisan outcomes nonetheless feature partisan constituency manipulation. These findings echo a growing literature that analyzes the geographic aspects of gerrymandering and highlight how turnover patterns motivate redistricting strategies.}
underrepresented in policymaking institutions throughout most of America's history. Little is known, however, about the political consequences of this enduring feature of our democratic system. This essay examines the relationship between legislators' class backgrounds and their votes on economic policy in the House of Representatives during the twentieth century. Like ordinary Americans, representatives from working-class occupations exhibit more liberal economic preferences than other legislators, especially those from profit-oriented professions. These findings provide the first evidence of a link between the descriptive and substantive representation of social classes in the United States.,
Legislative votes can be taken by roll call noting the position of each individual member or by some form of indication (sitting or standing, shouting yea or nay, etc.) noting only an aggregate outcome. Cameral rules define one method of voting as the standard operating procedure and how to invoke any alternative voting methods. We develop a series of hypotheses related to position taking to explain why, when procedures would typically lead to a vote taken by indication, legislators choose to vote by roll call—a means that makes it much easier for actors outside the chamber to observe the positions taken by individual legislators and partisan blocs. With data from Argentina and Mexico, we test these hypotheses regarding the strategic choice of vote procedures and their relationship to observed party unity.

The determinants of public approval for state legislatures have not received much attention, but one important finding is that more professionalized legislatures experience lower levels of public support. We argue that this result is an artifact of limited data and problematic model specifications. Analyzing a large national survey sample, we demonstrate that the negative relationship holds primarily for conservatives and to a lesser extent for moderates but not liberals. Additionally, we find that legislative approval in states with term limits and ballot initiatives is no different than in states without these institutions.

The strategic use of prisons in partisan...
The census data used to redraw legislative districts counts the country's nearly 2 million prisoners in the location of their incarceration, rather than their previous place of residence. By drawing these phantom populations into districts that lean heavily toward the majority party, legislators can free up eligible voters from those districts to be distributed among neighboring marginal ones, thereby increasing that party's likelihood of winning additional seats in the state legislature. An analysis of state senate district finds that prison populations shift systematically from districts controlled by one party to districts controlled by the other following a switch in partisan control.
The Single-Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade-off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single-party regimes manage this trade-off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate-level data from Vietnam, we demonstrate that single-party regimes, in particular, forsake information on overall regime support and strength of opposition in favor of information on the popularity of local notables and the compliance of local officials with central mandates. In addition, we show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex post fraud at achieving these goals.

Using Cosponsorship to Estimate Ideal Points

Ideal point estimates based on roll-call vote results have provided leverage for a variety of theory testing efforts. Recently, scholars have suggested using cosponsorship data as a proxy for roll-call votes. Conceptually similar to roll-call votes, cosponsorship data are appealing for a variety of reasons. However, the data-generating process for cosponsorship is untheorized and little studied. We examine the properties of ideal point estimates from cosponsorship data. We find that the ability to estimate ideal points from cosponsorship data is contingent on the underlying data-generating process; reliance on such measures requires strong and often unrealistic assumptions.
This study attempts to assess the degree of influence interest groups can exert on the state policy process, specifically via their lobbying activities. The analysis uses data from the 2005-06 Wisconsin Legislative Session to assess the association between lobbying activity and legislative outcomes in one state legislature. The study finds a direct association between lobbying activities and bill outcomes, while also exploring the potential influences of both key political actors and public attention. Public attention is found to reduce the effects of lobbying efforts, suggesting that lobbying is most effective when focused on less salient issues.

Female and minority judicial nominations take longer and are less likely to be confirmed, yet presidents eagerly seek such nominations. I account for this puzzle by building a model in which senators face costs for opposing female and minority nominees. I predict that such nominations are more likely when the gridlock interval is large. Using appellate nominations from 1977 to 2004, I find that Republican presidents are more likely to pursue these nominations during periods of high gridlock. Furthermore, accounting for the gridlock interval erases the differences in confirmation duration and success between female/minority nominees and white male nominees.
It's Not You, It's Me: Determinants of Voluntary Legislative Turnover in Canada

The Canadian federal parliament is unique among Westminster parliamentary democracies due to the unusually high level of voluntary and involuntary MP turnover that occurs at each general election. This article builds on existing research to test the hypothesis that the MP career duration is related to MPs' expectations about parliamentary roles, insofar as voluntary turnover is concerned. Data on MPs drawn from historical records collected by the Library of Parliament and from surveys conducted in 1993 and 2001 are used to develop an event history model which estimates the hazard of voluntary career termination when different parliamentary roles are taken into consideration. Findings suggest that a number of individual factors play a role in voluntary turnover, most notably that MPs who enter Parliament hoping to affect policy are the most likely to move on.

Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization

This article explores the relationship between electoral institutions and the personal vote in legislative organization. It examines how different electoral systems influence the behavior of MPs and the structure of the parliament. Findings suggest that electoral systems have a significant impact on legislative dynamics, with implications for policy outcomes.
What is the relationship between electoral institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing research on the U.S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives shaped by the candidate-centered nature of congressional elections explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature. Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism (pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering extra-legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis, combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.

@article{zucco_distinguishing_2011,
title = {Distinguishing {Between} {Influences} on {Brazilian} {Legislative} {Behavior}},
year = {2011},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
volume = {36},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00019.x},
abstract = {Ideal point estimators hold the promise of identifying multiple dimensions of political disagreement as they are manifested in legislative voting. However, standard ideal point estimates do not distinguish between ideological motivations and voting inducements from parties, coalitions, or the executive. In this article we describe a general approach for hierarchically identifying an ideological dimension using an auxiliary source of data. In the case we consider, we use an anonymous survey of Brazilian legislators to identify party positions on a left-right ideology dimension. We then use this data to distinguish ideological motivations from other determinants of roll-call behavior for eight presidential-legislative periods covering more than 20 years of Brazilian politics. We find that there exists an important nonideological government-opposition dimension, with the entrance and exit of political parties from the governing coalition appearing as distinct shifts in ideal point on this second dimension. We conjecture that the Brazilian president's control over politically important resources is the source of this dimension of conflict, which has recently become far more important in explaining roll-call voting than the ideological dimension.},
number = {3},
}
@article{battista_party_2011,
  title = {Party Pressure in the US State Legislatures},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00020.x},
  abstract = {We extend Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart's (2001) method of measuring party influence over roll-call voting to the comparative state legislative context. Examining 27 state lower chambers, we find that overall parties exert detectable influence on 44\% of all roll calls and 69\% of close votes, but that the incidence of party influence varies strongly across chambers. Taking advantage of the comparative leverage the state context brings, we find that party influence responds significantly to measures of legislative careerism and state socioeconomic diversity, with majority size playing some role. The effect of preference polarization is complicated and conditioned by challenges facing the legislature, and we find results both challenging and conditionally supporting the conditional party government account.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Battista, James Coleman and Richman, Jesse T.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2011},
  note = {WOS:000293848900004},
  pages = {397--422}
}

@article{bratton_networks_2011,
  title = {Networks in the Legislative Arena: How Group Dynamics Affect Cosponsorship},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00021.x},
  abstract = {In this study, we explore the determinants of cosponsorship activity within state legislatures. Utilizing a social dynamic framework, we develop and test a model of the interplay of the activities of sponsorship and cosponsorship that includes both individual-level and social network characteristics as determinants of agenda-setting behavior; the latter demonstrating how collaboration and mutual interests shape the agenda-setting process. We find several consistent factors that influence the frequency of cosponsorship activity: (1) ideological distance, (2) proximity of legislators' districts, (3) homophily (similar characteristics such as race, gender, and ethnicity), and (4) transitivity (the idea that friends of
my friends are also my friends).},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Bratton, Kathleen A. and Rouse, Stella M.},
month = aug,
year = {2011},
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pages = {423--460}
)

@article{carson_constituency_2011,
  title = {Constituency Congruency and Candidate Competition in US House Elections},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00022.x},
  abstract = {Research on candidate competition has focused on how much context matters in emergence decisions and election outcomes. If a candidate has previously held elected office, one additional consideration that may influence entry decisions is the relative degree of overlap between the candidate's current constituency and the "new" set of voters she is seeking to represent. Using GIS software, we derive a measure of the challenger's personal vote by focusing on constituency congruency between state legislative and congressional districts. Results suggest state legislators are more likely to run for a seat in the U. S. House if constituency congruency is relatively high.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Carson, Jamie L. and Crespin, Michael H. and Eaves, Carrie P. and Wanless, Emily},
  month = aug,
  year = {2011},
  note = {WOS:000293848900006},
  pages = {461--482}
)

@article{squire_introduction_2011-2,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {36},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00009.x},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = may,
  year = {2011},
  note = {WOS:000290177800001},
  pages = {165--167}
)
The exchange of rationales among debate participants is necessary for legitimacy in a deliberative democracy. I show that witnesses in congressional committee hearings tend to use falsifiable rationales when they encounter moderate levels of disagreement and shift to nonfalsifiable rationales when they encounter extreme disagreement. I use data from a coding of hearings testimony on the Medicare program, held between 1990 and 2003, as well as from a survey of participating witnesses measuring their perceptions of disagreement at the hearing. The results identify conditions that enhance falsifiable discourse and help to establish the empirical grounding of deliberative democratic theory.

Political competition lies at the core of representative democracy. Yet, uncompetitive elections and uncontested races are widespread in the United States, particularly at the state level. In this article, we analyze the consequences of uncontested elections on lawmaking activity. Our primary hypothesis is that legislators who run unopposed are less active lawmakers than those who were selected through competitive elections. Studying roll-call vote participation and bill introduction and enactment for most of the U.S. states for 1999-2000, we find that state legislators elected in uncontested elections perform more poorly compared to their colleagues elected in competitive contests.
Governments often extol the policy refining functions of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems, governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for governments to act strategically to avoid defeats (even when facing a friendly chamber), while opposition majorities and a weaker ability to sanction members who deviate from their party's position increase the likelihood of defeat.

Incumbents are highly likely to win reelection at all levels of government, but scholars continue to debate the extent to which serving in office has a causal effect on winning. For city council elections it is unclear whether or not we should predict a causal effect at all. City councilors may not regularly seek reelection, and any apparent advantage could be entirely attributable to preexisting qualities rather than incumbency. This article uses a regression discontinuity design to provide evidence that city council incumbents are more likely to run and win their next elections because they served a term in office.
In every election cycle the fate of some candidates is determined by partisans who defect from their usual voting habits to cast a ballot for the candidate of the opposing party. Defections in congressional elections have been attributed to incumbency, presidential approval, partisan strength, and factors related to individual voters. Our systematic assessment of the impact of issues on voter defections shows that party-owned issues and performance issues associated favorably with one party affect the likelihood of partisan defections. The results suggest that congressional candidates can use issues to draw supporters away from the opposing party and to keep partisan voters loyal.

Literature on open-seat elections has focused on the individual attributes of a candidate and/or institutional arrangements. When a seat becomes an open contest could be a significant indicator as to how likely the incumbent party is able to maintain the seat. Examining data on open U.S. House seats from 1996 to 2008, we use OLS regression and logistic regression analysis, finding that time is a significant predictor for incumbent party fund-raising and seat maintenance. We conclude that political parties have an interest in encouraging members of Congress to announce their retirement early in the election cycle.
Under what conditions, if any, does the mass electorate hold congressional members accountable for their records on specific issues? We examine this question on the issue of crime, for which salience has varied substantially and opinion has favored Republicans, and the environment, for which salience has not varied much and voters have favored Democrats. Because different parametric specifications produce divergent findings, we utilize matching analysis in addition to ordinary least squares. The tests suggest that issue accountability exists even controlling for a member's overall record. However, such accountability depends crucially on issue salience and a member's partisan affiliation.

Research on term limits suggests that they have substantial consequences for the power of legislatures vis-a-vis the executive and interest groups and for the relationship between leaders and rank-and-file members within a chamber. Existing work, however, has not accounted for the actual power of relevant state actors. We contribute to this research by examining the effect of term limits on the influence of institutional actors conditional on the existing political power structure in a state. The inclusion of controls for the direct and moderating effect of actual institutional power suggests some significant extensions of previous findings regarding the institutional effects of term limits.
Presidential influence is partly a function of the partisan, economic, and international context within which the president governs. Presidents are, however, more than bystanders relying on the political milieu for policy opportunities. Recent scholarship demonstrates that presidents consciously influence this milieu and build political capital by campaigning for congressional candidates. We contribute to this literature by assessing the effects of presidential campaigning on legislative support for two presidents who governed under extremely dissimilar circumstances: Bill Clinton in the 106th Congress and George W Bush in the 108th Congress. We find evidence of campaign effects on congressional policymaking during both administrations.
abstract = {Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands from national parties and European party groups. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item-response analysis of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Lindstaedt, Rene and Slapin, Jonathan B. and Vander Wielen, Ryan J.},
month = feb,
year = {2011},
note = {WOS:000287265900003},
pages = {37--70}

@article{lowe_scaling_2011,
title = {Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts},
volume = {36},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00006.x},
abstract = {Scholars estimating policy positions from political texts typically code words or sentences and then build left-right policy scales based on the relative frequencies of text units coded into different categories. Here we reexamine such scales and propose a theoretically and linguistically superior alternative based on the logarithm of odds-ratios. We contrast this scale with the current approach of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), showing that our proposed logit scale avoids widely acknowledged flaws in previous approaches. We validate the new scale using independent expert surveys. Using existing CMP data, we show how to estimate more distinct policy dimensions, for more years, than has been possible before, and make this dataset publicly available. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the future design of coding schemes for political texts.},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Lowe, Will and Benoit, Kenneth and Mikhaylov, Slava and Laver, Michael},
month = feb,
year = {2011},
note = {WOS:000287265900006},
pages = {123--155}
}

@article{loewenberg_malcolm_2010,
The Influence of Conference Committees on Policy Outcomes

This article examines the effect that the spatial location of conference committees relative to the parent bodies has on congressional policy outcomes. The article presents a theoretical model proposing that conferees choose policies that maximize their policy utility subject to the constraint of gaining House and Senate majorities on the conference report. I tested the model using conferences on bills associated with votes that generated liberal-conservative divisions. The results confirm that, under specified conditions, conferees pull outcomes away from the parent bodies toward conferee preferences.
Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making in many multiparty legislatures. It is not clear, however, whether these rapporteurs are best characterized as partisan animals or technical experts seeking consensus in non-majoritarian institutions. We addressed this question by examining which members of the European Parliament become repeat rapporteurs. Using an original dataset comprising all committee reports from the 4th and 5th European Parliaments (1994-2004), we found that the report allocation process provides a way to pursue partisan policy goals within a multiparty, consensual institution that rewards both coalition building and expertise.

This article empirically illustrates the value of coalition formation in legislative bargaining. I argue that legislators' potential to form powerful coalitions, their coalition potential, is essential to their ability to obtain preferred policy outcomes. Using data on the European Union's legislative process, I show that coalition potential significantly increases legislators' success. Moreover, the value of coalition potential depends on the voting rules used to pass legislation. For example, under the unanimity voting rule, the importance of coalition potential is insignificant because of the veto power held by each legislator.
This article examines the connection between unified party government and campaign contributions. Our central argument is that unified party government confers a substantial, but previously overlooked, fundraising advantage to intra-chamber majority parties. We examined data on corporate campaign contributions to U.S. House incumbents and state legislators in 17 different legislative chambers. We found a strong fundraising benefit accruing to intra-chamber majority status across all of these legislatures, but the benefit is heavily conditioned by the presence of unified or divided government. The results offer important implications for our understanding of the financial balance of power in American politics and for the vast scholarly literature on unified party government.

Political dynasties, families in which multiple members have held elected office, commonly feature in the U.S. Congress. I explored the electoral origins of this phenomenon and determined that members of political dynasties have a significant advantage over first-generation politicians in open-seat House elections. Using an original dataset containing candidate- and district-level covariates for all candidates in open-seat House contests between 1994 and 2006, I found that dynastic politicians enjoy "brand name advantages," giving them a significant edge over comparable nondynastic opponents. In contrast, hypotheses concerning potential advantages stemming from past political experience and fundraising ability yield null results.
The modern Committee on Rules plays a critical role in structuring the agenda of the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact, resolutions from the Committee on Rules are the primary means through which controversial legislation reaches the House floor. But the Committee on Rules did not play a role in shaping the floor agenda until the 1880s and, despite intense scrutiny of episodes such as the institution of the Reed rules and the revolt against Speaker Cannon, our understanding of the role of the Committee on Rules is limited and skewed heavily toward the post World War II era. This limitation is unfortunate, because special rules play a starring role in major theories of legislative organization. In this article, I present analysis of the usage and historical development of special rules in the House, and I offer findings from my empirical analysis of the determinants of rule choice from 1881 to 1937. A nuanced interrogation of new data on special rules in this era reveals support for committee specialization and conditional party government as motives for rule choice in this era.
Theories on committee power assert that legislators self-select to committees and therefore have preferences regarding the policy issues under the committees' jurisdictions that differ from the preferences of noncommittee members. I argue that preference outliers may be shaped both by processes of self-selection and by endogenous processes within committees. Contrary to previous examinations of committee member preferences, the study utilizes a dynamic approach to examine the development of preferences over time in order to separate self-selection from endogenous processes. Analyzing the development in the spending preferences of 859 Danish local politicians over three different election periods, I find that politicians increasingly prefer spending on their committees' jurisdictions over time, but their preferences do not change to the same extent on policy issues beyond their committees' jurisdictions. The findings point to the importance of endogenous processes in committees. Hence, committees may be outliers for very different reasons than those proposed by mainstream theory.

Influential theories of legislative organization predict that congressional leaders will be selected from the center of their parties. Yet previous research has generally rejected the "middleperson hypothesis," finding leaders to be extremists. We challenged these findings by testing more-appropriate null hypotheses via Monte Carlo simulation. We found that congressional leaders (and leadership candidates as a whole) tend to be closer to their party's median than would occur by chance, but leaders also tend to be selected from the left of the median for Democrats and to the right for Republicans. Compared to the pool of announced candidates for leadership positions, winners are not ideologically distinctive. This result suggests that factors affecting the ideology of leaders tend to operate more at the candidate emergence stage.
Research indicates that senators evaluate U.S. Supreme Court nominations on two ideological dimensions: the distance between themselves and the nominee, and the potential effect confirmation would have on the Court median. My analysis of nominations from 1968 to 2006 provides evidence that senators are also influenced by the ideological contrast between the nominee and the departing justice.

Researchers face two major problems when applying ideal point estimation techniques to state legislatures. First, longitudinal roll-call data are scarce. Second, even when such data exist, scaling ideal points within a single state is an inadequate approach. No comparisons can be made between these estimates and those for other state legislatures or for Congress. Our project provides a solution. We exploit a new comparative dataset of state legislative roll calls to generate ideal points for legislators. Taking advantage of the fact that state legislators sometimes go on to serve in Congress, we create a common ideological scale. Using these bridge actors, we estimate state legislative ideal points in congressional common space for 11 states. We present our results and illustrate how these scores can be used to address important topics in state and legislative politics.
@article{squire_introduction_2010-2,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010791170178},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, Peverill},
  month = may,
  year = {2010},
  note = {WOS:000277644600001},
  pages = {153--155}
}

@article{stiglitz_agenda_2010,
  title = {Agenda {Control} in {Congress}: {Evidence} from {Cutpoint} {Estimates} and {Ideal} {Point} {Uncertainty}},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010791170187},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Stiglitz, Edward H. and Weingast, Barry R.},
  month = may,
  year = {2010},
  note = {WOS:000277644600002},
  pages = {157--185}
}

This article develops two new tests of partisan and nonpartisan theories of lawmaking based on cutpoint estimates and measures of uncertainty about ideal point estimates. Theories of congressional organization make explicit predictions about the absence of cutpoints in certain intervals of the policy space. We test these theories with new cutpoint estimates and exploit the fact that the ideal points of members located far from the density of cutpoints are necessarily estimated with less precision. We validate our empirical approach through simulations, and we test three models of congressional organization using House roll call data from the 86th through the 110th Congresses (1959-2008). We find strong evidence of partisan agenda control. Our findings exhibit modest differences from the results predicted by Cox and McCubbins's party cartel theory: negative agenda control increases over time and is negatively correlated with the size of the blockout region.
Parties, Preferences, and Petitions: Discharge Behavior in the Modern House

Although discharge petitions lie at the confluence of personal preferences, committee prerogatives, and party leadership in Congress, these procedures have received little scholarly scrutiny. We capitalize on the public nature of petition signatures since 1993 to examine the behavior of the most cross-pressured members in discharge battles: bill sponsors and cosponsors belonging to the majority party who personally prefer the bills they have sponsored but who face party pressure not to sign the petitions that threaten the leadership's control of the legislative agenda. After controlling for personal preferences, we find a statistically significant partisan effect in the U.S. House, which further illuminates the "Where's the party?" debate.

The Logic of Legislative Leadership: Preferences, Challenges, and the Speaker's Powers

Principal agent theory implies that legislators will delegate power to a leader only when they need the leader's help and the leader can be expected to provide satisfactory help if granted power. This study is the first to evaluate the implied interaction between legislators' need for help and the degree to which legislators and leaders have similar preferences. By analyzing the Speaker's powers in the U.S. states, I arrived at three key conclusions. First, institutional leadership power responds to the interaction between preference alignment and policymaking challenges. Traditionally expected effects only appear when both alignment and challenges are relatively high. Second, professionalization causes weaker leadership powers. Finally, electoral competition correlates with stronger appointment, committee, and resource powers, but weaker procedural powers.
Many studies on legislatures around the world have not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often important political figures and can exert strong influence on state politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, the caucus leaders, into working for their states' interests on fiscally relevant issues, especially the annual budget. On all other issues, the governors delegate their deputies' votes to the party's legislative leadership.

Scholars have long recognized that members with more ideologically heterogeneous constituencies behave differently than members with more homogeneous ones. Empirical tests of these theories, however, have typically been stymied by a lack of appropriate measures. We corrected this shortcoming by developing a measurement model for ideological heterogeneity, and we used our method to generate estimates for the 50 U.S. states and 435 congressional districts. Beyond the specific results presented here, a key contribution of our model is its flexibility: our technique can be used to produce similar estimates in a variety of contexts.
Vacancies in the U.S. House of Representatives are filled using special elections. These elections occur off the usual American electoral cycle, and their results are routinely portrayed by the American mass media as indications of what to expect in the next general election. We examined the predictive power of special elections results with respect to the general election outcomes for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1900 to 2008. We found that special elections that yield a change in partisan control do have predictive power regarding general election results.

Introduction

Delegation and Defensive Legislative Strategies in Brazil
In the course of the legislative process, legislators choose how much policy discretion to delegate to the executive branch. Uncertainty about policy outcomes and bureaucratic intentions weighs heavily in such decisions. In Brazil, executive control over the budget creates uncertainty about the availability of discretionary spending, which results in comparatively high levels of delegation in the legislature's direct-spending decisions. I demonstrate that sidelining the legislature from the budget in order to insulate government spending from political pressures diminishes the value of legislative work in Brazil and reinforces historical patterns of policymaking centered on the federal executive.

This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty-coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context-specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief executives enjoy only acquires explanatory power when it is interacted with government turnover. Because Brazilian governors have great ability to build oversized majority coalitions, coalition strength influences the governor's strategy when the governor faces credible threats from rival elite groups.

This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty-coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context-specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief executives enjoy only acquires explanatory power when it is interacted with government turnover. Because Brazilian governors have great ability to build oversized majority coalitions, coalition strength influences the governor's strategy when the governor faces credible threats from rival elite groups.
State legislators' relationships with administrators have received scant attention in the literature despite the importance of these relationships for delivery of public services. We explored whether or not the legislator-administrator relationship in one professional state legislature resembles Congress's oversight of federal agencies. We also assessed whether or not term limits changed this relationship. Our findings indicate that monitoring state agencies was a low priority for this legislature, and it dropped even lower after term limits were implemented. More specifically, we found some institutional roles to be associated with legislators placing a higher priority on monitoring, especially before term limits, whereas some individual motives were associated with a lower priority, especially after term limits. Legislators exhibited more confusion about the process of monitoring after term limits.

We explored the extent to which legislators respond to redistricting-induced demographic shifts in their constituencies. Our analyses focused on the behavior of members of the House of Representatives who served in the terms preceding and following the redistricting that took place in the early 2000s (namely, the 107th and 108th Congresses). We investigated how demographic shifts relate to the content of legislators' subsequent agendas (the legislation that members introduce and cosponsor) and the nature of members' voting patterns (their interest group voting scores). Our results indicate that responsiveness is widespread, but important variation exists in the patterns for agenda activities and roll-call voting.
@article{harward_calculus_2010,
  title = {The \{Calculus\} of \{Cosponsorship\} in the \{US\} \{Senate\}},
  volume = {35},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298010790821950},
  abstract = {We investigated why a legislator would be willing to vote \"yea\" on final passage of a bill but would choose not to cosponsor that bill. We tested a series of hypotheses regarding the cosponsorship decisions of individual senators, using a dataset that includes every major initiative that was introduced and received a floor vote in the Senate between 1975 and 2000. We found that senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when their preferences diverge from the Senate median but are closer to those of the bill's sponsor. Also, senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when they sponsor a higher number of bills overall, when they become more connected with colleagues, and when their constituents increase demand for legislation within particular policy areas. Senators are less likely to cosponsor bills if they received a higher percentage of the general election vote in their most recent election.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Harward, Brian M. and Moffett, Kenneth W.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2010},
  pages = {117--143}
}

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2009,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009789869682},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = nov,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000272502100001},
  pages = {451--453}
}

@article{schickler_agenda_2009,
  title = {Agenda \{Control\}, \{Majority\} \{Party\} \{Power\}, and the \{House\} \{Committee\} on \{Rules\}, 1937-52},
  volume = {34},
}
The role of the U.S. House Rules Committee is consequential for theories of congressional parties, yet its role during the "conservative coalition" era is not well understood. We systematically analyzed the politics surrounding all special rules considered in Democratic Congresses from 1937 to 1952. We found that Rules repeatedly used its agenda power to push to the floor conservative initiatives that were opposed by the Democratic administration, the Rules Committee chair, and most northern Democrats, especially in Congresses that followed Republican election gains. The 44 conservative initiatives we identified include many of the most important policy issues considered during the period. Our findings challenge the idea that the majority party has consistently enjoyed a veto over which initiatives reach the floor, and they underscore the limits of roll-call-vote analysis in assessments of agenda control.

Making a Good Impression: Resource Allocation, Home Styles, and Washington Work

Members of Congress engage in a variety of representational activities, but existing research suggests that the effect of these activities on reelection margins is mixed. Reframing the question, we examined whether or not constituents notice the home styles of members and members' efforts to communicate their activities through the allocation of official resources. Combining new data on members' office expenditures with data from the American National Election Studies, we found evidence that constituents perceive the representational activities of their members in a meaningful fashion. Franking, office expenditures, and travel back home to the district provide positive benefits to incumbents, shaping how constituents view these members and their activities.
Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived Its Usefulness? In a Word, "No"

Race-conscious redistricting remains crucial to the election of an overwhelming number of African American and Latino officials. We present descriptive evidence, easily interpretable by nonspecialists, from recent elections at the state and federal levels to support our claims. The Voting Rights Act remains a valuable tool to protect the ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates.

Comparing NOMINATE and IDEAL: Points of Difference and Monte Carlo Tests

Empirical models of spatial voting allow us to infer legislators' locations in an abstract policy or ideological space using their roll-call votes. Over the past 25 years, these models have provided new insights about the U.S. Congress, and legislative behavior more generally. There are now a number of alternative models, estimators, and software packages that researchers can use to recover latent issue or ideological spaces from voting data. These different tools usually produce substantively similar estimates, but important differences also arise. We investigated the sources of observed differences between two leading methods, NOMINATE and IDEAL. Using data from the 1994 to 1997 Supreme Court and the 109th Senate, we determined that while some observed differences in the estimates produced by each model stem from fundamental differences in the models' underlying behavioral assumptions, others arise from arbitrary differences in implementation. Our Monte Carlo experiments revealed that neither model has a clear advantage over the other in the recovery of legislator locations or roll-call midpoints in either large or small legislatures.
Carroll et al. (2009) Summarize the similarities and differences between the NOMINATE and IDEAL methods of fitting spatial voting models to binary roll-call data. As those authors note, for the class of problems with which either NOMINATE and the Bayesian quadratic-normal model can be used, the ideal point estimates almost always coincide, and when they do not, the discrepancy is due to the somewhat arbitrary identification and computational constraints imposed by each method. There are, however, many problems for which the Bayesian quadratic-normal model can be easily generalized, so as to address a broad array of questions and take advantage of additional data. Given the nature and source of the differences between NOMINATE and the Bayesian approach—as well as the fact that both approaches are approximations of the decision-making processes being modeled—we believe that it is preferable to choose the more flexible Bayesian approach.

Clinton and Jackman (2009) introduce the NOMINATE and IDEAL methods of fitting spatial voting models to binary roll-call data. As these authors note, for the class of problems with which either NOMINATE and the Bayesian quadratic-normal model can be used, the ideal point estimates almost always coincide, and when they do not, the discrepancy is due to the somewhat arbitrary identification and computational constraints imposed by each method. There are, however, many problems for which the Bayesian quadratic-normal model can be easily generalized, so as to address a broad array of questions and take advantage of additional data. Given the nature and source of the differences between NOMINATE and the Bayesian approach—as well as the fact that both approaches are approximations of the decision-making processes being modeled—we believe that it is preferable to choose the more flexible Bayesian approach.
Candidates face a trade-off in the general election between taking a more-moderate position that appeals to swing voters and a more-extreme position that appeals to voters in the party's base. The threat of abstention by voters ill the party's base if their candidate takes a position too moderate for them moves candidates to take more-extreme positions. I discuss hypotheses regarding how this trade-off affects candidate positioning and describe my tests of those hypotheses using data on House members in the 107th Congress and Senate members for the period 1982-2004. I then present data on how the distribution of voters in the electorate has changed over the past three decades and discuss how, in light of my empirical findings, these changes might explain the observed pattern of asymmetric polarization in Congress in recent decades.

Are congressional committee investigations into alleged executive-branch wrongdoing more common during periods of divided government'? We analyze original data tracking congressional committee investigations into alleged fraud, waste, and abuse by the executive branch between 1947 and 2004. Countering David Mayhew's (1991) empirical finding, we show that divided government generates more and more-intensive congressional investigations, but this relationship is contingent on partisan and temporal factors. Our findings shed new light on the shifting dynamic between partisan institutional politics and congressional oversight.
@article{lazarus_different_2009,
  title = {Different {Houses}: The Distribution of {Earmarks} in the {US} {House} and {Senate}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897772},
  abstract = {Nearly all studies of pork-barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork-barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lazarus, Jeffrey and Steigerwalt, Amy},
  month = aug,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000269176500004},
  pages = {347--373}
}

@article{battista_why_2009,
  title = {Why {Information}? Choosing {Committee} {Informativeness} in {US} {State} {Legislatures}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788897808},
  abstract = {Using a new dataset drawn from American state legislatures, I modeled the informativeness of legislative committees as a choice over institutions. I found higher informativeness to be associated with better preparedness for information transfer, more-partisan chambers, and higher demand for information combined with greater incentives to control committee assignments. These associations shed light on congressional committee informativeness. A simple model of committee informativeness can predict the informativeness of the U.S. House's committees.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},}
Under what conditions are Latino candidates elected to Congress and state legislatures? How much does the ethnic composition of a district affect the chances that a Latino candidate will be elected in that district? Latinos constitute the single largest minority group in the country, one that is growing at an exponential rate. Post-2000 redistricting created more majority-Latino districts, but the absolute number of Latino legislators did not increase correspondingly. My analysis demonstrates that states with citizen legislatures and with higher legislative turnover rates are more conducive to the election of Latino candidates than are other states. Institutional and demographic differences among states affect the states' Latino descriptive representation. Namely, the institutional design of the legislature matters in terms of electoral responsiveness, with Arizona and California being the most responsive bodies and New York and the U.S. House the least responsive.}

Do Latino representatives enhance or "enlarge" Latino representation (Walsh 2002)? I examined the content of websites posted by members of the 110th Congress and found that the websites of Latino representatives are not more accessible to Spanish-speaking users than the websites of non-Latino representatives, nor are the sites more likely to exhibit pro-immigrant positions or offer immigration assistance. The websites of Latino representatives are, however, more likely to present Latino perspectives. Latino representatives enhance Latino representation in this forum by enlarging or broadening the
presence of a Latino voice in policy discussion.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wilson, Walter},
  month = aug,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000269176500007},
  pages = {427--448}
}

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2009-2,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314345},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = may,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000266575000001},
  pages = {155--158}
}

@article{hix_after_2009,
  title = {After {Enlargement}: {Voting} {Patterns} in the {Sixth} {European} {Parliament}},
  volume = {34},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298009788314282},
  abstract = {We examined how voting behavior in the European Parliament changed after the European Union added ten new member-states in 2004. Using roll-call votes, we compared voting behavior in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (July 2004-December 2006) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999-2004). We looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around the left-right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also played a role.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hix, Simon and Noury, Abdul},
  month = may,
  year = {2009},
  note = {WOS:000266575000002},
  pages = {155--158}
One aspect of the partisan model for legislative committee development that is rarely studied is the degree to which the majority party seeks to control legislative committees-and, thereby, chamber decisions-via numerically "overproportional" majority party representation on standing committees. This form of "party stacking" is often mentioned in the literature but has received little systematic examination and hypothesis testing. Using data from state legislative committees for all 49 partisan legislatures in the 2003-04 and 2005-06 sessions, we find support for the partisan model: majority party stacking is associated with a slim majority party advantage in a state legislative chamber.

When determining whether or not legislators are representing their constituents' interests, scholars using voting studies may overstate the role of strategic factors, such as reelection goals and constituent influence, while understating the effect of descriptive characteristics. I argue that race and ethnicity matter in congressional oversight of bureaucratic policymaking. My examination of hearing transcripts from the 107th Congress indicates that minority legislators are more likely than white legislators to participate in racial-oversight hearings but not more likely than whites to participate in social welfare hearings. The results show that descriptive representation contributes to substantive representation, even if the costs of participating outweigh the electoral benefits.
Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives tend to retire at a higher rate than Democrats—a fact with potentially important electoral and policy ramifications—but research on the possible explanations for this partisan disparity has been scarce. I test various explanatory hypotheses using multilevel statistical analyses and find that Republicans are more likely to retire—not because they have been the predominant minority party, had more political opportunities, or had different private-sector experiences, but because they harbor more conservative ideologies than their Democratic colleagues.

Privately sponsored congressional travel raises questions about the influence of interest groups on lawmakers and about legislative behavior. I used multiple regression to explain variation in congressional travel, looking at 15,825 trips, both domestic and overseas, taken by House and Senate members and their staff between 2001 and 2004. I found that both supply-side and demand-side factors influence congressional travel. Electoral vulnerability corresponds with reduced trip-taking, and institutional power is associated with greater trip-taking, although not to the extent that rent-seeking theory might predict. Members' racial or ethnic minority status also corresponds with greater trip-taking in the House. Pending retirement also influences trip-taking, but in the opposite direction from what some "shirking" theories would predict.
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Rosenson, Beth A.},
month = may,
year = {2009},
note = {WOS:000266575000006},
pages = {245--271}
}

@article{patterson_candidates_2009,
volume = {34},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298009788314309},
abstract = {While characterized by disagreement, all scholarly work on multimember district electoral systems in which each voter casts a single, nontransferable vote (MMD/SNTV) is alike in one way: it evaluates party nominations under the assumption that votes are invariant under alternative strategies. But party votes may, in fact, vary with different nomination strategies. Moreover, depending on how much party votes vary under alternative nomination strategies, a method that considers such changes may evaluate nominations differently than previous studies in the literature have. In this article, I address party-vote variance, proposing a method that estimates how much a party's obtained votes change under alternative nomination strategies and using this method to reevaluate the nominating behavior of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Patterson, Dennis},
month = may,
year = {2009},
note = {WOS:000266575000007},
pages = {273--285}
}

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2009-3,
title = {Introduction},
volume = {34},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298009788314309},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
month = feb,
year = {2009},
note = {WOS:000264419600001},
pages = {1--3}
}
Gender quota laws are intended to increase the number of women elected to legislatures, but initial evidence suggests that many laws have had little effect. I present a cross-national, statistical test that analyzes how three key dimensions of candidate quota laws affect women's representation. My results show that quotas that require more women to be on party ballots lead to the election of more women, independent of placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms, but rules governing where female candidates are listed on the ballot and sanctions for noncompliance amplify that effect. Candidate quotas can increase women's representation, but the quotas' effectiveness depends on their design.}

Constituency demand is of secondary importance. Ideology, partisanship, and national conditions play little or no role. Consistent with a theoretical cost-benefit framework, the results suggest that senators are motivated by the prospect of electoral and policy rewards from successful legislation rather than from mere position taking. The findings attest to the enduring importance of the committee system in a highly individualistic and increasingly partisan Senate.
When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the "staring match" logic captured by divide-the-dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.

We use bill cosponsorship and roll-call vote data to compare legislators' revealed preferences in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. We estimate ideal points from bill cosponsorship data using principal-component analysis on an agreement matrix that included information on all bills introduced in the U.S. House (1973-2000) and Argentine Chamber (1983-2002). The ideal-point estimates of legislators' revealed preferences based on cosponsorship data strongly correlate with similar estimates derived from roll-call vote data. Also, cosponsorship activity in the U.S. House has lower dimensionality than cosponsorship has in the Argentine Chamber. We explain this lower discrimination as a function of individual- and district-level factors in both countries.
I used elite survey data and scaling techniques to estimate the location of political actors (parties, chief executives, and legislators) from nine countries in a common ideological space. The recovered ideological configuration of each country accurately reflects the description of that country's political landscape given by the popular press and in the scholarly literature. My findings demonstrate that data generated by survey responses can be reliably used to locate legislators' ideological positions in a low-dimensional space in a manner analogous to the roll-call-based methods commonly used in the scholarship on the U.S. Congress. My approach has two important advantages over methods that use roll-call data, expert surveys, or some combination thereof. First, it does not rely on recorded votes and so is unaffected by concerns about the validity of roll-call data as unbiased indicators of legislator preference. And, because it does not require access to voting records, this approach can be applied to any legislature in the world. Second, my method can be used to estimate the location of political actors in a common ideological space.
Comparative legislative research has contributed to an examination of the validity of roll-call votes as measures of legislators' policy preferences. It has prompted an awareness of the influence of legislative structure on the composition of the voting record. Comparative research on members' ideal points has confronted the problems of selection effects, abstentions, the influence of the agenda setter, and the effect of party strategy. It has encouraged the search for alternate measures of members' preferences, including members' speech, cosponsorship, survey responses, and party manifestos. In the non-American setting, ideal points have been regarded as group-level, as well as individual-level, variables. The game-theoretic approach to the study of legislatures has led to the formulation of hypotheses relating legislative structure to members' ideal points.

Recent empirical studies of lawmaking activity by legislatures rely heavily on roll call based measures and assume that roll call activity reflects lawmaking activity. We question this assumption for the case of the U.S. Congress. We examine several plausible sources of dissonance between the set of enacted public statutes and the universe of recorded votes in the U.S. Congress, using a comprehensive dataset of public enactments and roll call activity between 1891 and 1994. Because only 11.9\% of the bills signed into law receive a recorded vote in the House, only 7.9\% receive a recorded vote in the Senate, and only 5.5\% receive a recorded vote in both the House and Senate, we provide guidance as to when studying voting behavior is likely a reasonable proxy for lawmaking behavior. There are sometimes important differences between
the laws that do and do not receive a roll call that researchers should account for when using roll calls to study lawmaking in the U.S. Congress.

@article{carrubba_legislative_2008,
  title = {Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll-Call Vote Selection},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403079},
  abstract = {The empirical study of legislative behavior largely relies on roll-call vote analysis, but roll-call votes in many legislatures represent only a sample of legislative votes. We have good reasons to believe this sample is particularly poor for inferring party effects on legislative behavior. The selection of votes for roll call may be endogenous to exactly the characteristics of voting behavior (for instance, party cohesion) that we want to study. We must understand the roll-call vote institution and account for its selection effects before we can draw inferences about legislative behavior from roll-call results. This article develops a game-theoretic model of roll-call vote requests predicated on party leaders requesting votes to enforce party discipline. The model offers general and testable predictions about the selection process and how it affects observed and unobserved legislative voting behavior, particularly party cohesion.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Carrubba, Clifford and Gabel, Matthew and Hug, Simon},
  month = nov,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000261367400004},
  pages = {543--572}
}

@article{rosas_models_2008,
  title = {Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008786403088},
  abstract = {Tools dedicated to inferring the ideological leanings of legislators from observed votes—techniques such as NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or the item-response-theory model of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004)—rest on the assumption that the political
process that generates abstentions is ignorable, an assumption not always easy to justify. We extended the item-response-theory model to analyze abstention and voting processes simultaneously in situations where abstentions are suspected to be nonrandom. We applied this expanded model to two assemblies where the existing literature gives reason to expect nonrandom abstentions, and we demonstrate how our extensions yield nuanced analyses of legislative politics. We also acknowledge limits to our ability to decide on the adequacy of alternative assumptions about abstentions, since these assumptions are not readily verifiable.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Rosas, Guillermo and Shomer, Yael},
month = nov,
year = {2008},
note = {WOS:000261367400005},
pages = {573--601}
)

@article{cox_legislative_2008,
title = {Legislative {Productivity} in the 93d-105th {Congressess}},
volume = {33},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298008786403123},
abstract = {We exploit a large new dataset in order to revisit the determinants of "legislative success" in Congress. Previous studies have focused on one or (rarely) two Congresses. Ours is the first study based on panel data, allowing us to better measure such causal effects as how a members productivity increases when they become a committee chair or their party attains a majority. While corroborating several previous findings, we also differ on several important points—e.g., whereas the most sophisticated previous study finds greater seniority and committee leadership posts boosting productivity in neither party, we find them boosting productivity in both.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Cox, Gary W. and Terry, William C.},
month = nov,
year = {2008},
note = {WOS:000261367400006},
pages = {603--618}
)

@article{peress_strategic_2008,
title = {Strategic {Voting} in {Multi}-{Office} {Elections}},
volume = {33},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298008786403060},
abstract = {What are the incentives for voters to vote

strategically when legislative policy outcomes are constrained by a system of checks and balances? The policy-balancing theory supposes that moderate voters split their tickets because such splitting is the only way these voters can achieve moderate policy outcomes. I show that a different type of strategic voting, policy stacking, is characteristic of legislatures that endow the majority party with only limited institutional powers. Focusing on voting for the president and House of Representatives in the United States reveals that a substantial proportion of voters engage in policy-stacking behavior, but very few engage in policy-balancing behavior.

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2008-1,
    title = {Introduction},
    volume = {33},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298008785260844},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
    month = aug,
    year = {2008},
    note = {WOS:000258859400001},
    pages = {353--356}
}

@article{fowler_seen_2008,
    title = {Seen but not heard: Committee visibility and institutional change in the Senate national security committees, 1947-2006},
    volume = {33},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298008785260862},
    abstract = {Scholars have neglected the effect of the press on political institutions in favor of media influences on campaigns or on voters' trust and information about government. This article examines senators' committee preferences in response to declining media coverage of Congress, focusing on the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees from 1947 to 2006. The research relies on new, continuous measures of committee desirability and a unique dataset of congressional press coverage. Although both committees' visibility and attractiveness have declined dramatically over 60 years, statistical analyses indicate that change in internal rules and external events are the most important influences on senators'
investment in committee careers.),
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fowler, Linda L. and Law, R. Brian},
  month = aug,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000258859400002},
  pages = {357--385}
}

@article{malhotra_disentangling_2008,
  title = {Disentangling the relationship between legislative professionalism and government spending},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008785260880},
  abstract = {Recent movements to deprofessionalize American state legislatures have been driven partly by the notion that professional legislators spend more than their citizen counterparts. This article explores the relationship between legislative professionalism and government spending, a connection complicated by the possibility that legislators in high-spending states may choose professional institutions to handle their responsibilities more effectively. I employed propensity score matching, an increasingly used technique of causal inference, to disentangle the relationship. Contrary to previous academic work and popular notions, I found that professional legislatures do not spend significantly more than part-time bodies do, if one accounts for the fact that legislatures in high-spending states have a greater need to be professionalized and therefore select those structural frameworks. These findings have important implications for the study of the effects of legislative institutions on public policies more generally and attest to the utility of recently developed techniques of causal inference to disentangle these relationships.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Malhotra, Neil},
  month = aug,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000258859400003},
  pages = {387--414}
}

@article{bagashka_invisible_2008,
  title = {Invisible politics: Institutional incentives and legislative alignments in the {Russian} {Duma}, 1996-99},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008785260853},
  abstract = {Previous analysis of legislative voting has focused on the behavior of nominal legislative parties, regardless of whether
the country under examination was an established democracy or a newly
democratized country. This approach is inadequate for countries with
Young party systems. To establish the extent to which legislative
coalitions are party based, scholars must allow for the possibility
that institutional incentives predominate over party influence. For
this study, I applied a Bayesian discrete latent variable method to
identify the legislative coalitions in the 1996-99 Duma. I found that
legislative alignments cut across party lines: electoral incentives
and support for the president contribute to divides within parties
that lack coherent platforms. Here I present a novel methodological
approach to the identification of intraparty divisions and the major
determinants of legislative coalitions in many legislative settings.
This approach allows a comparison of the importance of party influence
relative to other institutional incentives. It is especially useful
for analyzing legislative voting in young party systems and where
constitutional frameworks and electoral systems subject legislators to
competing pressures.

@article{fogarty_strategy_2008,
  title = {The strategy of the story: {Media} monitoring legislative activity},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008785260899},
  abstract = {To what degree do the news media provide voters with the
  information needed to hold House members accountable for their
  actions in Congress? Previous studies have simply debated whether or
  not local news media cover politicians' actions, but this article
  considers the news media as a strategic actor when covering House
  members. I developed a set of theoretical expectations about the
  conditions under which local news media would be more or less likely
to monitor the actions of members of Congress outside of election
  seasons. I tested these expectations using an extensive content
  analysis of local newspapers in both descriptive and multivariate
  settings. I find that local news media are strategic in their coverage
  of local members of Congress. Local newspapers invest more resources
to cover out-of-step members than they do to follow members with
  policy preferences congruent with the district's. In addition,
  coverage of out-of-step members tends to be less positive than
  coverage of in-step members.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fogarty, Brian J.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000258859400004},
  pages = {415--444}
Although electoral institutions have been shown to have a variety of effects, scholars have not investigated if certain voting rules enable politicians to enjoy longer legislative careers. I took advantage of a natural experiment—a sudden transition from a semiproportional voting rule to single-member districts with plurality voting (SMDP)—to measure the effect of electoral institutions on careerism. My analysis revealed that voting rules have a profound influence on the dynamics of legislative careers: politicians elected under SMDP are far less likely to suffer electoral defeat or to retire than those elected via cumulative voting. The findings of this study not only provide additional insight into the seat safety of politicians elected in first-past-the-post systems, but moreover offer new criteria by which to evaluate the choice of electoral institutions.
We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20\% on all final-passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills — results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.

This article presents evidence that the recent increase in partisanship in Senate roll-call voting is partly due to changes in the content of the Senate agenda. The analysis draws on an original dataset classifying Senate roll-call votes from 1981 to 2004 according to substantive issue content. Over the past two decades, the types of issues that were most divisive along partisan lines in earlier periods became progressively more prominent on the Senate roll-call agenda. Even when one controls for the effects of other electoral and institutional factors, one finds that the shifting agenda notably contributed to the rise in Senate partisanship.
We examined the effects of subjective and objective descriptive representation and district demography on African Americans' attitudes toward their member of Congress and the U.S. Congress as an institution. We investigated whether or not African Americans in more-racially homogeneous districts differ in their attitudes from counterparts in districts with fewer African Americans. We also studied the effects of descriptive representation and district demography to determine if these effects are contingent on voters' perceptions of descriptive representation. We found that living in a district with a higher proportion of blacks enhances African American voters' feelings toward their representative and marginally elevates these voters' evaluations of Congress. This effect is mediated, however, by the election of a black representative to Congress.

A growing body of congressional scholarship investigates variation in the incumbent electoral advantage that depends on factors such as competence, political skill, and ideological extremity. This article contributes to this line of work by providing analysis of the relationship between senators' home-state approval ratings and their electoral fortunes using newly available data from the Job Approval Ratings (JAR) collection. The findings show that senatorial job approval affects retirement, quality-candidate emergence, campaign spending, and outcomes. The myriad indirect effects suggest that strategic political actors are central to the process by which incumbents are held accountable for the reputations they develop in their constituencies.
Numerous studies have examined the incidence of killer amendments in Congress, but most of these studies have been either case specific, focusing on the legislative maneuverings around a single issue or bill, or temporally limited, focusing on strategic activity in only one or two Congresses. In this article, we present the beginning of a comprehensive research agenda for the systematic study of killer amendments. Using roll-call data from the 83d through the 108th U.S. House (1953-2004), we identified those bills that (a) were successfully amended and (b) subsequently went down to defeat, a necessary condition for the existence of a killer amendment. We then examined these cases in greater detail, using both spatial analyses and case studies. Our analysis uncovered five cases, four of which are new, that appear to have the characteristics of true killer amendments, thus setting the stage for future analyses across time and legislative chambers and bodies.

This article explores the political determinants of congressional investigatory activity. Using Mayhew's list of high-profile probes updated through 2006, we developed five measures of the frequency and intensity of investigative oversight. Contra Mayhew, we found that divided government spurs congressional investigatory activity. A shift from unified to divided government yields a five-fold increase in the number of hearings held and quadruples their duration. Conditional party government models also offer explanatory leverage because homogeneous majorities are more likely to investigate the president in divided government and less likely to do so in unified government. This dynamic is strongest in the House, but
analyses of the Senate also afford consistent, if muted, evidence of partisan agenda control.

@article{richman_uncertainty_2008,
  title = {Uncertainty and the prevalence of committee outliers},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008784310975},
  abstract = {Political scientists often suppose that the informational model of legislative organization predicts an absence of committee outliers. In fact, the model predicts that committee outliers will be more common when the floor is more uncertain than its committees. Data limitations have largely prevented testing this uncertainty-outlier prediction, until now. For this article, I investigated whether or not the informational model correctly predicts under what scenarios outliers will be more frequent. As predicted, more uncertainty is associated with more committee outliers in U.S. state legislatures. Legislatures in which the floor is less informed than the committees are more likely to have committee outliers.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Richman, Jesse},
  month = may,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000256205700008},
  pages = {323--347}
}

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2008-3,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {33},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298008783743264},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = feb,
  year = {2008},
  note = {WOS:000254187300001},
  pages = {1--4}
}

@article{pereira_agenda_2008,
This article examines how institutional change in the use of extraordinary legislation affects delegation of power and unilateral action in new democracies. From 1988 to 2001, Brazilian presidents were able to reissue decrees indefinitely and thus had substantial legislative power. In 2001, Congress amended the constitution so as to restrict the president to a single reissue of each lapsed decree. This reform has had mixed results: although it ended the practice of infinite reissues, it induced Presidents Cardoso and Lula to use more decrees than previous executives had. Presidential agenda power, rather than being reduced, has been sharpened. By analyzing patterns of presidential initiatives from 1995 to 2005, we demonstrate the mixed results of this constitutional reform.

@article{finocchiaro_war_2008,
    title = {War for the floor: {Partisan} theory and agenda control in the {US} house of representatives},
    volume = {33},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298008783743273},
    abstract = {This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives to the issue of procedural control of the legislative agenda via special rules. In particular, we draw out a facet of cartel and conditional party government theories that has not been addressed in prior analyses: the simultaneous interrelationship between positive and negative agenda control. Using roll-call data on two procedural matters—votes to order the previous question on a special rule and votes to adopt a special rule—over the 1953–2002 period, we found that, in the area of procedural control of the floor agenda, the majority party's amount of agenda control depends to a significant degree upon the party's homogeneity and power.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Finocchiaro, Charles J. and Rohde, David W.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2008},
}
@article{den_hartog_value_2008,
title = {The value of majority status: The effect of 
{Jeffords}'s switch on asset prices of republican and democratic 
firms},
volume = {33},
issn = {0362-9805},
abstract = {Using the change in party control of the Senate that 
resulted from Jim Jeffords's 2001 change in party affiliation, we 
compare competing partisan and partyless legislative theories. We 
offer a reconceptualization of agenda control that provides a new and 
promising basis for studying parties and policymaking in the Senate. 
Also, we present a novel methodology—an "event study"—to test partisan 
and partyless hypotheses. Our results show that, when Jeffords 
switched, the stock prices of Republican-supported energy firms 
dropped and prices for Democrat-supported firms rose, supporting the 
hypothesis that the majority party influences Senate decisions.},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Den Hartog, Chris and Monroe, Nathan W.},
month = feb,
year = {2008},
note = {WOS:000254187300004},
pages = {63--84}
}

@article{adler_intended_2008,
title = {Intended consequences: Jurisdictional reform and issue 
control in the US house of representatives},
volume = {33},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298008783743318},
abstract = {The power of congressional committees rests in large 
part on their ability to set the legislative agenda in particular 
issue areas. But how do committees acquire their issue jurisdictions? 
Existing research points to informal committee turf wars—not 
collective reforms—as the roots of jurisdictional allocations (King 
1994, 1997). Yet the House of Representatives has made nearly 150 
formal changes to its committees' jurisdictions since 1973. We 
investigated the effects of one prominent instance of extensive 
jurisdictional changes, the Bolling-Hansen reforms of 1975, and found 
that this body of reforms advanced collective goals of improved policy 
coordination and enhanced information sharing.},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Adler, E. Scott and Wilkerson, John D.},
month = feb,
year = {2008},
The literature on the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections has focused mostly on political variables, such as competition and incumbent resources. For this article, I identify an important sociological variable: a cohort effect that separates older generations from younger ones. Younger generations have been more likely to vote for incumbents, and the difference has endured over time, even as the political environment itself has changed and become more partisan. Moreover, the results hold even when one controls for partisan identification and general time-period effects. The incumbency advantage may be a broader and more-enduring part of American politics than has previously been recognized.

What effect do electorally successful third parties have on congressional roll-call votes? There is widespread belief among scholars that third parties influence the policies of the major parties, but there is little systematic evidence of this influence. I exploit the unique historical context surrounding the Populist Party formation in 1892 to examine the effect of the Populist Party's electoral success on congressional roll-call votes related to Populist issues. The results are consistent with two claims. First, co-optation of the Populist Party's issues occurred even before the formation of the party. Second, the co-optation of Populist policies does not appear to be correlated with the electoral success of the Populist candidates.
Prior scholarship on the effects of war casualties on U.S. elections has focused on large-scale conflicts. For this article, we examined whether or not the much-smaller casualty totals incurred in Iraq had a similar influence on the 2006 Senate contests. We found that the change in vote share from 2000 to 2006 for Republican Senate candidates at both the state and county level was significantly and negatively related to local casualty tallies and rates. These results provide compelling evidence for the existence of a democratic brake on military adventurism, even in small-scale wars, but one that is strongest in communities that have disproportionately shouldered a war's costs.
abstract = {Although partisan swing is often assumed to be uniform across congressional districts, our analysis of the 2006 House elections demonstrates that systematic variation exists. In addition to incumbency status, partisanship, spending, and scandal, variation in the local salience of national issues across districts affects vote shifts in these districts. Notably, partisan swing in Republican districts proved highly sensitive to the number of Iraq war deaths from that district and, to a lesser degree, to the roll-call vote of Republican House members on the war resolution. These findings have implications for theories of anticipatory representation, retrospective voting, and electoral accountability.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Grose, Christian R. and Oppenheimer, Bruce I.},
month = nov,
year = {2007},
ote = {WOS:000251362300003},
pages = {531--557}
}

@article{swers_building_2007,
title = {Building a reputation on national security: {The} impact of stereotypes related to gender and military experience},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007782398512},
abstract = {in a post-9/11 world, all senators must establish their national security credentials with voters. Yet senators do not compete for leadership on an equal basis. Through an analysis of bill sponsorship, Sunday talk show appearances, and interviews with Senate staff, I demonstrate that defense policy is made in a partisan and gendered context. Gender stereotypes favoring male defense leadership create an additional hurdle for women, particularly Democratic women, as they seek to establish their reputations on security. By contrast, a record of military service facilitates senators' efforts to achieve action on their proposals and gain media attention for their views.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Swers, Michele},
month = nov,
year = {2007},
ote = {WOS:000251362300004},
pages = {559--595}
}

@article{miler_view_2007,
title = {The view from the hill: {Legislative} perceptions of the district},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007782398477},
abstract = {This article addresses legislative perceptions of constituents' interests and develops a theory of perception that highlights the role of information accessibility in the formation of legislative offices' views of their districts. I used original data regarding health policy in the U.S. House to analyze perceptions of constituents' interests. I found that legislators do not see all constituents in their district, nor do they see the largest constituencies. Rather, legislators are more likely to see active and resource-rich constituents. These findings provide unique evidence of the influence of money in Congress and suggest that legislative misperception is both common and systematically biased.},

@article{herrnson_presidential_2007,
  title = {Presidential campaigning in the 2002 congressional elections},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007782398468},
  abstract = {Theories involving coattails, surge and decline, presidential popularity, and the economy ascribe little importance to presidential efforts to influence congressional elections. Since such efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president campaigns for fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush's decisions to campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the effect of his visits on Republicans' electoral successes. Both the competitiveness of a race and the president's electoral self-interest increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a candidate. Neither party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect. We conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance candidates' electoral prospects.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Herrnson, Paul S. and Morris, Irwin L.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000251362300006},
  pages = {629--648}
}

@article{snyder_multimember_2007,
  title = {Do multimember districts lead to free-riding?},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Snyder, Kristina C.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000251362300005},
  pages = {597--628}
}
We studied the effects of districting on intergovernmental aid by state governments to local governments in the United States. We found that metropolitan areas receive relatively more aid when represented in the state legislature by an at-large delegation than when divided into single-member districts. This suggests that the free-riding that may occur with at-large representation is more than counterbalanced by other factors. The estimated effects are robust to the effects of other confounding factors as well as the choice of estimators.

@article{snyder_effect_2007,
  doi = {10.3162/036298007782398503},
  abstract = {We studied the effects of districting on intergovernmental aid by state governments to local governments in the United States. We found that metropolitan areas receive relatively more aid when represented in the state legislature by an at-large delegation than when divided into single-member districts. This suggests that the free-riding that may occur with at-large representation is more than counterbalanced by other factors. The estimated effects are robust to the effects of other confounding factors as well as the choice of estimators.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Snyder, James M. and Ueda, Michiko},
  month = nov,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000251362300007},
  pages = {649--679}
}

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2007,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {32},
  isbn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699681},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = aug,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000249232800001},
  pages = {337--340}
}

@article{roberts_statistical_2007,
  title = {The statistical analysis of Roll-call data: A cautionary tale},
  volume = {32},
  isbn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699636},
  abstract = {Roll-call voting and congressional procedures are two of the most heavily studied aspects of the U.S. Congress. To date, little work has focused on the effect of procedures on the composition of the roll-call record. This article takes a step in this direction by demonstrating the effect of chamber rules and institutional constraints on House and Senate roll-call data, as well as on the inferences that scholars have drawn from the roll-call record. More specifically, I focus on recent efforts to measure party effects and ideological alignments, and I demonstrate that the composition of the roll-call record can affect these measures.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
}
According to strategic-politicians theory, political elites help ensure electoral responsiveness even when the mass public is deficient. Testing this theory requires measuring the effects of candidate experience and campaign spending, but one must confront endogeneity problems, because the theory requires potential candidates and campaign contributors to be responsive to district partisan conditions and national partisan tides. By applying an instrumental-variable method to control for selection bias, we found that challenger experience only matters indirectly, through its effect on campaign expenditures, but partisan context matters both directly and indirectly. We theorize that challenger experience is best understood as an informational short-cut: it signals incumbent vulnerability to potential campaign contributors.}

Theories of agency design maintain that lawmakers impose requirements on how bureaucratic agencies make policy decisions, preventing those agencies from undermining lawmakers' political and policy goals. Empirical support for these theories is limited, however, by the difficulty of measuring critical variables hypothesized to influence the use of this tool of political control. For this study, I employed a methodology particularly well suited, but not previously employed, to study variance in the use of agency-design provisions: interviews with congressional committee staff. Staffers' responses support several theories, cast doubt on one explanation, and
point to nuances in other explanations of agency design.

@garticle{gamble_black_2007,
title = {Black political representation: An examination of legislative activity within {US} house committees},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007781699663},
abstract = {How minority legislators influence policy development in Congress remains a relevant question for those interested in race and political representation. This article addresses this question using evidence from participation in committee work—a vantage point that has received minimal attention in scholarship on black political representation. I interpret racial differences in participation in House committees across a range of policy areas, demonstrating that black members participate at higher rates within committees than whites on both black interest and nonracial bills. The results suggest that race has a substantive effect on members' policy priorities and their legislative activity within committees.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Gamble, Katrina L.},
month = aug,
year = {2007},
note = {WOS:000249232800005},
pages = {421--447}
}

@article{barnello_bridging_2007,
title = {Bridging the gender gap in bill sponsorship},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007781699645},
abstract = {Under what circumstances do men sponsor issues that are traditionally regarded as salient primarily to women? By examining the sponsorship of legislation in the upper and lower chambers of 15 state legislatures in 2001, we explored the conditions under which men are likely to focus attention on policy areas involving women's issues and children's issues. We found little effect of institutional context (such as party control of the legislature or diversity within the legislature) on the sponsorship behavior of either men or women. Personal characteristics such as race, education, age, and family circumstances are associated with sponsorship by men, but not by
women. Committee service is also strongly associated with sponsorship behavior, particularly for men. Differences in sponsorship are relatively marked in the sponsorship of legislation that focuses on reproduction or other health issues particularly relevant to women. We conclude that the boundaries of the set of issues traditionally defined as "women's issues" may be changing over time and that it is important to recognize that the influences on the sponsorship of women's issues can be different for men than they are for women.},

@article{schaffner_political_2007,
  title = {Political parties and the representativeness of legislative committees},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007781699672},
  abstract = {What role do parties play in determining which interests committees represent? In this article, I compare committee organization and representativeness in Nebraska's nonpartisan legislature with those in the partisan senates of Kansas and Iowa. I demonstrate that when parties do not organize legislative conflict, committees are less representative of the full chamber. I argue, however, that committee representativeness does not necessarily result from parties actively working to create representative committees. Rather, when legislative conflict has a definitive partisan structure and the committees are always controlled by the majority party, representative committees will result as a simple by-product of the partisan structure and organization.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Schaffner, Brian F.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000249232800007},
  pages = {475--497}
}

@article{loewenberg_editors_2007,
  title = {Editor's introduction},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907905},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  month = aug,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000249232800008},
  pages = {475--497}
Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self-restraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.

An image of an antebellum "golden age" of Senate debate and deliberation has passed virtually unblemished from one generation of historians and political analysts to the next. In what ways, if any, is the image of a more deliberative Senate evident in the realities of antebellum House and Senate debates? In this article, I present a series of case studies to examine elements of the quantity and quality of floor debate in each chamber. By providing comparative evidence about House and Senate debate during the antebellum period, I offer an assessment and critique of the bicameral implications of the largely untested "golden age" understanding of the Senate and join other recent efforts to reassess the nature of the early Senate and
its relation to the House. My results show the conventional wisdom to be an oversimplification, at least in its implications about the scope and depth of House debates. The House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day.

@article{wirls_relatoin_2007,
  title = {Relating representation to the House. My results show the conventional wisdom to be an oversimplification, at least in its implications about the scope and depth of House debates. The House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wirls, Daniel},
  month = may,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000247083000003},
  pages = {193--222}
}

@article{thames_searching_2007,
  title = {Searching for the electoral connection: Parliamentary party switching in the Ukrainian rada, 1998-2002},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907888},
  abstract = {Studies of legislative behavior almost universally begin with the assumption that legislators desire reelection. For scholars who study the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, this assumption is perhaps tenuous, given the weaknesses of political parties and the significant party switching. Yet an analysis of party switching between 1998 and 2002 using a new method that controls for selection bias demonstrates that, although turnover among parties was high, this turnover followed an electoral logic: deputies changed parties, in part, to secure reelection. Thus, the electoral connection, assumed in so much of the legislative behavior literature, existed even in the chaotic Rada.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Thames, Frank C.},
  month = may,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000247083000004},
  pages = {223--256}
}

@article{marshall_strategic_2007,
  title = {Strategic position taking and presidential influence in congress},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907923},
  abstract = {The rise and fall of presidential success in Congress remains a central puzzle in the literature. We model success as two interrelated processes: presidential position taking and Congress's decision to support or oppose the president. The analysis emphasizes the importance of strategic position taking in determining presidential success. We show that presidential approval significantly
influences success, not only because it affects congressional behavior, but also because it shapes presidential decisions to take positions. Moreover, we explain that legislative success during the honeymoon period is driven by presidential position taking. Our findings highlight the role of a president's strategic decisions for theories explaining congressional-executive relations.

@article{wolak_strategic_2007,
  title = {Strategic retirements: {The} influence of public preferences on voluntary departures from congress},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907897},
  abstract = {Are members of Congress responsive to public preferences in their decisions to seek reelection or retire, or do members simply rely on the advantages of incumbency to secure reelection? I argue that members of Congress consider their electoral vulnerability when deciding whether or not to seek reelection, informing their reelection odds with the same short-term electoral forces that influence election outcomes: partisan preferences, economic evaluations, and congressional approval. Considering aggregate rates of voluntary departures from the House and Senate from 1954 to 2004, I show that rates of retirement reflect, not only institutional environments within Congress, but also the mood of the electorate.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wolak, Jennifer},
  month = may,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000247083000006},
  pages = {285--308}
}

@article{wilhelm_policymaking_2007,
  title = {The policymaking role of state supreme courts in education policy},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007780907914},
  abstract = {In this article, I examine the relationship between courts and legislatures from a comparative perspective. Specifically, I discuss how (1) the ideological composition of the bench, (2) the
propensity of court involvement in a given policy area, and (3) the presence of an advisory opinion affect the number of bill introductions and policy enactments by state legislatures. Examination of education policy in the American states reveals that ideologically distant courts limit the number of bill introductions and bill enactments in state legislatures. Alternatively, the presence of an advisory opinion increases policy introduction and enactment in state legislatures. A fundamental implication of these findings is that courts exert the greatest impact on policy during the introduction stage of the legislative process. Previous studies have not examined the introduction stage and have therefore marginalized the real impact of court influence on policy.

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2007-1,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, Gerhard},
  month = feb,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000245071700001},
  pages = {1--3}
}

@article{druckman_communist_2007,
  title = {Communist successor parties and coalition formation in Eastern Europe},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007X201967},
  abstract = {One of the most distinctive features of new democracies is the presence of political parties associated with the old, repressive regime. This article investigates whether or not the Eastern European variant of these parties, which we call communist successor parties (CSPs), has affected coalition politics. It finds that CSPs do have significant effects on the dynamics of coalition formation. CSPs are less likely than other parties to be included in governing coalitions; coalitions that include CSPs are more likely to be oversized (that is, to include superfluous parties); and CSPs that make it into government are penalized, insofar as they receive less than their fair share of governing portfolios. We attribute these
results to the salience of the regime divide—the affective dislike of many citizens for the legacies of communism. Our results extend research on coalition behavior to Eastern European contexts and show how affective dislike combined with vote-seeking motivations can affect governing behavior.),

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Druckman, James N. and Roberts, Andrew},
month = feb,
year = {2007},
note = {WOS:000245071700002},
pages = {5--31}
)

@article{meinke_slavery_2007,
title = {Slavery, partisanship, and procedure in the {US} house: {The} gag rule, 1836-1845},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007X201976},
abstract = {From the 24th through the 28th Congresses, the House of Representatives operated under versions of a "gag rule" that blocked petitions dealing with abolition and related matters. This article presents the gag rule as not only a historically important window into slavery deliberations in Congress but also a case study in majority party restrictions of minority rights—and in the boundaries that constituency politics can place on majority power. Through analysis of vote choices and voting changes over time, I demonstrate that the gag rule's partisan origins gave way as northern members voted against party and with specific constituency pressures as well as general sectional sentiment. The gag rule shows the power of electoral considerations and constituency in the early U.S. House, and it also illustrates the force that constituency can have over majority procedural maneuvering.),
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Meinke, Scott R.},
month = feb,
year = {2007},
note = {WOS:000245071700003},
pages = {33--57}
)

@article{young_vote_2007,
title = {Vote switchers and party influence in the {US} house},
volume = {32},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298007X201985},
abstract = {Party-centered theories of Congress often rely on the critical assumption that some majority party members vote against their preferences when granting their leadership procedural powers,
Such as closed rules. Such an assumption renders these approaches ad hoc, and thus theoretically dubious, unless firm support for the assumption can be found. Firm support is elusive largely because it is difficult to separate party and preference effects. In this article, we produce a simple but critical test of the party persuasion assumption that largely avoids these measurement problems. Specifically, we use a "switcher analysis" (Krehbiel 1998) to compare votes on final passage of the legislation with the votes on the closed rule. Our analysis of all closed rule-final passage vote pairs for the 104th-108th Congresses reveals vote patterns that cannot exist absent significant party effects.

@article{brady_primary_2007,  
  title = {Primary elections and candidate ideology: {Out} of step with the primary electorate?},  
  volume = {32},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298007X201994},  
  abstract = {This article draws on a new dataset of House primary- and general-election outcomes (1956-98) to examine the relationship between primary elections and candidate ideology. We show that, like presidential candidates, congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma: should they align themselves with their general- or primary-election constituencies? Relative to general-election voters, primary voters favor more ideologically extreme candidates. We show that congressional candidates handle the dilemma by positioning themselves closer to the primary electorate. This article thus supports the idea that primaries pull candidates away from median district preferences.},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Brady, David W. and Han, Hahrie and Pope, Jeremy C.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {2007},  
  note = {WOS:000245071700004},  
  pages = {79--105}  
}

@article{haider-markel_representation_2007,  
  title = {Representation and backlash: {The} positive and negative influence of descriptive representation},  
  volume = {32},  
  issn = {0362-9805},
For this article, I built on previous studies of representation by exploring the potential positive and negative impacts of descriptive representation in the policy process. Specifically, I examined the influence of openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) state legislators on the amount and types of LGBT-related state legislation introduced from 1992 to 2002. My findings suggest that higher LGBT representation in state legislatures leads to greater substantive representation. The results also suggest, however, that descriptive representation is associated with the amount of anti-LGBT legislation introduced. Additional analysis reveals that the net policy influence of increased LGBT representation is positive for the LGBT Community.

@article{goodliffe_campaign_2007,
  title = {Campaign war chests and challenger quality in Senate elections},
  volume = {32},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298007X202010},
  abstract = {This article presents the first comprehensive analysis of the role of war chests in U.S. Senate elections. Using data on races from 1980 to 2000, I demonstrate the effect of an incumbent senator's war chest on a campaign. War chests do not deter strong general-election challengers and have an insubstantial or insignificant effect on primary elections, challenger spending, and other electoral variables. Also, war chests are not raised in anticipation of a tough electoral battle but are instead the result of money left over from the previous campaign.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Goodliffe, Jay},
  month = feb,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000245071700007},
  pages = {135--156}
}

@article{loewenberg_legislative_2006,
  title = {Legislative studies quarterly - Introduction},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201887},
  abstract = {For this article, I built on previous studies of representation by exploring the potential positive and negative impacts of descriptive representation in the policy process. Specifically, I examined the influence of openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) state legislators on the amount and types of LGBT-related state legislation introduced from 1992 to 2002. My findings suggest that higher LGBT representation in state legislatures leads to greater substantive representation. The results also suggest, however, that descriptive representation is associated with the amount of anti-LGBT legislation introduced. Additional analysis reveals that the net policy influence of increased LGBT representation is positive for the LGBT Community.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Haider-Markel, Donald P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2007},
  note = {WOS:000245071700006},
  pages = {107--133}
}
Television and the incumbency advantage in US elections

We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study the relationship between television and electoral competition. In particular, we compare incumbent vote margins in media markets where content originates in the same state as media consumers versus vote margins where content originates out of state. This contrast provides a clear test of whether or not television coverage correlates with the incumbency advantage. We study U.S. Senate and state gubernatorial races from the 1950s through the 1990s and find that the effect of TV is small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.

Local news coverage and the incumbency advantage in the US House

Much of the incumbency advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives is attributed to incumbents' efforts to address constituents' needs. Yet House members do not win reelection simply by performing well in office, but also by informing constituents of how well they are doing their jobs. I examined the value of local news coverage for legislators seeking to publicize their legislative work on behalf of constituents. I found that incumbents who win more newspaper coverage are viewed as being more in touch with the district and are more likely to win support from constituents during bids for reelection.
Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median-voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median-voter model may be time-bound to the twentieth century—after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.

To date, no study has found evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court is constrained by Congress in its constitutional decisions. We addressed the selection bias inherent in previous studies with a statute-centered, rather than a case-centered, analysis, following all congressional laws enacted between 1987 and 2000. We uncovered considerable congressional constraint in the Court’s constitutional rulings. In particular, we found that the probability that the Rehnquist Court would strike a liberal congressional law rose between 47\% and 288\% as a result of the 1994 congressional elections, depending on the legislative model used.
@article{malhotra_government_2006,  
  title = {Government growth and professionalism in \{US\} state legislatures},  
  volume = {31},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201931},  
  abstract = {This article analyzes the professionalization of American state legislatures since the 1960s and expands on previous studies by considering the strategic incentives of members. Fiorina and Noll's (1978a, 1978b) theory that reelection-minded legislators serve as "ombudsmen to the bureaucracy" on behalf of their constituents suggests that legislatures have professionalized in response to growth in public spending in order to strengthen members' abilities to handle increased facilitation duties. I used longitudinal analysis and instrumental variables regression to test this hypothesis and disentangle causal directionality, since professional legislators may have the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts. Both methods revealed empirical support for the Fiorina and Noll hypothesis that spending increases caused legislators to become more professional.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Malhotra, Neil},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2006},  
  note = {WOS:000242501000006},  
  pages = {563--584}  
} 

@article{woods_legislative_2006,  
  title = {Legislative professionalism and influence on state agencies: \{The\} effects of resources and careerism},  
  volume = {31},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201940},  
  abstract = {Legislative professionalization typically involves two concomitant processes: increasing institutional resources and increasing careerism among state legislators. These processes, we argue, entail different effects for legislative influence on state administrative agencies. Greater legislative resources serve to increase legislative influence, but greater political careerism among state legislators serves to decrease it. Because these two processes
are normally intertwined within the process of legislative professionalization, the net effect of professionalism is uncertain, although our analysis suggests that the negative effect of careerism may outweigh the positive effect of institutional resources. These results have significant implications for the democratic responsiveness of executive branch agencies.


We studied an underutilized source of data on legislative effectiveness and exploited its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but to learning-by-doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of "positive sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success and on the probability of legislators moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.

We describe a model of electoral selection and legislative policy choice that explores the effects of term limits on legislative spending. In the model, self-interested voters in a collection of districts prefer representatives who deliver pork over representatives who maximize aggregate social welfare. Term limits can, in some cases, inhibit voters from selecting representatives who deliver particularistic benefits, and, in these cases, term limits reduce pork spending. On the other hand, when pork is extremely socially inefficient, representatives who want to deliver pork to their districts have incentives to refrain from doing so to reduce future pork in other districts. In this scenario, term limits actually prevent legislators from promoting future spending moderation and thus paradoxically increase pork spending.
@article{griffin_senate_2006,
title = {Senate apportionment as a source of political inequality},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298006X201869},
abstract = {Political scientists have long known that the equal representation of states in the U.S. Senate and the placement of state lines might disadvantage politically relevant groups, granting some citizens greater voting weight in the chamber. Yet we lack systematic, longitudinal evidence that identifies the groups disadvantaged by Senate malapportionment, the sources of this disadvantage, and probes the policy consequences. In this article, I compare each state's liberalism and racial composition with its relative voting weight in the Senate over time. Additionally, I examine whether roll-call coalitions in the Senate map onto these patterns of state ideology and racial composition.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Griffin, John D.},
month = aug,
year = {2006},
ote = {WOS:000239882100005},
pages = {405--432}
}

@article{yamane_religion_2006,
title = {Religion in the legislative arena: {Affiliation}, salience, advocacy, and public policymaking},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298006X201878},
abstract = {Religion is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that informs politics in various ways. This article examines the effects of religious affiliation, religious salience, and religious group advocacy on roll-call voting in the Wisconsin state legislature. Various studies have demonstrated the impact of religious affiliation on legislative politics, but our use of additional religious indicators allows us to model the religious effect in a more accurate and nuanced manner. Using data from an original survey of state legislators, we utilized structural equation modeling to measure the direct and indirect effects of these religious factors on both the
general pattern of roll-call voting and voting on a high-salience issue, abortion. Ultimately, the findings indicate that, even when we control for political party affiliation, which is a dominant influence on roll-call voting, conservative Protestant religious affiliation and high religious salience influence legislative voting. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for future studies of religion in the legislative arena.},

@article{loewenberg_introduction_2006,
  title = {Introduction},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201751},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = may,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000238030500001},
  pages = {149--152}
}

@article{carroll_how_2006,
  title = {How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201760},
  abstract = {Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call "mega-seats." We consider the selection of three different types of mega-seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega-seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega-seats (one important payoff of "winning"), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Carroll, Royce and Cox, Gary W. and Pachon, Monica},
  month = may,
This article asks, "What effect does the choice of a nation's electoral system have on the gender composition of its parliament over time?" I find that the electoral system has an important part to play, but previous work has overstated, by factors of between two and three, how much of a difference an electoral system can make. This article contributes an updated nonlinear theory of female representation, an improved dataset on women's representation across space and time, and more modern statistical techniques than previously used in research on this question.

The most recent explanations for the existence of committee systems in legislative chambers have posited that committees are the agents of one of three very different principal actors: (1) individual members (distributive theory), (2) the full chamber (informational theory), or (3) the major political party (partisan theory). In addition to defining and operationalizing the concept of institutional committee system autonomy, I put forth and test several hypotheses linking these three explanations to committee system autonomy. In the end, the results show empirical support for the informational theory over the distributive and partisan theories.
To assess the relative impact of party and ideology on legislative behavior, I utilize survey-based measures of legislator ideology to examine voting in five state legislatures. The results suggest that, although party and ideology both influence voting, the impact of party is greater. The magnitude of this impact varies, however, from chamber to chamber. The activity of parties in the electoral arena explains part of this variance, with more active parties having more influence. Thus, research on legislative behavior should focus on the context surrounding the decision-making process in order for us to understand the influences on voting.

Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross-state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.
Citizen suit provisions, which give proregulatory interests access to the federal courts, can be used by Congress to increase the courts' role in regulatory policy. I analyze 284 environmental regulation bills reported favorably out of committee and show that committee support for citizen suits is a function of the committee's policy goals and the political context in which the bills are generated. These findings indicate that Congress deliberately uses judicial procedures as instruments of political control and that scholars examining judicial policymaking must include legislative goals in the list of explanatory factors.


Recent comparative research on presidential systems has analyzed the ways in which presidents build majorities for their legislative agendas. Through an analysis of roll-call votes from the...
2000-03 Russian State Duma on a set of issues reflecting President Putin's legislative agenda, I examine the impact of parliamentary party affiliation, policy preferences, issue type, and electoral mandate type on structuring floor support for the president. I also assess the implications of a mixed electoral system for building legislative coalitions in multiparty legislatures. Further, my findings shed light on Putin's recent reforms of the Duma's rules and procedures and the country's electoral system.},

@article{remington_2006,
  title = {Who wins? Party effects in legislative voting},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298006X201724},
  abstract = {Political scientists have long attempted to measure and describe the modest and contingent effects of party on the behavior of members of Congress. Recent efforts have extended the debate to the more specific question of whether or not party influences are sufficiently strong to move policy outcomes away from the median position. In this article, we specify four theories of legislative behavior. One is a preference-based, or partyless, theory of behavior. This theory posits that there are no party effects independent of preferences and that equilibrium outcomes are located at the chamber's median. The other theories rely on different conceptions of the foundations of party effects and yield distinctive predictions about the legislators who will support bills on final passage votes. After testing, our conclusion is that strong party influences can be found in final passage voting in the House: the partyless theory receives little support, but a model based on majority party agenda control works well. Legislative outcomes are routinely on the majority party's side of the chamber median.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lawrence, E. D. and Maltzman, F. and Smith, S. S.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000235471000003},
  pages = {33--69}
}

@article{volden_2006,
  title = {How strong should our party be? Party member preferences over party cohesion},

In this article, we seek to explain when and why political parties pressure their members to vote with the party. We model party cohesion as an endogenous choice of preference alignment by party members. Couched in Krehbiel's (1996, 1998) pivotal politics model, the formal theory advanced here shows party cohesion to be related to the initial preference alignment of party members, the divergence in preferences between parties, the cohesion of the opposing party, the party's size, and the party's majority or minority status. We solved the model analytically for generalized-partial equilibrium results and further analyzed it through computer simulations. We tested the model's predictions in the U.S. Senate using Rice party cohesion scores from the 46th through 104th Congresses. The data analyses show strong support for this theory of endogenous choice of party pressure.

The effects of term limits on state legislatures: A new survey of the 50 states

Term limits on legislators were adopted in 21 states during the early 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the limits legally barred incumbents from reelection in 11 states, and they will do so in four more by 2010. In 2002, we conducted the only survey of legislators in all 50 states aimed at assessing the impact of term limits on state legislative representation. We found that term limits have virtually no effect on the types of people elected to office—whether measured by a range of demographic characteristics or by ideological predisposition—but they do have measurable impact on certain behaviors and priorities reported by legislators in the survey, and on the balance of power among various institutional actors in the arena of state politics. We characterize the biggest impact on behavior and priorities as a "Burkean shift," whereby term-limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns. The reform also increases the power of the executive branch (governors and the bureaucracy) over legislative outcomes and weakens the influence of majority party leaders and committee chairs, albeit for different reasons.
@article{monroe_multi-institutional_2006,
  title = {A multi-institutional explanation for the emergence of standing committees in the \{House\} and \{Senate\}, 1789-1825.},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Monroe, N. W. and Hammond, T. H.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000235471000013},
  pages = {138--138}
}

@article{den_hartog_powers_2006,
  title = {The powers and limits of parties in the \{US\} \{Senate\}.},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Den Hartog, C.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000235471000014},
  pages = {139--139}
}

@article{jarvis_ideological_2006,
  title = {The ideological consequences of partisan legislation.},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Jarvis, M.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2006},
  note = {WOS:000235471000015},
  pages = {139--140}
}

@article{bertelli_measuring_2006,
  title = {Measuring constituency influence in congressional voting decisions.},
  volume = {31},
  issn = {0362-9805},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Bertelli, A. M. and Carson, J. L.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000017},
pages = {140--140}
}

@article{carey_political_2006,
title = {Political institutions, competing principals, and party unity in legislative voting.},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Carey, J. M.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000018},
pages = {140--141}
}

@article{krehbiel_selection_2006,
title = {Selection criteria for roll call votes.},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Krehbiel, K. and Woon, J.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000019},
pages = {141--141}
}

@article{lawrence_changing_2006,
title = {Changing patterns of party effects in congressional voting.},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Lawrence, E. D. and Maltzman, F. and Smith, S. S.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000020},
pages = {141--141}
}

@article{lee_principled_2006,
@article{kernell_responsiveness_2006,
title = {The responsiveness of state legislative elections during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Kernell, S.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000025},
pages = {143--143}
}

@article{roberts_coalition_2006,
title = {Coalition formation in {Eastern} {Europe}.},
volume = {31},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Roberts, A.},
month = feb,
year = {2006},
note = {WOS:000235471000026},
pages = {143--144}
}

@article{loewenberg_editors_2005,
title = {Editor's introduction},
volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201635},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Loewenberg, G.},
month = nov,
year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000233264600001},
pages = {475--477}
}

@article{krehbiel_joe_2005,
title = {Joe {Cannon} and the minority party: {Tyranny} or bipartisanship?},
volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201644},
abstract = {The minority party is rarely featured in empirical
research on parties in legislatures, and recent theories of parties in legislatures are rarely neutral and balanced in their treatment of the minority and majority parties. This article makes a case for redressing this imbalance. We identified four characteristics of bipartisanship and evaluated their descriptive merits in a purposely hostile testing ground: during the rise and fall of Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, "the Tyrant from Illinois." Drawing on century-old recently discovered records now available in the National Archives, we found that Cannon was anything but a majority-party tyrant during the important committee-assignment phase of legislative organization. Our findings underscore the need for future, more explicitly theoretical research on parties-in-legislatures.

@article{andeweg_modes_2005,  
  title = {Modes of political representation: {Toward} a new typology},  
  volume = {30},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201653},  
  abstract = {The mandate-independence controversy still features prominently in studies of political representation even though the problems with its theoretical foundation and empirical operationalization have long been recognized. This article proposes an alternative typology of modes of representation. By combining type of control (ex ante or ex post) with direction of the interactions (bottom-up or top-down), our study captures the most important aspects of the relationship between voters and representatives. We demonstrate how the typology can be used in a survey instrument by comparing the attitudes toward representation of Dutch members of Parliament with the attitudes held by voters, and by relating the views of the members to their behavior.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Andeweg, R. B. and Thomassen, J. J. A.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2005},  
  note = {WOS:000233264600003},  
  pages = {507--528}  
}

@article{druckman_influence_2005,  
  title = {Influence without confidence: {Upper} chambers and government formation},
In most parliamentary democracies, governments must maintain the confidence of a single legislative chamber only. But in bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to collapse sooner than those with upper-house majorities. In this article, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of upper-chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation decisions. After controlling for a host of "usual suspect" variables concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129 bargaining situations, we found that potential coalitions that control upper-house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are those with upper-house minorities. Our findings are important for students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and, perhaps most significantly, for those who study policymaking in parliamentary democracies.

@article{box-steffensmeier_incidence_2005,
  title = {The incidence and timing of {PAC} contributions to incumbent {US} house members, 1993-94},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201671},
  abstract = {In this article, we discuss how donor and recipient characteristics affected the incidence and timing of political action committee (PAC) contributions to incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1993-94 election cycle. We contribute to the campaign finance literature by modeling the timing of contributions, which is important because timing affects the perception of political actors about the competitiveness of elections and the loci of power among members of Congress, interest groups, and between members of Congress and interest groups. Split-population event history models allow us to compare and contrast determinants of whether and when contributions are made, across various types and sizes of PACs.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. and Radcliffe, P. M. and Bartels, B. L.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000233264600004},
  pages = {529--548}
}
@article{lawless_will_2005,
  title = {Will she stay or will she go? Career ceilings and women's retirement from the US Congress},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201680},
  abstract = {This article offers the first broad-based, systematic, times-series assessment of the gender dynamics underlying congressional retirement. We extend the body of work on gender and representation by using the congressional retirement literature to develop an argument that accounts for the gender gap in the average length of congressional service. Our results indicate that women are less willing than men to remain in Congress when their ability to influence the legislative agenda stalls. Because of women's relatively early departures from the House of Representatives, our analysis suggests that prospects for women's representation are less promising than the conventional wisdom suggests.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lawless, J. L. and Theriault, S. M.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000233264600006},
  pages = {581--596}
}

@article{heberlig_redistributing_2005,
  title = {Redistributing campaign funds by US House members: The spiraling costs of the permanent campaign},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201699},
  abstract = {In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the
institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Heberlig, E. S. and Larson, B. A.},
month = nov,
year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000233264600007},
pages = {597--624}
}

@article{loewenberg_untitled_2005,
title = {Untitled},
volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201572},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Loewenberg, G.},
month = aug,
year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000231474800001},
pages = {325--326}
}

@article{kam_timing_2005,
title = {The timing of cabinet reshuffles in five {Westminster} parliamentary systems},
volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201581},
abstract = {Despite their political prominence, cabinet reshuffles have not attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. We provide a theory of cabinet reshuffles that emphasizes both systematic and time-varying causes. In particular, we argue that prime ministers employ cabinet reshuffles to retain power in the face of both intraparty and electoral challenges to their leadership. We use repeated-events duration models to examine the timing of cabinet reshuffles in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the period 1960-2001, and find support for several of our hypotheses.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Kam, C. and Indridason, I.},
month = aug,
year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000231474800002},
pages = {327--363}
}

@article{jenkins_parties_2005,
title = {Parties as procedural coalitions in congress: {An}}
We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictions from the party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). We gain leverage on the question of party influence in Congress by focusing on three types of House members: reelection seekers, higher-office seekers, and retiring members. We argue that retiring House members are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means (when compared to higher-office seekers and reelection seekers) to determine the existence of party influence. Results from a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of the 94th through 105th Congresses (1975-98) suggest that party influence is indeed present in Congress, especially where the party cartel theory predicts: on procedural, rather than final-passage, votes. Moreover, we find that procedural party influence is almost exclusively the domain of the majority party. This latter finding is especially important because most prior studies have been limited to investigating interparty influence only.

What are the political consequences for members of Congress who switch parties? Roll-call and electoral consequences of congressional party switching have been studied, but other implications of party defections have yet to be systematically explored. In this article, I examine the committee assignments of House party switchers and argue that party leaders seek to reward members of the opposing party who join their ranks. Using committee assignment data from the 94th House (1975-76) through the 107th House (2001-02), I show that party switchers are more likely than nonswitchers to be the beneficiaries of violations of the seniority norm. The findings from this article are of interest to students of political parties and legislative institutions, and fill a gap in the literature on party switching.
Women-and-politics research emphasizes the importance of social identity as a determinant of legislative behavior, yet congressional scholars largely ignore identity and focus on the impact of constituency, party, and institutional factors. To examine the link between descriptive and substantive representation, I utilize an original database of cosponsorship activity in the 103d and 104th Congresses that encompasses five social welfare issues that reflect the gender gap in the mass public. I find that the policy preferences of elites do reflect gender differences in the mass public and voter expectations concerning the policy expertise of women candidates. These differences are constrained by changes in the political and institutional contexts since women increase their activity on social welfare issues when they gain access to strategic positions of power, particularly majority party status, to a greater extent than do similarly situated men.

This article offers the first theory to explain the relationship between primary election divisiveness and general election outcomes that is grounded in candidates' own behavior. Conventional wisdom holds that divisive primaries cause candidates to do poorly in general elections. I show that primary divisiveness does not cause this or any other pattern of general election results. Rather, expectations about general election results cause primaries to be divisive. Non-incumbents enter races they think they can win, and
they think they can win where the incumbent is vulnerable. More candidates enter those races than others, splitting the vote among them. This stampede creates divisive primaries in which incumbents are most likely to do poorly, and challengers well, in the general elections. As a result, divisiveness is associated with (but does not cause) better general election performances among challengers and worse performances among incumbents. In this manner, primary divisiveness is an unintended consequence of behavior directed towards the goal of winning the general election. I tested these propositions using data from major-party House primaries between 1976 and 1998 and found that (a) candidate expectations of victory determine when and where divisive primary elections occur, (b) those expectations drive the correlation between primary divisiveness and general election results, and (c) primary divisiveness correlates with incumbents doing poorly, and challengers well, in general elections.

@article{loewenberg_editors_2005-1,
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  volume = {30},
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  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201491},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = may,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000229463900001},
  pages = {159--162}
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@article{wawro_peculiar_2005,
  title = {Peculiar institutions: {Slavery}, sectionalism, and minority obstruction in the antebellum senate},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201509},
  abstract = {This article examines obstruction in the U.S. Senate, focusing on political conflict in the antebellum period. I consider different theories that predict when obstruction should occur and conduct individual-level analysis of the use of and support for dilatory tactics. The analysis investigates how the costs of obstruction, the probability that obstruction succeeds, the policy preferences of the senator, and the salience of legislation relate to
decisions to obstruct. I find that both sectional and partisan factors influence obstruction, with the former being especially important for legislation related to slavery. In particular, Southern senators' concerns about being in the minority led them to obstruct to protect their interests in slavery.},

@article{wawro_minority_2005,
  title = {Minority rights and majority power. {Conditional} party government and the motion to recommit in the house},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201527},
  abstract = {Students of legislative politics have struggled to explain and measure party influence on voting and outcomes in Congress. Proponents of strong party effects point to the numerous procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority party as evidence of party effects, yet recent theoretical work by Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002) argues that House rules guaranteeing the minority a motion to
recommit with instructions effectively balances the procedural
advantages enjoyed by the majority. This article identifies and tests
the empirical implications of the Krehbiel and Meirowitz theory, using
roll-call data from the 61st to 107th Congresses (1909-2002). The
results call into question the validity of Krehbiel and Meirowitz's
conclusions about party government in the House and provide support
for the theory of conditional party government.),

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Roberts, J. M.},
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year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000229463900004},
pages = {219--234}

@article{mcdermott_congressional_2005,
title = {Congressional performance, incumbent behavior, and
voting in senate elections},
volume = {30},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298005X201536},
abstract = {Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members
of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve
public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the
literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of
Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to
expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the
institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is
incorrect. Using multiple state-level exit polls of Senate voting
conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key
findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a
significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races
across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that
punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not
distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a
particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens
hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is
significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for
the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {McDermott, M. L. and Jones, D. R.},
month = may,
year = {2005},
note = {WOS:000229463900005},
pages = {235--257}

@article{moser_strategic_2005,
title = {Strategic ticket splitting and the personal vote in
...
This article examines ticket splitting in five different mixed-member electoral systems—Germany, New Zealand, Japan, Lithuania, and Russia—and indicates the shortcomings inherent in any analysis of such ticket splitting that does not take into account the presence of the personal vote. We find that the personal vote plays a central part in shaping ticket splitting in all of our cases except for Germany, a heavily party-oriented system in which we find evidence of only a weak personal vote but evidence of substantial strategic voting.

We explore factors that influence the chances that a state legislator will be the target of national party recruitment to run for the U.S. House. Using data from a sample of legislators in 200 U.S. House districts, we find that national party contact reflects strategic considerations of party interests. State legislators serving in professional institutions and in competitive districts are most likely to be contacted by national party leaders. In addition, the analysis suggests that national party leaders may be sensitive to the potential costs to the state legislative party: legislators in institutions that are closely balanced between the parties are slightly less likely to be contacted.

Reserved seats in national legislatures: {A} research note,
As competitive democracy is crafted in ethnically plural and postconflict nation-states, the question of whether or not to reserve legislative seats for communal groups—ethnic, national, or religious—is increasingly a topic of debate. This research note provides an overview of targeted electoral mechanisms designed to ensure the inclusion in national parliaments of representatives of ethnic, racial, national, or religious communities. The data show that the existence of reserved seats in national legislatures for such groups is much more widespread, and less idiosyncratic, than many scholars previously thought. This finding, along with current discussions in high-profile cases of constitutional design, suggests that the occurrence and impact of reserved seats should be analyzed in greater detail.
word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. By adopting an approach that allows us to separate the factors that lead to the event itself (that is, the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those that influence the timing of the event, we find that case-specific factors are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, whereas Congress- and Court-specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our study yields a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation-of-powers system.},

@article{rogers_empirical_2005,
  title = {Empirical determinants of bicameral sequence in state legislatures},
  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298005X201437},
  abstract = {In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this "first-mover advantage" implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  month = feb,
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@article{batto_electoral_2005,
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  volume = {30},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hettinger, V. A. and Zorn, C.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2005},
  note = {WOS:000227578600002},
  pages = {5--28}
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While the electoral system undoubtedly influences legislative behavior, it does not necessarily have a uniform effect on all legislators. In this article, I argue that the different strategies that candidates choose in the quest for office result in differing incentives once the candidates have been elected. In the Taiwanese context, candidates who adopt a campaign strategy based on organization will tend to engage in more rent-seeking activities once in the legislature, in order to offset the heavy financial burden of this strategy. From 1992 to 2001, Taiwanese legislators whose votes were highly concentrated in a small number of precincts tended to serve significantly more time on committees with the most rent-seeking opportunities than did legislators with far less concentrated support. Legislators whose votes were spread more evenly across the entire electoral district and legislators elected from the party lists tended to serve more time on committees with little rent-seeking potential.

Title: Priming partisan evaluations of Congress
Authors: Kimball, D. C.
Journal: Legislative Studies Quarterly
Volume: 30
Issue: 1
Pages: 43-62
Year: 2005
DOI: 10.3162/03629805X201455
Abstract: Congress has been the scene of increasingly partisan and ideologically polarized conflict in recent years. I examine the extent to which the national political climate mutes or amplifies the effect of partisanship on evaluations of Congress. Using data from the National Election Studies and a content analysis of national media coverage, I find that public evaluations of Congress divide most sharply along party lines when elite-level discourse is most partisan (as during an election season or a highly charged partisan debate in Congress). This finding is consistent with an opinion leadership or priming hypothesis of public opinion. In addition, the most knowledgeable citizens are most likely to be primed by the partisan political climate in Washington. In contrast, less attentive citizens tend to rely on nonpartisan cues when evaluating Congress. I discuss the implications of these findings for public opinion and improving the public standing of Congress in an increasingly partisan climate.
This paper characterizes the behavioral and policy implications of the decline in the number of military veterans in the U.S. Congress, from more than 70\% of legislators in the early 1970s to less than 30\% in the contemporary House and Senate. Many scholars argue that military service shapes information and beliefs, and that this decline has had negative effects on defense policy. The analysis tests these arguments using voting data from the House and Senate in the 1990s and the House in the 1970s, showing that the impact of veteran status on votes is generally small and has a relatively minor effect on legislative outcomes.

Although members of Congress exhibit considerable stability in their voting decisions on similar, recurring issues, members' long-term voting histories reveal evidence of systematic instability as well. I argue that members reverse positions in predictable ways when the vote history loses value as a decision cue, and I present empirical evidence for this behavior in the context of the highly salient and regularly repeated House decisions on increasing the federal minimum wage. The empirical findings suggest that reversals of member positions are related to institutional, electoral, and constituency factors. I conclude by discussing the importance of these findings to understanding congressional decision making and representation.
Previous studies of House members' speech-giving behavior treat the behavior as a product of members' individual goals. By uncovering leadership memoranda soliciting member participation in one-minute speech giving, I find, first, that parties significantly structure one-minute speech giving, with party-orchestrated message campaigns accounting for about one-third of the speeches given. Second, I find that a party-based explanation illuminates individual members' speech-giving behavior. Ideological proximity to the party leadership and party organizational factors strongly influence a member's willingness to be "on message." These findings have important implications for studies of both party message politics and members' speech-giving behavior.

Using term limits to estimate incumbency advantages when office holders retire strategically,
Empirical study of U.S. elections over the last 50 years has documented a strong electoral advantage to incumbency in state and federal elections. Recently, however, critics have argued that traditional estimates of the incumbency advantage may overstate the advantage by as much as 100\% because the estimates fail to consider strategic retirements. This article directly examines whether or not strategic retirement biases conventional regression estimates of incumbency advantages. We use term limits in state executive and legislative elections as instrumental variables to correct for strategic retirement. We find that, as an empirical matter, strategic retirement is not substantively important. Estimates of incumbency advantages that take account of strategic retirement actually are marginally larger than estimates that do not.

Cost-benefit models of career choice predict that potential legislators choose legislative careers when they expect greater utility from legislative service than from other options. In state legislatures, the utility of legislative service includes the monetary value of outside careers. I hypothesize that legislators are more likely to pursue outside careers when financial opportunity costs are higher or when they derive less non-monetary value from legislative service. In particular, I posit that individual characteristics that predict labor market value (such as age, education, race, and sex) and legislative salary predict outside careers. I test this model employing a new dataset of individual outside-career activity derived from financial disclosure reports. The findings strongly support the hypothesis that outside-career behavior is a function of the financial opportunity costs of legislative service. In addition, I find that Republicans are more likely to hold outside careers than are Democrats. This research has important implications for the study of state legislative participation, legislative organization, and the Democratic bias hypothesis.
In this paper, we analyze the roll-call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two-party systems in American history: the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican system (3rd to 12th Congresses), the Democratic-Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic-Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll-call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.

Using Democratic whip counts from the 92d House, we compare representatives' stated intentions to their actual roll-call votes to detect evidence of party pressure. After arguing that this strategy understates real party influence, we nonetheless point to evidence of member conversion by party leaders. On 16 bills analyzed, two-thirds of the switches between the count and the vote occur in the direction favored by party leaders. We examine one bill in depth, showing how the efforts of party leaders were consequential to the outcome. The pattern of movement on this bill, along with data from the larger set of bills, provides evidence that leaders act strategically, targeting the members whose persuasion requires the fewest resources.
Members of Congress engage in discretionary behaviors, such as making speeches and cosponsoring bills, which are generally motivated by either electoral needs or policy preferences. We examine a discretionary behavior that engages the judicial branch in the conversation: the participation of members of Congress as amici curiae before the Supreme Court. Amicus curiae briefs provide members of Congress with a direct avenue of communication with the judiciary, and this characteristic suggests that cosigning would be a method of creating good public policy. Using data from the 1980-97 terms of the Supreme Court, however, we find that members of Congress cosign onto amicus curiae briefs as a means of "taking stances," akin to cosponsoring a bill. The action allows the member to speak indirectly to an audience beyond these governmental institutions. Evidence shows that ideological extremism and committee jurisdiction promote participation as amici curiae.

This study proposes a number of theoretical and methodological innovations in an attempt to better understand how legislators compete for media coverage. We make a distinction between those variables that determine the potential newsworthiness of a legislature (production assets) and those that are related to the political and media environment in which the legislators operate (news opportunities). We then put forth five hypotheses and test them by
examining the political standing, charismatic communication skills, and radio exposure of 54 members of the Israeli Knesset. The results confirm that political standing and charismatic communication skills are important predictors of media exposure and that the relative importance of these factors changes during different political seasons.

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volume = {29},
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201203},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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Increases in legislative professionalization along with the implementation of term limits in about one-third of the American states raise significant questions about the path of state house and senate turnover. We first update turnover figures for all states, by chamber, from the mid-1980s through 2002. We then compare turnover rates in states with and without term limits. We find that turnover rates, overall, continued to decline through the 1980s but that the long downward trend abated in the 1990s as a result of term limits. The effects of term limits vary depending on the length of the term limit and the opportunity structure in the state. There is also a strong relationship between the presence of term limits and interchamber movement. In addition to term limits, professionalization levels, redistricting, the presence of multi-member districts, and partisan swings explain differences in turnover rates between states.

Theoretical work assumes that legislators use ex ante design to gain bureaucratic influence, not only at an agency's appointment stage but also as an ongoing tactic. Yet no empirical work has investigated whether or not legislators prefer to use design to exert influence after an agency's appointment stage. Using a mail survey of more than 2,500 legislators, we model legislators' preferences for ex ante design as a function of both institutional factors and individual legislators' characteristics. Our results
suggest that the feasibility of agency design as an ongoing tactic of bureaucratic influence is more limited than theoretical work indicates and that both institutional- and individual-level factors explain legislators' preferences.,

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@article{forgette_party_2004,
title = {Party caucuses and coordination: {Assessing} caucus activity and party effects},
volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201230},
abstract = {Party caucuses are increasingly important to members' allocation of time. This article reports findings from new data on the minutes, frequency, timing, and attendance of House party caucus meetings. I argue that the party caucuses increasingly affect political and policy information flows to members. This growing party coordination has resulted in a greater bonding and shared strategic information among rank-and-file copartisans. This research also contributes to the party effects literature. Earlier research on congressional partisanship has used roll-call data to measure both member preferences and party effects. I investigate whether or not members' attendance at party caucus meetings immediately prior to key congressional votes imposes partisan cohesion beyond members' preferences. The results indicate that party coordination contributes to greater congressional party unity on key floor votes at both the bill and member level controlling for members' ideological preferences. This party coordination effect occurs even during a period of high intraparty preference homogeneity.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Forgette, R.},
month = aug,
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pages = {407--430}
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@article{grant_job_2004,
title = {The job of representation in {Congress}: {Public} expectations and representative approval},
volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201249},
abstract = {Few concepts are more central to democratic theory than that of representation. Theories of representation are commonly premised on the belief that citizens' expectations of their representative are politically consequential, yet we know little about the nature of these expectations and precisely how they matter. Using individual-level data from a recent national survey, we investigate the influence of constituents' job expectations on their approval of their representative in Congress. We find that citizens' job expectations condition the effects of members' legislative activities on their job approval.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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month = aug,
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@article{yoon_explaining_2004,
title = {Explaining women's legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa},
volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201258},
abstract = {This study examines the relative impacts of social, economic, cultural, and political determinants on women's legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa by using an ordinary least squares multiple regression model. Under study are sub-Saharan African countries that held democratic legislative elections between January 1990 and June 30, 2001. Only the latest election in each country is included for analysis. My study finds that patriarchal culture, proportional representation systems, and gender quotas are statistically significant. This study, by focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, fills a gap in the extant literature, which has focused on women's legislative representation in advanced industrialized democracies.},
number = {3},
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author = {Yoon, M. Y.},
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year = {2004},
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@article{berard_moderation_2004,
title = {Moderation, extremism, and representation in Congress},
volume = {29},
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number = {3},
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@article{binder_transforming_2004,
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title = {Analyzing congressional party communication operations from a formal perspective.},
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title = {The geography of power: Coalition formation and industry influence in the house and senate, 1880-1930.},
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@article{yoshinaka_party_2004,
title = {Party switching among incumbent southern state legislators, 1980-2003.},
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month = aug,
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note = {WOS:000223089100028},
pages = {478--478}
)

@article{loewenberg_untitled_2004,
title = {Untitled},
volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201122},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Loewenberg, G.},
month = may,
year = {2004},
note = {WOS:000221256400001},
pages = {155--158}
)

@article{jacobson_assessing_2004,
title = {Assessing the president's role as party agent in congressional elections: The case of Bill Clinton in 2000},
volume = {29},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298004X201131},
abstract = {Presidents have become their parties' chief fundraisers and thus have the capacity to further their parties' collective fortunes by imposing a more efficient distribution of campaign resources than might otherwise prevail. In order to succeed, presidents must, first, accurately target their efforts where they will best improve candidates' prospects for winning seats, and second, either directly or indirectly (through signaling to other donors) generate sufficient new resources to affect the election outcome. Analyses of Bill Clinton's extensive fund-raising efforts during the 1999-2000 election cycle confirm that presidents can indeed use their unmatched fund-raising ability to help their parties win congressional contests they might otherwise lose. But analysis of the Clinton record}
also shows that presidential fund-raising activities may be shaped by other purposes that lead to a distribution of effort that is suboptimal for the party.

@article{lee_bicameralism_2004,
  title = {Bicameralism and geographic politics: Allocating funds in the house and senate},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201140},
  abstract = {Because they represent different kinds of constituencies-states versus parts of states-senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools-earmarks and narrow categorical programs-that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House-Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lee, F. E.},
  month = may,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000221256400003},
  pages = {185--213}
}

@article{schwindt-bayer_gender_2004,
  title = {Gender turnover and roll-call voting in the {US} {House} of {Representatives}},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201159},
  abstract = {A number of studies suggest that the gender of a legislator affects his or her congressional ideology. We argue that these studies may have produced misleading results because of insufficient controls for constituency influences. To better account for constituency effects, we use a longitudinal research design based
on electoral turnover, which holds constituency constant while allowing gender and party to vary. We apply ordinary least squares regression to data from the 103d, 104th, and 105th Houses of Representatives and estimate the effect of gender turnover on changes in DW-NOMINATE roll-call voting scores. We find that, when we sufficiently control for both party and constituency influences, gender is not a determinant of the liberalness of a representative's roll-call voting behavior.

@article{schwindt_bayer_elected_2004,
  title = {Elected bodies: {The} gender quota law for legislative candidates in {Mexico}},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201168},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. and Corbetta, R.},
  month = may,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000221256400004},
  pages = {215--229}
}

@article{baldez_impact_2004,
  title = {The impact of federalism on national party cohesion in {Brazil}},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201177},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Baldez, L.},
  month = may,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000221256400005},
  pages = {231--258}
}

@article{desposato_impact_2004,
  title = {The impact of federalism on national party cohesion in {Brazil}},
  volume = {29},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298004X201177},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Baldez, L.},
  month = may,
  year = {2004},
  note = {WOS:000221256400005},
  pages = {231--258}
}
to multiple state-level interests but that state-level actors' impact on national party cohesion is surprisingly small.

To cite this article:


Because of senatorial courtesy, scholars typically assume that presidents defer to home state senators from their party when selecting judges for the federal courts. We challenge this view, arguing that presidents face structural incentives that encourage them to consult broadly with senators across the partisan and ideological spectrums in choosing nominees. Using new data on the fate of judicial vacancies on the federal district courts between 1947 and 1998, we show how institutional and political forces increase interested senators' leverage in choosing federal judges. Senatorial courtesy, we conclude, has its limits, given presidents' incentives to consult with institutionally empowered senators in selecting nominees. Instead of giving advice and consent on a President's nominee, senators block all but their own. Once the President yields to their choices, they are then easily wheeled to confirmation. Editorial, New York Times(1).

How do subnational factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together? We estimate the effects of two institutional forces operating at the state level-intralist electoral competition and alliance with governors-on voting unity among coalition cohorts to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, are less unified than smaller cohorts. We find no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, a result suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape governors' influence relative to that of national-level legislative actors.
I analyze the legislative interaction between representatives from big and small states in a bicameral legislature that decides on the allocation of a fixed resource among the states. I assume that the two houses are malapportioned and that the big states are underrepresented in the upper house. By studying the effect of this and other institutional features on the relative welfare of big and small states and on equilibrium coalitions, I find that, contrary to common belief, an increase in the representation of small states may reduce those states' expected payoff, ceteris paribus. Also, contrary to interpretations of minimum-winning-coalition theorems, I demonstrate that excess majorities may occur in one of the two houses. When proposal making tends to be dominated by big (small) states, excess majorities occur in the upper (lower) house. I also find that higher proposal power increases the payoff of a group of states. Changes in the majority requirements in the two houses and expansion to encompass more small (big) states have non-monotonic effects on the relative welfare of the two groups. I conclude my analysis with an empirical application using calibrations results for the 103d U.S. Congress and the legislative institutions of the European Union before and after the Treaty of Nice. "The equality of representation in the senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states, does not call for much discussion." James Madison (1788). Time: "Did the battle over the relative weight of big and small countries overshadow more important matters at Nice?" Verhofstadt: "It was absolutely necessary. What they tried to do in Nice was make a directorate of the big countries. The European Union can't survive like that." Interview of Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium TIME (2000).
In this paper, we extend recent work exploring the prevalence of outlying committees in American state legislatures. Using an expanded sample of 45 states and measures of legislator preferences generated by a single, federated group, we find that most legislative committees are representative of the parent chambers from which their members are selected. Furthermore, we test multivariate models designed to account for theoretically relevant patterns in variations in outlier percentages among control and noncontrol committees. The fact that our models are such poor predictors of nonrepresentative committees speaks to the idiosyncratic nature of the relatively small percentage of outlying committees in the states. This conclusion, in turn, provides further support for the proposition that representative committees are simply rational.

Tokens, or low levels of minority or female representatives in state legislatures, have been studied with respect to their perceptions of self-efficacy and political attitudes but not with respect to their actual influence on the passage of public policy. This paper uses state-level data from the child support program between the years 1976-84 to measure the influence of women tokens on the policy process. Using ordered probit models, I explore policy adoption under three configurations: (1) a test of the independent impact of tokens, (2) a dynamic test of the differential impact of tokens and nontokens to analyze potential backlash effects and the potential diffusion of policy preferences, and (3) an interactive test on the potential for tokens to form coalitions. My analysis strongly suggests that tokens make a policy difference independently and to a greater extent than when they are on the cusp of becoming nontokens, but I found less support for the idea that tokens successfully form coalitions to achieve specific policy goals.
@article{loewenberg_untitled_2003,
  title = {Untitled - Editor's Introduction},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200953},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2003},
  note = {WOS:000186424400001},
  pages = {447--448}
}

@article{neto_inefficient_2003,
  title = {The inefficient secret revisited: The legislative input and output of Brazilian deputies},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200962},
  abstract = {Shugart and Carey (1992) posit that presidential democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not offered highly identifiable choices over national policies. Such systems are driven by an inefficient secret, which is essentially a nonpartisan representation of the policy process. To check the propositions of the inefficient secret model (ISM), this article investigates the aggregation level, effect, and subject of Brazilian deputies' legislative input and output. Our empirical analysis indicates that, although some ISM-related factors drive legislative output, there is partisanship in deputies' legislative input. This result means that the ISM underestimates the prospects for programmatic parties (especially in opposition) to emerge within systems where the electoral and constitutional rules encourage particularism.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Neto, O. A. and Santos, F.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2003},
  note = {WOS:000186424400002},
  pages = {449--479}
}

@article{jenkins_out_2003,
We examine the internal politics that preceded the House adoption in 1839 of viva voce (voice) voting for Speaker and other House officers. First, we find that the struggles over the rule's adoption actually centered on the election of the House Printer. These struggles were tied to attempts by the two major parties to establish effective newspaper networks to assist in national political campaigns. Democrats generally favored public election of House officers, whereas Whigs generally opposed. In the short term, the change to public voting for Speaker and other House officers had the expected effect of instilling greater partisan regularity among House members. As sectional divisions grew in the nation at large, however, the public election of the Speaker made it increasingly difficult for House leaders to forge the transregional coalitions necessary to organize the House.

It is generally accepted by scholars, as well as by cameral partisans, that adding a second chamber to an otherwise unicameral legislative process will decrease the volume of laws that a legislature enacts. This study challenges the conventional wisdom. First, I offer a simple theoretical argument that shows that when second chambers can originate as well as reject legislation, bicameralism will have an indeterminate impact on legislative production. Second, I provide historical data gathered from the four U.S. states that have experienced cameral transitions. Although very rudimentary, the historical evidence, when coupled with the theoretical argument, raises serious doubt regarding the traditional claim that bicameralism reduces the production of legislation.
This article examines the extent to which changes in distributional benefits influence congressional election outcomes. Although conventional wisdom holds that a direct link exists between distributional benefits and electoral outcomes (Mayhew 1974b), recent evidence suggests that this link only exists under certain circumstances (Stein and Bickers 1994). In this article, I use 1995 military base closures to test the nature of the relationship. Contrary to recent research on the politics of pork barreling, my findings indicate support for a direct relationship between major base realignments and closures and House electoral outcomes. Specifically, major realignments and closures significantly decreased first-year Democrats' vote margins in the 1996 House elections.

Leadership political action committees (PACs) are committees headed by federal politicians but separate from the politicians' personal campaign committees. Like other PACs, leadership PACs receive donations from individuals and groups, then make contributions to the political candidates that they support. Previous research indicates that member contribution strategies reflect both party-based and personal goals. Using a range of data from before and after the 1994 "Republican Revolution," this study fills a void in the existent research by testing whether or not House members with leadership PACs switch contribution strategies once their party status changes. My analysis reveals that a shift in party status tends to produce a subsequent shift in contribution strategy. My findings also suggest that members, while acting within a party-based framework, may target their contributions in ways that also reflect their personal goals.
Although much has been written on the critical congressional reforms of the 1970s, few studies have analyzed support for reform systematically. In this article, we draw upon previously untapped sources of information that make an individual-level, quantitative analysis possible. We analyze 20 indicators that measure support for a wide variety of reforms in both chambers. Our results reveal a remarkably consistent pattern: in virtually every case, junior members and liberals were more pro-reform than were senior members and conservatives. Also, Republicans were often more likely than Democrats to back reform. Our findings challenge the view that the reform movement was essentially a Democratic party phenomenon; liberals and junior members in both parties—not just Democrats—supported reform.
Understanding legislative organization requires that we understand internal institutional choice; we must be able to describe and predict variation in internal structures across legislatures rather than simply explain a given structure. Currently, models that would enable us to do so are largely unavailable. This article offers a more general model, based on a variant of ambition theory, with the explicit purpose of examining variation in internal organization rather than a particular structure. Theoretical results indicate that legislators' strategic preferences over structures will fall into distinct and opposed types. This finding implies that legislatures themselves should fall into the same types and that structures, rules, and norms should appear in organized, relatively coherent bundles linked to varying legislator types.

Our research addresses how individual member behavior and institutional variables affect legislative success in the U.S. House of Representatives. Using new measures of activity from the 103d Congress (1993-94), a count dependent variable, and negative binomial regression, our analysis assesses member effectiveness. We find that a member's activity level encourages legislative success, but gains are limited when members speak or sponsor too frequently. Our results provide a clearer picture of the role of legislative context and the relevance of institutions in determining a member's legislative successes and failures.
Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure "hip-pocket votes" or "if you need me" pledges from rank-and-file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options-pay legislators to convert to favorable votes-when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non-key votes from the 106th Congress (1999-2000).

This article characterizes the electoral consequences of messages of institutional loyalty and disloyalty sent by incumbent House members to their constituents. We show that, for the contemporary House, there is variation in these messages-not all incumbents in the contemporary House "run for Congress by running against Congress." Moreover, we show that these messages can, under the right conditions, have significant electoral consequences, even after controlling for party affiliation and district political factors. In addition to demonstrating the electoral relevance of legislators' presentations, our results show an incumbent-level link between constituents' trust in government and their voting behavior-a link created by interaction between constituents' perceptions, legislators' party affiliations, and the messages that legislators send to their constituents.


Recent research points to the importance of subnational elections as variables shaping the national party system in federal states (Jones 1997b; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels 2000). I propose that the effects of subnational elections are not limited to federal states but instead can be seen throughout the region. This paper examines the impacts of gubernatorial elections across eighteen Latin American countries during the most recent democratic period. The analysis suggests that intermediate subnational elections do exert an influence on national party systems, whether the state is federal or not, and particularly influence how many parties are elected to a legislature's lower house.

This paper focuses on U.S. senators and their home-state approval ratings from 1981 to 1997. We examine these ratings to assess the relative impacts of tactical factors, such as the senators' bill sponsorship and media activity, and contextual influences, such as economic performance, state population size, and the evaluations and behavior of other elected officials. We find that the senators' own tactical behavior affects the approval ratings, but a stronger influence is the context in which the senators operate.

Bill cosponsorship has become an important part of
the legislative and electoral process in the modern House of Representatives. Using interviews with congressional members and staff, I explain the role of cosponsorship as a signal to agenda setters and a form of position taking for constituents. Regression analysis confirms that cosponsoring varies with a member's electoral circumstances, institutional position, and state size, but generally members have adapted slowly to the introduction of cosponsorship to the rules and practice of the House.),

number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Koger, G.},
month = may,
year = {2003},
note = {WOS:000183112500005},
pages = {225--246}
}

@article{bergara_modeling_2003,
title = {Modeling {Supreme} {Court} strategic decision making: {The} congressional constraint},
volume = {28},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298003X200881},
abstract = {This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one-third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Bergara, M. and Richman, B. and Spiller, P. T.},
month = may,
year = {2003},
note = {WOS:000183112500006},
pages = {247--280}
}

@article{loewenberg_editors_2003-1,
title = {Editor's introduction},
volume = {28},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298003X200773},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
@article{chaisty_defending_2003,
    title = {Defending the institutional status quo: {Communist} leadership of the second {Russian} {State} {Duma}, 1996-99},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200782},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Chaisty, P.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2003},
    note = {WOS:000180798200002},
    pages = {5--28}
}

@article{kada_role_2003,
    title = {The role of investigative committees in the presidential impeachment processes in {Brazil} and {Colombia}},
    volume = {28},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.3162/036298003X200791},
    abstract = {One of the most important political debates today regards how to design institutions to ensure the accountability of public officials. The impeachment process is one mechanism of accountability check available to legislatures. It is, however, susceptible to misuse. What determines how the impeachment process functions? In this paper, I argue that control of information by congressional investigation committees is a crucial factor in deciding the outcome of the impeachment process. I show how the difference in information control by the investigative committees in Brazil and Colombia contributed to the removal of a president in one country and a president's acquittal in the other.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Kada, N.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2003},
    note = {WOS:000180798200003},
    pages = {29--54}
}

@article{grose_electoral_2003,
    title = {The electoral consequences of party switching by incumbent members of {Congress}, 1947-2000},
    }
What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have ran for Congress under more than one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching causes the primaries in the switcher's party and in the the opposing party (the switcher's "old" party) to become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switcher's new party are less competitive than those in the old party before the switch.

@article{frendreis_testing_2003,
  title = {Testing spatial models of elections: {The} influence of voters and elites on candidate issue positions},
  volume = {28},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298003X200818},
  abstract = {This research tests spatial models of electoral competition using survey data on state legislative candidates' policy positions and ideology in eight U.S. states. Our data support several hypotheses: 1) candidates' issue positions do not converge; 2) party elites have more extreme positions than do candidates; 3) candidate issue positioning is a function of party-elite issue positions and union involvement in the campaign, as well as constituency characteristics; and 4) when candidates rely heavily on elite resources during their campaign, elites become more important in shaping candidate issue positions.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  month = feb,
  year = {2003},
  note = {WOS:000180798200005},
  pages = {77--101}
Primaries are an important but understudied component of American elections. In this article, I examine competition in state legislative primaries across 25 states during the 1994 and 1996 election cycles. My findings indicate that competition varies greatly and is affected by a number of factors on the state and district levels. The presence of an incumbent reduces competition, but strong district support for a party leads to greater competition in that party's primaries. Population size and social diversity do little to affect competition, but urbanism and unified party control have a positive impact. Further, legislative professionalism is associated with greater competition, particularly in open-seat races. Overall, the results have important implications for theories about the conditions that enhance or inhibit competition across different types of elections.
abstract = {We explore the nationalization of state lobbying communities by examining all lobbying registrations held by organizations in the 50 states in 1997, with special attention given to the frequency of multi-state registrations. Following discussion of the meanings and sources of nationalization among state interest communities, we develop and analyze several measures of the level of localism, examining what factors drive variation in multiple state registrations across group types and states. Finally, we discuss the substantive and measurement implications of the nationalization of state interest communities. Our findings identify an interesting paradox of interest representation before state legislatures: although lobbying responses and techniques may have become more nationalized, the composition of state interest communities remains predominantly local.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Wolak, J. and Newmark, A. J. and McNoldy, T. and Lowery, D. and Gray, V.},
month = nov,
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000178721400002},
pages = {527--555}

@article{wilkins_influence_2002,
title = {The influence of governors on veto override attempts: A test of pivotal politics},
volume = {27},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/03629802X200729},
abstract = {Using the "switcher" analysis developed by Krehbiel (1998), we examine the ability of Missouri governors to sway legislators on veto override attempts. Our initial results closely mirror Krehbiel's finding that the chief executive successfully achieves influence at and around the veto pivot, but these results change once we take into account the political party of the legislators. Governors are far more likely to influence legislators from their own party, regardless of legislator ideology. Our study provides a rare systematic analysis of gubernatorial influence in the legislative arena, while also contributing to the current debate over preference-based versus partisan-based theories of legislatures.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Wilkins, V. M. and Young, G.},
month = nov,
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000178721400003},
pages = {557--575}

@article{rudolph_economic_2002,
title = {The economic sources of congressional approval},
volume = {27},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.3162/036298002X200738},
abstract = {Models of congressional approval have, in both theory and specification, often imitated models of presidential approval. Through their modeling decisions, researchers have implicitly assumed that the economic determinants of presidential and congressional approval are identical. Such assumptions have discouraged other researchers from testing competing hypotheses about the economic determinants of congressional approval. Using aggregate-level time-series analysis, this study investigates the question of whether or not the economic determinants of approval vary by the target of political judgment. I find that presidential approval is driven largely by sociotropic prospections, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, I find the public relies most heavily upon egocentric retrospections when judging the U.S. Congress.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Rudolph, T. J.},
month = nov,
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000178721400004},
pages = {577--599}

@article{green_institutional_2002,
  title = {Institutional change, party discipline, and the \{House\} {Democratic} {Caucus}, 1911-19},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598661},
  abstract = {The House Democratic Caucus of 1911 to 1919 is a largely understudied institution in the literature on congressional party government, despite the claims of many scholars that the caucus functioned as a significant instrument of party government by binding legislators' floor votes. An analysis of roll-call votes, new data from the caucus journal, and contemporary accounts from the period indicate that these claims are largely exaggerated, although the caucus did, on occasion, improve floor discipline within the party. I find that intraparty homogeneity on crosscutting issues was related to caucus success. In addition, I argue that the adoption and use of the binding caucus can best be understood from the "multiple goals" viewpoint of congressional politics. These findings have important implications for understanding the development of party-based institutions in Congress.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Green, M. N.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2002},}
@article{shvetsova_gaining_2002,
    title = {Gaining legislative control through strategic district nomination: The case of the Russian left in 1995},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598662},
    abstract = {The greater the importance of the legislative goals for a party, the more it will concern itself in the electoral campaign with the parliament's ultimate composition, rather than simply its own seat gains. While unquestionably the dominant force in the political left, the Communist Party in Russia was also uniquely positioned in the 1995 election to take advantage of the combination of electoral and parliamentary institutions and to devise a nomination strategy that made the rest of the parliament's left wing fully dependent on the Communists, thus giving the Communists effective control over the legislature despite their minority status.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Shvetsova, O.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000178721400006},
    pages = {635--657}
}

@article{mutalib_constitutional-electoral_2002,
    title = {Constitutional-electoral reforms and politics in Singapore},
    volume = {27},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/3598663},
    abstract = {The existence of a dominant one-party system in Singapore makes legislative passage of constitutional and electoral system reforms easy. Such a system has enabled the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) government to formulate and implement sweeping reforms with little difficulty, however controversial they are. Since 1980, the Singapore government has instituted nonconstituency MPs, nominated MPs, group representation constituencies, and an elected presidency. Although not necessarily intended, one consequence of these reforms has been the consolidation of the government's power.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Mutalib, H.},
    month = nov,
    year = {2002},
    note = {WOS:000178721400006},
    pages = {635--657}
Despite party system fluidity and high rates of electoral volatility in the first decade after the transition to democracy in Poland and the Czech Republic, career politicians are emerging. Using data on all parliamentary candidates in the last election before the fall of communism and in all elections since then, we show that, in both countries, parliamentary carryover rates have risen substantially, a growing number of incumbents are seeking reelection, and an increasing proportion of candidates for legislative office have competed in previous parliamentary elections. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior political experience has a persistent and positive effect on winning office. We argue that the rise of career politicians facilitates the consolidation and effectiveness of these new democracies.
Electoral influences on legislative behavior in mixed-member systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada

This article addresses how mixed-member systems that combine proportional representation (PR) and single-member districts (SMD) into a single election can influence legislators' voting behavior. Scholars have generally extended standard expectations of behavior to mixed-member systems by assuming that legislators occupying PR seats in mixed-member parliaments should be more cohesive than those occupying SMD seats. I argue that controlling for seat type alone does not take into account the interaction between PR and SMD in mixed-member systems. Using voting data from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, I show that controlling for dual candidacy and the "safety" of the deputy's district or list position increases our understanding of the factors motivating legislative cohesion.

Explaining seat changes in the US House of Representatives, 1950-98

Recent U.S. House elections have challenged existing models of congressional elections, raising the question of whether or not processes thought to govern previous elections are still at work. Taking Marra and Ostrom's (1989) model of congressional elections as representative of extant theoretical perspectives and testing it against recent elections, we find that the model fails. We augment Marra and Ostrom's model with new insights, constructing a model that explains elections from 1950 to 1998. We find that, although presidential approval ratings and major political events continue to drive congressional elections, the distribution of open seats must also be taken into account.
Lower salience elections present greater opportunities for representational bias at the polls than do elections with higher levels of political interest. We hypothesize that turnout bias is most likely to occur during Midterm congressional elections in which there are clear short-term forces that exploit the low turnout setting. The effects of these forces are more likely to be observable among registered nonvoters than citizens who are not registered to vote because registrants have access to the polls and are likely to have voted in previous presidential contests. Using midterm National Election Study data from 1918 to 1998, we find that registered nonvoters are frequently more Democratic than midterm election voters, particularly in 1994 and 1998. The historic 1994 congressional election seat losses for Democrats may be partially explained by the finding that voters going to the polls were clearly more conservative than registered nonvoters.

Over the last 25 years, there has been a steady increase in party voting in the U.S. House, with much of this increase attributed to changes in the South. We argue that changes in the North are also important. Democrats now win a higher percentage of elections in the North, and a larger percentage of the congressional party comes from the North. Northern Democrats became steadily more liberal in the 1980s and 1990s, which increased the liberal record of the entire party. We examine two factors in the rise in liberal voting in the North. First, Democrats now win more seats in urban, lower-income,
nonwhite districts that tend to generate liberal voting records. Second, there has been an increase in the number of districts that tend to produce liberal-voting Democrats. Together, these changes have resulted in more liberal Democratic Party voting and greater polarization between the parties.}

@article{fisher_whistle_2002,
  title = {Whistle while you work: {Job} satisfaction and retirement from the {US} {House}},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298002X200675},
  abstract = {The literature analyzing the effects of job satisfaction on congressional retirement has been inconclusive. The problem with this literature is its reliance on indirect measures of job satisfaction. We use a direct measure of job satisfaction to demonstrate that job satisfaction does have a significant independent effect on congressional retirement. The findings imply that the indirect measures of job satisfaction measure frustration as opposed to job dissatisfaction, a conceptually different variable. The fact that members' job satisfaction affects their career length suggests that a Congress that keeps its members happy will have greater retention and will, presumably, keep its best members.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fisher, S. H. and Herrick, R.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000177386400007},
  pages = {445--457}
}

@article{stein_public_2002,
  title = {Public support for term limits: {Another} look at conventional thinking},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598573},
  abstract = {Americans are enamored with term limits for elected officials at all levels of government. Explanations of public support for term limits focus on partisanship, group underrepresentation, voter dissatisfaction with specific political institutions, political cynicism, and ideology. We qualify the conventional wisdom that term
limits are mostly a Republican issue: Support for term limits is more a function of the incongruence between an individual's expressed partisanship and the party of their representative than of the individual's party affiliation. Further, the effect of unsatisfactory representation is strongly related to a voter's engagement with politics and willingness to monitor political affairs actively.

@article{stein_limits_2002,
  title = {Limits are mostly a Republican issue: Support for term limits is more a function of the incongruence between an individual's expressed partisanship and the party of their representative than of the individual's party affiliation. Further, the effect of unsatisfactory representation is strongly related to a voter's engagement with politics and willingness to monitor political affairs actively.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Stein, R. M. and Johnson, M. and Post, S. S.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000177386400008},
  pages = {459--480}
}

@article{austin_seats_2002,
  title = {Seats that may not matter: Testing for racial polarization in {US} city councils},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598574},
  abstract = {Critics of the Voting Rights Act claim that electoral structures used by city councils lead to racially polarized legislatures in which African American members are consistently outvoted by white majorities. Using council votes from six cities, this study shows that the critics' claim is exaggerated. In only one city were African American council members generally less likely to be on the winning side of votes because of their race. Polarization is more of a concern for particular issues: members with large black constituencies were less likely to be on the winning side of votes on housing or police affairs in four cities.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Austin, R. A.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000177386400009},
  pages = {481--508}
}

@article{loewenberg_editors_2002-2,
  title = {Editor's introduction},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.3162/036298002X200549},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G.},
  month = may,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000175289300001},
}
In this article, we distinguish legislative stability from government stability and argue that the character of the relationship that exists between them is a complex one in which various combinations are possible. We focus on Italy because of the manner in which it has combined legislative stability with government instability. Our findings indicate that the relationship between legislative and government stability in Italy is best seen as curvilinear, that the analysis of government stability must take the number of governments as well as the duration of governments into account, and that the attributes of the party system that stabilize the legislature destabilize governments. Given these findings, we discuss their implications for explaining stability in parliamentary regimes in terms of events, "strong parties," and strategic calculation. We conclude that legislative stability should not be treated simply as a secondary or derivative effect of government stability and that Italy can serve as a benchmark for further study of the nature and determinants of the relationship between the two in other parliamentary systems.
between proposal order and power by considering a model that allows preference heterogeneity and status quo centrality to vary. Finally, we relate the findings to recurring substantive debates on majority party power and committee power.

@article{hibbing_how_2002,
  title = {How to make {Congress} popular},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {Conventional wisdom holds that Congress is unpopular because it does not measure up to the people's populist expectations. Instead of being the "citizen's legislature" that the people desire, it is an institutionalized legislature with well-paid, longtime members and an elaborate infrastructure of committees, caucuses, parties, and perquisites. The people, it is alleged, desire more of a voice in the decisions made by Congress, they want congressional procedures to be more open so ordinary people know what is going on in the halls of power, and they want more accountability and more representation of the interests of real people. In this paper, I argue that the enactment of this populist reform agenda would actually make Congress substantially less popular with the people. In other words, I contend that the more Congress gives people voice, accountability, representation, and open, visible procedures, the more the people will be dissatisfied with Congress. The real cause of congressional unpopularity is not that people would rather make decisions themselves but that people do not trust members of Congress to make decisions in a non-self-interested fashion.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hibbing, J. R.},
  month = may,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000175289300004},
  pages = {219--244}
}

@article{jones_ideological_2002,
  title = {Ideological distance from the majority party and public approval of {Congress}},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {We analyze whether or not perceived ideological distance from the congressional majority party influences individuals'
approval of the way Congress as a whole handles its job. We argue that, to the extent citizens see the majority party as representing an ideological stance that is distant from their own, they are unlikely to feel that Congress is representing them and therefore will be less supportive toward Congress. In contrast, when members of the public feel that the congressional majority is close to them ideologically, they are likely to feel well represented by and thereby approve of Congress. Using cross-sectional data covering periods of Democratic, Republican, and split party control of Congress (1980-98), this analysis provides strong support for the ideological proximity argument.}

@article{lynch_midterm_2002,
  title = {Midterm elections and economic fluctuations: The response of voters over time},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598531},
  abstract = {Recent empirical work (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Erikson 1990) has shown that economic conditions may not have influenced House midterm elections since 1915. I argue that economic conditions may have influenced House midterms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Congress dominated economic policy-making, parties offered starker positions on economic issues, and national issues dominated House elections. As the 20th century progressed, congressional power over the economy declined, the parties converged over certain economic policies, and district-level forces grew more important in elections. I test the stability of the relationship between the economy and House midterms over time, using F-tests to show how the impact of macroeconomic conditions has changed in House midterm elections from 1872 to 1994. The results indicate that the gross national product (GNP) influenced House races before 1913 but, as the 20th century continued, the importance of the economy in House midterms declined.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lynch, G. P.},
  month = may,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000175289300006},
  pages = {265--294}
}
Previous studies have shown that, because of their race, African American candidates for public office are often evaluated less favorably than their colleagues by voters. Does this dynamic continue when black candidates become elected officials? Using data on the North Carolina General Assembly, I address this question by examining the effects of race on perceptions of legislative effectiveness. When the dependent variable is the average effectiveness rating given by three groups—lobbyists, journalists, and other legislators—there is evidence that African American representatives are evaluated negatively because of their race. When the dependent variable is disaggregated into the separate effectiveness ratings given by each of the respondent groups individually, these negative perceptions of blacks on account of race remain on the part of lobbyists and other legislators, but not for journalists. Moreover, the negative perceptions of black representatives are not mitigated by these representatives possessing certain characteristics (e.g., seniority and leadership positions) that previous studies have found to be correlated with positive effectiveness evaluations. The presence of an African American Speaker in one legislative session did, however, seem to attenuate the negative perceptions.
At first glance, wide-ranging presidential decree authority suggests executive branch domination of legislatures. However, decree power may also be a rational delegation of authority by legislators, in accord with their political objectives. Seen in this light, the key issue for legislators is not halting decree authority but reducing the agency losses that result from delegation. This paper shows how decree authority, as practiced in Brazil, constitutes an example of rational delegation by a legislature in which seniority and policy specialization are relatively undervalued. Brazilian legislators prefer to endow presidents with broad decree power and then monitor presidents on an issue-by-issue basis by amending executive decrees. This method of "oversight after delegation" lowers the transaction costs of delegation and speaks to the influence of Brazilian legislators over what is typically seen as an important source of presidential power.

At times, the American political parties are so close in terms of policy positions that critics denounce the lack of a "dime's worth of difference" between them. At other times, the gap between them on a left-right dimension is huge. How can we explain this variation? We argue that parties can behave rationally as collective units, and that shifts in divergence and convergence can be explained as rational responses to changes within governmental institutions and to shifts in conditions outside. We analyze this argument using adjusted ADA scores (Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder 1999) to compare voting score differences between the Democratic and Republican parties in Congress from 1952 to 1996. We pose specific hypotheses for potentially important factors shaping party behavior and test them with a multivariate model. Our results support the argument that the variation in the behavioral gap between the two parties in Congress can be explained as rational party responses to internal and external stimuli.
Explaining the role of restrictive rules in the postreform house

Four competing explanations have emerged regarding restrictive rules in Congress. Informational theory claims that rules reduce information costs and facilitate committee specialization. The distributional perspective suggests that rules enforce legislative bargains and help members achieve gains-from-trade. Another claim is that rules increase the Rules Committee's independent influence over policy. Lastly, partisan theory asserts that rules are used to increase the majority party's influence over policy. This analysis tests these claims during the 97th, 98th, 104th, and 105th Congresses. The findings demonstrate that theoretical constructs developed in earlier analyses of special rules are not robust over time and across legislative contexts. The results refute majoritarian assertions that rules are used as informational devices. Similarly, little evidence supports the claim that Rules Committee preferences independently affect rule assignment. Instead, a partisan principal-agent framework emerges as the most useful construct to explain procedural choice in the postreform House.

Congressional leadership 1965-96: A new look at the extremism versus centrality debate

An examination of the differences between the ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House of Representatives (1965-96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median
Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.

@article{grofman_changes_2002,
  title = {Changes in legislative support for the governors program over time},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This study examines changes in legislative support for the governor's legislative agenda in Georgia during the governor's first term in office (1991-94). I analyze the factors that led legislators to support the governor's agenda, as well as how the level of support changed between election years and off-years. I use multivariate OLS models of gubernatorial support to determine how support varied (1) between the parties, (2) between factions within parties, and (3) over time. I find that there was wide variation in support among factions in the majority party and that support varied widely between election years and off-years.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hall, T. E.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200006},
  pages = {107--122}
}

@article{weissert_legislative_2002,
  title = {Legislative demands for bureaucratic policymaking the case of state medical boards},
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/3598522},
  abstract = {While much is known about the relationship between Congress and regulatory agencies, there has been little examination of the role state legislatures play in the activities of state regulatory bodies, particularly those activities related to timely, salient policy issues. This article explores the relationship of state legislatures to medical boards, which are increasingly becoming more policy active. We find that state legislative involvement and
influence are the most important determinants of policy-active state medical boards; institutional elements play a secondary role. Major changes in the private health care delivery system affect legislative involvement and play an indirect role in predicting policy activism. We drew our data from a 50-state survey of executive directors of state medical boards.

@article{hamm_tools_2002,  
  title = "A 'tools of the trade' look at comparing congress with state legislatures.",  
  volume = {27},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Hamm, K. E. and Squire, P.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {2002},  
  note = {WOS:000173645200009},  
  pages = {141--141}
}

@article{serra_casework_2002,  
  title = "Casework, issues, and voting in state elections: Bridging the gap between congressional and state legislative research.",  
  volume = {27},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Serra, G. and Pinney, N.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {2002},  
  note = {WOS:000173645200010},  
  pages = {141--142}
}

@article{den_hartog_gatekeeping_2002,  
  title = "Gatekeeping and the majority party in the Antebellum House.",  
  volume = {27},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  number = {1},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Den Hartog, J. and Ford, M.},  
  month = feb,  
  year = {2002},  
  note = {WOS:000173645200008},  
  pages = {123--139}
}
@article{renka_musical_2002,
  title = "{Musical} chairs: {The} changing seniority system in congress.",
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Renka, R. D.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200012},
  pages = {142--143}
}

@article{bond_disappearance_2002,
  title = "{The} disappearance of moderate and cross-pressured members of congress: {Conversion}, replacement, and electoral change.",
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bond, J. R. and Fleisher, R.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200015},
  pages = {143--144}
}

@article{white_senate_2002,
  title = "{Senate} apprenticeship in historical perspective.",
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {White, D. R.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200013},
  pages = {143--143}
}

@article{wolfensberger_use_2002,
  title = "{The} use of self-executing rules under democratic and

@article{conway_paris_2002,
  title = "{Paris}, defectors on roll-call votes in the {United} {States} {House} of {Representatives}: {A} model estimating when members are most likely, to defect.
  },
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Conway, K. J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200016},
  pages = {144--144}
}

@article{cox_measuring_2002,
  },
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Cox, G. W. and Poole, K. T.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200017},
  pages = {144--145}
}

@article{grose_consequences_2002,
  title = "{The} consequences of party switching in {Congress}: {The} electoral fortunes of incumbent legislators who switched parties, 1947-2000.
  },
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Grose, C. R. and Yoshinaka, A.},
  month = feb,
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Fiber, P. M.},
month = {feb},
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000173645200022},
pages = {147--147}
}

@article{rothenberg_strategic_2002,
title = "{Strategic} influences and congressional voting: {Continuity} and change."},
volume = {27},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Rothenberg, L. S.},
month = {feb},
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000173645200023},
pages = {147--147}
}

@article{sinclair_structure_2002,
title = "{Structure}, preferences, and outcomes: {Explaining} when bills do and don't become law."},
volume = {27},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Sinclair, B.},
month = {feb},
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000173645200024},
pages = {147--148}
}

@article{carson_congressional_2002,
title = "{Congressional} responses to {Supreme} {Court} activism."},
volume = {27},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Carson, J. L. and Randazzo, K. A.},
month = {feb},
year = {2002},
note = {WOS:000173645200025},
pages = {148--148}
}
@article{carroll_increasing_2002,
  title = "{Increasing} diversity or more of the same? {Term} limits and the representation of women, minorities, and minority women in state legislatures.",
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Carroll, S. J. and Jenkins, K. E.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200030},
  pages = {150--150}
}

@article{jeydel_are_2002,
  title = "{Are} women effective legislators? {Evidence} from the {US} {House} in the 103d-105th {Congresses}.",
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Jeydel, A. S. and Taylor, A. J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200031},
  pages = {151--151}
}

@article{swers_fighting_2002,
  title = "{Fighting} for women's issues on the house floor: {An} analysis of floor amending behavior in the 103d and 104th {Congresses}.",
  volume = {27},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Swers, M. L.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2002},
  note = {WOS:000173645200032},
  pages = {151--151}
}

@article{loewenberg_editors_2001,
  title = {Editor's introduction},
  volume = {26},}
The effects of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting,

Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J. M. and Stewart, C.,

The importance of issues in senate campaigns: {Citizens}' reception of issue messages,

Kahn, I.
evidence that when candidates and the news media focus on a particular issue (i.e., the economy, health care, environment, education), citizens are more likely to recognize the issue as a campaign theme.

@article{hood_key_2001,
  title = {The key issue: {Constituency} effects and {Southern} senators' roll-call voting on civil rights},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440271},
  abstract = {One striking manifestation of the twentieth-century transformation of Southern politics is the liberalization of roll-call voting behavior of Southern Democrats on civil rights issues. One explanation for this shift focuses on the leftward pull of an increasingly mobilized black electorate. A second explanation cites the leftward push of a growing Republican Party. Using data for Southern senators and states from 1969 to 1996, we implement a time series cross-sectional analysis to evaluate the competing explanations. We find that the liberalization of voting patterns was a joint result of the mobilization of the black electorate and the growth of Southern Republicanism.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hood, M. V. and Kidd, Q. and Morris, I. L.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000172040200004},
  pages = {599--621}
}

@article{tate_political_2001,
  title = {The political representation of blacks in {Congress}: {Does} race matter?},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440272},
  abstract = {Congressional scholars generally take the position that members of Congress don't have to descriptively mirror their constituents in order to be responsive. Yet ample scholarship has shown that legislators work very hard at identifying with their constituents, at conveying the impression that they are alike in interests and opinions. Matching the race of the House member to their constituents' ratings in the 1996 National Black Election Study, I
find that blacks consistently express higher levels of satisfaction with their representation in Washington when that representative is black, even controlling for other characteristics of the legislators, such as political party. This study underscores the value of descriptive representation in the black community and highlights the need for additional empirically based studies of political representation.

Influencing from impaired administrations: Presidents, White House scandals, and legislative leadership

Journalists and scholars alike have suggested that scandal has a harmful effect on the effectiveness of the political system. Little systematic evidence exists to validate this claim, but we address the problem by offering theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that White House scandal-independent of other influences such as public approval of the president-has a negative effect on presidential support in Congress. We analyze individual House members' votes on key legislation during the Watergate, Iran-contra, and Monica Lewinsky scandals, employing as an independent variable an innovative measure of scandal presence and intensity. Our empirical tests show that the usual contextual influences on congressional voting are significant and that scandal has a strong, negative effect on presidential support. After detailing these findings, we conclude with a discussion of implications both for presidential politics and for the presidential leadership literature.

Legislative professionalism and the demand for groups: The institutional context of interest population density

Legislative Studies Quarterly

@article{meinke_influencing_2001,  
  title = {Influencing from impaired administrations: Presidents, White House scandals, and legislative leadership},  
  volume = {26},  
  issn = {0362-9805},  
  doi = {10.2307/440273},  
  abstract = {Journalists and scholars alike have suggested that scandal has a harmful effect on the effectiveness of the political system. Little systematic evidence exists to validate this claim, but we address the problem by offering theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that White House scandal-independent of other influences such as public approval of the president-has a negative effect on presidential support in Congress. We analyze individual House members' votes on key legislation during the Watergate, Iran-contra, and Monica Lewinsky scandals, employing as an independent variable an innovative measure of scandal presence and intensity. Our empirical tests show that the usual contextual influences on congressional voting are significant and that scandal has a strong, negative effect on presidential support. After detailing these findings, we conclude with a discussion of implications both for presidential politics and for the presidential leadership literature.},  
  number = {4},  
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  
  author = {Meinke, S. R. and Anderson, W. D.},  
  month = nov,  
  year = {2001},  
  note = {WOS:000172040200006},  
  pages = {639--659}
}

@article{berkman_legislative_2001,  
  title = {Legislative professionalism and the demand for groups: The institutional context of interest population density},  
  volume = {26},  
  issn = {0362-9805},
Do state interest group systems develop independently of the legislatures they lobby? The Energy-Stability-Area model developed by Gray and Lowery (1996) implicitly suggests they do. I argue that legislative professionalism conditions how group systems respond to environmental factors. As legislatures professionalize, their demand for information from lobbyists decreases. Groups are in this and other ways less effective in professional legislatures and more likely to exit a crowded group system. I model interest density with professionalism as a contextual variable. The results have implications for the number and mix of interests, the impact of lobbying regulations, and the consequences of legislative de-institutionalization.

@article{berkman_state_2001,
  doi = {10.2307/440274},
  abstract = {Do state interest group systems develop independently of the legislatures they lobby? The Energy-Stability-Area model developed by Gray and Lowery (1996) implicitly suggests they do. I argue that legislative professionalism conditions how group systems respond to environmental factors. As legislatures professionalize, their demand for information from lobbyists decreases. Groups are in this and other ways less effective in professional legislatures and more likely to exit a crowded group system. I model interest density with professionalism as a contextual variable. The results have implications for the number and mix of interests, the impact of lobbying regulations, and the consequences of legislative de-institutionalization.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Berkman, M. B.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000172040200007},
  pages = {661--679}
}

@article{krehbiel_joseph_2001,
  title = {Joseph {G}. {Cannon}: {Majoritarian} from {Illinois}},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440328},
  abstract = {Congressional scholars regularly identify Speaker Joseph G. Cannon as the personification of centralized authority and partisan strength in the United States Congress. This paper assesses the conventional wisdom on Cannonism by employing the Groseclose-Stewart (1998) method for estimating values of committee seats to study variation in member-specific committee portfolio values. The data are useful both for reassessing the historical thesis of Cannon as tyrant and for testing more recent political science hypotheses about the underpinnings of a strong majority party. The findings fail to corroborate the notions of majority party power and Cannon as tyrant, and, if anything, support a new portrait of Cannon as a majoritarian.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Krehbiel, K. and Wiseman, A.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000170284100001},
  pages = {357--389}
}

@article{mattei_senate_2001,
  title = {Senate apportionment and partisan advantage: {A} second look},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Mattei, R.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000170284100001},
  pages = {357--389}
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440329},
abstract = {In an earlier paper, Lee and Oppenheimer (1997) found that apportionment has generally functioned as a check on majority rule since the institution of direct Senate elections. Also, according to the authors, apportionment has consistently worked to the advantage of Republicans since 1956. Its influence, however, was more pronounced between 1980 and 1986 than in the 6-year electoral cycle ending in 1994. As a result, the authors surmise that the most recent Republican control of the Senate may outlive that of the 1980s. This analysis reconsidered the impact of apportionment on Senate elections. The findings indicate that apportionment's check on majority rule occurred less frequently than originally claimed; that apportionment's pro-Republican bias began at least two decades after its alleged onset in 1956; and that the size of apportionment bias is generally smaller than that estimated by Lee and Oppenheimer. Finally, bias did not vary significantly during the two most recent periods of Republican control of the Senate. Hence, apportionment appears irrelevant to any forecast about the endurance of the current Republican majority.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Mattei, F.},
month = aug,
year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000170284100002},
pages = {391--409}
}

@article{fox_gender_2001,
title = {Gender and the decision to run for office},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440330},
abstract = {Despite an electoral system that appears to present excellent opportunities for women to win elective office, the number of women candidates remains low. While the initial decision to run for office is critical in understanding women's continued under-representation in elective office, very little research explores this subject. To examine the manner in which gender affects the decision to seek an elective position, we investigated how men and women in the "pool of eligible candidates" in New York State perceived running for office. Two central findings emerged from our data. First, contrary to findings in previous research, women and men in our sample expressed roughly equal levels of political ambition and viewed the campaign environment similarly. Our second central finding, however, is that important gender differences emerged in the factors that contributed to the decision to run. In other words, women considered many more factors when thinking about running for office, whereas men of all types felt more freedom to launch a candidacy. These findings tend to reinforce the notion that broad patterns of sex-role socialization
continue to impede women from full inclusion in the electoral process.

@article{schecter_dancing_2001,
  title = {Dancing with the one who brought you: (The) allocation and impact of party giving to state legislators},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440331},
  abstract = {Like their national counterparts, the state parties play an increasingly significant role in the campaigns of their members. Nowhere is that more evident than in the allocation of direct contributions to party candidates. For the parties, the allocation of party support provides opportunities to both win elections and promote subsequent party unity. Yet, as events in Florida in the 1990s indicate, winning elections in these politically tumultuous times may make the link between party money and party unity problematic. In 1996 and 1998, Democratic and Republican officials were able to target party funds to those house races where they were likely to do the most good—in competitive races in which party members faced well-funded opponents. At the same time, the receipt of party money did not translate into party support in the 1997 and 1999 legislative sessions.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Schecter, D. L. and Hedge, D. M.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000170284100004},
  pages = {437--456}
}

@article{jewett_partisan_2001,
  title = {Partisan change in southern legislatures, 1946-95},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440332},
  abstract = {What accounts for partisan change in southern legislatures between 1946 and 1995? I draw my hypotheses from general theories of partisan change and tailor them to the South based on history and previous research to explain the variance in southern Republican legislative strength. I estimate a pooled time series analysis of the eleven former Confederate states to test the path
model. The model uses Democratic elite liberalism as an endogenous variable in order to determine the overall effect of several important independent variables including black population, black political influence, urbanization, white northern migration, and wealth. Determinants of state legislative partisan change include the following: secular forces such as wealth, urbanization, and migration; political forces such as presidential midterm losses, party organizational strength, and political scandal; party issue stances on race and general party ideology; changes in national party preferences that precede change at lower levels; and finally, rules governing the structure of political opportunity such as reapportionment and participation.

@article{ingall_determinants_2001,
  title = {Determinants of home style: {The} many incentives for going home in {Colombia}},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440333},
  abstract = {A legislator's behavior in his or her electoral district, "home style," reveals much about awareness of constituents' wishes and the importance attributed to district matters. Legislators who frequently travel home represent their constituents differently than those who do not. In the Latin American country of Colombia, home style is a contentious issue. The country is plagued by violence and corruption, but the national legislature devotes much of its time to "pork barrel politics." We use data from Colombia, a presidential democracy, to test competing explanations of home style, evaluating several political factors as determinants of variation in legislators' propensity to go home. We find that higher district magnitudes, spatially concentrated vote patterns, failure to solidify electorally dominated bailiwicks, and electoral invulnerability all contribute to a legislator's fixation on district concerns. If needed political reforms are to succeed, reform-minded presidents will need allies in the legislature who are relatively less likely to focus on district matters.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ingall, R. E. and Crisp, B. F.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000170284100006},
  pages = {487--512}
}
@article{anonymous_editors_2001,
title = {Editors' {Introduction}},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Anonymous},
month = may,
year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000168813000001},
pages = {181--184}
}

@article{cox_agenda_2001,
title = {Agenda setting in the {US} {House}: {A} majority-party monopoly?},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440199},
abstract = {How strongly does the majority party control the agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives? In this article, I contrast two spatial models of U.S. House committees—one in which each committee's agenda is set by the full committee, one in which it is set by the committee's majority-party contingent. These two models lead to clearly different predictions about (1) who dissents on final passage votes in committee and (2) who tiles dissents to committee bill reports. Data from the 84th through the 98th Congresses gibe with the partisan model. Majority-party members with a given ideological location dissent substantially less often than do minority-party members with comparable ideological locations. And majority-party dissent rates are extremely low on an absolute scale, with over 50\% of majority-party members never dissenting.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Cox, G. W.},
month = may,
year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000168813000002},
pages = {185--210}
}

@article{abramowitz_its_2001,
title = {It's {Monica}, stupid: {The} impeachment controversy and the 1996 midterm election},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440200},
abstract = {This paper tests three competing explanations for the outcome of the 1998 midterm election: a normal politics explanation, a
peace-and-prosperity explanation, and a scandal backlash explanation. After examining the evidence from the 1998 National Election Study, I conclude that the most important reason for the Republican party's poor showing in the 1998 midterm election was a voter backlash against Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr and congressional Republicans over their handling of the presidential sex scandal and impeachment inquiry. I then address the question of why congressional Republicans acted as they did, and I examine what implications these findings may have for the ability of the GOP to maintain control of Congress in future elections.

@article{arnold_distribution_2001,
  title = {The distribution of senate committee positions: {Change} or more of the same?},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440201},
  abstract = {Recent work on the United States Senate has focused on its transformation from a clublike dominance of a few members to one in which individual senators play significant roles in the policymaking process regardless of seniority (Ripley 1969; Sinclair 1989a). Some argue that part of this transformation was the democratization of committee assignments (Sinclair 1988). I examine the degree to which the Senate has democratized its committee assignments and test possible explanations for this democratization process. I argue that changes in committee assignment practices that gave junior members improved assignments were the result of institutional reform rather than membership changes or changes in the Washington environment alone.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Arnold, L. W.},
  month = may,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000168813000004},
  pages = {227--248}
}

@article{gilmour_powell_2001,
  title = {The {Powell} amendment voting cycle: {An} obituary},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440202},
The adoption of the Powell amendment on a bill to provide federal aid to education in 1956 is the most widely cited instance of a voting cycle in the U.S. House of Representatives. This article shows, however, that it was not a voting cycle and that the adoption of the Powell amendment was not responsible for the bill's defeat. Using evidence of members' preferences derived from their votes on similar measures the next year, I show that the status quo of not passing a bill would have defeated both the original bill and the amended bill.

I offer empirical evidence on the validity and reliability of measures of legislator ideology derived from three different methods: survey research, content analysis of news stories about the legislators from their initial election campaigns, and inferring individual legislators' ideologies from that of a relevant co-partisan elite. The analysis is replicated for independent samples of U.S. Senators and House members, and indicates that all three methods produce ideology measures of high validity and reliability.

According to Glazer and Robbins (1985), House members were responsive to redistricting induced changes in the partisan composition of their districts in the 1970s and 1980s. In this paper, I extend the Glazer and Robbins model to the 1990s. It is possible that the high turnover rates observed in the House in the 1990s
reflect constituency dissatisfaction with House members' ability or willingness to modify their roll-call vote behavior after redistricting. Using House members' NOMINATE scores as the dependent variable, I examine the effect of changes in the Democratic composition of House districts, on roll-call conservatism. The findings reveal that when the Democratic composition of a district decreases due to redistricting, the roll-call vote behavior of the House member becomes more conservative. Although there is much speculation as to what caused the high levels of turnover in the 1990s, a lack of responsiveness on the part of incumbent House members is not the answer. Furthermore, in contrast to the Glazer and Robbins study, I find that senior members seem to be less responsive than their junior counterparts, a finding that suggests a generational effect may be taking place.,
This study examines the power of state House Speakers to test the theory that legislative leaders act as agents of their followers. To accomplish this task, I created an index of the Speakers' institutional powers for all forty-nine state lower houses. I then examined how these powers are affected by the competitiveness of the state's electoral system, the professional character of the state's legislature, and the career opportunities offered to legislators. The data analysis indicates that the distribution of power is shaped predominantly by the strength of electoral competition and the career opportunity structure. The paper explains why these findings are consistent with principal-agent theory.

This paper updates the findings in Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting and compares them to findings for both European legislatures and the United Nations General Assembly. Congress argues that important episodes in American political and economic history can be better understood by supplementing or reinterpreting more traditional analyses with the basic space theory of ideology. In Congress, we measured ideology with D-NOMINATE scores. Here we summarize new estimations that are complete
through the 105th Congress. We find that the trend to polarization and unidimensionality identified in Congress has continued unabated. The shift to Republican control after the 1994 elections is part of this trend and does not represent a sharp break in roll-call-voting behavior. Comparison of NOMINATE results for the United States to those for other legislatures both further indicates the ideological character of roll-call voting in Congress and suggests that low-dimensional spatial models apply as well to multiparty systems as to two-party systems.

@article{bullock_when_2001,
  title = {When experience fails: The experience factor in congressional runoffs},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {Ambition theory identifies political experience as a major correlate of holding higher office. We explore the possibility that under certain conditions, political experience may do little to promote election. Specifically, in runoff primaries experience may not promote a candidate's prospects for nomination. When an experienced candidate, such as a former state legislator, fails to win a majority in the initial primary, it may indicate that any advantages derived from experience have been discounted by the electorate. The relationship between experience and runoff election success is explored using 87 U.S. House elections from 1982 through 1994. The evidence shows that in runoffs experienced candidates who led their primaries have no advantage, while the greater the experience of the primary runner-up, the more likely it is that the front-runner will be nominated.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bullock, C. S. and Gaddie, R. K. and Ferrington, A.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000166828300003},
  pages = {31--43}
}

@article{bailey_quiet_2001,
  title = {Quiet influence: The representation of diffuse interests on trade policy, 1983-94},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bailey, M. C.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000166828300004},
  pages = {5--29}
A core tenet of many approaches to American trade politics is that diffuse interests exert little or no influence on the process. This paper argues, however, that there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that diffuse interests can and do influence congressional trade politics. Members of Congress respond to these interests in order to preempt their mobilization by political rivals, interest groups, the president, and the media. This mechanism does not preclude interest group influence but rather points our attention to an additional influence on congressional trade voting. Evidence for this view comes from statistical analyses of ten years of House and Senate trade voting in the eighties and nineties. The results indicate that skilled labor—an interest that receives diffuse benefits from trade but lacks direct organization—has been a statistically significant, consistent, and substantial influence on congressional trade voting.

Although much of the literature examining congressional behavior presumes that representatives can influence how their constituents view them, there is little evidence supporting this belief. Focusing on members' attempts to convey their positions on two high-profile votes—the 1991 Persian Gulf War Use of Force Resolution and the 1993 Budget-Reconciliation Conference Report—I show that these efforts can indeed be successful. Members' messages to constituents are proxied by the content of official newsletters. Employing National Election Study survey data, I demonstrate that respondents whose representatives put forth the effort to publicize these votes were significantly better able to state correctly their representatives' positions on these issues.
@article{morris_reexamining_2001,
  title = {Reexamining the politics of talk: (Partisan) rhetoric in the 104th house},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440405},
  abstract = {Drawing off the work of Maltzman and Sigelman (1996), this paper looks at the propensity of members to speak on the House floor during one minute speeches in the 104th Congress. I used a negative binomial event count model to predict not only who will participate in "one minutes" in general, but also who will engage in partisan rhetoric, which was such an important aspect of the volatile 104th Congress. The model finds that, while general participation can be predicted, we can also use a number of explanatory variables, such as tenure, electoral insecurity, ideological intensity, party rank, constituency time zone, and party identification to understand why some members engage in partisan rhetoric during one minutes and why others do not. The findings have implications both for understanding partisan behavior in the 104th Congress and for understanding and predicting one minute speaking practices in the future.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Morris, J. S.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000166828300006},
  pages = {101--121}
}

@article{bernick_anchor_2001,
  title = {Anchoring legislative careers},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440406},
  abstract = {A general theory developed in industrial psychology, career anchor theory, can be used to aid in understanding legislators' orientations toward their careers. To determine if legislative anchors exist, I used data from a survey conducted in 1995 of North Carolina legislators. I employed factor analysis of thirteen closed-ended items previously associated with career anchors and the results showed that three legislative anchors do exist: power, service, and specialization. I then assigned factor scores to legislators. A cluster analysis uncovered five groups of legislators, each with a different pattern of association toward the three anchors. Legislative career orientation was associated with attainment of a leadership position, political ambition, and acceptance of legislative norms.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bernick, E. L.},
  month = feb,
This article gives a comprehensive account of the rules and practices of agenda setting that were typically in force in the lower or single Houses of Western European (national) parliaments during the 1980s. From this account, comparative indices for control of both the budgetary agenda and the lawmaking agenda are developed. These indices are then used to check the empirical validity of hypotheses that expect, as legislative outcomes from agenda control, a reduction of budget deficits and legislative inflation. Finally, possible trade-offs between parliamentary agenda control and control by other decision-making structures outside parliament are explored.
title = {The electoral basis of partisan polarization in congress.},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Jacobson, G. C.},
month = feb,
year = {2001},
ote = {WOS:000166828300015},
pages = {169--169}
}

@article{larson_redistricting_2001,
title = {The redistricting cycle and strategic candidate decisions in {US} house races.},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Larson, B. A. and Geobetti, S. and Hetherington, M. J.},
month = feb,
year = {2001},
ote = {WOS:000166828300016},
pages = {169--170}
}

@article{herrick_publics_2001,
title = {The public's need for ethical lawmakers: {An} examination of the linkage between political scandals and public support for {Congress}.},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Herrick, R. L. and Moore, M. K.},
month = feb,
year = {2001},
ote = {WOS:000166828300018},
pages = {170--171}
}

@article{maestas_when_2001,
title = {When to risk it? {State} legislators and the decision to run for the {US} {House}.},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Maestas, C. D. and Maisel, L. S. and Stone, W. J.},
@article{morris_conventional_2001,
title = {Conventional politics in exceptional times: {House} votes, money, and the {Clinton} impeachment.},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Morris, I. L.},
month = feb,
year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000166828300017},
pages = {170--170}
}

@article{sellers_context_2001,
title = {Context, interest, and effort: {US} senators' media activities, 1979-1997},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Sellers, P. J. and Schaffner, B. F.},
month = feb,
year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000166828300020},
pages = {171--171}
}

@article{evans_message_2001,
title = {Message politics: {Party} campaigning and legislative strategy in congress.},
volume = {26},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Evans, C. L.},
month = feb,
year = {2001},
note = {WOS:000166828300022},
pages = {172--172}
}

@article{harvey_partisanship_2001,
title = {Partisanship in the congressional electorate, 1880-1940.},
@article{theriault_impact_2001,
  title = {The impact of national media coverage and ideological extremity upon \{U\}.\{S\} senate campaign contributions.},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Theriault, S. M. and Brady, D. W.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000166828300021},
  pages = {172--172}
}

@article{jenkins_sophisticated_2001,
  title = {Sophisticated behavior and speakership elections: \{The\} elections of 1849 and 1855-56.},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Jenkins, J. A. and Stewart, C.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000166828300024},
  pages = {173--173}
}

@article{lawrence_party_2001,
  title = {Party effects in the senate.},
  volume = {26},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Lawrence, E. D. and Maltzman, F. A. and Smith, S. S.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2001},
  note = {WOS:000166828300025},
  pages = {173--174}
}
Omnibus legislating—the practice of combining numerous measures from disparate policy areas in one massive bill—has become a standard part of the legislative landscape in Washington and alters lawmaking in important ways; yet we know little about it. In this paper, I consider whether or not the omnibus method positively affects legislative productivity, as is suggested by many observers in Washington and academia. To test this hypothesis, I estimate two different models of legislative production. I find omnibus usage to be a positive and significant independent influence on legislative productivity in both models.

Most accounts portray the 1890-1910 period of...
congressional history as an exemplary instance of highly centralized party government. However, we contend that this interpretation obscures other important forces driving institutional development during this time. In 1899, the Senate approved a rule change dispersing jurisdiction over appropriations bills. This change added a significant centrifugal element to the Senate committee system. Taking advantage of new evidence, in particular a petition circulated by supporters of the reform, we assess competing explanations for the appropriations decentralization. We find that junior senators' demands for increased access to power played an important role in this change. By contrast, partisan considerations played an insignificant role. The 1899 reform indicates the relevance of a causal variable that scholars have typically ignored: "intergenerational warfare" among members of Congress who differ in seniority level. Sectional differences were another key motivation for decentralization. This change, therefore, not only forces a reevaluation of the depiction of the turn-of-the-century Senate as a highly centralized institution, but also suggests the multiple kinds of coalitions that drive congressional development.

@article{cohen_state-level_2000,
    title = {State-level presidential approval and senatorial support},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440435},
    abstract = {The effect of public presidential approval on congressional support for the president has been the subject of considerable debate and controversy. Systematic, quantitative studies have been unable to demonstrate convincingly that public approval leads to greater legislative support for the president. The lack of constituency-level public approval data has hindered resolution of the controversy. Studies have relied upon either election results or national-level approval data as substitutes, but both alternatives are problematic as measures of public approval at the constituency level. In this paper, we use new data gathered from 50 state surveys in September 1996 that asked respondents, among other things, to rate the job performance of the president. We test whether or not public approval in the states affects senators' support for the president and also look at some hypotheses: whether or not minority party status, running for reelection, electoral vulnerability, and presidential coattails interact with constituents' approval of the president to affect senators' roll-call support for the president. With controls
for partisanship and ideology of the senator and the state, analysis indicates no support for the hypothesis that public approval of the president leads to greater presidential support among senators.},

@article{bardwell_puzzling_2000,
  title = {The puzzling decline in house support for free trade: Was fast track a referendum on NAFTA?},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440436},
  abstract = {In 1993, both houses of Congress passed and President Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Just four years later, fast-track legislation stalled short of a vote in the House of Representatives, despite the endorsement of the president and majority-party leaders. Using interest group "head counts" in lieu of roll-call data, I test the theory that fast track was a referendum on the district-level economic impact of NAFTA. The findings show that economic and political aftershocks from NAFTA, including trade-related job losses in many members' districts, helped to undermine House support for fast track in 1997.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bardwell, K.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000165163900005},
  pages = {591--610}
}

@article{calabrese_multimember_2000,
  title = {Multimember district congressional elections},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440437},
  abstract = {In the Apportionment Act of 1842, the House of Representatives mandated single-member districts (SMDs) for elections of its members. Before this act, many states had multimember districts (MMDs), and even after this act, Congress permitted some exceptions up until 1967. This paper addresses several questions related to the election of representatives in MMD elections. Herein, I develop a model of MMD elections that predicts that one party will sweep all the seats in this type of election. I then perform empirical analyses to
examine and validate the four key assumptions of the model. My prediction that one party will sweep all the seats in an MMD election is verified by examining the actual results of all MMD House races in history. In this paper, I also show that, in general, the diversity of a state's House delegation increases when the state shifts from general-ticket to single-member districts, but diversity decreases when the state moves in the opposite direction.}

@article{powell_impact_2000,
  title = {The impact of term limits on the candidacy decisions of state legislators in {US} {House} elections},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440438},
  abstract = {This study investigates the hypothesis that term limits at the state level increase electoral competition for seats in the U.S. House. With a greater number of ambitious state legislators being unwillingly turned out of office, we can expect that those individuals interested in legislative careers will increasingly turn their attention to Congress. In order to assess whether or not state legislators are more likely to run for Congress in states with legislative term limits, I specified and tested logistic regression models. The models were derived from our prior knowledge of the behavior of strategic politicians and included control variables for theoretically important national-and district-level factors. The results presented in this study provide support for the hypothesis that state legislators are more likely to run for the House in states with legislative term limits.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Powell, R. J.},
  month = nov,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000165163900007},
  pages = {645--661}
}

@article{maestas_professional_2000,
  title = {Professional legislatures and ambitious politicians: {Policy} responsiveness of state institutions},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440439},
abstract = {This paper examines the relationship between professionalism, progressive ambition, and legislative responsiveness in state legislatures. I argue that professional legislatures that foster and support progressive ambition will be more responsive to aggregate constituency concerns than will less professional legislatures. Institutions that attract progressively ambitious members create a natural incentive for representation because legislators are motivated to identify and respond to the interests of broad-based constituencies in preparation to pursue higher office. Consistent with this argument, I find that states with more professional legislatures and more opportunities for members to progress to higher office have greater aggregate opinion-policy congruence, even after controlling for the effects of electoral competition and alternative policy influences.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Maestas, C.},
month = nov,
year = {2000},
note = {WOS:000165163900008},
pages = {663--690}
}

@article{loewenberg_untitled_2000,
title = {Untitled - Editors' Introduction},
volume = {25},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Loewenberg, G. and Smith, S. S. and Hamm, K.},
month = aug,
year = {2000},
note = {WOS:00008828282900001},
pages = {361--364}
}

@article{born_congressional_2000,
title = {Congressional incumbency and the rise of split-ticket voting},
volume = {25},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440412},
abstract = {Despite the general recognition that incumbency has influenced voters' decisions to split their ballots for president and the House, past research has not focused on the specific magnitude of this effect and its responsibility for growing ticket-splitting in the United States. In this study, I find that incumbency was a powerful determinant of the step jump in ticket-splitting that occurred from the 1956-68 to 1972-92 periods. This is in contrast to the weak expansive force exerted by declining partisan intensity in the electorate. Incumbency's impact, however, was confined to districts
where members of the losing presidential party run for reelection; in
districts with campaigning incumbents of the winning presidential
party, it made for only about the level of ticket-splitting that could
be expected in open seats.},

@article{bishin_constituency_2000,
  title = {Constituency influence in congress: {Does}
subconstituency matter?},
  volume = {25},
  ISSN = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440413},
  abstract = {Conflicting findings in the congressional roll-call
voting literature have been attributed, in part, to scholars' failure
to identify appropriately the subconstituencies to whom legislators
appeal when making decisions (Jackson and Kingdon 1992). This paper
develops and examines a new model of legislator behavior that accounts
for the prospective constituency—the subset of the legal constituency
to whom legislators are likely to appeal in the next election. The
prospective constituency is based on the idea that legislators
consider the views not only of past supporters but also of swing
voters and moderate opposing partisans as well. Results from this
model are compared to results generated by a traditional model—one
that does not account for subconstituency. Models incorporating the
prospective constituency find constituency to influence senators' roll-call decisions, and they offer an explanation for the conflicting
results of past studies.},

@article{nokken_dynamics_2000,
  title = {Dynamics of congressional loyalty: {Party}
defection and roll-call behavior, 1947-97},
  volume = {25},
  ISSN = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440414},
  abstract = {I seek to determine whether or not political parties
have significant independent effects upon the roll-call behavior of
their members. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I analyze the roll-call behavior of those members of the House and Senate from 1947 to 1997 who changed party affiliation while in office. Using data from the 80th to 105th Congresses, I find that Democrats who become Republicans, for instance, start to vote like Republicans at the time they "cross aisles." This finding is consistent with the claims made in a growing literature that emphasizes the partisan aspects of congressional organization, and it supports the contention that party plays a direct role in determining members' roll-call behavior.

@article{wilson_concordance_2000,
  title = {Concordance and projection in citizen perceptions of congressional roll-call voting},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440415},
  abstract = {Research on political cognition suggests that individuals absorb and retain more information consistent with their political predispositions than they do information at odds with those predispositions. When citizens view a member of Congress favorably, they should thus be more likely to recall that member's vote on a bill if it is in agreement with their own positions; additionally, if they do not recall, they will tend to assume that the member voted in accordance with their own preferences. When citizens view a representative negatively, the opposite patterns should obtain. Here, we find considerable evidence for both of these effects—concordance and projection. Attitude toward the representative and agreement on the issue substantially drive citizen perceptions of congressional roll-call voting.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wilson, J. M. and Gronke, P.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000088282900005},
  pages = {445--467}
}

@article{wright_caucus_2000,
  title = {The \{Caucus\} reelection requirement and the transformation of house committee chairs, 1959-94},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Nokken, T. P.},
  month = aug,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000088282900004},
  pages = {417--444}
}
Standing committee chairs in the House, as a group, are now dramatically more supportive of their party, its leaders, and their agenda than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. I present original data analysis that tests the two dominant explanations for this transformation—first, that it was the direct result of the Caucus reelection requirement for committee chairs and the dramatic removal of three incumbents under this new rule in 1975, and second, that it was simply an artifact of the general increases in partisanship across this same period. The results show that the critical transformation occurred immediately after the new rule was first used in 1975 but well in advance of the resurgent aggregate-level partisanship of the 1980s. This change is statistically significant, even after controlling for general levels of partisanship and other factors commonly expected to have affected the voting behavior of committee chairs between 1959 and 1994.

Ambition and competition: Explaining legislative turnover in Brazil

Despite Brazil's electoral laws, which would appear to encourage incumbency, legislative turnover in Brazil consistently exceeds 50% with each election. In this article, I explain this phenomenon as a function of two factors: the nature of political ambition and the dynamics of electoral competition. Political ambition accounts for about half of the turnover because a sizeable portion of incumbent legislators decides to run for nonlegislative office. Electoral competition accounts for the other half. Since many potentially strong candidates for reelection decide to run for another office the group of incumbents running for reelection is relatively weak. In addition, a wide-open nomination process ensures that incumbents running for reelection face a pool of extremely strong challengers. Finally, Brazil's at-large, open-list proportional representation electoral system undermines incumbents' attempts to protect their status. Given these factors, many incumbents lose. I provide evidence for the impact of ambition and competition on legislative turnover in Brazil, place Brazil in comparative perspective, and suggest avenues for further research.
This study examines the hypothesis that voters seek political moderation by balancing one party with the other. Washington State's weak parties and its bicameral, multimember legislative districts are especially conducive to examining this idea. Therefore, I analyze state legislative election outcomes in Washington State from 1948 to 1996. While divided legislative districts are more ideologically moderate, the variety of patterns by which districts are divided, the frequency with which the same district is both divided and unified, and the frequency of unique patterns of division and unification make it very difficult to infer that district voters are consistently and systematically balancing parties in search of moderation. Divided outcomes are also associated with several measures of mobilization, suggesting that such outcomes are instead by-products of district circumstances, a conclusion also reached by research using individual-level data.
In this essay, I consider how a legislature's rules of procedure can affect both the process and the outcome of legislation. I begin by asking whether or not rules of procedure should have any effects at all, given that they can often be changed by simple majorities of legislators. The second part of the essay classifies the effects that rules have. Rules can change the set of bins that plenary sessions of the legislature consider; they can change the menu of amendments to any given bill considered in the plenary; they can affect how members vote; and—putting the first three effects together—they can affect which bills pass. I review evidence that rules do in fact have the suspected effects.
The generally accepted explanation for the congressional reforms of the 1970s is that Northern Democrats sought greater control over the legislative process in order to enact a liberal policy agenda. Party leaders, according to this explanation, then acted forcefully and cohesively to satisfy these ideological policy demands. I argue instead that congressional reforms were motivated by the need for House Democrats to raise money for reelection, and that the subsequent policies enacted by party leaders were designed to satisfy important interest group constituencies that supply campaign money. The former argument suggests that interest groups reconcile their policy demands to the ideological policy objectives of the party. My explanation suggests that political parties adjust their policy agendas to satisfy interest group constituencies.

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Measuring the ideologies of US senators: The song remains the same

This research note discusses and compares nine measures of senator ideology. It is motivated by the newest measure of legislator ideology offered by Hill, Hanna, and Shafqat (1997), which seeks to improve on existing measures, particularly those based on roll-call votes. We gather and compare nine different ideological measures from a wide variety of sources. After evaluating them theoretically and empirically, we conclude that existing indicators operationalize ideology as least as well as the newer alternatives.

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Reexamining the filibuster and proposal powers in the Senate

This article reexamines the filibuster and proposal powers in the Senate, focusing on the procedural mechanisms that allow senators to block or delay legislation.
Conventional wisdom views the Senate filibuster as a protection of minority rights. In this paper we challenge this intuition by showing that this common belief always holds true only for specific assumptions about Senate procedures. We show that under an open rule, while the filibuster option may advantage the minority, it is also true that the filibuster option may benefit the proposer at the expense of the minority. Whether the filibuster under an open rule advantages or disadvantages the minority, the majority, or the proposer, is a function of the proposer's preferred policy, the status quo, and the costs faced by potential filibusterers. The use of the filibuster in today's Senate serves the interests of the minority at the expense of the majority. Far from preserving the Senate's role as a deliberative assembly, the filibuster today encourages rampant individualism and obstructionism, endless delays and unfocused discussion, hardly conducive to the thoughtful consideration of measures to solve vexing problems of public policy.

This paper contributes to the literature on divided government and legislative productivity. We begin by reexamining Mayhew's data on landmark enactments. We show that Mayhew's claim that divided government does not affect legislative productivity is a consequence of aggregating time series that exhibit different behavior. We then extend Mayhew's analysis by broadening the concept of significance and creating a new four-category measure that encompasses all 17,663 public laws enacted in the period of 1945-94. Using appropriate time-series techniques, we demonstrate that periods of divided government depress the production of landmark legislation by about 30\% at least when productivity is measured on the basis of contemporaneous perceptions of legislative significance. Divided government, however, has no substantitive effect on the production of important, albeit not landmark, legislation and actually has a positive effect on the passage of trivial laws.
We argue that the competitiveness of House candidates is in part a function of the district in which they run and its geographic relationship to media markets. When the television market is well matched to the district, incumbents enjoy less of an advantage over challengers in making contact with the voters. In contrast, when the size of the television market is fragmented across more than one market, incumbents enjoy a bigger edge over challengers in getting out their name and message. This in turn affects the likelihood of a challenger defeating an incumbent. We find support for the idea that challengers who run in districts that are better matched with television media markets are more competitive than are challengers running in fragmented districts. But we find, too, that incumbents also benefit from representing districts with congruent media markets, which mitigates some of the benefits gained by challengers.

State legislatures in the United States have changed in many ways since the drive for reform began in the 1960s. Using a modification of Squire's legislative professional index, this analysis demonstrates that a higher degree of professionalism is a general, but not a universal, trait of state legislatures. Disparities among state legislatures have increased, with some being no more professional today than they were 30 years ago. On the other hand, states that have removed legal restrictions on legislative sessions, whose populations have grown larger, and whose neighbors have more institutionally
advanced assemblies have developed more professional legislatures.

@article{loewenberg_editors_2000-1,
    title = {Editors' introduction},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Loewenberg, G. and Smith, S. S. and Hamm, K.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2000},
    note = {WOS:000085207400001},
    pages = {1--2}
}

@article{rasch_parliamentary_2000,
    title = {Parliamentary floor voting procedures and agenda setting
            in {Europe}},
    volume = {25},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440391},
    abstract = {Which voting methods do European parliaments use when
            they make choices between multiple, mutually exclusive alternatives?
            To what extent are legislative outcomes affected by differences in
            floor voting procedures at the final stage of legislative processes?
            In the first part of the analysis, I describe the parliamentary voting
            procedures applied in Western and East-Central Europe. It turns out
            that only two approaches occur: the amendment (elimination) procedure,
            and the successive procedure. In the second part of the paper, I
            outline and discuss: some normative properties and political
            consequences of the two parliamentary voting procedures, focusing in
            particular, on principles of agenda formation.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Rasch, B. E.},
    month = feb,
    year = {2000},
    note = {WOS:000085207400002},
    pages = {3--23}
}

@article{huber_costs_2000,
    title = {The costs of control: {Legislators}, agencies, and
Political scientists have long studied the relationship between legislatures and agencies—in particular, between Congress and the bureaucracy in the United States. In the past two decades, however, there has been a renewed interest in this topic along with a variety of new theoretical contributions and insights. We review these relatively recent contributions and examine how transaction cost and principal-agent approaches have provided many of them with a theoretical underpinning. Specifically, we examine a series of basic concepts from these literatures and discuss how these concepts can be used both to provide theoretical advances and to suggest empirical tests about the relationship between legislatures and agencies.

We argue that the partisan voting patterns of new members of the House of Representatives are affected by national political conditions. New members of a party advantaged by national forces should exhibit distinctively partisan voting patterns, while new members of the disadvantaged party should not. We use a comparative statics research design to examine eight congresses with large numbers of new members that were also characterized by different national forces. Multivariate OLS models of party support are used to isolate the effects of first-term status while controlling for other factors that might influence a member's willingness to support his or her party. We find that national forces have the expected general effect on the partisan support of new members of the advantaged party, and that the size of that effect varies with the particular character of the national forces.
Since party is so highly correlated with ideology, party-line voting in the U.S. House may indicate members voting their own preferences. If, however, the reputation of a member's party is valuable as a cue for voters and other party supporters, then legislators should be willing to vote against their own preferences and for those of their party, at least sometimes. To investigate whether and how often this does occur, we use roll-call data from the House from the 1950s to 1990s to perform cross-sectional and other tests that isolate the effects of parties, including analyses of members who switch parties. Our regression results indicate that party influence on voting has varied, but that there is an effect, even when controlling for ideology.

This study explores the Republican Party's origins at the institutional level, specifically in the 34th House of Representatives. We focus on an especially critical event, the House speakership election of 1855-56, which resulted in the first major victory for the new party. We conduct our analysis by applying the spatial theory of voting to the House balloting for Speaker, using a scaling technique developed by Poole (1998). Results from our spatial model suggest that slavery was the overriding determinant of vote choice throughout the two-month speakership battle. Its effects were considerable from the outset, even in multiple candidate rounds, and proved to be more influential as the balloting progressed. We also find that the issue of nativism, which was so important in the previous congressional elections and would continue to affect the Republicans' electoral fortunes for several more years, had no impact on members' votes for speaker. Once elected, the new Republican
speaker, Nathaniel Banks, organized the House around anti-slavery
tenets, stacking both committees and chairs with anti-slavery
advocates. Overall, these results suggest that while the Republicans
would struggle for an electoral identity deep into the 1850s—balancing
the competing interests of slavery and nativism to win office—they
emerged as a single-issue, anti-slavery coalition at the institutional
level as early as 1855.

@article{squire_uncontested_2000,
  title = {Uncontested seats in state legislative elections},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440396},
  abstract = {Uncontested seats are far more common in U.S. state
legislative elections than in U.S. House elections. But the incidence
of uncontested seats varies across the states. In this paper, I
attempt to explain that variance. Using pooled data on state
legislative elections from 1992 to 1996, I test relationships
suggested by the literature on uncontested seats in U.S. House
elections. In addition, I also look at important differences among the
state legislatures, such as level of professionalization, the
competitiveness of the state's electoral system, the use of
multimember districts, and the institution of term limits. I find that
the value of a seat, measured either by professionalization level or
member pay, and the competitiveness of the state's electoral system
are powerful variables in explaining the incidence of uncontested
seats across the states. Region also is important, with state
legislatures in the South suffering a higher percentage of uncontested
seats than state legislatures in the North.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000085207400007},
  pages = {131--146}
}

@article{abramowitz_its_2000,
  title = {It's {Monica} stupid: {Voting} behavior in the 1998
midterm election.},
  volume = {25},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Jenkins, J. A. and Nokken, T. P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {2000},
  note = {WOS:000085207400006},
  pages = {101--130}
}
The institutional context of member behavior: (Measuring) systematic differences between committees and the floor,

Carson, J. L. and Finocchiaro, C. J. and Rohde, D. W.,

The evolution of committee structure, powers, and procedures in twentieth century state legislatures,

Hamm, K. E. and Hedlund, R. D. and Martorano, N.,

Partisan policymaking in the United States house of representatives, 1929-1998,

Canon, D. T. and Price, K. S.,

Agenda-setting in the US house. (A) majority-party-monopoly?

Cox, }
In this paper we reexamine the rise of careerism in the United States House of Representatives. Following the insights of Gilmour and Rothstein (1993) and Kiewiet and Zeng (1993), we model careerism as a combination of the desire of incumbents to serve in the House for long periods and the ability to be reelected. The focus in this paper is on the probability that incumbents seek reelection, and conditional on their decision to seek reelection, the probability they will be elected. The results of our analysis show that different factors influence electoral safety and the desire to continue holding office. Namely, institutional innovations such as the Australian ballot and primaries slightly decreased the probability of seeking reelection. In addition, bringing pork home and a strong partisan advantage in the district increased the probability of renomination. In regard to seat safety, incumbent party advantage, especially post-1896, increased the probability of winning reelection, as did economic prosperity.

The investment theory of campaign finance posits that political action committees invest campaign funds in members who provide services at a low cost. We build on and directly test this theory, hypothesizing that PACs give to members who are effective legislators. Using data collected from the 103d and 104th Congresses and a direct measure of effectiveness, we find that contributions flow to members who are successful in getting a large percentage of their sponsored bills enacted into law. Being an effective legislator is one way a member can purchase time for his or her Washington work.
@article{herron_artificial_1999,
    title = {Artificial extremism in interest group ratings and the preferences versus party debate},
    volume = {24},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440260},
    abstract = {Congressional voting studies often use interest group ratings as proxies for legislator policy preferences. This paper investigates the extent to which artificial extremism in interest group ratings affects the ability of such studies to estimate accurately the impact of legislator preferences and party membership on roll-call votes. Using a sequence of Monte Carlo experiments, I find that artificial extremism does not have serious implications for understanding whether policy preferences impact legislator voting behavior. However, in many cases artificial extremism can cause analyses of roll-call votes to draw improper conclusions regarding the direction and magnitude of the impact of party membership on roll-call voting decisions.},
    number = {4},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Herron, M. C.},
    month = nov,
    year = {1999},
    note = {WOS:000083472600004},
    pages = {525--542}
}

@article{wilson_transitional_1999,
    title = {Transitional governance in the United States: Lessons from the First Federal Congress},
    volume = {24},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440261},
    abstract = {This paper details the transition from a confederated to a federal legislative system in the United States. Covering the period 1782 through 1792, I examine how political elites fundamentally reshaped their legislative institutions. This period in American history was extremely important. The newly created nation faced enormous problems reconstituting itself from a loose aggregation of independent and sovereign states into a unified nation. Almost every commentator from the period noted the fragile nature of newfound democratic rights and the importance of this national experiment. The concluding sections of the paper draw lessons from this period of American transition to contemporary legislatures in democratizing systems. While few of these lessons directly apply to current transitional systems, they shed light on the kinds of issues that scholars should raise while studying democratizing systems.},
    number = {4},
The recent wave of democratization worldwide has focused attention on the evolution of legislatures in new democracies. In regimes where potent executives—either presidential, parliamentary, or hybrid—exist alongside new legislatures, it is necessary to distinguish the idea of legislative autonomy from that of effectiveness. We emphasize the centrality of the second concept to understanding representative institutions in recent transitions. We provide case studies of the lower legislative chambers in Poland and the Czech Republic during the past decade, describing the evolution of the party and committee systems, the structure of legislative leadership, and its relationship to the executive. Finally, we examine the role of the legislature in drafting and overseeing the execution of policy, paying particular attention to budget bills as bellwethers of legislative autonomy and the cohesiveness of parties and coalitions. We conclude that both the Polish Sejm and the Czech Parliament have developed much of the internal institutional framework to support legislative autonomy, and that in the Czech case in particular, recent experiences with minority government are contributing to this trend.

In this essay, I review and critique the scholarly literature about rules and other structural arrangements in Congress. My focus is on empirical research that has been informed by rational
choice theory. I emphasize three categories of rules-committee jurisdictions, leadership prerogatives, and floor procedure. An implication is that the forces shaping procedural politics vary depending on the aspect of congressional structure under consideration. Structural features within Congress also reflect different levels of institutionalization; procedures often begin as informal practice, gradually become precedent, and eventually are codified as formal rules. Finally, many important aspects of structural development in Congress exhibit significant path dependencies.

@article{squire_editors_1999,
    title = {Editors' Introduction},
    volume = {24},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Squire, P. and Loewenberg, G. and Collie, M. P.},
    month = aug,
    year = {1999},
    note = {WOS:000081713900001},
    pages = {329--330}
}

@article{canon_electoral_1999,
    title = {Electoral systems and the representation of minority interests in legislatures},
    volume = {24},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440349},
    abstract = {The rules and institutions used to translate preferences into electoral outcomes have a profound impact on the nature of representation provided in a political system. This is especially true when it comes to representing divergent racial and ethnic group interests. This essay examines the range of alternatives that nations have used to address this fundamental problem, with a focus on the representation of minority interests within U.S. legislatures. After a brief review of related issues, I examine the following questions: how should representation be provided to minorities within a majority rule system (the normative literature); how can representation be provided (the legal literature); and, how are minority interests represented (the partisan implications of racial redistricting and the broader empirical literature on
In this essay, I consider how electoral laws affect parties' mobilizational incentives and, hence, turnout. The strategy is to look systematically at how differing electoral rules affect the translations from effort-to-votes, votes-to-seats, and seats-to-portfolios, and hence, parties' incentives to mobilize. Considering each of these steps in turn leads us to many of the most important extant claims about how electoral institutions affect turnout. Such an approach also underscores that, even by a purely instrumental calculus, both social structure and political context are directly relevant to explaining mobilization (hence, turnout).

Newt Gingrich's phenomenal successes in the 104th Congress led many political scientists to question the discipline's prevalent conception of congressional leadership. Most see congressional leaders as agents who must satisfy members' expectations to get reelected. Those expectations arise from members' goals and from the political and institutional context in which they attempt to advance them. The change in the political context between the 104th and 105th Congresses provides something of a natural experiment. A comparison of party leadership in the 104th with leadership before the 104th as well as in the 105th allows us to assess the adequacy of principal-agent theory for making sense of a complicated, even
exceptional, case. I assess continuity and change in the rate and type of House majority party leadership activity and in leadership strategies. Compared with the Democratic leaderships of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Gingrich's leadership in the 104th Congress shows considerable continuity but also some distinctive features. The considerable changes in Republican leadership from the 104th to the 105th can be explained by changes in context that altered members' expectations.

@article{bianco_party_1999,
  title = {Party campaign committees and the distribution of tally program funds},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440352},
  abstract = {This paper uses data supplied by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee to examine the relationship between candidate tallying and party allocations in the 1992 and 1994 elections and, in doing so, to provide a new test of hypotheses concerning the role and powers of the party-in-government in the postwar Congress. The focus is on two hypotheses: a recycling hypothesis (allocations were driven by candidate tallies), and an electioneering hypothesis (allocations were driven by the goal of winning elections). Analysis of the data provides no support for the recycling hypothesis. Rather, consistent with the electioneering hypotheses, DSCC allocations are strongly influenced by political variables, such as the closeness of a race, a candidate's success at fundraising, state population, and the cost of campaigning. These findings confirm a strong redistributive role for the contemporary party-in-government in the electoral process.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bianco, W. T.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000081713900005},
  pages = {451--469}
}

@article{squire_editors_1999-1,
  title = {Editors' introduction},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Sinclair, B.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000081713900004},
  pages = {421--449}
}
Legislative careers: Why and how we should study them,

Legislative careers can provide extremely useful information on political institutions, but only if used wisely. For example, we cannot assume that the amount of membership turnover in a legislature is an indication of the degree to which it is institutionalized. The real variable of interest is the (unfortunately much more difficult to quantify) consequences of that turnover. And even if we can determine that the consequences of legislative turnover are minimal, we cannot conclude that the legislature is institutionalized since what appears to be legislative institutionalization may actually be the institutionalization of political parties. More accurate indications of institutionalization would be the tendency of members to want to stay in the body (regardless of whether or not they do), and the length of service in the body required before leadership positions become a real possibility.

Recruitment and retention in US legislatures,

Questions of recruitment and retention of legislators are central to our understanding of the nature of representative democracy. This essay traces the dominant perspectives and issues involved in the study of legislative candidates and legislative careers in the United States. A central theme of this essay is that congressional and state legislative scholars have tended to ignore each other's work. This is largely due to a difference in the unit of
analysis, wherein congressional scholars concentrate on the individual while state legislative scholars concentrate on the institution. But two recent events in state legislatures have the potential to provide linkages between congressional and legislative research. The first is the increase in careerism among state legislators. The second is the effect of term limits.

@article{Moncrief_analysis_1999,
  title = {Analysis, wherein congressional scholars concentrate on the individual while state legislative scholars concentrate on the institution. But two recent events in state legislatures have the potential to provide linkages between congressional and legislative research. The first is the increase in careerism among state legislators. The second is the effect of term limits.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Moncrief, G. F.},
  month = may,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000079921000003},
  pages = {173--208}
}

@article{Santos_recruitment_1999,
  title = {Recruitment and retention of legislators in {Brazil}},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440310},
  abstract = {This article discusses the recruitment and retention of legislators in Brazil since World War II and identifies the main theoretical challenges for developing comparative research on such an issue. It argues that a comparative analysis on this subject cannot make theoretical headway without an understanding of the reasons by which different countries display different modes of interaction between the legislative branch and the broader political system. The conclusion is that more historical research (and not just more comparative-static analysis and measures of institutionalization) is needed for the investigation concerning the cause of the emergence of different career patterns.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Santos, F.},
  month = may,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000079921000004},
  pages = {209--237}
}

@article{Patzelt_recruitment_1999,
  title = {Recruitment and retention in {Western} {European} parliaments},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440311},
  abstract = {This article reviews and evaluates recent research on parliamentary recruitment in Western Europe. It illuminates the particular difficulties of doing comparative legislative research in Europe and summarizes several important studies and their methodologies. Next, it presents a country-by-country overview of
comparative and case studies on legislative recruitment. Included are the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece), France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Belgium and the Netherlands, the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), and the European Parliament. Additionally, studies on gender effects in legislative recruitment are reviewed. A final section evaluates several major substantive and methodological issues. These include the strengths and shortcomings of European recruitment research; the types of data collected and research questions answered; the common research methods and their limits; the theoretical frameworks applied; and the neglect of normative research.

@article{patzelt_comparative_1999,
  title = {Comparative and case studies on legislative recruitment. Included are the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece), France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Belgium and the Netherlands, the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), and the European Parliament. Additionally, studies on gender effects in legislative recruitment are reviewed. A final section evaluates several major substantive and methodological issues. These include the strengths and shortcomings of European recruitment research; the types of data collected and research questions answered; the common research methods and their limits; the theoretical frameworks applied; and the neglect of normative research.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Patzelt, W. J.},
  month = may,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000079921000005},
  pages = {239--279}
}

@article{stonecash_political_1999,
  title = {Political cleavage in {US} state legislative houses},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440312},
  abstract = {Does the income of state legislative districts affect the erection of Republicans and Democrats? If such a relationship exists, is it uniform across states, or do states retain some uniqueness in their party cleavages? This paper assesses the relationship of district income to partisan outcomes across states, using district data from The Almanac of State Legislatures and a file of winners of legislative elections compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures. The results indicate that the association between district income and partisan outcomes varies significantly across the states. The varying partisan cleavages across the states are not just a product of state conditions such as the diversity within states. States have unique patterns of partisan cleavages that we need to explain and incorporate into analyses.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Stonecash, J. M.},
  month = may,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000079921000006},
  pages = {281--302}
}

@article{brasher_state_1999,
  title = {State lobby registration data: {The} anomalous case of {Florida} (and {Minnesota} too!)},
Florida's lobbying community was anomalously large in 1990, a problem that threatens to undermine more general interpretations of the density of state interest systems. We use time series and cross-sectional data to better understand just what happened in Florida. Two explanations are examined, one focusing on changes in lobbying regulations, and the other based on a population ecology interpretation of Florida's battle over the sales tax on services and what should replace it. The data provide circumstantial support for the latter account, which suggests that Florida is anomalous only in the extremity of the conditions governing the size of its interest community in the late 1980s, not the conditions themselves.
enter into commitments to coalition partners that involve implicit or explicit obligations to impose intraparty discipline. Leaders may do this with greater or lesser enthusiasm, and the required discipline may or may not be forthcoming. Thus, governments may be defeated in legislative votes because the legislature fails to honour obligations entered into by the executive. This paper sets out a simple model of this process, begins to analyse it, and elaborates a recent real-world example of the phenomenon.}

@article{krehbiel_paradoxes_1999,
  title = {Paradoxes of parties in Congress},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440299},
  abstract = {This paper identifies four paradoxes of parties. These paradoxes illustrate not only substantive problems in their own right but also diverse ways that formal models can help to define and address problems in legislative research. Models are shown to clarify key concepts (such as majority party strength), to sharpen the definition of important problems of inference (observational equivalence of theories), to evaluate widely used measures (party voting), and to derive and test competing hypotheses (majoritarian versus majority-party determinants of legislative organization).},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Krehbiel, K.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000078615000003},
  pages = {31--64}
}

@article{norton_uncovering_1999,
  title = {Uncovering the dimensionality of gender voting in Congress},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440300},
  abstract = {A unidimensional liberal-conservative voting model is generally accepted as the pattern that structures Congressional voting. Empirical research on mass and elite gender consciousness, case studies on congressional handling of women's issues, and feminist theory all imply, however, that more than one dimension should be used
to explain voting for legislation that affects women. Using exploratory factor analysis, I provide evidence of a gender-related dimension in a set of voting indexes and a set of roll-call votes made by both male and female members of the 101st, 102d, and 103d Congresses.

Interest group ratings have long been used by social scientists to distinguish between liberal and conservative members of Congress. It is also well known that ratings by different groups are highly correlated with one another. Here, rather than focusing on the similarities between such measures, we focus on the differences between them. Although the relationship between measures is nearly linear, we find systematic robust differences between Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and American Conservative Union (ACU) scores. Using a variety of techniques, we show that interest groups are most interested in distinguishing among their ideological friends and tend to group their ideological enemies near the bottom of the scale. Because of this, using any single interest group score to explain political phenomena (i.e., party loyalty) is likely to produce an inconsistent estimate of the impact of ideology on such phenomena. Finally, we propose and test a method that corrects for this bias.
elections as referenda on the approval of presidents—and therefore as products of national forces—while explaining regularly scheduled elections as the product of not only national political forces, but also constituency and candidate attributes specific to particular districts. In this paper we examine whether outcomes in special elections and their nearest counterpart, open-seat elections, are driven by similar or different forces. We used district-level data on U.S. House special elections and open-seat elections from 1973 to 1997 to test a model that integrates constituency, candidate, and presidential approval variables. The results of this analysis indicate that special elections are a subset of open-seat elections, with both types of contests strongly impacted by candidate and constituency influences. We found no evidence of a substantial presidential-approval effect in special elections. The absence of such a relationship underscores the importance of candidates and constituent preferences in structuring elections and indicates the inappropriateness of drawing national implications from special House contests.

@article{nownes_solicited_1999,
  title = {Solicited advice and lobbyist power: {Evidence} from three {American} states},
  volume = {24},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440303},
  abstract = {The work of William P. Browne and Won K. Paik (1993) suggests that legislators act as "unrestrained entrepreneurs" in an unstructured legislative environment. As a result, legislators rely heavily upon lobbyists for information and advice. Using data from a survey of 595 lobbyists in three American states, this paper asks: What determines whether or not and how often a lobbyist is approached for advice by policymakers? My findings suggest that full-time, experienced lobbyists have the largest "advice advantage." However, female lobbyists, as well as those who work for governmental bodies, also appear to have an advice advantage. Ultimately, these findings provide insight into what makes some lobbyists more influential than others.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Nownes, A. J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1999},
  note = {WOS:000078615000007},
}
@article{loewenberg_editors_1998,
  title = {Editors' introduction},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Loewenberg, G. and Collie, M.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000076703100001},
  pages = {465--466}
}

@article{thies_when_1998,
  title = {When will pork leave the farm? Institutional bias in Japan and the United States},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440236},
  abstract = {All industrialized countries have seen their populations "urbanize" over time. In democracies, this demographic trend ought to have ramifications for politics and policy. In this paper, I examine the effects of urbanization on agricultural subsidy programs in Japan and the United States. I show that even after malapportionment was dealt with, rural retrenchment was delayed by the balance of power within the majority party in each country. In Japan, once urban members constituted a majority within the ruling party in the House of Representatives, government policy changed quickly and dramatically. In the U.S., powerful House committees and permanent rural over-representation in the U.S. Senate delayed policy change much longer than was true in Japan, which has no similar institutional impediments.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Thies, M. F.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000076703100002},
  pages = {467--492}
}

@article{jenkins_property_1998,
  title = {Property rights and the emergence of standing committee dominance in the nineteenth-century house},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440237},
  abstract = {Between 1810 and 1825, the bill-referral process in

the House of Representatives changed dramatically, from a system that channeled a majority of legislation through select committees to a system that was dominated almost exclusively by standing committees. At the heart of this change, I contend, were grants of new rights to both standing committees and individual committee members. To explain this dispensation of new rights, I follow a new institutionalist approach and use a political theory of property-right origination, developed by Riker and Sened (1991), as a theoretical guide. I find that all necessary and sufficient conditions for right emergence, in the form of new bill-referral powers and seat-assignment privileges, are met by the actual macro-level and micro-level events of the early nineteenth century. Specifically, the greater heterogeneity of the Jeffersonian coalition and the self-interested machinations of the House Speaker, Henry Clay, combined to produce an institutional change that served the needs of all major parties in the House.

@article{hutchings_issue_1998,
  title = {Issue salience and support for civil rights legislation among southern Democrats},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440238},
  abstract = {Does the size of their black constituency influence support for civil rights legislation among southern Democrats? Previous research on the subject has produced mixed results. I argue that part of the reason for this is that the voting indices typically used to measure constituency influence are invariably made up of both salient and more obscure roll calls. To illustrate this point I examine scores from the 1990 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), along with two roll calls of similar impact yet markedly different levels of salience—the final vote on the 1990 Civil Rights Act and a less publicized amendment. I show that the size of the black constituency, as well as other district-level factors, was an important determinant of how southern Democratic House members voted on the 1990 Civil Rights Act, but not on the more obscure amendment or the overall LCCR scores.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Hutchings, V. L.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000076703100004},
  pages = {521--544}
}
Prior analyses of the bases of legislators' popular support have provided a mixed set of findings. In this note, we lay out a series of hypotheses about the determinants of legislators' home-state reputations, and test these expectations using a 1996 survey in which 40 thousand constituents in all 50 states rated their senators' job performance. We find that ideological congruence, state demographics, and electoral factors best explain variation in senators' reputations. Parochial attention, partisanship, and legislative activism do little to boost senators' approval ratings.

There are many good reasons to expect that the diversity of a constituency should impact electoral competitiveness. However, in the face of these strong expectations, the empirical record that has sought to quantify this relationship is at best mixed. The work by Bond (1983) is an excellent example. Using a measure of diversity (the Sullivan Index) common to other researchers, Bond's investigation of House races in the 1970s revealed no relationship between district diversity and competitiveness. The principle finding of this study is that much of the confusion in the literature is caused by the measure of diversity used: the Sullivan Index measures the absolute, not political, diversity of a constituency. Thus, I develop and examine a measure of diversity that assumes constituency characteristics have differential partisan impact. Use of this measure clearly demonstrates that for House elections held between 1962 and 1996, diverse House districts experienced significantly more electoral competition than did relatively less diverse House districts.
Electoral career patterns and incumbency advantage in the US House of Representatives

John Alford and John Hibbing (1981) questioned the thesis of generational replacement that explains the improved incumbency advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives. They presented evidence that improved incumbent performance was uniform across all levels of tenure between 1966 and 1978. Alford and Hibbing found an almost monotonic increase in non-southern incumbent vote percentage across all levels of tenure, increasing as tenure increased. Our purpose in this study is to update and elaborate upon the Alford and Hibbing research by examining electoral margins of House incumbents from 1980 to 1996. Unlike Alford and Hibbing, we examine all House members' (including southern members) vote percentages to detect whether these patterns maintain throughout the 1980s and 1990s. We update the data on incumbency advantage through the 1996 elections and compare changes in the South and the non-South. Members from both regions earn large victory margins early in their careers, but the victories of Southern members are markedly more decisive.

The home style homepage: Legislator use of the World Wide Web for constituency contact

The Internet not only provides a low cost and increasingly popular medium for legislators to interact with constituents, but also an opportunity for researchers to test established theories of "home style" using a much larger group of elected officials. Examining the Web sites of members of the House of Representatives during the Internet's introduction into Congress (June through August of 1997), we address two questions: (1) What factors
influence members to invest scarce resources in an official congressional homepage? (2) Of those who go "online," why do some members emphasize constituent casework while others do not? Our findings confirm that legislators use the World Wide Web much as they do other means of constituent contact. Republicans, younger legislators and representatives of more affluent populations are more likely to have homepages. Of those who have a homepage, Democrats and members from electorally marginal districts are more likely to use that Web site to solicit casework.},

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Adler, E. S. and Gent, C. E. and Overmeyer, C. B.},
month = nov,
year = {1998},
ote = {WOS:000076703100008},
pages = {585--595}
}

@article{loewenberg_untitled_1998,
title = {Untitled - {Editors}' introduction},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Loewenberg, G. and Collie, M. P.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
ote = {WOS:000075223300001},
pages = {317--318}
}

@article{warwick_policy_1998,
title = {Policy distance and parliamentary government},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440357},
abstract = {The policy-distance assumption stipulates that a party's incentive to join a parliamentary coalition government decreases with the distance between its policies and those of the government. Based on this assumption, recent formal work has posited a connection between the size and relative ideological centrality of the formateur party and the formation of smaller, especially minority, governments. Under these models, policy distance affects government composition in two ways: by influencing how large the government will be, and by influencing which parties will participate in it. This paper tests for these effects at both the government and party levels, using data sets covering West European parliamentary democracies in the 1945-89 era and incorporating two different measures of ideological positions. The findings support both effects, and in addition, show that the emergence of external support parties is influenced by considerations of policy distance. Although the formal
models are not wholly sustained, the evidence strongly indicates that policy distance is critical to parliamentary government.

@article{uslaner_let_1998,
  title = {Let the chits fall where they may? {Executive} and constituency influences on congressional voting on {NAFTA}},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440358},
  abstract = {The approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the House of Representatives in November 1993 depended heavily on lobbying by President Clinton. I show that this lobbying power does not inhere in the presidency, but was strategic. Clinton concentrated his lobbying on members who were either undecided or leaning against NAFTA in September, as well as members who received large contributions from business and from districts where the president did well. I use estimates of lobbying efforts derived from probit analysis to predict the NAFTA vote. This endogenous measure of contacting had the third greatest effect for Democratic House members voting on NAFTA (behind only presidential support) and labor political action committee contributions. But for Republicans, contact seemed to have a perverse negative effect.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Uslaner, E. M.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300003},
  pages = {347--371}
}

@article{taylor_domestic_1998,
  title = {Domestic agenda setting, 1947-1994},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440359},
  abstract = {This article examines domestic agenda setting in Washington between 1947 and 1994. It finds that House and Senate majority leaders have, over time, set increasingly more of this agenda. I examine the role of presidents and congressional committee chairs in domestic agenda setting, and I evaluate the success of presidential and congressional proposals within the legislative process. Recent changes in agenda-setting patterns seem to be the
product of a number of factors, including more frequent and polarized
divided government, as well as changes in the formal rules of Congress and
the ideological composition of the legislative parties.},
(article)

@article{kim_clarence_1998,
title = {Clarence {Thomas} and the politicization of candidate
gender in the 1992 senate elections),
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440360},
abstract = {The Clarence Thomas confirmation battle was a highly
politicized, controversial, and symbolic event that clearly affected
the 1992 Senate elections. Various hypotheses attempting to explain
the controversy's impact on election results have focused on mass
voting behavior based on group self-interest, negative voting against
incumbent Senators, or on the symbolic impact of the confirmation
vote. I focus instead on the actions of strategic political elites,
hypothesizing that female elite behavior successfully politicized
candidate, rather than voter, gender into an electoral asset in the
1992 Senate elections. As usual, strategic elites translated national
political tides into local outcomes, but in the process, female
candidate exploitation of the Thomas controversy led to several
interesting and unusual implications.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Kim, T. P.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
note = {WOS:000075223300005},
pages = {399--418}
}

@article{theriault_moving_1998,
title = {Moving up or moving cut: {Career} ceilings and
congressional retirement),
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440361},
abstract = {This research note presents a theory of congressional
retirement and tests it with data from the 102d Congress. The results
bridge the gap between the 1970s macro retirement studies and the more
recent micro-centered approaches by highlighting the importance of
career ceilings. Defined as the interaction between formal position
and years of service, the career ceilings variable can be interpreted as the degree to which the member's career in the House has stagnated. This variable dominates the traditional causes of retirement in the quantitative analysis. In light of the convergence of the unique 1992 retirement-causing factors, its power is especially surprising. Not only was 1992 the first election after redistricting and the House bank scandal, but it was also the last chance for members to convert excess campaign cash to personal income. Nevertheless, career ceilings predict retirement much better than any of the 1992-specific variables.)

@article{swers_are_1998,
  title = {Are women more likely to vote for women's issue bills than their male colleagues?},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440362},
  abstract = {Many hypothesize that the election of more women to the U.S. Congress is more than simply an issue of equity, but will make a substantive policy difference. I test this hypothesis by analyzing the voting records of all representatives in the 103d Congress on a set of women's issues. It is my premise that women will not necessarily exhibit a more liberal ideology than their male counterparts on all issues; however, the more directly an issue affects women, the more likely it is that women will vote together across party lines. The results of regression analysis on the composite score of women's issue votes indicate that gender exerts a significant and independent effect on voting for women's issues in the face of controls for other major influences on congressional voting. These influences include constituency factors, party, personal characteristics, and ideology. Interaction terms for gender by party indicate that much of the impact of gender is due to the influence of Republican women. Legit analysis of the individual votes demonstrates that the gender of the representative was most significant on votes that dealt with abortion and women's health. The influence of gender was overwhelmed by other factors such as party, ideology, and constituency concerns on votes that were less directly related to women, such as education.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Swers, M. L.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  pages = {419--433}
@article{ardoin_between_1998,
  title = {Between a rock and a hard place: {The} effects of constituent diversity on congressional representation.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ardoin, P. J. and Garand, J. C.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300009},
  pages = {449--449}
}

@article{tien_asian-american_1998,
  title = {Asian-{American} and {Hispanic} representation in the {US} {House} of representatives.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Tien, C. and Levy, D.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300010},
  pages = {449--450}
}

@article{berger_congressional_1998,
  title = {Congressional parties and primary election challenges.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Berger, M. M. and Munger, M. C.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300012},
  pages = {450--450}
}

@article{gimpel_mistaken_1998,
  title = {Mistaken accountability: {Voters}' false judgments about their representatives' behavior.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300013},
  pages = {450--450}
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journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Gimpel, J. G.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
note = {WOS:000075223300013},
pages = {450--451}
}

@article{wood_legislator-constituency_1998,
title = {Legislator-constituency relations: {Perspectives} for a five-nation study.},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
umber = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Wood, D. M. and Young, G.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
note = {WOS:000075223300011},
pages = {450--450}
}

@article{herrnson_candidates_1998,
title = {Candidates, campaign agendas, and voting in congressional elections.},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Herrnson, P. S. and Patterson, K. D.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
note = {WOS:000075223300014},
pages = {451--451}
}

@article{lau_effects_1998,
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Lau, R. R. and Pomper, G. and Mumoli, G. A.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
note = {WOS:000075223300015},
pages = {451--452}
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@article{lipinski-causes_1998,
pages = {453--453}
}

@article{cox_electoral_1998,
  title = {Electoral rules, career ambitions, and party structure: {Conservative} factions in {Japan}'s upper house.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Cox, G. W. and Rosenbluth, F. M. and Thies, M. F.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300020},
  pages = {453--454}
}

@article{fugate_risk_1998,
  title = {Risk aversion and members' decisions to retire: {The} 102d {House} revisited.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Fugate, G. A.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300021},
  pages = {454--454}
}

@article{nokken_getting_1998,
  title = {Getting out of the house: {Roll}-call behavior and voluntary exit, 1947-96.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Nokken, T. P.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000075223300022},
  pages = {454--455}
}

@article{hager_look_1998,
  title = {Look for the party label: {Party} influences on voting in the {US} {House}.},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {3},
}
@article{williams_office-seekers_1998,  title = {Office-seekers, position-seekers, and seat-holders: {Ambition}'s effects on congressional neophytes, 1955-1986.},  volume = {23},  issn = {0362-9805},  number = {3},  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},  author = {Williams, C. A.},  month = aug,  year = {1998},  note = {WOS:000075223300023},  pages = {455--455} }
British elections are traditionally understood to be dominated by parties and leaders. Local candidates are taken to be mere ciphers, whose impact on the outcome is negligible. Recently, however, several works have documented a change in MP behavior. Today's members do more constituency service than did their predecessors, in the belief that this will create a personal vote. If the MPs are succeeding, incumbency advantage should now be evident, as it is in American elections. In fact, incumbency advantage does not seem to have changed over the postwar period: for the major parties, it remains small and sporadic.

Committees usually win on the floor, but it is unclear why members of Congress support committee recommendations, or how we should account for variation in such support. One explanation for committee success is that members derive power from the committee system, and thus are reluctant to challenge committee recommendations. A second explanation is that committees themselves are partisan institutions, and thus members support committee recommendations out of partisan loyalty. A third explanation is that members support committees because
committees recommend policies that are consistent with members' policy preferences. Unlike previous studies that have relied primarily on single-vote case studies, I use roll-call data from the 98th through the 100th Congresses (1983-88) to construct an aggregate measure of committee support and to test these three competing explanations of the sources of committee support. I conclude that with few exceptions, policy and partisan motivations have a stronger influence on member support for committee recommendations than do incentives stemming from members' institutional positions.

@article{bawn_congressional_1998,
  title = {Congressional party leadership: {Utilitarian} versus
  majoritarian incentives},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440281},
  abstract = {By making procedural decisions about how individual
  bills are referred, scheduled, subjected to amendments, and sent to
  conference, majority party leaders exert important influence on
  legislative outcomes. In this paper, I use a sequence of formal models
to analyze regularities in the preferences of party leaders,
regularities that determine how procedural decisions are made. I find
that the goal of maintaining party strength causes leaders to make
procedural decisions based on the preference intensity of the rank and
file. Leaders will make procedural decisions in ways that benefit
intense minorities within the party whenever the party minority's
stake in the bill is greater than that of the less-intense party
majority. The desire to keep a leadership position, however, creates
an incentive to please a party majority. I show, however, that this
majoritarian incentive will generally have only limited influence on
procedural decisions. Its impact is limited in particular by shifting
coalitions within the majority party and by backbenchers' preferences
for party maintenance.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Bawn, K.},
  month = may,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000073478200004},
  pages = {219--243}
}

@article{hood_boll_1998,
Using a pooled time-series analysis of southern congressional districts from 1983 to 1992, we evaluate theories associating constituency and institutional factors with recent shifts in the voting patterns of southern Democrats. While we find that Democrats serving areas with larger minority populations and more progressive white populations tend to be more liberal, the greatest portion of the aggregate liberalization of voting patterns is attributable to cohort change. Voting records of southern Democrats elected prior to 1982 remained relatively constant, and we find no evidence of any general trend in the recent voting patterns of southern Democrats when controlling for other factors.

Legislative theory suggests that anticipatory effects of term limits would first affect the types of individuals elected to office and only later influence the legislature itself. Our results, based on a 1995 survey of nearly 3000 state legislators nationwide, indicate otherwise. There are no systematic differences between term limit and non-term limit states in the composition of the legislature (e.g., professional backgrounds). Yet with respect to legislative behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing pork, and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers.
@article{francis_editors_1998,
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  volume = {23},
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  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000071773000001},
  pages = {1--3}
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@article{clarke_divided_1998,
  title = {Divided government and budget conflict in the {US} states},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440211},
  abstract = {Much of the recent literature on the topic of divided government has concentrated on explanations for its occurrence at the national and state levels. In this article I use agency data from twenty states to assess the effects of divided government on budgetary conflict between governors and legislatures. After controlling for state party system characteristics and gubernatorial power, I found that divided government indeed contributes to conflict, but only when the legislative chambers are united against the governor. If split partisan control of the legislature exists, the governor's position with respect to agency spending levels is supported.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  note = {WOS:000071773000002},
  pages = {5--22}
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@article{squire_membership_1998,
  title = {Membership turnover and the efficient processing of legislation},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440212},
  abstract = {Is membership turnover related to the ability of a legislature to efficiently process legislation? I examine this question using pooled data on state legislatures from 1989 to 1993. Membership turnover is not related to the number of bills enacted per legislative day, nor to the percentage of bills passed. Instead, legislative efficiency is related to the number of interest groups in a state, the number of bills legislators introduce, and a
legislature's level of professionalization. Legislative rules also influence efficiency. The implications of these findings for the debate on term limits is discussed.

@article{gartzke_thinking_1998,
  title = {Thinking globally or acting locally? {Determinants} of the {GATT} vote in {Congress}},
  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440213},
  abstract = {While there exist many influences on legislators' votes, the U.S. system of plurality districts should ensure that constituent interests weigh most heavily. However, in marked contrast both to theories of legislative influence and to representatives' own explanations for their votes, quantitative analysis of congressional roll-call voting has largely failed to show a significant relationship between constituent interests and congressional behavior. We examine the 1994 House and Senate votes on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in light of this incongruence between empirical research, anecdotal evidence and theoretical argument. Unlike previous studies, we compile data at the level of congressional districts. Our analysis pays special attention to the construction of competing economic models of constituent interest and welfare. Finally, our research supports the argument that congressional committees are pivotal in the legislative decision-making process. We assess the impact of committees on the GATT bill in terms of partisanship, personal ideology and constituent interests of committee members. Better data, a more precise research design, and introduction of committees allows a better assessment of this paradox of congressional voting.},
  number = {1},
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  pages = {33--55}
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@article{soherr-hadwiger_military_1998,
  title = {Military construction policy: {A} test of competing explanations of universalism in {Congress}},
  volume = {23},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1998},
  note = {WOS:000071773000003},
  pages = {23--32}
}
Theories of universalism are based upon questionable assumptions that distributive benefits tend to be allocated universally, and that this pattern of allocation leads to near-unanimous floor support for many distributive benefit programs. I offer an alternative, general (or collective) benefit explanation to interpret patterns of allocation of distributive benefits and the size of floor coalitions supporting these programs. The case study of military construction policy is used to test the relative effect of general benefit and distributive benefit considerations on the size of floor support coalitions in the U.S. House of Representatives. The findings suggest important modifications of extant universalism theories.

In this note we use the Senate's six-year election cycle to explain why the "iron law of midterm loss" that applies so consistently to the House works with less certainty in the Senate; in fact, since 1946 there have been three instances (1962, 1970, and 1982) where the Senate has experienced no midterm loss. To explain the differing nature of midterm seat change in the Senate, we employ a natural experiment in which Senate midterm elections (1946-1994) are categorized in the following way: (1) The same party controlled the White House two and six years prior to the midterm; or (2) a different party held the presidency six years as compared to two years before the midterm. We hypothesize that, in the first situation, midterm loss forces are mutually reinforcing; thus, the Senate experiences large and unidirectional seat changes against the party that holds the White House. In the later situation, however, the electoral cycle effects (t-2 and t-6) run counter to one another and, therefore, seat change is not unidirectional, midterm loss is lessened, and there is even the potential for midterm gain. In fact, all of the midterm gains in the Senate in the 20(th) century occur in this situation.
Some leaders of Chinese local people's congresses emphasize autonomy in order to promote decentralization and enhance representation. Other legislative insiders favor sacrificing autonomy in order to strengthen capacity and improve oversight. Tight coupling between congresses appeals to local legislators because it offers opportunities to mobilize supporters, obtain resources, and expand jurisdiction, while representatives of higher congresses often oppose closer ties in order to preserve local initiative, safeguard elections, and reduce conflict with Party committees. In a reforming communist state, single legislatures may not be the right unit of analysis for assessing autonomy. Established boundaries, in the early stages of institutionalization, may apply to the legislative system as a whole rather than to its parts. And softening boundaries between congresses at different levels can harden boundaries against other bureaucracies.

This note expands research on representation of women in national legislatures. Existing models are tested on newer data in advanced industrialized democracies, and these models are then applied to a sample of democracies in developing countries. There are striking differences across the two samples. While a proportional representation electoral system, women's participation in the labor force, the cultural standing of women, and the country's level of development all have positive effects on female representation in OECD democracies, none of these variables have a statistically significant and positive effect in less developed countries. These findings
strongly suggest the existence of a threshold. Only after that threshold is passed do proportional representation, labor force participation, and cultural standing exert positive influences on the representation of women.

@article{strom_making_1998,
title = {Making and breaking governments: {Cabinets} and legislatures in parliamentary democracies.},
volume = {23},
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author = {Strom, K.},
month = feb,
year = {1998},
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pages = {127--143}
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@article{strom_rationalizing_1998,
title = {Rationalizing parliament: {Legislative} institutions and party politics in {France}.},
volume = {23},
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number = {1},
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author = {Strom, K.},
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@article{bader_minority_1998,
title = {Minority party leadership in the {US} senate: {Preliminary} findings.},
volume = {23},
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number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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@article{lee_ethnic_1998,
  title = {Ethnic underpinnings of voting preference. {Latinos} and the 1996 {US} senate election in {Texas}.},
  volume = {23},
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  number = {1},
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  month = feb,
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@article{buchman_save_1998,
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  volume = {23},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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  month = feb,
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  pages = {151--152}
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  number = {1},
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  pages = {151--151}
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@article{sellers_house_1998,
  title = {From the house floor to the campaign trail. {The} costs
and benefits of strategic position taking.},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Sellers, P. J. and Holian, D. B.},
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@article{carey_incumbency_1998,
title = {Incumbency and the probability of (Reelection) in state legislative elections.},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Carey, J. M. and Niemi, R. G. and Powell, L. W.},
month = feb,
year = {1998},
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title = {Contested local elections and active campaigns. {The} effects of cumulative voting and districting.},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Donovan, T. and Sulkin, T. and Bowler, S. and Brockington, D.},
month = feb,
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)
@article{banducci_citizens_1998,
title = {Citizen's attitudes about democracy after electoral reforms. {Institutional} change in {New} {Zealand}.},
volume = {23},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Banducci, S. and Donovan, T. and Karp, J.},
month = feb,
year = {1998},

This paper focuses on 1988 roll-call votes in the 1987-88 Brazilian Constitutional Congress in an analysis of party discipline within the Congress. Because of the large number (1021) of roll-call votes during the Constitutional Congress and the availability of an excellent database, the Brazilian Constitutional Congress offers an opportunity for one of the most detailed studies ever conducted on party discipline in a third-world legislature. We begin by discussing how we calculated discipline scores, given some distinctive features of the Brazilian party system and the Constitutional Congress. We show that the biggest Brazilian parties of this period were comparatively undisciplined, and we also show that the leftist parties were a powerful exception to this general tendency. We demonstrate that legislators who switched parties during the Constitutional Congress were more likely than others to be undisciplined before switching, and that their discipline increased markedly after their move to new parties. Finally, we attempt to explain why discipline was low in all but the leftist parties.

In this study I look at the relationship between bicameralism and government budget deficits. The more actors there are who can kill legislation or influence its content, the more deals must be cut to pass a budget. Bicameralism sets up a bilateral veto game between legislative chambers, which leads to higher government budget deficits, all else constant. Since it is easier to cut deals to raise spending than to raise taxes, the need to cut deals across the chambers of a bicameral legislature generally leads to higher spending and, hence, higher deficits. I test this hypothesis on a sample of deficits from 17 countries, from 1965 to 1990.
In addition to structuring the rules governing legislator-lobbyist interactions, legislators also affect their interactions with lobbyists by promoting lobbying enterprises, which are groups of like-minded lobbyists and their legislative allies, all of whom seek to coordinate their efforts. The long-term relationships inherent in lobbying enterprises reduce uncertainties, insure ready access to legislators, and allow lobbyists to reach undecided legislators indirectly. Lobbying enterprises complement staff systems, the committee system, and members' constituent contact committees. This article concludes with specific suggestions for incorporating concepts developed here into empirical and formal theoretic work on lobbying influence.

In order to further our understanding of the empirical value of the constituency control model of representation, we seek to determine whether differences in voter information and recall affect the capacity of elections to serve as instruments of accountability. We address this question by focusing on the degree to which voters held their senators accountable for their votes on the Clarence Thomas nomination in the 1992 senate elections. We find that policy-specific accountability requires voters to correctly recall their incumbent's roll-call behavior. Reliance on more general cues such as party identification and ideology leads some voters to mistakenly hold their representatives accountable for something they did not do. Since these cues are not so helpful on cross-cutting issues like the Thomas nomination, citizens who invest in detailed information will minimize errors in judgment made in the frequent
instances when legislators’ actions cross partisan and ideological lines. The high school civics texts may be right about the importance of an informed citizenry to democratic practice after all.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Wolpert, R. M. and Gimpel, J. G.},
month = nov,
year = {1997},
ote = {WOS:A1997YG57400005},
pages = {535--550}
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@article{hogan_voter_1997,
title = {Voter contact techniques in state legislative campaigns: The prevalence of mass media advertising},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440343},
abstract = {What methods of voter contact are used by candidates running for state legislative office? A number of studies on the congressional level suggest that mass media advertising, particularly on television, is becoming the predominant form of voter contact. However, few studies have questioned whether these findings are generalizable to state legislative races. This analysis of itemized expenditure data for 583 primary and general election candidates in Texas and Kansas shows that state legislative campaigns differ dramatically from congressional campaigns in their methods of voter contact. in both primary and general election campaigns, state legislative candidates allocate a preponderance of their voter contact dollars to direct forms of contact, such as mailings and pamphlet distribution. However, some candidates do allocate resources to advertising in mass media. District-level features condition the choice more than do candidate type, level of expenditures, or electoral competition.},
number = {4},
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}

@article{bullock_party_1997,
title = {Party targeting and electoral success},
volume = {22},
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abstract = {ORVIS, a measure of partisan strength calculated from the precinct-level vote share in previous statewide elections, has been used since 1988 to target Republican efforts in Georgia state legislative contests. The top-down approach implied in the use of this
targeting device has paid dividends. Successful Republican challengers come disproportionately from districts with high ORVIS scores. The relationship between ORVIS scores and the share of the vote going to Republican candidates persists after factors such as campaign funding are controlled. The party's past success in statewide contests is a much better predictor of performance than is the showing in the previous legislative contest.},

number = {4},
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title = {How much does money matter? 'Buying' votes in Japan, 1967-1990.},
volume = {22},
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@article{flemming_congressional_1997,
title = {Congressional campaigns and the theory of issue ownership: Evidence from the 1992 and 1994 house elections.},
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@article{dunn_suspension_1997,
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@article{krebs_advantage_1997,
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@article{clifton_evolution_1997,
  title = {The evolution of the {Republican} {Party} coalition.},
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  year = {1997},
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@article{wrighton_parliamentary_1997,
  title = {Parliamentary siege: {Obstructionism} in the {US} senate over time.},
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  year = {1997},
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Witnesses at the confirmations? The appearance of organized interests at senate hearings on federal judicial appointments, 1945-1992.

Investment in politicians? Political alliances and partisan change.

Balance of power: Republican party leadership and the committee system in the 104th House.

No place like home: Subsystem politics and committee jurisdictional change.
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@article{baumgartner_new_1997,
title = {New issues and old committees: {Jurisdictional} change in {Congress}, 1947-1993.},
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@article{marshall_theories_1997,
title = {Theories of legislative organization: {An} empirical study of committee outliers in the senate.},
volume = {22},
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number = {4},
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@article{burchett_legislative_1997,
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@article{pinney_congressional_1997,
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@article{scully_ideological_1997,
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  title = {Congress and the environment: \{A\} longitudinal analysis.},
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  number = {4},
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pages = {595--595}
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@article{loewenberge_editors_1997-1,
title = {Editors' introduction},
volume = {22},
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author = {Loewenberg, G. and Hibbing, J. R. and Francis, W. L.},
month = aug,
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997XV26700001},
pages = {289--291}
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@article{mccubbins_as_1997,
title = {As a matter of factions: The budgetary implications of shifting factional control in Japan's LDP},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440318},
abstract = {For 38 years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) maintained single-party control over the Japanese government. This lack of partisan turnover in government has frustrated attempts to explain Japanese government policy changes using political variables. In this paper, we look for intraparty changes that may have led to changes in Japanese budgetary policy. Using a simple model of agenda setting, we hypothesize that changes in which intraparty factions control the LDP affect the party's decisions over spending priorities systematically. This runs contrary to the conventional wisdom expressed in the voluminous literature on LDP factions, which asserts that factions, whatever their raison d'être, do not exhibit different policy preferences. We find that strong correlations do exist between which factions comprise the agenda-setting party mainstream and how the government allocates spending across pork-barrel and public goods items.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {McCubbins, M. D. and Thies, M. F.},
month = aug,
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997XV26700002},
pages = {293--328}
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Israel's democracy is in the midst of a dramatic and comprehensive restructuring, a so-called 'constitutional revolution.' Because it lacks a written constitution, Israel turns to its parliament, the Knesset, as both the source and the target of most governmental reforms. As a result of these reforms, the 13th Knesset (1992-96) behaved very differently from its predecessors and changed the existing patterns of executive-legislative interaction. The reshaping of government in Israel presents an institutionally unique and developing political laboratory in which evolving executive-legislative relations can be analyzed while the composition and construction of the regime continues to unfold. This article has three primary aims. I first describe the reforms that were enacted toward the end of the 12th Knesset (1988-92) regarding the two branches of government. Then I analyze the evolving executive-legislative relations in the 13th Knesset. And third, I assess the significance of these changes for the stability and governability of Israeli democracy in general and the 14th Knesset in particular.

This research note builds on the work of scholars who have identified the importance of ideological and partisan criteria in the selection of congressional leaders. Viewing leadership selection as a problem of agency, we develop a framework for conceptualizing how ideology and partisanship affect leadership selection. Testing the framework on House leaders from 1875-1987, we find substantial variation between the two parties. While Republican leaders conform to the 'core' hypothesis, Democratic leaders behave in accordance with the 'polarizer' hypothesis. We conclude by suggesting that these interparty differences are the result of varying levels of intraparty heterogeneity.
This paper examines the extent to which electoral support for Ross Perot influenced House members' votes on the North American Free Trade Agreement. Using Perot's share of the congressional district vote and members' electoral safety as key predictor variables, we test a legit model, holding constant district demographic characteristics, members' party and ideology, region, and labor and business PAC contributions. The results of the analysis indicate that the magnitude of the Perot vote exerted a significant effect on the NAFTA vote outcome, specifically for marginal House Republicans. Thus, we provide evidence that under certain conditions members respond to Independent political movements and Independent voters in their districts when deciding on legislation.

This study investigates the relationships between party campaign activity and party unity in the House of Representatives. Using data from the 1984 and 1992 elections and the 99th and 103d Congresses, we find little support for the hypothesis that previous party unity influences the distribution of party money or assistance in campaign management, fundraising, or communications. There is also little support for the hypothesis that party spending, campaign assistance, or recruitment efforts lead to greater party unity on normal roll-call votes. Nevertheless, Democratic candidates who receive substantial assistance in developing their campaign messages are more likely than others to vote with their party on key
votes. Overall, the results show that U.S. political parties are more election than policy oriented.

@article{squire_another_1997,
  title = {Another look at legislative professionalization and divided government in the states},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440323},
  abstract = {Does the professionalization of state legislatures lead to more instances of divided government? Fiorina (1994) persuasively argues that it does. In this article I reexamine that relationship, looking at divided government in the states from 1960 to 1990, the years of the professionalization movement. I argue that few state legislatures are professionalized. But, while most of the other state legislatures have been professionalizing, they have few of the characteristics we would expect of legislatures where entrenched incumbents are equipped to fend off changing political tides the way we expect congressional incumbents to be able to do. I then test several variations on the hypothesis that the level of professionalization is linked to the incidence of divided government. Although some results lend support to the general hypothesis, overall the relationship is not very robust. I conclude by suggesting several reasons for the weak results, pointing in particular to the rise of candidate-centered gubernatorial campaigns and the adoption of professional-like behavior on the part of state legislators in every sort of institutional setting.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Squire, P.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997XV26700007},
  pages = {417--432}
}

@article{francis_editors_1997,
  title = {Editors' introduction},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Francis, W. L. and Hibbing, J. R. and Loewenberg, G.},
  month = aug,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997XV26700007},
  pages = {417--432}
}
Constituency-level competition in the U.S. states, 1968-1988: A pooled analysis

Author: VanDunk, E. and Weber, R. E.

Abstract: This work examines constituency-level competition in U.S. state legislative races for the period 1968-88 using two measures of competition—proportion of seats marginal and proportion of seats contested. An incentive model is assessed to determine the impact of four variables—legislative institutionalization, incumbency, the likelihood of the minority party taking control of the chamber, and legislative performance—in a pooled time-series analysis. We find some support for the impact of the explanatory variables, particularly legislative institutionalization and incumbency. Finally, we present both descriptive and statistical evidence that the degree of constituency-level competition is decreasing during the time period under study.

Incumbency advantage and the persistence of legislative majorities

Author: Ansolabehere, S.

Abstract: Between 1955 and 1995, although the GOP occasionally controlled the Senate and won landslide presidential election victories, the Democratic party controlled the majority of seats in the U.S. House. This paper argues that Republican, indeed, any minority party's problems stem from the interaction between career decisions and electoral prospects. We argue that there is a previously overlooked link between the incumbency advantage and the long-term persistence of legislative majorities. We develop a model that shows how the incumbency advantage can produce higher retirement rates among the minority party, which in turn decreases the likelihood that the minority party will win a majority of seats in the next election. Data on actual retirement rates of members of the U.S. House and of the U.K. Parliament fit the patterns predicted by our model.
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Ansolabehere, S. and Gerber, A.},
month = may,
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WV70800003},
pages = {161--178}
}

@article{clucas_party_1997,
title = {Party contributions and the influence of campaign committee chairs on roll-call voting},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440381},
abstract = {Herrnson (1988) hypothesized that the increased activity of the four congressional campaign committees may increase the power of the campaign committee chairs on policy matters. In this paper I examine Herrnson's hypothesis. First, I analyze selected roll-call votes from the 98th and 99th Congresses to determine whether the committees' activities encourage members to be more supportive of positions advocated by the chairs of the House Democratic and Republican campaign committees. I then analyze the effect of these contributions on building party loyalty. I find that although the committees' activities have some influence on the amount of support freshman recipients give to the committee chairs, they have no effect on building support for the party.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Clucas, R. A.},
month = may,
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WV70800004},
pages = {179--194}
}

@article{frymer_party_1997,
title = {Party elites, ideological voters, and divided party government},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440382},
abstract = {Do voters consciously split their tickets in order to 'balance' the national government between the two major political parties, as some theories of divided government contend they do? Or do 'sincere' and ideologically consistent voters split their ballots in response to elite behavior and party cleavages? Focusing on the 1988 election, the last time divided government was the direct result of split-ticket voting, we find that most split-ticket voters in national elections are ideologically conservative in their policy views. These conservative voters split their tickets in favor of the Republican
presidential candidate and a Democratic House candidate they perceive to be similarly conservative. Meanwhile, the smaller proportion of voters who split for the Democratic presidential candidate and a Republican House candidate are ideologically liberal, and they respond to House Republicans perceived as similarly liberal. Finally, we discuss the implications of both our theory and our findings for the 1994 Republican midterm victories.},

@article{wood_comparing_1997,
  title = {Comparing constituency activity by junior legislators in {Great} {Britain} and {Ireland}},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440383},
  abstract = {To compare the relationship between constituency service and reelection concerns for British junior MPs and Irish junior deputies (TDs), we analyze interviews with 45 British MPs and 40 Irish TDs. Using a comparison of frequencies and Poisson regression analysis, we find support for the familiar expectations that TDs are substantially more active in their constituencies than are MPs, that they are more inclined than MPs to cite reelection as a motive for such activity, and that there is a stronger statistical relationship between reelection motivation and constituency activity for TDs than for MPs. We also find a positive relationship for both countries between distance from the capital and number of days per week spent in the constituency doing constituency work.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Wood, D. M. and Young, G.},
  month = may,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WV70800006},
  pages = {217--232}
}

@article{scully_policy_1997,
  title = {Policy influence and participation in the {European} {Parliament}},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440384},
  abstract = {How does a legislature's influence over policy outputs affect its members' behavior? This paper examines this
question, a question that has been neglected in the legislative literature. Using an unusual natural experiment in the European Parliament (EP), I investigate whether greater policy influence leads legislators to participate more in parliamentary votes. In addition to the impact of other variables—including the timing of votes, leadership cues, and the requirement that an absolute majority of members vote at certain stages—EP members are stimulated to participate more in votes on legislation where the EP's influence is greater. The implications of this result for legislative theory, and for our understanding of the EP, are discussed in the conclusion.

@article{scully_legislative_1997,
  title = {Political career paths and the European Parliament},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440385},
  abstract = {This study examines how seats in the European Parliament fit into domestic political careers. It shows that the Parliament's four largest national delegations have developed a core of MEPs who have made long-term commitments to the European institution. There are significant national differences in these patterns, but as a whole they make it more likely that future European Parliaments will be filled with careerist MEPs who will view the Parliament as their principal political arena, and who will seek to increase the institution's prestige and power relative to other European and domestic institutions.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Scarrow, S. E.},
  month = may,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WV70800008},
  pages = {253--263}
}

@article{reichest_narratives_1997,
  title = {Narratives of justice: Legislators' beliefs about distributive fairness - {Reeher},{G}},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440386},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Reeher, G.},
  month = may,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WV70800008}
}
This paper examines two unanticipated consequences of the equal representation of states on Senate elections—competitiveness and partisan advantage. Using a fixed-effects (LSDV) model that controls for important intervening variables to test the hypothesis that variation in state population size affects the competitiveness of Senate elections, we find a far stronger relationship between state population and electoral competitiveness than have previous works. In addition, Senate apportionment has had implications for the partisan composition of the Senate. When we compare the actual outcomes of Senate elections over time with hypothetical outcomes, which we derive by holding state population constant, we find that Senate apportionment has had important consequences for the partisan composition of the Senate in several periods. From the mid-1970s until (but not including) 1994, Senate apportionment enabled Republicans to hold seats disproportionate to their party's share of the national Senate vote.

Cosponsorship is a signal about the content of legislation and ask whether it is a meaningful signal for members. Specifically we focus on whether cosponsorship influences a bill's passage. Three types of signals are considered: bandwagon, ideological, and expertise. Using data drawn from the 99th Congress, we analyze 8,002 House and Senate bills. Our findings show that
cosponsorship is common. However, they also show that it is an overrated cue. At best it provides a signal concerning expertise at the outset of the legislative process, but generates a very weak signal thereafter. In short, cosponsorship has become a routine and rarely effective aspect of the legislative landscape.},

@article{levitt_decomposing_1997,
    title = {Decomposing the sources of incumbency advantage in the {US} {House}},
    volume = {22},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440290},
    abstract = {This paper develops a model of incumbency advantage that takes into account candidate quality, and then estimates the parameters of that model using panel data on the U.S. House from 1948 to 1990. Our approach allows us to go beyond the previous literature, which has focused primarily on measurement of incumbency advantage, to a decomposition of its sources. The primary explanation for the rising incumbency advantage appears to be the increasing ability of incumbents to deter high-quality challengers. In contrast, direct officeholder benefits (e.g., franking privileges, media exposure, fund-raising advantages, etc.) have been relatively stable over time and now account for less than half of the overall incumbency advantage.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Levitt, S. D. and Wolfram, C. D.},
    month = feb,
    year = {1997},
    note = {WOS:A1997WG91300004},
    pages = {45--60}
}

@article{medvic_influence_1997,
    title = {The influence of political consultants in the 1992 congressional elections},
    volume = {22},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440291},
    abstract = {Beginning with the common knowledge that political consultants heavily influence the outcome of election campaigns, and adding inferences drawn from the few available academic studies of consultants, we test the hypothesis that professionally run campaigns
in the 1992 U.S. House races were characterized by higher vote percentages than those without such professionals. We examine only nonincumbent candidates and find clear support for this hypothesis, both according to level of campaign professionalization and according to specific types of political consultants.},

@article{medvic_hypothesis_1997,
  title = {Determinants of candidate emergence in US House elections: An exploratory study},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440292},
  abstract = {The difficulty with studying the challenger side of the incumbency effect—the unwillingness of potentially strong challengers to run against U.S. House incumbents—has been in identifying strong potential candidates who, in fact, decide not to run. We rely upon a sample of politically astute informants to identify potential candidates prior to the 1994 elections. Our survey of these potential candidates reveals three common characteristics: they had many of the attributes one would expect of strong House challengers, there was variance in what they stated was the likelihood of their running for the House in 1994, and they were most strongly influenced by what they perceived to be their chances of winning their party's nomination in their district. In addition, they understood that they would be much less likely to receive their party's nomination if they shared party affiliation with the incumbent, a finding that reinforces the incumbency effect. We also find that respondents who held elective office at the time of the survey were more likely to run, and that there is little evidence that personal factors related to the costs and benefits of running weigh heavily in the decision to run.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Maisel, L. S. and Stone, W. J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WG91300006},
  pages = {79--96}
}

@article{crombez_co-decision_1997,
  title = {The co-decision procedure in the European Union},
  volume = {22}
}
This paper presents a spatial model of the EU's co-decision procedure, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The theory characterizes the set of policies that can be adopted and the equilibrium EU policy as a function of the ideal policies of the member countries, the Commission, and the Parliament, and the location of the status quo. The paper examines whether the Parliament has become a legislator of equal stature to the Council, and discusses the Commission's power and the extent of indecision under the co-decision procedure. A comparison with the EU's other principal legislative procedures yields comparative statements about EU policy and the institutions' powers.
@article{schiller_states_1997,
  title = {States as two-member districts. {The} effect of dual representation on {Senate} behavior and constituent awareness.},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Schiller, W. J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WG91300014},
  pages = {123--124}
}

@article{ansolabehere_interelection_1997,
  title = {The interelection dynamics of campaign finance: {US} {House} elections, 1980-94.},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J. M.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WG91300015},
  pages = {124--124}
}

@article{ansolabehere_money_1997,
  title = {Money, elections, and candidate quality.},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J. M.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1997},
  note = {WOS:A1997WG91300016},
  pages = {124--124}
}

@article{brunell_explaining_1997,
  title = {Explaining divided {Senate} delegations, 1788-1994: {A} realignment approach.},
  volume = {22},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},}
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Remington, T. F. and Smith, S. S.},
month = {feb},
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WG91300027},
pages = {129--129}
}

@article{carey_effects_1997,
title = {The effects of term limits on state legislatures.},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Carey, J. M. and Niemi, R. G. and Powell, L. W.},
month = {feb},
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WG91300030},
pages = {130--130}
}

@article{shaw_beyond_1997,
title = {Beyond divided government: {Explaining} vote controversy on important legislation.},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Shaw, T. C. and Shull, S. A.},
month = {feb},
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WG91300029},
pages = {130--130}
}

@article{lewis_determinants_1997,
title = {The determinants of state black caucus legislative success in an era of increasing {Republican} strength, an assessment of the {Florida} {House}, 1985-95.},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Lewis, A. C.},
month = {feb},
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WG91300031},
pages = {131--131}
}

@article{moncrief_gender_1997,
title = {Gender and campaign contributions in state legislative races.},
volume = {22},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Moncrief, G. and Hamm, K. and Thompson, J.},
month = feb,
year = {1997},
note = {WOS:A1997WG91300032},
pages = {131--131}
}

@article{francis_editors_1996,
title = {Editors' introduction},
volume = {21},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Francis, W. L. and Hibbing, J. R. and Loewenberg, G.},
month = nov,
year = {1996},
note = {WOS:A1996VR65600001},
pages = {461--462}
}

@article{snyder_constituency_1996,
title = {Constituency preferences: {California} ballot propositions, 1974-90},
volume = {21},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440457},
abstract = {What effect do their constituencies' voting preferences have on legislators' roll-call voting patterns? Through a study of citizens' votes on statewide ballot propositions and legislators' votes on roll calls in California, I find that when aggregated into legislative districts, the revealed preferences of California voters can be described by a spatial model with just three dimensions; that the constituency preference dimensions defined by this spatial model do an excellent job of predicting the overall roll-call voting patterns in the California legislature; and that there is evidence of a strong dimension-by-dimension correspondence between constituency preferences and legislative roll-call patterns. These findings suggest that the high degree of constraint found in roll-call voting in many U.S. legislatures may be due to legislator-constituency linkages.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {Snyder, J. M.},
month = nov,
year = {1996},
}
Little is known about the political activities of former members of Congress. Political pundits, journalists, and theories concerning subgovernment politics suggest former members have lucrative jobs with either bureaucracies or interest groups, but there is little confirmation of this. In this note we examine the post-congressional occupations of House members who retired between 1971 and 1992 and find that former members of Congress pursue a wide variety of careers. While many work for the government or interest groups, former members are more likely to leave career politics. Additionally, much of the variation in members' post-congressional careers can be explained by their interests and opportunities. Members who express interest in remaining politically active or see career opportunities in politics outside of Congress are likely to find jobs with the government or with interest groups. Conversely, members who are ill or have reached retirement age are likely to leave politics.

Recent scholarship has stressed the importance of deliberation in legislative decision making. Yet the empirical basis for claims about deliberation is weak, and the concept of deliberation itself needs to be sharpened. In this article I attempt to lay the groundwork for a systematic analysis of deliberation in real-world legislatures. I provide a framework for studying deliberation, consider the largely ignored issue of deliberation quality, and offer a set of indicators for determining the extent and quality of deliberation. Additionally, I provide testable hypotheses about factors that promote deliberation. Perhaps most importantly, I provide recommendations for analyzing the consequences of deliberation.
Estimating the partisan consequences of redistricting plans - Simply

Although some judges and political scientists have recently questioned the idea that it is possible to predict the partisan consequences of redistricting plans, I demonstrate that it is simple to do so with a pair of OLS equations that regress voting percentages on major party registration percentages. I test this model on data for all California Assembly and congressional elections from 1970 through 1994, and compare it to more complicated equations that contain incumbency and socioeconomic variables. The simplest equations correctly predict nearly 90\% of the results. I show that analogous equations using registration or votes for minor or even major offices in California, North Carolina, and Texas can also predict outcomes with considerable accuracy. Using these equations, I show that the so-called 'Burton Gerrymander' of 1980 had minimal partisan consequences, while the nonpartisan plan instituted by the California Supreme Court's Special Masters in 1992 was nearly as biased in favor of the Republicans as the proposal of the Republican party. I also introduce a new graphic representation of redistricting plans and conclude with a discussion of some seemingly methodological choices that have important substantive implications for assessing the fairness of redistricting plans.

Recent research on legislative staffs

In this article, I survey the literature on legislative staffing from 1983 to the present. Recent studies of the
staffs of the U.S. Congress, U.S. state legislatures, and legislatures outside of the United States present new data and analyses. Research includes increasingly precise and sophisticated analyses of staff influence and power, and offers perspectives on specialized staff groups, legislative enterprises, and staff members as candidates for elective office. Interesting and significant questions remain for further research.

{article}
    title = {Editors' introduction},
    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Francis, W. L. and Hibbing, J. R. and Loewenberg, G.},
    month = aug,
    year = {1996},
    note = {WOS:A1996VC42000001},
    pages = {297--299}

{article}
    title = {Revisiting the state of U.S. state legislative research},
    volume = {21},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440247},
    abstract = {Fifteen years ago, in this journal, Malcolm Jewell surveyed the field of state legislative research. In so doing, he identified some topics about which we, as a scholarly community, did not have adequate information. He also suggested some lines of inquiry for further research. In effect, in that 1981 article, Malcolm Jewell helped define the research agenda for a generation of state legislative scholars by discussing the state of our knowledge in seven specific areas. In this article we update the state of our knowledge in those seven areas by surveying more than 160 studies published in the years subsequent to Jewell's 'The State of U.S. State Legislative Research.'},
    number = {3},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {Moncrief, G. and Thompson, J. A. and Cassie, W.},
    month = aug,
    year = {1996},
In this paper we take the analysis of the role of money in legislative elections one step beyond the extant literature by examining the factors that affect the impact of spending on the vote. We hypothesize that two sets of factors, contextual and conversion, condition money's effect on the vote. The analysis of data from 12 state house races finds some significant support for the notion that spending responds to the context and the characteristics of the race, findings which have important theoretical and practical implications.

This research investigates the linkage between the governor's electoral party coalition and the governor's coalition within the legislature. Legislators in 10 states in 1983 are examined for their voting loyalty on the governor's program bills. In the five states with strong parties, where the parties "endorse" for governor, party line voting for or against the governor is quite high; whereas, in the states with nonendorsing parties, there is less gubernatorial party support and less partisan voting. Party line voting is enhanced also by unified rather than divided party control of government, and the governor receives greater legislative support following a strong electoral showing in the districts of legislators.
In this paper we assess the role of political parties in organizing state legislative committees. This research is guided by an explanation found in Malcolm E. Jewell's early work on responsible political parties in U.S. state legislatures and in his more recent assessment of the conditions associated with state legislative control by strong political parties. We evaluate majority party representation (MPR) on the membership of all standing committees in 10 state legislative chambers for the last two sessions in each decade of the twentieth century. Findings from two of our earlier studies of majority party representation on committees are also included.

Our understanding of congressional campaign finance and party behavior is incomplete because scholars have not yet examined the millions spent in soft money by the national parties. This analysis of soft-money spending shows that federalism and campaign finance regulations provide both opportunities and constraints that influence the parties' ability to turn soft-money "straw" into hard-money "gold." A party's level of hard-money wealth significantly shapes how it spends soft money and helps explain why the parties pursue different strategies. The analysis suggests that the parties play a larger role in congressional campaign finance than has been previously reported, since parties spend soft money in ways that can benefit House candidates.
This study examines voter turnout in congressional districts during the 1988 and 1990 elections. Drawing heavily from studies of congressional campaign finance and vote outcomes, the analyses demonstrate the importance of campaign context. In addition to the fundamental influence of sociodemographic factors (e.g., district education level and population density) on turnout, vigorous campaigns waged by strategic elites increase political excitement and the flow of information, which in turn spur aggregate participation. In races where the House incumbent faces opposition, incumbent efforts (measured as campaign expenditures) have a significant and positive influence on turnout. The strategic position of the challenger has both direct and indirect effects on voter turnout, with a strong challenge translating into heavier turnout. In a nonpresidential year, high-profile senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns also get out district voters. However, a presidential contest provides a largely overriding stimulus that diminishes the influence of these state-level races on voter turnout.
Political scientists have viewed modern state legislatures from three perspectives. Legislative reform in the 1960s and 1970s, legislative professionalization in the 1980s, and most recently legislative institutionalization. Institutionalization is best indicated by the boundedness of the legislature from the environment, as specified by personnel differentiation, normative structure, and managerial autonomy. When various indicators are taken into account, legislatures appear to be moving in the direction of deinstitutionalization.

Although the number of black state legislators has increased dramatically in the last several decades, there is relatively little known about these important officeholders and how they compare to their white colleagues. Through a nationwide survey conducted in 1991-92, we gain some information on these legislators. The results depict some similarities among black and white legislators in terms of background characteristics and public policy concerns. The more obvious trends in the survey findings, however, are the many significant racial differences between these lawmakers, especially their perceptions of black legislative life and racial progress. While region, racial composition of district, party status, and gender serve to condition these racial disparities, significant differences in black-white legislative views remain.
Because fundamental control over the legislative process occurs not on the floor but in standing committees, and because assignment to important standing committees increases members' power to control the legislative agenda, congressional committee assignments are important in determining the political and electoral success of incumbents. Changing membership patterns of committees over time provide some clues on the importance of seats on the committees. Using data on committee membership for the U.S. Senate for congresses from World War II to the 103d Congress, we measure the relative value of seats on Senate committees. We assume that senators who transfer from one committee to another are increasing their political and electoral capital. Two different measures developed by Bullock and Sprague and Munger are employed to create an ordering of Senate committee membership prestige. Committee assignment allocation processes in the House of Representatives and the Senate produce similar, expected rankings of legislator preferences among seats on standing committees.

In this note we use survey data from the 1988 and 1990 NES Senate Elections Studies to examine the concept of challenger quality in greater depth than previous studies have done. We look at our measures of challenger quality from a number of angles to confirm their utility. We also use the pooled data to show that they produce the expected relationships with campaign-related variables, and that they perform better than other measures of challenger quality.
Recent theoretical work suggests that barriers to entry in political campaigns can affect who runs for office and how much effort they devote to that enterprise. We investigate the effects of legal barriers to competition—in the form of filing fees and petition requirements—on congressional election results during the 1980s. Higher ballot access requirements significantly increase the frequency of uncontested seats and decrease the frequency of retirements. Contrary to Supreme Court opinions, petitions pose as great a burden on potential challengers as filing fees do.
We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yields several testable hypotheses. The model receives some empirical backing, but overall the results of our analyses do not support it. We therefore attribute the conflict between the Yeltsin government and the RCPD to fundamental disagreements over policy and not to internal contradictions in constitutional design.

What variables affect the provision of casework in state legislatures? Using survey data of legislators collected in four states, we examine what influences legislators' commitment of time to the provision of constituency service. We find that several variables affect the amount of time legislators devote to casework: state level factors, the number of demands made on the legislator, and the legislator's belief about what is important. We also examine the relationship between the legislator's time commitment and different types of service activities.
This paper reports data from a survey sent to all state legislators who have served for more than 15 years. The purpose of the questionnaire was to ascertain the nature and extent of changes in the legislature during the members' tenure. Veteran legislators perceived significant changes in influence structures within the legislature, in the nature of their job, and in the general environment in which they legislate. Variations in some of their perceptions are associated with differences between types of legislatures.}

This paper examines the effects of gender and race on the prestige of House newcomer committee assignments since 1965. Due to the advancement of women and minorities in other areas of social life as well as the changing internal character of Congress, there should be increasing equity in the prestige of their congressional committee assignments. Findings generally confirm my expectations, although periodic surges and declines in the data, particularly for women, point up the impact of short-run political conditions. More generally, the data highlight linkages between Congress and the larger social system; continued equity depends on the nature of these linkages.
Bicameralism and the core: An experimental test

While the primary problem confronting democratic theorists in the past several decades has been majority rule instability, recent formal results suggest that this problem is diminished by long-standing constitutional provisions such as bicameralism. Bicameralism should theoretically be much more likely to create a set of stable and undominated outcomes—a core. This paper reports a series of experiments testing whether individuals partitioned into two chambers do in fact behave as the formal theory of bicameralism predicts. In two sets of trials, the outcome chosen under a given bicameral partition is almost always in the bicameral core for that partition, and a change in the bicameral partition has a statistically significant impact on the choice of outcome.

Constituents and legislators: Learning about the Persian Gulf War resolution

This study examines how much citizens know about a highly salient roll-call vote: the Gulf War Use of Force Resolution. Citizens' awareness of how their representatives voted, while not great, was not trivial. Drawing on survey response theory, the authors determine that how well citizens are able to recall or guess their representatives' positions is structured by individual characteristics and a reasonable see of contextual cues. In their conclusion, the authors draw implications for the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, the ability of citizens to monitor their representatives in noncampaign periods, and for theories of the representation process.
Our analysis uses simulations to consider the likely impact of campaign finance reform on electoral outcomes and electoral competitiveness. The analysis improves upon previous research by both utilizing more than a single econometric model as a basis for the simulations and utilizing a wide range of campaign finance scenarios. Conclusions as to the likely impact campaign finance reform has on electoral competitiveness rely on the model employed and the type of campaign finance reform considered.

Cross-national studies suggest that electoral law, the arrangement of political institutions, political cleavages in the electorate, and political stability influence the number of parliamentary parties and their policy-making role. These factors do not yield unambiguous expectations for the parties in Russia's new parliament. Nevertheless, the Duma, the lower and more powerful chamber of the new Russian Federal Assembly, has developed a strongly
party-oriented decision-making process. In this paper, we detail the role of parties in the Duma and conclude that the particular sequence of events in late 1993 and early 1994 crucially influenced the emergence of such a strongly party-oriented process.

Relying on the opinions of 97 advocates who actively participated in steering any one of six diverse and controversial bills through the 100th Congress, we uncover a network of congressional leaders comprised of both the unelected and the elected members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Beyond assembling a profile of this elite group of policy champions in terms of their experience, party affiliations, and political ideologies, we test several theoretical propositions about the personal and structural attributes of congressional leadership that adhere to officeholders and aides.

Using AFL-CIO COPE roll-call voting scores, we show that the voting behavior of a House member who moves to the Senate is virtually indistinguishable from the voting behavior of both the mean House member and the incumbent senator from the new senator's state and party, and that the representative's voting behavior exhibits little systematic change after moving from the House. Moreover, what change there is cannot generally be interpreted as a move in the
direction of the state's median voter. However, the directionality of our results is consistent with the Glazer and Robbins (1985a) finding that when their constituencies change, Democrats are likely to be unresponsive to a change in constituency policy preferences unless it involves a shift to the left, while Republicans are likely to be unresponsive to a change in constituency policy preference unless it involves a shift to the right.)
valid and reliable index-based measures of gubernatorial powers, enabling resources, and state legislative professionalism. Next, using data from all 50 states for the biennial periods from 1978 to 1991, we test a multivariate probabilistic model of determining whether a most effective governor is currently in office. The logistic regression results indicate that gubernatorial effectiveness in office is associated with the presence of a highly professionalized state legislature, relatively high state economic growth, and joint increases in gubernatorial institutional powers and enabling resources. This suggests that both institutional and environmental considerations influence gubernatorial effectiveness in office and that the power relationship between the governor and the state legislature is not necessarily a zero-sum game, with one institution gaining influence at the expense of the other.

@article{amed_development_1995,
  title = {{THE} {DEVELOPMENT} {OF} {PARLIAMENTARY} {OVERSIGHT} {IN} {BANGLADESH} - {A} {RESEARCH} {NOTE}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {The parliament of Bangladesh is not primarily a lawmaking body but one whose main function is to exercise oversight over the executive. In the first 20 years of the existence of the Jatiya Sangsad (JS), only its most recent incarnation, elected in 1991, has had a sufficiently large proportion of opposition MPs to encourage the use of existing oversight procedures. When we compare the fifth JS to the first JS elected in 1973, we see that the use of both call-attention motions and questions has increased, and that the number of committees and committee positions has proliferated in the fifth JS. We also find that the focus of oversight is surprisingly on national rather than on local issues.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {AMED, N. and KHAN, S.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995TH05700007},
  pages = {573--583}
}

@article{loewenberg_untitled_1995,
  title = {{UNTITLED} - {EDITORS} {INTRODUCTION}},
  volume = {20},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {DILGER, RJ and KRAUSE, GA and MOFFETT, RR},
  month = nov,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995TH05700006},
  pages = {553--571}
}
The study provides the first thorough empirical examination of how individuals' knowledge of and opinions about the candidates and issues of a campaign affect participation. The study proposes a campaign attention model in which people assess whether there is someone for whom to vote before deciding whether to vote. More specifically, the model posits three candidate-based conditions for participation: knowledge, distinctiveness, and preference. First, individuals who have knowledge of the candidates or issues are more likely to vote than those who do not. Second, individuals who perceive the candidates as distinct from one another are more likely to vote than others. Third, individuals who judge at least one candidate favorably are more likely to vote than those who do not. The model is tested in previously unstudied Senate elections. The results of a probit analysis for the 1990 midterm Senate races indicate the importance of the campaign attention model. Individuals' issue awareness, issue preferences, candidate recognition, perceived candidate differences, and candidate preferences significantly affect individuals' decisions to go to the polls, controlling for the effects of their demographic characteristics, political involvement, and the electoral context.
abstract = {Studies of the incumbency advantage in U.S. state legislative elections have usually been limited to the relatively few states that use single-member districts exclusively. In this paper we provide a method for computing the incumbency advantage in multimember districts, based on the Gelman-King (1990) estimator for single-member districts, and use it to estimate the incumbency advantage in 40 U.S. states over the period 1970-86. We find that the incumbency advantage has increased in states using multimember districts but at a substantially lower average rate than in states with single-member districts. We also find that states in which legislators have more opportunity or ability to perform casework services for their constituents are also those in which the incumbency advantage is larger.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {COX, GW and MORGENSTERN, S.},
month = aug,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RR48600003},
pages = {329--349}
}

@article{donnay_public_1995,
title = {{PUBLIC} {FINANCING} {OF} {LEGISLATIVE} {ELECTIONS} - {LESSONS} {FROM} {MINNESOTA}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440225},
abstract = {In 1976, when a system to publicly finance Minnesota's state legislative elections was introduced, the legislation's proponents claimed it would make elections to the legislature more competitive. An observer, however, might conclude that the incumbency advantage has increased since the introduction of public financing. When we introduce a variety of controls and examine the data with multivariate regression, we find that public financing did in fact go a long way toward increasing the competitiveness of Minnesota's legislative elections.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {DONNAY, PD and RAMSDEN, GP},
month = aug,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RR48600004},
pages = {351--364}
}

@article{freeman_comparative-analysis_1995,
title = {A {COMPARATIVE}-{ANALYSIS} {OF} {SPEAKER} {CAREER} {PATTERNS} {IN} {US} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},
In this paper, I use Polsby's (1968) theory of institutionalization to study change in the career patterns of state legislative speakers. I find that in certain ways leadership is institutionalizing. Most speakers today had previous leadership experience, and in a majority of chambers there is a specific career path to the speakership. Both previous experience and career path are indicators of institutionalization. However, the career path in virtually all chambers is flexible. Further, the more professionalized legislatures are more likely to lack a specific career path than are less professionalized institutions. These findings add to the literature that suggest that state legislatures do not show a consistent pattern of institutionalization.

Control over deployment of U.S. armed forces has been one of the most hotly contested issues in foreign policy between the president and Congress in recent years. Yet despite the lingering legacy of Vietnam, Congress has never fully forced presidents to curtail U.S. military activities through use of the War Powers Resolution, its appropriations powers, or other legislation. I attempt to show that although Congress generally leaves military policy to the executive branch, it occasionally tries to interject itself into policy-making when there are sufficient political incentives. I develop a model to explain what leads Congress to periodically use the War Powers Resolution and other legislation in an attempt to curtail U.S. military operations abroad, and find that public opinion, protracted conflicts, divided government, and violence against United States citizens all exercise statistically significant impacts on congressional behavior.
In 1988 Congress established the Independent Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and gave it nearly complete authority to determine which domestic military bases would be closed. I analyze both the structure of the base-closing process and the procedural requirements imposed on the commission, and find that two factors explain the extensive delegation of power (which was unusual). First, legislators reduced the costs of any potential adverse commission activity by insisting that the process be nonarbitrary and by restricting the commission's authority to a narrow jurisdiction. Second, legislators lowered the risk of political retribution by insulating themselves from the commission's actions, providing a mechanism that allowed them to demonstrate concern for affected constituents and insuring that the public would accept the commission's decision as legitimate.

We examine the impact of media exposure in United States Senate and House elections and find that high levels of media exposure are associated with an increased likelihood that individual respondents will vote for House incumbents. In addition, we find that the effects of media exposure in Senate elections are mediated by challenger political quality. We also find that, within House elections, media exposure appears to have its most dramatic impact among independents and similar partisans.
This article examines the types of organized interests that get included in the policy-making process. To examine this question, I propose a theory that emphasizes the importance of costly organizational resources and I test it using as a dependent variable whether or not groups are invited to testify at congressional hearings. The analysis demonstrates that if a group expects to testify, it must have a substantial degree of organizational resources. The findings underscore the importance of organization and money in explaining successful interest group articulation.
@article{judge_member-constituency_1995,
title = {{MEMBER}-{CONSTITUENCY} {LINKAGES} {IN} {THE} {HUNGARIAN} {PARLIAMENT}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440445},
abstract = {Linkage has traditionally been identified as a central function of legislatures. Given the Parliament's initial institutional preeminence in Hungary after 1990 and underdeveloped linkages through organized interests or stable and cohesive parties, the linkage function of erected representatives was of special importance. This article examines the pattern of MP constituency linkage in the first democratically erected Hungarian Parliament (1990), the political context within which this pattern was established, and the conceptions MPs held of their representative focus.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {JUDGE, D. and ILONSZKI, G.},
month = may,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RA25100003},
pages = {161--176}
}

@article{ainsworth_unanimous_1995,
title = {{UNANIMOUS} {CONSENT} {AGREEMENTS} {AS} {LEADERSHIP} {TOOLS}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440446},
abstract = {Unanimous consent agreements are the main tool the U.S. Senate majority leader uses to perform several functions. The leader guides floor proceedings by utilizing these agreements to restrict amendments and to limit time for debate. Scholars have argued that unanimous consent agreements are a service tool used to appease the demands of an increasingly individualistic Senate. We use a bargaining model to demonstrate that these agreements can be a leadership tool. In addition, we highlight the importance of institutional innovations leaders have adopted to maintain the durability of unanimous consent agreements as leadership tools.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {AINSWORTH, S. and FLATHMAN, M.},
month = may,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RA25100004},
pages = {159--159}
This study examines the impact of presidential coattails in open-seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives. Although presidential coattails exert a strong influence on congressional vote margins, coattails may have determined whether a party won or lost an open seat in only 34 of 254 races between 1972 and 1992-about 13% of the time. Where coattails are decisive, they seem to help Republicans (who frequently need the help) more than Democrats (who generally do not). Parties must continue to increase the competitiveness of open-seat races before coattails will influence the outcome of a substantial number of contests.

Abstract: This paper examines how gender affects legislative behavior and what significance these effects have for the substantive representation of women. Having examined voting behavior from 1981 to 1992, we confirm that female legislators have voting patterns that are more liberal, yet not significantly different, from those of their male counterparts. When regression is applied, gender remains insignificant in explaining voting behavior until 1991 and 1992, where it demonstrates a significant negative effect. Bill introduction data for the same period reveals that congressional women are introducing women-related legislation proportionate to their number. Finally, examining the cohesion of voting patterns reveals that congressional women are as cohesive as or more cohesive than two ethnic congressional groups but less cohesive than southern Democrats or their male partisan counterparts. In combination, the findings suggest that congressional women display distinctive legislative behavior that portends a greater representation of women and women's issues.
Much of the research on African American legislative behavior has focused on men in office, while the literature on female legislators has looked primarily at white women. Far less is known of the growing number of African American female politicians. As the findings of this paper reveal, black women are similar to nonblack women in their strong support for prowomen's policy issues, and they are like black men in their solid support for minority-targeted policies. On the other hand, they are unlike other groups in their near unanimous agreement on the policies that are most important to them and that they are most likely to pursue while in office. Unlike other race and gender groups, black women in state legislatures seem to share a strong consensus on which policy areas should receive priority. To these women, the most pressing issues are education, health care, economic development, and employment.

State legislative caucus campaign committees have emerged in the 1980s as an important party adaptation in state politics. This study explores the factors associated with the existence of these new party organizations and with their levels of contributions to party candidates. To explain these phenomena, five hypotheses are investigated concerning the strength of state parties, the cost of state campaigns, the level of legislative professionalism,
the degree of party competition, and the regulation of campaign contributions in states where these committees have emerged. Legislative professionalism and party competition are associated with the existence of the caucus committees. Legislative professionalization, party competition, and laws restricting campaign contributions are powerful explanations of the level of expenditure of these committees. Leadership stability and spending by the opposing party also help explain the activity of caucus campaign committees.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {ROSENTHAL, CS},
month = may,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RA25100008},
pages = {249--268}
}

@article{little_understanding_1995,
title = {{UNDERSTANDING} {LEGISLATIVE} {LEADERSHIP} {BEYOND} {THE} {CHAMBER} - {THE} {MEMBERS} {PERSPECTIVE}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440451},
abstract = {This paper examines the degree to which legislative leaders in the modern era are expected to expend energy on public relations, campaign activities, and interaction with other government officials, perhaps at the expense of more traditional institutional activities. Using data from 120 senators in three state legislatures, the author examines an empirical model in an effort to explain variations in the proportion of external activities associated with legislative leadership. Empirical tests reveal a statistically significant relationship between a legislator's institutional, electoral, and personal environments and the external nature of the individual's expectations of legislative leaders. However, characteristics of a member's personal environment—primarily experience, ambition, and role orientation—are most strongly related to how that member defines appropriate leadership. The vocal and visible legislative leadership of modern legislatures is encouraged by young, ambitious politicos who perceive themselves as electorally vulnerable. This tendency is particularly strong for legislators of the executive's party in competitive institutions. Leaders will continue to focus attention on external activities as long as members perceive such activity as being in their own interest.},
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {LITTLE, TH},
month = may,
year = {1995},
note = {WOS:A1995RA25100009},
pages = {269--289}
@article{kuklinski_rational_1995,
  title = {{THE} {RATIONAL} {PUBLIC} - 50 {YEARS} {OF} {TRENDS} {IN} {AMERICANS} {POLICY} {PREFERENCES} - {PAGE},{BI},{SHAPIRO},{RY}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440146},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {KUKLINSKI, JH and SEGURA, GM},
  month = feb,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800004},
  pages = {3--21}
}

@article{kahn_characteristics_1995,
  title = {{CHARACTERISTICS} {OF} {PRESS} {COVERAGE} {IN} {SENATE} {AND} {GUBERNATORIAL} {ELECTIONS} - {INFORMATION} {AVAILABLE} {TO} {VOTERS}},
  volume = {20},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440147},
  abstract = {Since campaigns are the mechanisms by which candidates communicate with voters, the content of campaigns tells us what voters are likely to learn about competing candidates. In this study, I conduct a content analysis of newspaper coverage in 24 U.S. Senate races and 21 gubernatorial races. The results suggest that voters are provided with substantially more coverage, and more equitable coverage, of gubernatorial candidates. In addition, newspapers apportion space differently to different types of coverage in Senate and in gubernatorial campaigns. I explain how these differences in coverage may influence the outcome of Senate and gubernatorial elections.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {KAHN, KF},
  month = feb,
  year = {1995},
  note = {WOS:A1995QH59800009},
  pages = {23--35}
}

@article{glazer_strategic_1995,
  title = {{STRATEGIC} {VOTE} {DELAY} {IN} {THE} {US} {HOUSE}-(OF)-
A legislator often has an incentive to present one face to constituents and another to party leaders. We examine this conflict by analyzing how representatives time their votes. In particular, using C-SPAN Videotapes of roll calls on veto overrides in the 101st Congress, we find that the House members who vote against their party delay voting on the floor. Our data also support the hypothesis that strategic vote delay is greatest when the vote is likely to be close.

U.S. state legislatures vary substantially in the degree to which they are professional institutions. Drawing on the state policy literature, this study identifies three general categories of potential influence on this variation: the characteristics of a state's population, its governmental structures, and the level of legislative professionalism in its peer group states. Using four measures of professionalism from different periods, the author tests hypotheses about several such variables in cross-sectional and panel analyses. He finds that each of these categories of influence has significant, independent effects on legislative professionalism, and that taken together these influences account for most of the observed variation in professionalism across the states.
Public financing schemes are often promoted as means of increasing the competitiveness of legislative elections and changing the way that candidates raise campaign funds. We investigate the impact that Wisconsin's system of public financing of state legislative elections, established in 1977, has had on these variables. Having compared trends in the pre- and postreform period, we find no evidence that providing challengers with public money has made elections more competitive, although it has narrowed the spending gap between incumbents and challengers. Most important, public financing has not increased the number of challengers, as incumbents increasingly face no opposition at all. We argue that challengers consider the overall strategic environment, and not just the question of fundraising, when making the initial decision to run. The availability of public money does little to encourage challenges to safe incumbents. While some changes in Wisconsin's system might marginally increase the likelihood of challenges, we conclude that public funding, by itself, cannot significantly change the competitiveness of legislative elections.}

This essay critically reviews research published in the last decade that explores how lobbyists and interest groups influence the actions of the U.S. Congress. The research is extensive and contains a rich, but often conflicting, set of findings about the influence of interest groups. The purpose of this essay is to inventory, review, and critique this research in ways that convey as clearly as possible the status of our current understanding of the nature and level of interest group influence in the U.S. Congress.
We argue that committee members are best viewed as agents of multiple principals—their parent chamber and parties, as well as external constituencies. We propose improvements in measuring the relationship between the policy positions of committees, parties, and parent chambers. We find predictable variation across committees and across issues within committee jurisdictions in this relationship. We conclude by making some observations about future directions for research in this area.

The institutional design debate at the heart of much recent theoretical controversy in legislative scholarship revolves around two questions: what is the core problem members of the legislature are attempting to solve in their choice of institutional arrangements? what is the key institutional mechanism through which
the problem is tackled? This analysis of special rules in the House aims to contribute to that debate directly and indirectly. I test the predictions that the principal theories make about rule choice and find the party model to be most successful in accounting for contemporary rule choice on major legislation. I then argue that my data and analysis suggest three desiderata for an adequate theory. First, it must incorporate party as a key mechanism, as the importance of party and party leadership in the contemporary House suggests. Second, the theory must be dynamic, as the change in the centrality of party leadership over time suggests; members' answer to the core question—if not the question itself—may change over time. Third, the theory needs to posit multiple goals, as a detailed look at the design of some rules suggests.

number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {SINCLAIR, B.},
month = nov,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PW06800003},
pages = {477--494}

@article{thielemann_explaining_1994,
title = {{EXPLAINING} {CONTRIBUTIONS} - {RATIONAL} {CONTRIBUTORS} {AND} {THE} {ELECTIONS} {FOR} {THE} 71ST {TEXAS} {HOUSE}},
volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440170},
abstract = {Because the rules and structures that affect policy making differ greatly from one state legislature to the next, the dynamics of contributing to the candidates may differ in corresponding ways. Contributors presumably make rational decisions about what investments will gain them influence. Although there is some evidence about rational contributing in Congress, there is little evidence to date at the state legislative level. Here we explore the contribution patterns in races for the Texas House of Representatives, with its highly centralized power structure, and offer compelling evidence that contributors are rational in deciding to invest their money in the most powerful members rather than in committee chairs, as they do in systems with dispersed power such as the U.S. Congress.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {THIELEMANN, GS and DIXON, DR},
month = nov,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PW06800004},
pages = {495--506}

@article{sollars_institutional_1994,
title = {{INSTITUTIONAL} {RULES} {AND} {STATE} {LEGISLATOR}}
In part because of the state legislature reform movement, the compensation of state legislators has changed over the last two decades: the level of real compensation has risen, and the number of methods of determining compensation has increased. In previous studies of legislative compensation, institutional rules and political factors play an important role in explaining the variance of compensation across states. This article presents a modification of a model of legislative compensation and explores differences in the mix of compensation. The empirical evidence suggests that constitutional and extra-constitutional restrictions no longer play an important role in determining the level of pay, but limits on length of session constrain pay.

This research note examines some hypotheses about why members wrote overdrafts on the House bank, the central behavior of the House bank scandal. We use the negative binomial model, a type of event-count model, to compare the effects of variables related to political power (party, seniority, and electoral security) with personal variables (age and wealth). The results are consistent both with partisan interpretations (Democrats bounced more checks, even when their lower average wealth is controlled for) and with more personalistic interpretations (younger members and members of modest means also wrote more overdrafts).
This review of research over the past decade on legislative elections employs the concept of electoral responsiveness—the link between voters' choices and legislatures' decisions. The article examines the field's three main approaches to responsiveness: research on collective choice, which focuses on how the electorate evaluates the legislature's performance, including its handling of the economy; research on competitive change, which primarily analyzes incumbency and challenger strength as factors that delimit how voters influence the composition of the legislature from one election to the next; and research on voter preferences, which details primarily how voters' commitments to party and class shape their reactions to candidates and parties. The study concludes that, although legislative election research is voluminous, the field lacks a strong theoretical and comparative focus within which many questions on responsiveness could best be answered.
problem of how to make it in at least some members' interests to act on any collectively shared interests of their party. I further suggest that this basic structure has a very long-term stability and that medium-term periods of more party-centered or more committee-centered politics, suggestive of an equilibrium of institutions within this basic stability, may be due to equilibria in the electoral choices of the public and, thus, in the representative nature of the legislature.}

@article{rohde_parties_1994,
title = {{PARTIES} {AND} {COMMITTEES} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE} - {MEMBER} {MOTIVATIONS}, {ISSUES}, {AND} {INSTITUTIONAL} {ARRANGEMENTS}},
volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440136},
abstract = {This analysis focuses on empirical and theoretical issues raised in Krehbiel's (1991) informational analysis of legislative organization in the House of Representatives. I argue that there are insufficient grounds for rejecting significant effects from party leaders and organizations and discuss evidence for such effects. I then propose that the partisan, informational, and distributive perspectives are compatible within a single theory of congressional organization. In this view, these perspectives apply to different domains in Congress, which affect various issues and committees in different but potentially predictable fashions.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {ROHDE, DW},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
ote = {WOS:A1994PE01700003},
pages = {341--359}
}

@article{lupia_who_1994,
title = {{WHO} {CONTROLS} - {INFORMATION} {AND} {THE} {STRUCTURE} {OF} {LEGISLATIVE} {DECISION}-{MAKING}},
volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440137},
abstract = {Legislatures around the world first delegate some of their policy making authority to experts and then accept their
delegates' proposals without question or amendment. Many scholars see this combination of events as evidence that complexity leads elected representatives to lose control of the actions of government. While we agree that complexity and delegation can render legislatures powerless, we argue that legislators around the world can, and do, overcome these potentially damaging forces. Specifically, we use a model of legislative behavior to show how both institutional characteristics and conditions that allow people to learn from others provide legislators with the faculty to protect their interests. We conclude that certain structural characteristics, such as those found in the United States Congress, allow ordinary legislators to exert considerable control over the actions of government and that other characteristics, such as those found in Britain and Japan, render most legislators relatively powerless.,
abstract = {Using budget data for the same domestic agencies included in Fenno's study of the House Appropriations Committee (1966), this article explores decision making in the committee in fiscal years 1963-82. The data show that the committee increased its budget advocacy in that period; however, it still acted as a budget guardian a majority of the time, as it had in the period studied by Fenno. The findings support Fenno's argument that the committee's response to the president's budget request depended on several factors, including who was president and what agency was involved. Further, this study demonstrates the utility of a micro-budgetary focus on change or stability in the role of the House Appropriations Committee.},

number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {GEIGER, SM},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PE01700006},
pages = {397--416}
}

@article{clucas_effect_1994,
title = {{THE} {EFFECT} {OF} {CAMPAIGN} {CONTRIBUTIONS} {ON} {THE} {POWER} {OF} {THE} {CALIFORNIA} {ASSEMBLY} {SPEAKER}},
volume = {19},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/440140},
abstract = {The provision of goods and services is routinely accepted as a primary source of power for legislative leaders, yet few studies analyze how these goods influence members' behavior, or even whether they do. This study tests the hypothesis that the distribution of goods generates an exchange between leaders and followers, increasing the leaders' power over the legislative process. Specifically, the study examines how the distribution of campaign assistance by the past two Speakers of the California Assembly affected support for their positions on major roll-call votes. The findings indicate that recipients of contributions are no more likely than nonrecipients to support the Speaker on these votes.},
number = {3},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {CLUCAS, RA},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994PE01700007},
pages = {417--428}
}

@article{mezey_presidents_1994,
title = {{PRESIDENTS} {AND} {ASSEMBLIES} - {CONSTITUTIONAL} {DESIGN} {AND} {ELECTORAL} {DYNAMICS} - {SHUGART},{MS}, {CAREY},{JM}},
volume = {19},
This issue and portions of the next two issues of this Quarterly are devoted to articles discussing formal theories of legislatures. They were commissioned and edited by Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast who serve as guest editors of this issue. In the following introduction to this issue the guest editors explain the origins and purposes of this special series.

This paper surveys the range of formal theories that have been developed in recent years to accommodate and explain various legislative practices. The newer theories, especially those emphasizing informational aspects of decision making and partisan features of legislative politics, constitute departures from an earlier tradition of modeling gains from exchange. The authors suggest how these newer developments blend with their forebears and yet still constitute critical departures. These approaches, it is argued, may be distinguished from one another by the weight each places on the demand side and supply side of legislative decision making.
Do rational legislators assign parliamentary rights in accordance with extremity and intensity of particularistic preferences? In numerous works in legislative studies, the gains from exchange hypothesis answers yes and asserts that such a legislative organization is politically efficient, since its outcomes give individual legislators more benefits in the policy domains they care about most. Such is the essence of logrolling. Surprisingly, no explicit and formal derivation of this hypothesis exists in the literature. This article presents and analyzes a model that embodies formally the essential features of pins from exchange as described in informal accounts: (1) different legislators receive differential benefits from distinct and particularistic policies, (2) bundles of collectively chosen policies are differentially efficient; and (3) preferences are such that there is no pure majority-rule equilibrium. Other forms of legislative organization are analyzed in an infinitely repeated noncooperative divide the dollar game. When legislators must choose from only two institutional arrangements-majority cloture and unanimous cloture—they indeed choose the gains from exchange institution, as hypothesized elsewhere. Two qualifications are significant, however. First, in contradiction of earlier informal theories, we find this result occurs for reasons unrelated to efficiency. Second, when the range of institutional arrangements is expanded only slightly, gains from exchange forms of legislative organization are not chosen and outcomes are inefficient. Students of legislatures are therefore cautioned against taking informal theories of gains from exchange at face value.
extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership, members must support Caucus decisions on the floor on a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence the policy decisions made in the House. We examine the rules of the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain the essential elements of an effective, extra-legislative bonding mechanism.

@article{londregan_comparing_1994,
  title = {{COMPARING} {COMMITTEE} {AND} {FLOOR} {PREFERENCES}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440426},
  abstract = {We propose a statistical model which permits us to test whether congressional committees are preference outliers. Unlike previous tests, our model acknowledges that each representative's policy preferences are unique and that a comparison of committee and floor preferences must account for this heterogeneity. We apply our model to the House of Representatives over the period 1951 to 1984 and identify many more committee outliers than previous research.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {LONDREGAN, J. and SNYDER, JM},
  month = may,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994NV48800005},
  pages = {233--266}
}

@article{baron_sequential_1994,
  title = {{A} {SEQUENTIAL} {CHOICE} {THEORY} {PERSPECTIVE} {ON} {LEGISLATIVE} {ORGANIZATION}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440427},
  abstract = {This essay presents a sequential choice theory of legislative organization as an alternative to social choice theories. Because of the sequential process of proposal making and voting, sequential choice theory yields equilibrium predictions for both particularistic goods programs and unidimensional and multidimensional collective goods programs. The theory thus does not require
legislative organization and procedures to yield stability. Although
this study does not present a formal theory of the choice of
legislative organization, sequential choice theory allows an
assessment of collective and individualistic incentives for the choice
of legislative organization and procedures. For example, the
legislature has collective incentives to control individualistic
incentives and can exercise control by allowing amendments to
committee proposals. Sequential choice theory also addresses the
durability issue that arises because current legislatures cannot bind
future legislatures. In the theory, legislators position programs
strategically to limit future changes.),
number = {2},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {BARON, DP},
month = may,
year = {1994},
note = {WOS:A1994NV48800006},
pages = {267--296}
}

@article{mishler_support_1994,
  title = {{SUPPORT} {FOR} {PARLIAMENTS} {AND} {REGIMES} {IN} {THE}
{TRANSITION} {TOWARD} {DEMOCRACY}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439797},
  abstract = {The generation and maintenance of public support is
among the most important functions ascribed to legislatures in
democratizing or newly democratic regimes. Survey data from six
eastern European countries in transition from authoritarian to
pluralistic regimes confirm that public support for legislatures is
remarkably widespread. Predictably, support is highest among attentive
publics and those most satisfied with the performance of the economy.
However, the extent of support even among those most dissatisfied with
the economy suggests that the basis of support is substantially
symbolic or diffuse in nature. As was to be expected, the relationship
between legislative and regime support is reciprocal, although support
for legislatures is much more a consequence than a cause of support
for the regime.),
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MISHLER, W. and ROSE, R.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100001},
  pages = {5--32}
}

@article{moncrief_professionalization_1994,
  title = {{PROFESSIONALIZATION} {AND} {CAREERISM} {IN} {CANADIAN}
{PROVINCIAL} {ASSEMBLIES} {COMPARISON} {TO} {UNITED}-{STATES}}
The development of legislative professionalization is well documented in U.S. state legislatures, where it is closely associated with the advent of careerism. This association is partly responsible for the term limit movement. In this paper we show that Canadian provincial legislative assemblies have undergone a similar trend toward professionalization but that careerism has been less evident. Turnover rates are higher than under similar conditions in U.S. state legislatures because the electoral advantage of incumbency is substantially smaller in Canadian provincial elections. We identify five reasons why incumbents are less advantaged in the Canadian system.

Research on how state legislative term limits affect legislative organization and policy is primarily conjectural, since these limits have been in place for only a short period. However, the effects of retroactive term limits can be analyzed and can yield, with some certainty, the impact of these limits on tenure. Using an earlier study as a model, I develop a cohort analysis to assess how many state legislators currently serving would be affected by a retroactive eight-year term limit. I find that a majority of state legislators both in states that have not adopted term limits and in the 15 states that have adopted limits would be forced out of office. Variation in retention rates is related to chamber, to Squire's opportunity type, and to legislative professionalism, although the last factor does not come into play as heavily in states where term limits already exist.
A clearer understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of measures of legislative preferences is essential for resolving substantive disputes about the composition of standing committees in legislatures. In criticizing interest group ratings as measures of legislative preferences, two recent works make important contributions to understanding these measures (Hall and Grofman 1990; Snyder 1992a). However, some key methodological issues remain unclear or unresolved. This paper first formalizes and inspects Hall and Grofman's claim that interest group ratings bias tests of the preference-outlier hypothesis to no-difference results when noncommittee members treat committee proposals with deference. It then examines Snyder's model of artificial extremism which leads to a similar conjecture about no-difference results. Within a formal notion of deference and empirically plausible conditions, Hall and Grofman's claim is shown not to hold. While Snyder's claim (as Snyder also notes) is shown not to hold in general, artificial extremism does tend to produce the conjectured bias on average. The bias is small, however, and the chance that it leads to faulty inferences is also small.

It is widely argued that legislative resources enable incumbents to increase their margins of victory. Changes within the New York Senate provide an opportunity to assess this thesis. Within a few years during the early 1970s, legislative resources increased substantially and abruptly. The legislative budget increased, a legislative office building opened, and district offices were established. There were also strong political motivations for the Senate legislative parties to become more concerned with retaining incumbent legislators. This analysis assesses changes in electoral margins from 1950 to 1990 and finds a distinct change in average
margins of victory after the early 1970s. In addition, in the era after 1974, legislators experienced significantly larger sophomore surges. The greatest increases were among those whose initial elections were close, a finding which suggests that resources are targeted.

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To account for the increase in divided government in the United States, Fiorina has advanced a purposive theory of split-ticket voting that emphasizes voters' desire to balance the relative policy 'tremism of the Democratic and Republican parties. This study uncovers little empirical evidence to substantiate the policy-balancing model. Respondents' issue-scale placements of the president and federal government challenge the premise that national policy is perceived as a weighted average of the individual positions staked out by the executive and congressional branches. More importantly, conditional logit analysis in three of the five presidential-year elections from 1972 to 1988 provides no support for Fiorina's central tenet that voters will endorse the presidential-House pair for which the averaged partisan position is closest to their own ideological preference. Finally, there is only scattered support for the propositions that are developed as logical 'tensions of this theory.'
@article{born_split-ticket_1994-1,
  title = {{SPLIT}-{TICKET} {VOTERS}, {DIVIDED} {GOVERNMENT}, {AND} {FIORINA} {POLICY}-{BALANCING} {MODEL} - {REJOINDER}},
  volume = {19},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439804},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {BORN, R.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1994},
  note = {WOS:A1994MZ46100008},
  pages = {126--129}
}

@article{muller_executive-legislative_1993,
  title = {{EXECUTIVE}-{LEGISLATIVE} {RELATIONS} {IN} {AUSTRIA} - 1945-1992},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439851},
  abstract = {This article analyzes changes in executive-legislative relations in Austria over the postwar period. The intragovernment mode and the opposition mode are identified as the most important patterns of relations. Two explanations for the changes within these relations are offered: increasing party system competitiveness and the differing degrees of executive-legislative competitiveness of the types of government in postwar Austria. While both causes are relevant, it is primarily the government types that have influenced executive-legislative relations and account for their changes over time. Finally, the Austrian case is put into comparative perspective. Its peculiar stress on consensus between government and opposition is explained as a special form of political competition.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {MULLER, WC},
  month = nov,
  year = {1993},
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100001},
  pages = {467--494}
}
This paper uses district-level electoral returns to estimate the size of the incumbency advantage in 24 U.S. states over the period from 1970 to 1986. Our major findings are two: first, the incumbency advantage in the median state roughly doubled over the time period investigated; second, this increase can be explained in terms of the growth of legislative operating budgets and, by inference, in casework and other particularistic services provided by state legislators to their constituents.

The research presented here is designed to answer some of the questions that remain regarding the impact of campaign expenditures on state legislative elections. Analysis of data from 12 states indicates that there is a significant relationship between campaign expenditures and the party vote in state house elections. The effect of expenditures conforms to the principle of diminishing marginal returns. The relationship, in several states, attains a level that make expenditures among the most important factors in state house races. Finally, the analysis uncovers both interstate and partisan differences in the importance of expenditures, a finding that opens up a whole new set of research questions.
Campaign professionals maintain that early money is more valuable than money raised late in the campaign, because it increases the success of later fund raising. We find that early fund raising by House challengers does stimulate later receipts, especially for those who lack experience in elected office. For these candidates, early money from any source improves later fund raising from all sources. For candidates who have held elected office, however, only early money from individual contributors is a significant predictor of later receipts from PACs.

This article treats universalization as a dynamic process encompassing the administration of programs within the political context of a policy subsystem. An analysis of federal mass transportation programs from 1965 through 1986 finds that subgovernment actors worked to broaden authorized programs and create related programs to serve an original core clientele and newer peripheral constituencies.

To advise and consent - the United States Congress and foreign policy in the 20th century -
@article{eulau_modern_1993,
  title = {{THE} {MODERN} {AMERICAN} {CONGRESS}, 1963-1989 - {SILBEY}, {J}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439856},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {EULAU, H.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1993},
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100014},
  pages = {569--592}
}

@article{eulau_united-states-congress_1993,
  title = {{THE} {UNITED}-{STATES}-{CONGRESS} {IN} {A} {NATION} {TRANSFORMED}, 1896-1963 - {SILBEY}, {J}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439856},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {EULAU, H.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1993},
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100013},
  pages = {569--592}
}

@article{eulau_united-states-congress_1993-1,
  title = {{THE} {UNITED}-{STATES}-{CONGRESS} {IN} {A} {PARTISAN} {POLITICAL} {NATION}, 1841-1896 - {SILBEY}, {J}},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439856},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {EULAU, H.},
  month = nov,
  year = {1993},
  note = {WOS:A1993MH86100011},
  pages = {569--592}
}
This article evaluates political career movement from house to senate in U.S. state legislatures. The most distinguishing feature of this movement is that house members are extraordinarily successful when they do run, winning over four-fifths of their campaigns for open seats and over two-thirds of the races against senate incumbents. Their success is explained principally by their selectivity in deciding whether to run. This analysis details the rational basis for why House members are so selective.

Using a random coefficients model and regression analysis, the authors examine the effects of incumbency in U.S. House and Senate elections since 1950. The model is based on assumptions about the behavior of voters. A strong effect for incumbency is demonstrated, amounting to at least 10 percentage points in the popular vote in elections since 1974. Part of the effect occurs because incumbents by definition do not run against incumbents. A significant time trend emerges, and there is a significant difference in the effect between presidential and nonpresidential years. The effect is robust, being relatively insensitive to changes in the specification of the underlying model. The model is also used to examine changes over time in the attachment of voters to political parties.

Using a random coefficients model and regression analysis, the authors examine the effects of incumbency in U.S. House and Senate elections since 1950. The model is based on assumptions about the behavior of voters. A strong effect for incumbency is demonstrated, amounting to at least 10 percentage points in the popular vote in elections since 1974. Part of the effect occurs because incumbents by definition do not run against incumbents. A significant time trend emerges, and there is a significant difference in the effect between presidential and nonpresidential years. The effect is robust, being relatively insensitive to changes in the specification of the underlying model. The model is also used to examine changes over time in the attachment of voters to political parties.
This paper proposes a new explanation for Democratic dominance in the House of Representatives: the greater propensity of Republicans to retire. A higher rate of retirement means that Republicans sacrifice the advantages of incumbency and thereby reduce the probability that the party will retain a seat after the election. This factor depresses Republican strength in the House by an amount we estimate at between 5 and 15 seats. In this paper we document the phenomenon of early retirement among Republicans and explain the relationship between retirement and party strength in legislatures. We then develop a mathematical model to estimate a steady state or equilibrium partisan balance in the House, based on long-term rates of retirement, open-seat victories, and incumbent defeats. This model allows us to estimate the overall impact of early Republican retirement and other factors on partisan strength.
This paper analyzes how PAC contributions from defense contractors influence members' votes for prodefense positions on the floor of the House of Representatives. Previous studies of defense voting in Congress have emphasized the powerful effects of ideological predispositions on members' roll-call votes on national defense. By contrast, PAC contributions are hypothesized to have a marginal impact. Even at the margins, the influence of PAC money is not likely to be the same for all members; it is hypothesized to be greater for moderate members than for liberal or conservative members. Because of the problem of simultaneous influences of PAC money and roll-call votes, a two-stage least squares estimation procedure is employed. The results once again confirm the powerful effects of ideology on defense voting but also indicate that PAC contributions exert a statistically significant (though marginal) impact even when ideological predisposition is controlled. In addition, the results support the argument that those members with weaker ideological predispositions are more responsive to the effects of PAC money. Finally, the results indicate that, even at the margins, PAC contributions from defense contractors can influence the outcome of legislative deliberations, especially when the vote margin is not very large.

Survey research with members of the New York State Legislature revealed support for differing views on crime causation and control. Scales measuring support for liberal and conservative perspectives toward crime and punishment were developed. Multivariate analyses indicated that legislators' race, gender, and party affiliation were consistent correlates of crime control ideology. The characteristics of New York legislators that are associated with crime control ideology have remained stable over time.
In recent years the study of the Canadian Parliament has lost some of its original momentum. Major gaps in research have begun to appear, and critics have argued that students of Parliament take a much too docile, uncritical view of parliamentary government as it is practiced in Canada. This article reviews recent research on the Canadian Parliament in light of these criticisms and compares it to more established work on the subject. The prospects are not as bleak as the critics maintain, but the authors express concern that Parliament may no longer pose the kind of intellectual challenge that attracted researchers in previous generations.
Parliament have remained largely unexplored by empirical research. This lack of attention reflects the conventional view that the Italian legislature has not developed institutional autonomy, complexity, and stability. This article begins to examine legislative behaviour in committees and explore whether informal rules and patterns may be traced. Evidence suggests that deputies have begun to make full use of the range of formal powers at their disposal. Moreover, some institutional specialization and complexity seems to be taking shape within the committee system, raising questions as to whether the problem of Parliament is still that of its institutionalization.
attention to the committee setting, this paper shows that previous measures of party influence have generally underestimated the strength of parties in Congress and have invariably presented a simplified version of their activity. Measures of party conflict, unity, and success in four House committees show that, in the differentiated committee system, parties structure voting differently across decision-making environments and are stronger than on the floor. In the legislative environment of the 1980s, voting patterns in all committees and on the floor converged toward partisanship, even as electoral and organizational indicators of party remained relatively weak.

@article{livingston_reexamining_1993,
  title = {REEXAMINING THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL RETIREMENT - EVIDENCE FROM THE 1980S},
  volume = {18},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439992},
  abstract = {An early scholarly consensus that congressional retirements would become increasingly rare as careerism became the norm was upset by the surge of retirements in the 1970s. This surge led a second wave of theorists to argue that retirements would increase in response to a growing disaffection with congressional service. Using House and Senate data from the 1980s, we update and critique these analyses of congressional retirements. We conclude that the 1970s were in fact an aberration. The evidence of the 1980s supports earlier explanations of retirement and scholars' more general understanding of congressional behavior: the vast majority of members seek continued reelection. Retirements are relatively rare, and, to the extent that they are systemically driven, are responses to age, institutional characteristics, and electoral difficulties. We present a model of congressional retirement that uses a discriminant analysis and incorporates these factors and their interactions.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {LIVINGSTON, SG and FRIEDMAN, S.},
  month = may,
  year = {1993},
  note = {WOS:A1993LA89800005},
  pages = {231--253}
}

@article{nye_conservative_1993,
Research on the Conservative Coalition has focused primarily on collective activity and aggregate outcomes. To understand change in coalition activity over time, this study explores age, period, and cohort effects. When party is controlled and longitudinal, cross-sectional, and time-lag differences are explored, period effects stand out as important determinants of coalition voting. Findings also indicate that the support of nonsouthern Democrats for the coalition varies considerably over time.

Candidate visibility has become a key variable in the study of congressional elections. There is ample evidence that visibility is a substantial advantage, one which almost always favors incumbents. In this paper I trace the visibility of members of the U.S. Senate between their bids for reelection and over their political careers. I find that there is a moderate drop off of visibility near the midpoint of a Senate term, and a fairly sizable rise in prominence in the two years leading up to a reelection bid. Yet, even in the middle of the term, incumbent senators remain quite salient in the minds of the public. Over an entire career, visibility cumulates for some perceptions and does not cumulate much for others. This differential accretion of visibility may have important consequences. Finally, I argue for the need to study perceptions of incumbents outside of the election period. The time of governing is at the center of a republican society, yet we have few studies of how governing is linked to public perceptions of incumbents.
The legislature is a collective decision-making body in which patterns of interpersonal esteem or mutual respect provide a foundation for purposive action. We map the networks of legislators' choices of respected members among their colleagues, and then we elaborate and test a model of interpersonal respect. The coefficients in the model are estimated from data drawn from interviews in 1965 with Iowa state legislators. We demonstrate that respect rests largely upon performance, achievement, and formal position, that the bases of respect differ from those of political friendship in important ways, that Democrats and Republicans accord colleagues respect on the basis of different criteria, and that freshman and veteran members respond to different forces in nominating respected members.

This paper examines the relationship between legislative election outcomes in California and the partisan predispositions of district electorates as reflected in voter registration data. It gauges the extent to which Democratic candidates for Congress and the state legislature over a two-decade period have failed to receive election-day support commensurate with their party's district registration, and it considers how this shortfall is affected by a series of intervening variables. The analysis develops and tests criteria by which political practitioners and observers can assess the electability of legislative candidates. Further, it addresses such issues as incumbency effects, the relative weakness of the legislative candidates of the president's party in midterm elections, and nascent Republican realignment beginning with the 1980 election.
To obtain additional funding after regular appropriations have been enacted, the president submits requests for supplemental appropriations to the Congress. Supplemental appropriations have been considered technical adjustments to various unpredictables and have received little attention in studies of the budgetary process. This study addresses the determinants of supplemental appropriations between fiscal years 1950 and 1989. The analysis reveals that supplemental appropriations have been used regularly both for discretionary purposes and to maintain the budgetary status quo. Ultimately, the need for and use of supplemental appropriations are much more substantial and politically defined than a theory of pure deficiencies implies.

State legislators have been moving into the House of Representatives with increasing frequency over the last 30 years. They enter the House with mastery over both institutional politics and particular areas of public policy, and they use this mastery to rapidly attain committee positions from which they can promote policy ideas developed from their state experiences. The extent of this mastery and their specific policy interests are shaped by the degree to which their state legislature is professionalized, the committee positions they held in the state, and their activeness in state policy making. Through interviews and analysis of committee assignments, four types of former state legislators in the House are identified: policy masters, policy participants, voluntary switchers, and disappointed
switchers.},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {BERKMAN, MB},
    month = feb,
    year = {1993},
    note = {WOS:A1993KQ48600004},
    pages = {77--104}
)

@article{leogrande_house_1993,
    title = {{THE} {HOUSE} {DIVIDED} - {IDEOLOGICAL} {POLARIZATION} {OVER} {AID} {TO} {THE} {NICARAGUAN} {CONTRAS}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440028},
    abstract = {{This study analyzes voting patterns in the House of Representatives on aid to the Nicaraguan contras during the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses, in order to examine three theoretical issues: the importance of ideology as a determinant of congressional voting behavior, the relative importance of conversion and member replacement in explaining congressional policy shifts, and the impact of changes in contextual factors on members' voting decisions. As in many recent studies of defense and foreign policy issues, the member's ideology proved to be the predominant factor in explaining contra aid votes. Party and region were also significant, but the constituency's ideology and the electoral vulnerability of members were not. Though membership replacement was a key factor in the shifting balance between the pro-contra and anti-contra blocs, replacement alone was not sufficient to explain changes in the House majority. Conversion was equally important and proved to be a function of President Reagan's standing in the polls and of events in central America that altered the political atmosphere of the debate. Public opinion on the contra aid issue and the content of aid proposals showed no effect.}},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {LEOGRANDE, WM and BRENNER, P.},
    month = feb,
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    pages = {105--136}
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@article{berg_representation_1993,
    title = {{REPRESENTATION} {OF} {THE} {OPRESSED} {IN} {THE} {UNITED} {STATES} {CONGRESS} - {STRUCTURAL} {LIMITS} {ON} {CAPITALIST} {DEMOCRACY}},
    volume = {18},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {BERKMAN, MB},
    month = feb,
    year = {1993},
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    pages = {105--136}
)
@article{chisholm.rules.1993,
  title={{THE} {RULES} {ARE} {NEVER} {NEUTRAL} - {GENERAL} {LEGISLATION} (IN) 19TH-{CENTURY} {NAVAL} {APPROPRIATIONS}},
  volume={18},
  issn={0362-9805},
  number={1},
  journal={Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author={CHISHOLM, D.},
  month=feb,
  year=1993,
  note={WOS:A1993KQ48600025},
  pages={144--145}
}

@article{huber.role.1993,
  title={{THE} {ROLE} {OF} {THE} {GUILLOTINE} (IN) 5TH {REPUBLIC} {FRANCE}},
  volume={18},
  issn={0362-9805},
  number={1},
  journal={Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author={HUBER, J.},
  month=feb,
  year=1993,
  note={WOS:A1993KQ48600026},
  pages={144--145}
}

@article{bader.86th.1993,
  title={{THE} 86TH AND 100TH {CONGRESSES} - {CHANGING} {GOALS} AND {A} {NEW} {DEFINITION} (OF) {SUCCESS} (IN) {PRESIDENTIAL} {RELATIONS}},
  volume={18},
  issn={0362-9805},
  number={1},
  journal={Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author={BADER, J.},
  month=feb,
  year=1993,
  note={WOS:A1993KQ48600028},
  pages={145--145}
}

@article{conley.electoral.1993,
  title={{ELECTORAL} {MANDATES} - {STRATEGY} (AND) {INFERENCES}}
Researchers concerned with women's access to public office are now studying the effects that electoral institutions have on female representation. Within the United States, a number of scholars have considered the effect of district magnitude on female representation in state legislatures. A controversy exists as to whether women are better represented in systems with multimember districts than in those with single-member districts only. This article presents the theoretical reasons why multimember districts should give women an advantage, reviews the empirical literature, proposes several hypotheses that would reconcile the inconsistent results in the empirical literature, and then tests those hypotheses in two states over a 22-year period. The results provide strong confirmation of the effect of district magnitude and cast serious doubt on those studies which show little effect. In closing, the authors suggest that their findings have important public policy implications for women's representation in state legislatures.
This study compares the performance of male and female candidates in open-seat primary elections for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1968 through 1990. Female candidates throughout this period tend to do as well as their male counterparts in acquiring votes and winning open-seat primaries. They are not appreciatively older than their male challengers, and they have had equal experience in public office prior to seeking a seat in the U.S. House. The fact that women hold few seats in the House is primarily due to the scarcity of their numbers in these races.

Are female legislators more likely than male legislators to actively represent women and women's concerns? A behavioral approach to this question might examine the legislators' roll-call votes and policy priorities. This article, instead, takes an attitudinal approach, focusing on legislators' predispositions that may or may not lead to active representation of women. Using data gathered primarily from interviews with California and Arizona state legislators, we find that female legislators are, indeed, more likely than their male counterparts to think of themselves as representatives of women and to consider women an important constituency group with particular political concerns. Evidence also suggests that female legislators tend to believe that, because of their gender, they are uniquely qualified to or responsible for representing women's
concerns. More importantly, they are more likely to accept this notion than their male colleagues are to reject it. Finally, interstate differences in these attitudes suggest that the entire issue of political representation of women is more salient in the California legislature than in Arizona legislature.

@article{hedlund_electoral_1992,
  title = {THE ELECTORAL ANTECEDENTS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439865},
  abstract = {In this analysis, data on committee assignment requests for four state legislatures are analyzed to test the reelection hypothesis—that legislators receive committee assignments which help insure their subsequent reelection. In Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Maine, we gathered committee request data for lower house members elected in 1986. Election data derive from State Legislative Election Returns in the United States, 1968-86, a data collection of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. In general, the analytical results disconfirm the reelection hypothesis but show that legislators' strategic decisions have important effects on committee assignment success.},
  number = {4},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {HEDLUND, RD and PATTERSON, SC},
  month = nov,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992KC05900004},
  pages = {539--559}
}

@article{platt_directional_1992,
  title = {DIRECTIONAL AND EUCLIDEAN THEORIES OF VOTING-BEHAVIOR - (A) LEGISLATIVE COMPARISON},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439866},
  abstract = {Recent research by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) claims that voting behavior is better accounted for by a directional model than by a traditional proximity or Euclidean model. This paper compares directional and Euclidean models using congressional roll-call voting data. For these relatively well-informed voters, we can
unambiguously reject the directional model in favor of the traditional Euclidean spatial model. We conclude that congressional voting can indeed be very accurately represented by the Euclidean model.

@article{hickman_effect_1992,
title = {{THE} {EFFECT} {OF} {OPEN} {SEATS} {ON} {CHALLENGER} {STRENGTH} {IN} {JAPANESE} {LOWER} {HOUSE} {ELECTIONS}},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/439867},
abstract = {This research tests the hypothesis that Japanese Lower House (multimember) districts with more open seats attract more strong challengers. Lower House incumbents are reelected at higher percentage rates than challengers are elected. Using data for the 10 most recent elections to the Lower House (1963-90), measures appropriate to the medium-sized district, single-entry ballot electoral system were constructed for the proportion of open seats and the effective number of strong challengers in each district. Analysis shows that strong challengers enter district races in proportion to the opportunities presented by open seats.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {HICKMAN, J.},
month = nov,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992KC05900006},
pages = {573--584}
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@article{coats_note_1992,
title = {A {NOTE} {ON} {THE} {COST} {OF} {STANDING} {FOR} {THE} {BRITISH} {PARLIAMENT} - 1852-1880},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
doi = {10.2307/439868},
abstract = {It has been noted that the cost of running for a county parliamentary seat in nineteenth-century Britain was about twice the cost of running for a borough seat. Since there were no residency requirements and no difference in political power between the borough and county MPs, this persistent price discrepancy needs explanation. Higher informational costs in the counties may have led to fewer contested elections.},
number = {4},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {COATS, P.},
month = nov,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992KC05900007},
pages = {585--599}
}
@article{snyder_artificial_1992,
  title = {{ARTIFICIAL} {EXTREMISM} {IN} {INTEREST} {GROUP} {RATINGS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439733},
  abstract = {This paper shows that interest group ratings based on roll-call voting records tend to exaggerate the degree of extremism and bipolarity in Congress. That is, the scores assigned to relatively moderate members of Congress are typically more extreme than their true positions. The paper then examines some of the implications of this bias for empirical studies that use ratings.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SNYDER, JM},
  month = aug,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992JK65400001},
  pages = {319--345}
}

@article{canon_party_1992,
  title = {{PARTY} {SYSTEM} {CHANGE} {AND} {POLITICAL} {CAREER} {STRUCTURES} {IN} {THE} {UNITED}-{STATES} {CONGRESS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/439734},
  abstract = {We join concerns with party system change, ambition theory, and political career structures in a comparative analysis of the realignments of the 1930s, the Civil War period, and recent changes in the South. To understand the relationships among elections, party system change, and policy change, research must focus on the strategic responses of politicians to electoral change. Our findings indicate that politicians' interpretations of developing events and their decisions about how to react in light of their career goals are integral elements of the realigning process.},
  number = {3},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {CANON, DT and SOUSA, DJ},
  month = aug,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992JK65400002},
  pages = {347--363}
We examine the relationships between black population and congressional liberalism over three decades, disaggregated by region (South, non-South). We show that different types of constituency effects have applied in different periods and in different regions of the country. Our work is unique in looking at the potential political implications of districting schemes that either concentrate or disperse black population across congressional districts. We show how such redistricting choices might be expected to affect mean congressional liberalism and to affect the likelihood that Democrats will be elected to the House of Representatives in the 1990s. We also explore the claim that creating majority black districts reduces the mean policy liberalism of Congress by leading to Republican and conservative gains in districts that have been stripped of black voters.

This study seeks to explain why some state legislative incumbents draw challengers and others do not. To that end, it analyzes decisions to challenge in races for the Florida House of Representatives between 1972 and 1980. Although it finds little evidence of strategic decision making among challengers in primary elections, incumbents who appear to be vulnerable are more likely to be challenged in the general election. The conditions which are less directly under an incumbent's influence are more likely to influence decisions to challenge.
Many news organizations have ranked or rated state legislators in their state as "best" or "most effective" and "worst" or "least effective," sometimes using several groups of informants, such as legislators, lobbyists, agency heads, and capital correspondents. Other organizations merely give the impressions of reporters. Obviously those rated worst are displeased with this evaluation and at least somewhat anxious as to what it will mean when they next face an election. This study assesses the validity of these rankings and their impact at the polls. The media rankings cannot be dismissed as invalid, and legislators cannot dismiss their impact at the polls. It helps to be ranked as among the best and it hurts to be among the worst, although the effects are small.

In this research note we investigate the sources and distribution of campaign funds for state legislative candidates in North Carolina, a state categorized by relatively strong interest groups and weak political parties. Consistent with previous studies, we find that political action committees (PACs) contribute more money and a larger proportion of funds to incumbents. In addition, PACs favor legislative leaders. Conversely, the state Republican party's strategy appears to be one of funding challengers in close races and assisting incumbents in competitive districts.
Since the end of the Vietnam War Congress has reclaimed a role for itself in the making of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Although the surge in congressional activism has attracted considerable normative commentary, political scientists have devoted relatively little effort to exploring the causes and consequences of Congress's renewed interest in foreign policy. To stimulate more empirical study in this area, this paper summarizes the existing work on foreign and defense policy in Congress and identifies opportunities for new research.

In many Dutch and comparative studies of executive-legislative relations the Dutch case eludes straightforward classification. Application of King's typology of modes of executive-legislative relations shows that the pattern of interactions between ministers and MPs has evolved from a primarily nonparty mode to a predominantly interparty mode. However, Dutch executive-legislative relations appear ambiguous primarily because all modes still exist to some extent, and Parliament can change gear according to the type of issue that is on the agenda.
This paper uses 1979-90 national cross-sectional and panel data to investigate how the public perceives Canadian MPs' representational activities and how these perceptions are influenced by the occurrence and outcomes of national elections. Responsiveness perceptions are structured in terms of two closely related representation and service factors. Although the occurrence of elections and identification with the winning national party positively influence these perceptions, the effects are modest and, in the aggregate, large majorities of Canadians express reservations about the responsiveness of MPs. The paper concludes by arguing that structural features of the Canadian political system and the brevity of parliamentary careers make it difficult for MPs to develop images as responsive public servants while leaving them exposed to the free-floating discontent that characterizes Canadians' feelings about politics and politicians.

The study of legislative influence has suffered from serious conceptual and methodological problems, and as a result important theoretical claims on the subject have proven difficult to evaluate. In this paper, I present a technique for measuring legislative influence based on a simple survey instrument administered to congressional staffers. The instrument elicits information about the effect of individual members' preferences on the substance of specific pieces of legislation. The measure is simple, is easy to administer, and squares well with how legislative scholars typically use the concept of influence, while avoiding many of the analytical problems associated with general reputational rankings or indicators derived from behavioral data. The measure stands up well under systematic tests of reliability and validity. And it is applicable to a wide range of bills for which plausible assumptions or reasonable
inferences about member preferences are not easily made.

@article{serra_electoral_1992,
  title = {{THE} {ELECTORAL} {CONSEQUENCES} {OF} {PERQUISITE} {USE} - {THE} {CASEWORK} {CASE}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440059},
  abstract = {The belief is widespread that incumbents have enhanced their bid for reelection by using the perquisites of office skillfully. The evidence supporting this belief is mixed, however. This study begins by examining how a particular perquisite, casework, affects incumbent saliency and reputation among constituents. Within an appropriate research design, the study finds that an incumbent's ombudsman service creates a more positive evaluation of the incumbent and increases the incumbent's saliency among constituents. These results are incorporated into a model used to predict the electoral consequences of perquisite use. The model suggests that perquisites have most impact in constituencies in which a relatively small proportion of voters identify with incumbent's party.},
  number = {2},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SERRA, G. and COVER, AD},
  month = may,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HX03600004},
  pages = {233--246}
}

@article{squire_challenger_1992,
  title = {{CHALLENGER} {QUALITY} {AND} {VOTING}-{BEHAVIOR} {IN} {UNITED}-{STATES} {SENATE} {ELECTIONS}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440060},
  abstract = {A number of aggregate-level studies find that challenger quality is an important variable in explaining congressional election outcomes. Using the National Election Studies' 1988 Senate Election Study, I provide individual-level evidence supporting this claim. I develop and test measures of two aspects of challenger quality, one based on political experience and the other on campaign skills. Senate challengers who hold higher profile offices and those who are good campaigners are better known and better liked...}
by voters and are much more likely to get votes, even with partisanship and campaign spending controlled. The findings reaffirm that candidates and campaigns matter in explaining election outcomes.

@article{squire_legislative_1992,
    title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {LEADERSHIP} {AND} {CAMPAIGN} {SUPPORT} {IN} {CALIFORNIA}},
    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440065},
    abstract = {This article argues that legislative leaders are rational goal-seeking actors but, unlike other legislators, they are motivated preeminently by the desire to retain power. To test this argument, the article examines the strategy used by California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown in distributing campaign support from 1982 to 1986. The findings indicate that Brown has followed a strategy different from the one traditionally associated with congressional leaders but that both act rationally to retain power. The difference in strategy is attributed to the state's control of reapportionment, which puts pressure on the Speaker to maximize his party's position in the Assembly.},
    number = {2},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {CLUCAS, RA},
    month = may,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HX03600006},
    pages = {265--283}
}

@article{ellickson_pathways_1992,
    title = {{PATHWAYS} TO {LEGISLATIVE} SUCCESS - {A} PATH {ANALYTIC} STUDY OF THE MISSOURI HOUSE-OF-REPRESENTATIVES},
    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440062},
    abstract = {A causal model depicting personal, environmental, and institutional pathways to legislative success is developed and tested with data drawn from the 1987-88 Missouri House of Representatives. With legislative success conceptualized as a multistep process ending in bill passage, direct paths to success include political party,
seniority, formal office, age, race, and educational level. Institutional variables have the strongest impact on legislative success and environmental factors the weakest. Age, urbanism, seniority, and political party affect legislative success indirectly through their effect on formal office, an intervening variable. The results of the path analysis provide strong support for the proposed model, with over 50% of the variance in legislative success explained by antecedent variables.

@article{vanroozendaal_effect_1992,
  title = {{THE} {EFFECT} {OF} {DOMINANT} {AND} {CENTRAL} {PARTIES} {ON} {CABINET} {COMPOSITION} {AND} {DURABILITY}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This article develops a typology of parliamentary games on the basis of the combined presence or absence of parties that are dominant and central players in the game. The author uses the typology to derive predictions with regard to cabinet composition and durability and tests these predictions with data on 382 cabinets in western multiparty democracies (1918-88). The results show that the approach developed here offers a promising perspective for further research on cabinet composition and durability.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {VANROOZENDAAL, P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HK23900001},
  pages = {5--36}
}

@article{moncrief_for_1992,
  title = {{FOR} {WHOM} {THE} {BELL} {TOLLS} - {TERM} {LIMITS} {AND} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440079},
  abstract = {The move to limit terms of office for state legislators is one of the most important political phenomena of this decade. Oklahoma, Colorado, and California passed term limitation measures in 1990, and about 40 more states considered such action in 1991. This note is an initial effort to assess the potential effect of enacting such limitations. We develop a cohort analysis to measure how
many of the legislators currently serving would be affected by term
limitations. We find that most state legislators do not stay in the
institution for as long as 12 years. Variation in retention rates is
related to chamber (house or senate), to Squire's opportunity type,
and especially to legislative professionalism.),

    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {MONCRIEF, GF and THOMPSON, JA and HADDON, M. and HOYER,
R.},
    month = feb,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HK23900002},
    pages = {37--47}
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@article{luttbeg_legislative_1992,
    title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {CAREERS} {IN} 6 {STATES} - {ARE} {SOME} {LEGISLATURES} {MORE} {LIKELY} {TO}},
    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440080},
    abstract = {We expect more responsiveness to the public in a more
competitive political system. This paper focuses on the careers of
members of the lower houses of six state legislatures to see how
states differ in the competition that legislators typically experience
over a career. On many of the measures, states differ as we might
expect given previous research on political party competition. All six
states lose experienced legislators quickly; few legislators stay
beyond 12 years in office. More leave voluntarily than because of
electoral defeat. These findings raise the question who is less
responsive: the legislator willing to retire voluntarily or the secure
incumbent?)},
    number = {1},
    journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
    author = {LUTTBEG, NR},
    editor = {RESPONSIVE},
    month = feb,
    year = {1992},
    note = {WOS:A1992HK23900003},
    pages = {49--68}
}

@article{squire_legislative_1992,
    title = {{LEGISLATIVE} {PROFESSIONALIZATION} {AND} {MEMBERSHIP} {DIVERSITY} {IN} STATE {LEGISLATURES}},
    volume = {17},
    issn = {0362-9805},
    doi = {10.2307/440081},
    abstract = {Proponents of state legislative professionalization
thought it would increase membership diversity. I assess whether this
expectation has been met by examining the relationship between the
level of professionalization and the numbers of blacks, women, and various occupational groups elected to the state legislature. I begin by proposing a new measurement of professionalization, one which uses the United States Congress as a baseline against which to measure the salary, staff, and time in session of all 50 state legislatures. Level of professionalization is found to be positively related to the percentage of blacks in a legislature but negatively related to the proportion of women serving. Occupational diversity also decreases as level of professionalization increases, because more members identify their occupation as full-time legislator.

@article{squire_level_1992,
  title = {Level of professionalization and the numbers of blacks, women, and various occupational groups elected to the state legislature. I begin by proposing a new measurement of professionalization, one which uses the United States Congress as a baseline against which to measure the salary, staff, and time in session of all 50 state legislatures. Level of professionalization is found to be positively related to the percentage of blacks in a legislature but negatively related to the proportion of women serving. Occupational diversity also decreases as level of professionalization increases, because more members identify their occupation as full-time legislator.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {SQUIRE, P.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HK23900004},
  pages = {69--79}
}

@article{nye_civil-rights_1992,
  title = {{CIVIL}-{RIGHTS} {SUPPORT} - {A} {COMPARISON} {OF} {SOUTHERN} {AND} {BORDER} {STATE} {REPRESENTATIVES}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.2307/440082},
  abstract = {This article examines the support for civil rights bills among members of the U.S. House from southern and border states over a 20-year period. In the 1960s, members from the deep South were considerably more opposed to black civil rights than were representatives from the rim South or border states. Over time, the distinctiveness of the deep South from the rim South has largely eroded. The deep South continues to be more conservative on civil rights than the border states, although differences have moderated. For most legislative sessions, party is a significant predictor, with Democrats more liberal than Republicans. Even in the deep South, Democrats are now more supportive of black civil rights than are Republicans.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {NYE, MA and BULLOCK, CS},
  month = feb,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HK23900005},
  pages = {81--94}
}

@article{rieselbach_actors_1992,
  title = {{ACTORS}, {ATHLETES}, {AND} {ASTRONAUTS} - {POLITICAL} {AMATEURS} {IN} {THE} {UNITED}-{STATES}-{CONGRESS} - {CANON}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  abstract = {This article examines the support for civil rights bills among members of the U.S. House from southern and border states over a 20-year period. In the 1960s, members from the deep South were considerably more opposed to black civil rights than were representatives from the rim South or border states. Over time, the distinctiveness of the deep South from the rim South has largely eroded. The deep South continues to be more conservative on civil rights than the border states, although differences have moderated. For most legislative sessions, party is a significant predictor, with Democrats more liberal than Republicans. Even in the deep South, Democrats are now more supportive of black civil rights than are Republicans.},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {RIESELBACH, J.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HK23900006},
  pages = {95--111}
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doi = {10.2307/440083},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {RIESELBACH, LN},
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year = {1992},
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@article{rieselbach_new_1992,
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volume = {17},
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doi = {10.2307/440083},
number = {1},
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year = {1992},
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@article{rieselbach_logic_1992,
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doi = {10.2307/440083},
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author = {RIESELBACH, LN},
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year = {1992},
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@article{rieselbach_information_1992,
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volume = {17},
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doi = {10.2307/440083},
number = {1},
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author = {RIESELBACH, LN},
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{EFFECTS} {OF} {PAY} {RAISES} {AND} {THE} {SAVINGS} {AND} {LOAN} {CRISIS} {ON} {THE} 1990 {HOUSE} {ELECTIONS}),
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {BERCH, N.},
  month = feb,
  year = {1992},
  note = {WOS:A1992HK23900021},
  pages = {145--146}
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@article{werner_connections_1992,
  title = {{THE} {CONNECTIONS} {BETWEEN} {ATTITUDES} {TOWARD} {WOMEN} {AND} {THE} {REPRESENTATION} {BY} {WOMEN} {IN} {STATE} {LEGISLATURES}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {WERNER, B.},
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  year = {1992},
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  pages = {145--145}
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@article{campbell_divided_1992,
  title = {{DIVIDED} {GOVERNMENT}, {PARTISAN} {BIAS} {AND} {TURNOUT} {IN} {CONGRESSIONAL} {ELECTIONS} - {DO} {DEMOCRATS} {SIT} {IN} {THE} {CHEAP} {SEATS}},
  volume = {17},
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  number = {1},
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  year = {1992},
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@article{crawford_united-states-senate_1992,
  title = {{UNITED}-{STATES}-{SENATE} {ELECTIONS} - {LEVELS} {OF} {ANALYSIS} {AND} {AGGREGATION}},
  volume = {17},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  number = {1},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  author = {CRAWFORD, S.},

number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {CHALLANDES, E.},
month = feb,
year = {1992},
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pages = {150--150}
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@article{gilmour_early_1992,
title = {{EARLY} {REPUBLICAN} {RETIREMENT} - {A} {CAUSE} {OF} {DEMOCRATIC} {DOMINANCE} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE}-{OF}-{REPRESENTATIVES}},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
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month = feb,
year = {1992},
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@article{prysby_presidential_1992,
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volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {PRYSBY, C.},
month = feb,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992HK23900034},
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@article{hale_party_1992,
title = {{PARTY} {FACTIONALISM} {IN} {CONGRESS} - {A} {STUDY} {OF} {THE} {DEMOCRATIC} {LEADERSHIP} {COUNCILS} {MEMBERSHIP} {IN} {THE} {HOUSE}},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
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author = {HALE, J.},
month = feb,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992HK23900038},
pages = {151--151}
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@article{carter_public-opinion_1992,
title = {{PUBLIC}-{OPINION} {AND} {HOUSE} {SUPPORT} {FOR} {THE}
{PRESIDENTS} {DEFENSE} {SPENDING} {PROPOSALS} - {THE} {REAGAN} {ERA}},
volume = {17},
issn = {0362-9805},
number = {1},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
author = {CARTER, R. and LAUGHLIN, C.},
month = feb,
year = {1992},
note = {WOS:A1992HK23900042},
pages = {153--153}
}

@article{covington_presidential_1992,
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@article{francis_leadership_1985,
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